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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966 The George Washington University wade a deliberate
institutional decision to inquire into the means by which the know--
ledge and analytical resources of a major university in the Nation's
Capital might be usefully related to the on-going public policy
i
process while simultaneously strengthening the research and instrue--
tional programs of the university. A generous institutional grant
from NASA enabled the University to establish the Program of Policy
Studies in Science and Technology which was to be applied to the
development of "a university policy analysis capability."
The Program of Policy Studies is an interdisciplinary, Univer-
sity-wide policy analysis group. The Program has a core staff of
full-time professional researchers representing a wide range of dis-
ciplines. The Program draws on the resources of the University
faculty, graduate and professional students and research -utilities.
The Program's special strength is the capability to assemble and
manage interdisciplinary analysis groups. Continuing relationships
are maintained with the governmental agencies, professional associa-
tions, and other private sector representatives in the Washington
area.
The Program has taken an active interest in all areas of Science,
E'	 Technology, and Public Policy. Members of the staff have had an	 1
i
early, intense, and continuing interest in the development of Tech-
.	 ,
nology Assessment concepts and methodologies. This aspect of policy
studies is especially appropriate since Technology Assessment involves
an interdisciplinary analytical process designed to provide decision
makers with information on the total social implications of proposed 	 i
s	 ,
programs and projects."
The Program produced approximately 40 publications relating to
Technology Assessment during the period of the NASA award. These	 I^
studies explore the historical, theoretical, methodological, and 	
i
institutional, aspects of assessment. Many of these publications 	 i
represent early efforts to probe the concept and methodologies of
the assessment function. They have served, along with the contrib-
utions of many other institutions and scholars, to acquaint a gener-
ation of technology assessment practitioners--bath graduate students
and policy makers----with the process of technology assessment. 	 l
This volume has two purposes. The first is to republish, in
whole or in part, PPS technology assessment publications still in
demand but now out of print. The second is to publish in one volume
some of the Program's more significant assessment studies. With	 I
these objectives in mind, the papers selected for this volume are
organized to reflect the Program's research in the following areas:
development of the concept of technology assessment; institutionali-
zation of technology assessment; the interface between law and tech-
nology assessment; and assessment case studies.
x
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Technology assessment is not one clearly defined analytical
technique, Quite the contrary. It embodies several essential proc-
7 - $ -
:I
esses: problem definition, data gathering, analysis of alternatives,
and policy implementation. However, the assessment procedure will
vary with the task-objective given or posited, including such var-
iables as the nature of the technological project configuration to
be assessed with respect to defined social environments !	4
The Program's publications on the development of the concept of
technology assessment reflect a variety of conceptual facets.
Kranzberg's paper, Historical Aspects of Technology Assessme nt,
indicates that current concepts of technology assessment and efforts
to institutionalize the assessment function clearly have antecedents
in the events and decisionmaking sequences of the past. The excerpts
from Coates's larger study, Technology and Public Policy: The Proc-
ess of Technology Assessment in the Federal Government, summarize
the basis of early legislative concern for establishing a legisla-
tive technology assessment component to aid in public decision-
..
`f	 making.
Sr
The Technology Assessment task must confront the interacting
A'
	
	 variables----conditions and trends--of an evolving social process.
Contextual factors are obviously of great relevance to the defini-
tion of the relevantproblem situation. These topics and others 	 j
are discussed in Mayo's paper, The Contextual Approach to Technology
t
Assessment: Implications for 'One-Factor Fix' Solutions to Complex
Social Problems. it is an obvious fact that we have attempted to
	 i
solve, alleviate, or somehow cope with intricate social problems by
totally inadequate "single factor" means whether the latter be legal,	
^h
Y..	
economic or 'technological. The contextual approach undertakes to
demonstrate that technology assessment assists in the identification
3
it
t
t
^i
1	 •_
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of the full range of implications of taking a particular action and,
in addition, facilitates the consideration of alternative means by
which the total affected social problem context might be changed by
available project options.
The paper by Black, Technology Assessment: What Should It Be?
provides a special perspective on the technology assessment function.
It stresses the necessity of uncovering unsuspected relationships
in proposed actions, and treats the feasibility of using decision
theoretical models to cope with problems of uncertainty in the fu-
ture-oriented analyses characteristic of assessments. Mayo's paper
on Social Impact Evaluation sets forth an anticipatory assessment
construct which emphasizes the importance of concepts and standards
of "social justice" or schemes of social value weight and distribu-
tion in performance of the assessment task.
The Program's publications have also reflected another aspect
of conceptual development, i.e., refinement of the methodology of
technology assessment. Jones's paper, Generating_Social Impact
Scenarios: A Key Step in Making Technology Assessment Studies, sum-
marines a methodology developed by the Mitre Corporation for the
Office of Science and Technology, This paper was presented in a
seminar series the Program conducted on technology assessment. The
`r
conceptual and methodological importance of doing retrospective
technology assessments is summarized in the research proposal:
Retrospective Technology Assessment: Submarine _Telegraphy.
f
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
The Program ' s papers and reports on the institutionalization of
^I
technology assessment represent several different perspectives and
1
	
levels of analysis. They include examination of the institutional-
+.	 3
ization of technology assessment in the legislative and executive
branches of the Federal government and in State government. The
important issue of public participation has also been addressed.
Drawing upon teaching, governmental and policy analysis exper-
ience, Mayo prepared a detailed analysis for the Congress of the
relationships between an institutionalized assessment function and
legislative information gathering and decisionmaking needs. This
is reprinted as: 	 Some Legal, Jurisdictional, and Operational Impli-
s cations of a Congressional Technology Assessment "om onent.
;f
Mayo's paper on Some Imp lications of the Technology Assessment
Function for the Effective Public Decisionmaking Process undertakes
to analyze ways in which the institutionalization of the assessment
function can affect the following phases of the public decision pra-
t cess: problem perception, problem definition, data assembly, inven-
tion of alternatives, evaluation of options, authorization, imple-
mentation, operation, appraisal, and modification.
Presented next are excerpts from one of the Program's studies
V on the implementation of technology assessment, or the use of tech-
nology assessment information in decisionmaking. 	 This study was pre-
pared by Kasper, Logsdon and Mottur and titled: Implementing Techno-
logy Assessments: Final Report of the Technology Assessment Imple-
mentation Project. +'	 "
Reprinted in its entirety is Coates's Summary Report: Technology
,I
f
_ 6
and Public Policy: The Process of Technology Assessment in the Fed-
eral Government. This review covers the following topics: 1) who is
doing technology assessment, 2) organization of technology assess-
ments, 3) disciplines and techniques used in technology assessment,
4) analysis of a sample of technology assessment studies, 5) gaps
and overlaps in federal technology assessment, 6) prerequisites for
further improvement of governmental technology assessment.
As part of its four-part program to develop priorities for
technology assessment research both for its own support program and
for the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, the National
Science Foundation awarded a grant to the Program to prepare a
statement on technology assessment priorities in the Executive branch.
Excerpts from the Program's report include: "Candidates and Priorities
for Technology Assessments: A survey of Federal Executive Agency
Professionals."
Executive and legislative staff in State governments have ex-
pressed keen interest in using technology assessment to improve
decisionmaking. In 1974 the Program staff participated in a con-
ference on this topic. Excerpts are taken from the report: The
Southern Regional Conference on Technology Assessment.
Coates has followed closely the origin and evolution of the
congressional Office of Technology Assessment. Her first evaluation
of the Office's performance is reprinted as: Emerging Trends in
Technology Assessment.
A considerable body of research has been devoted to examining
the role of the public in technology assessment. Two foci are ap-
parent. One relates to using citizen's opinions, attitudes, and
- 7 -
reactions to technology as data for the conduct of the assessment
process--that is, to use this information to estimate the social
impacts of technology. Another research focus examines the effort
to enhance the power base of the public in implementaing the results
of a technology assessment. The Program's research has addressed
both of these topics. Selections come from: Mottur's paper on
Technology Assessment and Citizen Action, and Coates's paper on
Technology Assessment---New Demands for Information.
The selection from the Program of Policy Studies Evaluation of
a Technology Assessment Performed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory
on the Modular Integrated Utility System Technology (MIUS) is in-
eluded for the purpose of indicating a further development in the
institutionalization process. This evaluation of an assessment is
indication of the need to establish professional standards for
judging the adequacy with which assessments are performed and for
analyzing the sufficiency of the definition of task-objectives that
are given to or posited by assessment entities.
IV. INTERFACE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE LAW
The first paper in this section undertakes to provide a basic
frameworA for the consideration of the purposes and techniques of
i4
scientific method and adversarial system. Similarities and differ-
ences in these two techniques of inquiry are considered. The role
of scientific method on the one hand and adversarial system on the
other, with reference to their relevance in the performance of as-
sessments, is the primary concern of the paper by Mayo, Scientific
Method, Adversarial System, and Technology Assessment.
The 'monograph by Green on Law's Interface with Expa ding Tech-
nology presents the author's views on the interaction of technology,
assessments with the process of political deci:sionmaking. Green
suggests a number of reasons why those engaged in the assessment
function should not be overly optimistic of the impacts of assess-
ment outcomes on political decisionmaking.
V. CASE STUDIES
Students of technology assessment have recognized that the pur-
pose or task-objective of assessments may vary greatly, depending
either upon the analyst's interest (if he has the privilegB of sel-
ecting the topic).or upon the requirements of the sponsoring agency
if the assessment is undertaken through contractual or grant arrange-
meats.
Many papers and studies which do not conform to a strict notion
of an assessment methodology may, nevertheless, indicate phases of
thought development about the assessment task or assist in the under-
standing of the basic purpose of the assessment function, i.e., to
clarify policy options or alternative project configurations.
One of the earliest assessments undertaken by the .Program
was directed to Early Experiences with the Hazards of Medical Use
of X-Rays: 1896-1906 by Marx. This is an interesting early attempt
y
E
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to "feel our way" in assessment methodology as well as to look at
the perceptions which-existed at the time of the introduction of a
significant new technology. The extract selected concerns operation
of the technology assessment process in early experiences with the
#	
hazards of medical use of X-Rays.
€	 The paper by Wollan, Controlling the Potential Hazards of Gov-
-"	 ernment--Sponsored Technology is an early attempt to examine the ab-
ility of governmental agencies to adequately assess technological
programs or projects to which they are committed. Wollan reviews
the hazards of government-sponsored activities, including weather
modification, supersonic.transport noise, and the value conflicts
involved in the flouridation controversy.
The paper by Mayo, Consideration of Environmental Noise Effects
in Transnorta-tion Plannina by Governmental Entities reviews the ev-
aluation of environmental concerns with respect to major transport-
ation systems: the inter-state highway system and commercial air
transportation. The paper sets forth in relatively brief form the
type of planning that was done for interstate highway system and
suggests the shift in social value emphasis that has become apparent
during the approximately 20 years since the interstate system was
1 „'i
r
f
5
authorized. While the focus of the paper ie primarily on transport-
ation noise, it reflects the growing significance of a variety of
3
new concerns about the quality of the social environment in the
1900's and early 1970 1 s,	
d `- 7
A paper of considerable current interest is that of Genetic 	 i
Technology: Promises and Problems by Frankel which is directed to 	 's
the evaluation of the emerging technologies of genetic medicine.
4
i
a
A
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The paper focuses upon the growing acquisition of new diagnostic
capabilities, their consequent impact on screening and counseling
for genetic disease, and the policy issues stemming from these cap-
abilities.
The growing concern with energy is reflected in the assess-
meat by Coates in a report on Community Level Impacts of ExRanded
Underground Coal Mining. This paper perhaps is more representative
than any of the others in Part V of the concepts and analytical
techniques now associated with technology assessment. The paper
identifies and evaluates the potential secondary consequences of
rapid community growth in deep mining localities and the ability of
affected communities to absorb and manage such growth.
The Abstract from a report An Integrated Strategy for Aircraft/
Airport Noise Abatement: A Legal-Institutional Analysis of §7 of
the Noise Control Act of 1972 and Proposals Based Thereon is included
for the reason that it represents an assessment task-objective which
is not always differentiated from the more common approach of pro-
posing a technological project configuration and asking what likely
social benefits and costs will result. Rather than being presented
with ae specific aircraft/airport noise plan for assessment, it was
the task of the Program staff to construct and assess alternative
abatement configurations. This abstract of a rather substantial re-
port on aircraft/airport noise examines the development of the air-
craft noise control structure since the Griggs case of 1962 which
crystallized legal doctrine by placing the responsibility upon the
airport operator rather than the carriers or the Federal Government,
i.e., the public. This legal "one-factor fix" simply was not an ade-
u
F
^I
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quate solution to a growing social problem. However, ten years
elapsed before the Noise Control Act of 1972 undertook to estab-
lish the legal-institutional framework within which an adequate air-
craft/airport noise abatement program might be initiated with con--	 9
tern for full recognition of all the beneficial and detrimental
consequences of air transportation and appropriate distribution of
benefits and costs.
- 1% ._ I
^. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
A Historical Aspects
of Technology-Assessment
Melvin K"aANZHERG
August 1969, pp. 1-21
a
a
I	
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HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Technology assessment as a limited art is nothing new. Simple assess-
ment is close to the purpose of any innovation, even if only a mere guess
that it will work to some good. It goes back to prehistory. We can
imagine some forebear of homo sapiens picking up a stone to kill small
game nr to beat_ a neighbor--or his wife--over the head, He had glimpsed
the purpose in advance. He immediately confirmed the efficacy of tha
weapon, no doubt with grunts of delight.
Every new tool, machine, process, technique, design, or product is
judged in the light of its efficiency in meeting some need. Technology
assessment still tries to answer questions about efficiency, cost, and
function related to purpose These questions run to how to make work
easier or life mare pleasant, how to make money, how to kill or destroy
more effectively, and in general haw to achieve specific goals the	 j
k
innovators seek. For mostref history, technology assessment has been
narrow and immediate, but within these limits perhaps effective. More
I
remote and broader effects were Ignored.
t The pyramids, for all we knw even today, preserved and sustained
the pharaohs' ka';s, or spirits, in the afterlife. From the standpoint of
the pharaohs--and they were the only people whose assessments counted
then---the pyramids were a worthy allocation of resources, admirably
fl
fulfilling, the special requirements for the afterlife of the god-kings.
From the standpoint of the millions of workers whose labor built these
great monuments and of the inhabitants of Egypt as a whole, the pyramids
were an unmitigated disaster. Still, the pyramids satisfied first-order
isf;-
a:
2assessment in the light of Egyptian learning and social structure, which
placed the pharaoh at the top of the pyramid, figuratively speading.
Throughout history most other first-order requirements have been
economic or military in nature, conceived in the narrowest possible
fashion.. .,But second--order effects--effects an the entire economy,
social effects beyond , .the economic, the socio-economic aftermaths of
war affecting both victor and vanquished--these were rarely, if ever,
considered.. Second-order and more remote effects occurred,.of course,
but their prediction was diffuse and unlikely to be convincing. In
that connection I recall a cartoon which appeared many years ago in the
late Collier's magazine. A caveman emerging from his cave with a bow-
and-arrow remarked to his companion, "This new little invention of mine
will make war so horrible that men will never make war anymore."
Only when random invention began giving way to systematic innovation
could technology assessment look much beyond first-order effects. Yet
failure to assess the far-reaching effects of technology did not, as I ii
have noted, keep them from occurring. Vast improvements in man's living
conditions, his conquest of the environment, and the uplifting of social
and educational standards were wrought by technological advances in
agriculture, construction, transport, and communications--even though
for the most part innovations in those fields were made by men who
}
considered only limited first-order effects.
By now we have awakened to the fact that technology has social
and human effects which we historians can clearly etect b our 20-20Y	   
hindsighti Today we claim--ox some of us claim--that these effects are
calculable in advance. The historical developments which have brought
i
31114
i
i
about this change I shall discuss under the headings of (1) the broadening
.hrough the centuries of the social context for tLchnological change and
assessment, (2) the growing need since the Industrial Revolution for
assessment, (3) the recent deepening awareness of the impacts of tech-
nology, (4) the development of social and communal responsibility for
technology, and (5) the current growth in the assessment capability.
Broadening of the Social Context for Technolop,i cal Change and Assessment
The example of the pyramids showed how technology assessment once
was concerned with but a single individual, the god-king. In classical
antiquity, and indeed through much of history, the range of assessment
extended only to the benefits for a small, elite group. This limited
the impetus for technical innovation. The Hellenistic scientists, for
example, knew about the power of falling water, the force of air pressure,
and the energy of expanding steam. They were familiar with the principles
of force pumps, water wheels, windmills, rotary grinders, and even the
reaction steam turbine. But instead of using this knowledge and these
mechanical appliances to perform work, they made toys.
Hero of Alexandria, who lived in the first century A.D., described
78 machines in his treatise of Pneumatics. There were siphons for pro-
ducing the illusion of turning water into wine. One contrivance lit
fires in hollow altars; the expansion of the air exerted pressure through
concealed pipes forcing libations of liquids onto the flame. Another
air-expansion device within the altar opened the doors of the temple and
later, as the fire died, closed them automatically. Hero is even said to
have devised the first automatic vending machine. it sold holy water, an
automatic vending market which has so far eluded the Mafia in our country.
knowledge and discoveries to control the environment by reason of social,
not intellectual, deficiencies.
	 They considered only the welfare of a
small number of iadividuals rather than the entire population. 	 The
majority of the people were workers, the lowest elements of society and, r•
in most cases, slaves. ''There was little need to improve technical devices
to save cheap slave labor.
Medieval society, still elitist in nature and contemptuous of
manual labor, dropped the institution of slavery, and despite the
` popular. myth to the contrary, the rising classes of artisans and merchants
were receptive to technological change.
	
The guilds of canny craftsman
^II
were quite aware that if they failed to adopt an innovation in production, -
other artisans would, and markets in the next city might be lost.
When the spinning wheel first appeared in Europe toward the end
of the 13th century, it must have caused unemployment„ 	 Yet the first.
mention of the spinning wheel in a guild regulation of about 1280 merely
prohibited the use of wheel-spun thread in the warp (as distinct from the
weft), presumably because it was not yet as strong as that produced by
hand.
	
The object, then, seems to have been to protect the quality of the ..
cloth, not to rule out technical improvements.
On close inspection, we find very little guild opposition to j
,r
industrial changes before the 16th century.	 When opposition appeared,
it was because the pace of technological change was quickening, and a
new industrial system was beginning to appear. 	 The guild structure itself `.
was slapping, fighting in vain for its very existence. 	 As a flourishing
part of medieval society, the guilds were strong enough to accept
'.
r
economic order did the attempt to block change begin.
The medieval guild cannot rightly be compared with the modern labor
union. Certainly, however, their limited view of technology assessment
in the face of new modes of production, once their very being was threatened,
seems fairly analogous. Featherbedding practices and building codes
represent indirect forms of technology assessment considering only the
welfare of the small segment of the population actually engaged in.running
trains or building houses, not the welfare of those using them, and
certainly not the entire community.
Despite the later guild opposition, the onset of industrialization
turned out to be irresistible. Yet, if there was anything that could be
called technology assessment, it was limited to first-order economic
effects, namely, the profit of individual businessmen. Theis sponsorship
of technological innovation on behalf of their own self-interest was
largely unchallenged because of the concomitant development of new con-
cepts of private property based on natural rights and, somewhat later,
on the doctrines of laissez-faire.
When opposition to industrialization began to appear at the beginning
of the 19th century, it was confined to small, special-interest groups
whose selfish concerns seem almost trivial today. In England some members
of the country gentry objected to the spoliation of the countryside. They
had in mind their own hunting rights hedged by railroads puffing their
way across the landscape. They also resented the rise to economic, and
a
>3
.•:
eventually to political, power of the self-made men representing the
burgeoning industries.
bThe Luddite protest, more dramatic, has been interpreted by many as
the first indication of worker opposition to the onset of industrial.za-
tion. We know now that the Luddites destroyed their machines, not so
much because they opposed the mechanization of their work, but as a me.
of venting their anger and frustration at the practices of their employers.
Yet the Luddites have become symbolic of opposition to machines. Certainly
their protest was a harbinger of things co come insofar as technology
assessment is concerned. For the first time, there was a real challenge
to the notion that only the profits of the factory ovmer Caere to be con-
sidered in adjudging the worth of technological change.
Although the factory legislation of the early 19th century was
largely ineffectual and did little to stop the gross exploitation of
workers, it marked an extension of the concept of technology assessment
to include the workers, their health, and their economic welfare. This
legislation also brought a new factor into technology assessment--the
government. Prevailing laissez-faire doctrines aside, the government
intervened to mitigate some of the worst social consequences of unfettered
industrialization. It was a sign of things to come.
The man chiefly responsible for broadening the social context of
technology assessment was Karl Marx. He made plain one great truth:
Technology has social and cultural ramifications far beyond the first-
order effects to which attention had hitherto been directed. This view
took the central position in the all-embracing Marxian theory of history---
a theory which, however unfortunate in politics, has deeply influenced
the study of society.
What is More, Marx avoided the confusion between technology itself
i..j^	
.
f
f
and the social system which it had so profoundly affected. Marx's
strictures were not against technological change. He called for greater
progress in .technology and sought to stimulate technical advance. Indeed,
he devoted many pages of praise to the industrial bourgeoisie in a work
dedicated to its overthrow, called Das I2 ital. His effort concentrated
I 	 .
not on mitigating the effects of technology but on rearranging, by
revolution, a socio-economic system which would enable the benefits of
technology to be spread among the massea ra.t. fiver t ;a n confined to the
profit of a few.
Aside from a few Engiish gentry and some spokesmen for the Romantic
movement during the mid-19th century, not many worried about the inroads
of industrialization on the natural. landscape. In America the concern
about the physical environment was largely based not on aesthetic con-
siderations, but on the question of rational exploitation of natural
resources. John Wesley Powell., who became director of the U.S. Geological
Survey in the last quarter of the 19th century, conducted an irrigation
survey to identify, locate, and conserve the fast -disappearing water
resources of the and westeta lands. Powell ' s attempts at scientific
conservation were at best only partially successful. John Muir,who
sought to preserves forest lands from sale to commercial interests,also
met with only partial success. Yet environmental considerations were
introduced to technology assessment, a factor which was to become of great
importance only by the mid-20th century. It was an extension that would
bring technology assessment in time to consider the protection of posterity.
itself, just as the societal context of technological change had already
become broadened to include all segments of society.
r	 .4
8The Growing Deed for Technology Assessment
The Industrial Revolution was a tremendous enlargement in the scale
of technology. Not surprisingly, the new dimensions produced enlarged
impacts of society and humanity. For one thing, there were simply more
people .around. For another, all the extra people were more intimately
affected by technology due mainly to crowding and the increasing economic
interdependence of mankind. Through most human history, the vast majority
of mankind had lived in rural areas, and their major occupation had been
concerned with agriculture. The Industrial Revolution changes all that.
Prod+xction, once centered in the hearth and home, now was carried on in
factories located in cities. The self-sufficiency of farming lift~ gave
way to the close-linked interdependence of individuals in the modern
metropolis. Now other groups in society besides the elite, the artisans,
the merchants, and the capitalists clamored for some of the benefits of
advancing technology. The factory workers' first--order assessment of
their own benefit frequently clashed iAth those of their employers. And
beyond them all was society as a whole, whose interests might suffer even
if workers and employers could compromise on their mutual benefit.
The need for technology assessment was also heightened by the
acceleration of social change, which was itself a corollary of speedier
technological change. .Anthropologists tell us that among the most deep-
seated of cultural habits are courtship patterns. After remaining static
fur centuries, courtship patterns have been revolutionized several times
within cur own century. Henry Ford's automobile not only brought the
farmer to the city; it also changed the wooing spot from the front parlor
to t:he rumble seat. Just where the locale d'amour is now, l am much too
E.
r
{
I
i
I
I,
i
i
4
t
e
_
1 -	 .	 . 9
professorially dignified to find out, though I occasionally stumble over
people billing and cooing their way to the bachelor's degree in the bushes
of an urban campus. Despite this throwback to the primitive setting, I
am always sure--without necessarily looking--that the festivities are
being conducted with due regard for second-order assessment of the bio-
logical technologies. My own thoughts about the abundant resources of
human love, however, are turning increasingly toward conservation.
The United States, too,:is rapidly advancing into middle age. Natural
resources, like love, once seemed so abundant that little thought had to
be given to conservation. As we grew up, advances of scientific tech-
nology in new materials and substitutes tended to avoid questions of
exhaustion, but we cannot continue to ignore them. Conservation has now
become at least a requirement of second-order technological assessment.
As one writer has put it, "We have not run out of fresh water in this
country; we have simply run out of streams to pollute."
Not only the scale but the cumulative nature of our technical
applications is endangering us. The emissions of a few thousand auto-
mobiles posed no great threat to the salubrity of the air. Millions of
i
automobiles do pose a serious threat. And DDT provides another example.
Thirty years ago, DDT was hailed as a miraculous insect killer.
During World War II, it kept our soldiery free of the lice and vermin
infestations which had produced more casualties in World War I than
actual combat. In large-scale public health programs throughout the
world following World War II, DDT succeeded in wiping out one of mankind's
?.	 greatest scourges, the malarial-carrying insects. Similarly, whenf
sprayed on crops, it enormously increased agricultural productivity. It
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is not surprising that the developer of DDT .was awarded the Kobel Prize
for Medicine. Yet today DDT is regarded as a potential threat to mankind.
Through 'a ;process of biological magnification in the food chain, slight
traces of DDT:build.up. as poisonous doses in fish and birds, and eventually
in man himself. : In.this way a one-time boon to .man has become at best a
mixed blessing. The magnitude, accumulation, and human impact of
•a y'" technological change, together with technologically produced social change,
have made pressing the need for technological assessment in all human,
environmental, and social aspects.
The Deepening Perception of the Impact of Technology
The awareness that technology can sometimes have harmful effects is
not new. In classical antiquity, Xenophon expressed a prevailing social
attitude when he said in Book IV of the 4economicus, "What are called
the mechanical arts carry a social stigma and are rightly dishonored in
10
our cities. For these arts damage the bodies of those who work at them
or who act as overseers by compelling them to a sedentary life and to an
indoor life, and in some cases to spend the whole day by the fire. This
physical degeneration results also in deterioration of the soul."
Similarly, John Ruskin in the 14th century looked back to an older,
medieval England, "ye merrie olde Englande" of cakes and ale and morris-
	 G
dancing on the green. Unfortunately, ye merrie olde Englande was not
"merrie" for the vast majority of its inhabitants who lived in fear,
poverty, superstition, and filth.' Jacques Barzun of Columbia University is
a contemporary example of the aristocratic, nostalgic, romantic discovery
I	 a
of the horrors of technology. His book, Science: The Glorious Enter-
taizuaent, is a compendium of common complaints about modern living: useless
ll
machinery, ugly architecture, tasteless . 'bread, planned obsolescence,
offensive advertising, zip codes; automatic telephone dialing, and the
like. The destruction of rural life, the mass exploitation of the poor,
cancerous growth of cities, and the uglification of the world through noise,
fear, and filth--these Barzun and his fellow 'bleeding-heart humanists"
laid at the .door of technology and science. 	 x
What strikes me about these criticisms is not that they are based
on a perceptive assessment of the social Implications of technology but
rather upon a false view of an idylli: past. In these days of urban
sprawl and the ravenous bulldozer, it is not surprising that many men
look back with fondness to small,--town life and nostalgically believe
that in many ways the past, which they usually identify as anytime before
1914, was much superior to the present. I am not at all certain that
American small--town life was really idyllic, and I invoke Sherwood
Anderson, Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, John O'Hara, the Lyads, and
Tennessee Williams as my witnesses. If the small-town "good old days" were
really so good, how are we to account for the fact that so many Americans
fled the small town? Perhaps the pronvincial, parochial, censorial,
gossipy, uncultivated world of Peyton Place does not correspond so much
s
to human desires as the challenge and excitement of the big city with
all its traffic snarls, television serials, and perpetual crises. The
fact is that the migratory trend is from the countryside to the city, not
the other way. A decade from now more - than 907. of all Americans, it is
estimated will be living in urban areas.	 g'
Not all the broad-scale attacks upon contemporary technological
society arise from romantic longings for a non-existent past. The modern
a
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novel, the contemporary drama, and today's poetry have as an insistent
theme that man has become the victim of a dehumanizing technology. This
literature of anti-technology employs the metaphors of Frankenstein's
monster, robots from R.U.R., and the regimented citizens of Brave New
World and 1984. The "bleeding-heart humanists" who misquote these works
seem confident that their technological target material cannot read the
books. What the original books and plays said is not that technology is
at fault, but its human abuse. What's worse is the view of man put
forth by the non-critics of these works; they claim that man is by nature
so abusive, so evil an animal that he cannot be trusted with technology.
Well, that is some kind of assessment.
More serious critics base their assessments on better philosophical
and literary grounds. Though willing to admit that technology has "raised
the ceiling of human achievement," Lewis Mumford claims that modern
technology--he calls it "technics"--has become authoritarian and is
"transferring the attributes of life to the machine and the mechanical
collective." Jacques Bllul has a similar apocalyptic view, feeling that
technology has become the end of human life. Fusing ideas borrowed from
both Freud and Marx, Harbert Marcuse attacks industrial civilization on
the grounds that it has made man "one-dimensional." Ewen admitting that
more men may be happier today than ever before, their happiness, he claims,
is "a state of anaesthesia." Though technology has done away with
scarcities, it forces men, says Marcuse, to "exhausting, stupefying,
inhuman slavery," alienating the workers from each other, from their
products, and from work itself. Mass society provides bread, circuses,
and technology. Material plenty yields no spiritual gratification and
F
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leads to social oppression. Marcuse holds these principles to be self-
evident in both capitalist and communist societies. They characterize
industrial civilization no matter what the sociopolitical arrangements
may be.
Marcuse offers little in the way of solutions. All efforts at
reform, are impotent, he claims. Free speech and electoral activity
are superficial devices for adjusting people to the status quo. Revolu-
tion is all but impossible. Marcuse can only offer strident opposition
to the society either by withdrawal or by confrontation which will shock
society Into changing. Here is technology assessment of the most sweeping
character.
While such wholesale indictments may stimulate nihilistic revolu-
tionary movements, they really tell us very little about what can be done
to guide and direct technological innovation along socially beneficial
lines. Twentieth-century man will never willingly divorce himself from
technology nor even consent to a moratorium on further advances. The
sentiments uttered by Marcuse and his youthful adherents might ultimately
succeed in bringing about major transformations in the softer supporting
systems--legal, educational, governmental, economic,and the like. They
are ineffectual as to technology because of their intellectual murkiness
about changes in the dynamics of technology itself. Still, they render two
cheers, heavily, for some kind of technology assessment. Mumford, Ellul,
and Marcuse deserve "A" for choice of topic, and "D" for effort. They
have nevertheless raised a right question: Do technological innovations
really help all mankind or are they only for the benefit of a few? The
people who really made the public understand this question were, of course,
neither philosophers nor historians. 	
j
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Rachel Carson, in her book, Silent Spring, first attracted wade
attention to the harmful effect of pesticides that persist and accumulate
in the environment. Her picture of a silent spring where the bards no
longer sing in a despoiled natural environment made her book into a
bestseller. It instigated Congressional investigations and scientific
studies, and awakened the public. Ralph Nader ' s book, Unsafe at Any Speed,
attracted attention to the problems of automobile safety by showing how
Detroit, in its efforts to attract sales through high styling and attempts
to economize for competitive reasons, frequently gave second place to
safety considerations. His work, too, brought about Congressional investi-
gations and awakened the public to dangers inherent in a technology where
motivations for private profit ignored public welfare.
Both books resulted in legislative action, indirectly and directly.
Federal legislation for the installation of safety devices in automobiles
and an increasing amount of state legislation on DDT bear witness to the
effectiveness of these popular writers, the one a first -class scientist,
the other a well-educated lawyer, in bringing about meaningful technology
assessment. Thanks to Carson and Nader more perhaps than anybody else,
awareness of the need for technology assessment has been deepened in
the United States.
j
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DeyeloLment of Social and Communal Responsibility
About a century ago society began to recognize that rampant individu-
alism armed with natural rights doctrine concerned with interests in
property did not necessarily result it the social welfare of all. The
reason that Adam Smith's "invisible hand" was unseen was because it
simply wasn't there. The sum of individual self-interests dial not result
i
15
in the wealth of nations. If society were to insure security and justice
1
for all its members, it was evident that the government must become a
very visible hand in guiding, controlling, and limiting individual rights 	 A
in the interests of the community at large. This was particularly the 	 a
case when, through the enlargement of the franchise and the growing democrati-
zatton of society in both Europe and America during the 19th century, larger
numbers of the population could make their voices heard in government and
could demand public attention to their needs. 'Viewed in this light, tech-
:i
nology assessment is simply another step in governmental intervention for 	 I-'H _.
the common good. het us look back at some precedents of government''
direction of technology in America.
In 1824, casualties from boiler explosions on steamboats, particularly 	 i4
an explosiou on the Aetna in New York Harbor, which killed 13 and caused
many injuries, made Congress take notice. A resolution was introduced in
the House of Representatives in May 1824 calling for an inquiry into the
expediency of enacting legislation barring the issuance of a certificate
of navigation to any boat operating at high steam pressuzes. This bill 	 E
did not pass, but the continuance of such explosions during the next few 	 ! '
years created a powerful public demand that something be done.	 E'
Since nobody knew the exact reason for the boiler explosions, the
I,
first order of business was to investigate the cause. In 1830, finally,
the government made its first research grant of a technological nature,
employing the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia to investigate the cause`:
of boiler explosions. Not until 1836 did the Institute r resent its full	 1 '`
#	 report and make detailed recommendations for regulatory legislation. It
was to take another two years before a law was passed, and that so watered
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down that the suggested inspection criteria and standards for steamboat
engineers were eliminated. Boiler explosions thereupon continued with
increasing losses of life. In 1852, at last, a law with teeth in it was
passed, with a regulatory agency to enforce it.
Other problems involving technology were taken up in the same piece-
meal fashion: first canal building, then railroad building, and, when
manned flight was young, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
was established. These were followed by the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Office of Desalination in the Department of the interior, and investi-
gating committees on automobile safety, insecticides, and the like. All
these agencies were involved in technological goals and purposes, but
they confined themselves for the most part to specific problems. Broader
assessment has come very slowly.
An attempt to institutionalize and regularize the giving of scientific
advice to the government, the prelude to technology assessment, occurred
quite early. The National Academy o:° Sciences was established in 1863, and
on the infrequent occasions when it was asked for advice, the advisory
approach was used primarily for individual projects or problems. But
what about the problems arising from the combined impact of many different
systems? And what about social systems in relation to science and technology
Powell ' s attempt to achieve a rational scientific basis for a conser-
vation program in the western lands was, indeed, a broad -scale approach to
the combined impact of several different technological systems and many
special interests. However, perhaps the most systematic attempt of the
government to confront the consequences of scientific and technological
developments was to be found during the New Deal in the Temporary National
s^
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Economic Committee (TNEC). The TNEC hearings, begun in December 1938
and lasting 18 months, were triggered by the economic recession of 1937,
and they resulted in the most thorough investigation of technology and
its implications in our history. The committee sat for 775 hours of
testimony, listened to 55 witnesses, and published its hearings; its
exhibits, reports, and transcripts fill two good-sized shelves. The
problem under closest scrunity was of course technological unemployment.
Nevertheless, the research potential of industry and the effects of the
patent system in encouraging technological, advance were considered on
issues of corporate monopoly, which was at the whipping post. Repre-
sentatives of special interest groups -largely labor and management-made
their cases. Few witnesses represented the public interest. Little
consideration was given to second-order effects of technological advance,
although much was implicit in the economic analyses presented to the com-
mittee. The President ' s Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic
Progress in the 1960 ' s made a similar large-scale effort to consider the
effect of technological change on American society. Yet it, like the TNEC,
was a "one-shat deal;" it did not represent a continuing effort in
technology assessment.
Parallel with these short-lived efforts to view the larger social
consequences of technological change was an extension in the concept of
the public whose welfare the government sought to serve. Pesticides again
provide the example. The first federal law dealing specifically with
pesticides was the federal Insecticide and Fungicide Act of 1910, which
sought to protect the pesticide user--the farmer- -from being bilked by
manufacturers who were selling him inferior products. It took almost
three decades before the protection of the federal government was extended
^F
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to the general consumer, the public which ate the food products grown
with the aid of pesticides; this was the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act which was designed to protect the consumer from harmful chemical
residues in his food. Rachel Carson gave a new dimension to the concept
of the consumer of pesticides by showing their effects on wildlife.
As of now, therefore, several federal agencies are concerned with
protecting the public in regard to pesticides: the Department of Agriculture
protects the farming public which uses pesticides in growing crops; HEW
protects the consuming public which eats food products grown with pesti-
cides; and the Department of Interior is concerned with protection of
wildlife and, in a sense, with the protection of future generations of
Americans, by attempting to preserve the,e&Aogical balance , for posterity.
The pesticide story thus manifests the development of governmental
responsibility for the social impact of technology; it reflects a
broadening of our national goals from a preoccupation with narrow
F
economic elements to the physical health of the consumer and, ultimately,
the general social welfare of the people and their physical environment. 	
a
Or, looking at it in another way, we find that our government of the
United States must concern itself with the welfare of all the inhabitants
of our land--birds, bees, animals, and fishes, as well as that peculiar
i
	 animal, man.
Increasing Assessment Capabilities
Given the historical opportunity, need, concern, and precedents,
have we developed the know-how for meaningful technology assessment? IJ':`..^
need not review in any detail the very recent history of man's growing
ability to collect and manipulate data. Both the hardware and the software
i
i,
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are becoming increasingly accurate and sophisticated, enabling us to
l	 deal with dynamic variables in complex situations. Along with these
^.	 are fundamental developments in mathematics, statistics, and general
systems theory. Attendants at an 'Engineering Founda,t oi. "esearch
Conference scarcely need to be reminded of the great strides made in
our ability to store and retrieve information.
Many scientists and engineers tend to be skeptical of these
techniques when applied to problems involving human and social factors.
Though such skepticism may have been warranted only a decade or so ago,
it can no longer be unintained. It is now possible to produce dynamic
models of systems involving complex human and social variables, and our
skill is growing. Systems and operations researchers are increasingly
competent to provide probabilistic data regarding the impact of scientific
and technological decisions on social trends and changes. Though the
information may not he so "hard" as that obtained in the physical
sciences, it represents a giant leap forward--to use a now famous phrase--
in man's ability to quantify social behavior and to develop social indica-
tors. It is precisely in this area of second-and-higher-order effects
that our assessment capabilities have progressed.
Yet our growing knowledge and expertise in the behavioral sciences
would be of little value in technology assessment if not accompanied by
the growth in our scientific and technological capabilities. These give
us technological alternatives which alone can make technological assess-
tt
scent reasonable and meaningful.
Let me explain. In societies where the level of science and technology
"	 is low, they must make use of any and every technological advance,which
1S
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they can afford in order to subsist, even if the applications have harmful
side-effects. for example, while Sweden and the United States can afford
to ban DDT, countries like India cannot afford to do so. It would not
be economically feasible for India to change to an insecticide less per-
sistent than DDT which would require spraying every few weeks instead of 	
r
twice a year. Yet India must have the insecticidal benefits from DDT
despite its harmful, effects. Its use there has cut down the incidence of 	 r
malaria from 100 million cases a year to only 15,000 cases, and the death
sn
rate from 750,000 to 1,500 a year. In more advanced industrial, countries
with higher standards of health, malaria presents no such problems.
Furthermore, our higher technological level enables us to use
technological alternatives at a slightly higher cost, let us say. The
search goes an for other methods of pest control---chemical, mechanical., and
biological--and it is Quite likely to be successful. Only nations possessing
this kind of potential can offer technological . alternatives allowing
response to unfavorabl y. technology assessments.
What I am really saying is that one major result of the technological
revolution of our time is to increase man's choices and options. Our
high level of scientific knowledge and technological performance gives
us the ability to pick and choose among different ways of accomplishing our
social. goals. This possibility of choice makes technology assessment both
r-
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time is long past but which exhibited little power. Notable among these
are the concepts of world peace and human brotherhood. They have been
around for some 2000 years, accepted in theory but never in practice.
Technology assessment strikes me as an idea whose time has come, but
I think it also has the power. It, too, is a matter of the human heart,
but it also has some powerful hardware and interests behind it.
In this brief review of the historical aspects of technology assess--
went, I have endeavored to outline the development of the factors
suggesting that the time has come for technology assessment. Techno-
logical changes now have a broader and accelerating social. impact. The
need exists; the awareness of the need exists; precedents for its applica-
tion are manifold; and we are developing the capabilities to apply it
effectively.
What really counts--and the examples of world peace and human
brotherhood plague us on the point--is our willingness to apply it in
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THE CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY I
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Introduction
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The accelerating rate of technological change and development
the twentieth century has raised serious questions concerning 	 3 `
-rise  ability of democratic systems to control and direct techno-
logical development in ways compatible with both the protection
of present and future public interest and the survival of
individual freedom. In highly industrialized societies scientific
invention, technological innovations, and public policy alterna-
tives are inextricably intermeshed. Consequently much of politi-
cal theory in the twentieth century has focused on the problem'
of democratic decisionmaking. Political philosophers have asked:
Wi ll the highly complex decisions which determine the quality of
men's lives, the conditions of their labor, and the shape of 	 i.
4
their physical environment, necessarily be made by an elite class
of specialists and technocrats? Will such decisions be made
within an anonymous and non-responsible corporate structure?
G
Can we escape this fate only at the cost of a highly controlled,
totalitarian State? Or will the technocratic elite, the corporate
structure, and the governing process inexorablx r merge, while the
mass of men, unable to participate meaningfully in decision-
making, lapse into apathy or alienation?
Fy l	 1-2
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^j	 Professor Stafford Beer, Professor of Cybernetics at Great
-..I I
Britains' Manchester University, testifying before a congressional
ff
	 committee in 1970, said:
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"...(Technology now seems to be leading humanity by
the nose. We appear to have no sense of priorities
!4	 where our problems are concerned; we do what is
^E
	
	
technologically easy -- and we do it regardless of
cost."
Professor Beer was concerned with the apparent failure of
democratic societies to develop systems of management and control
which are adequate to the complexities of their internal and
external environments. The alternative which he offered was to
"design a stable society," recognizing that this will involve
"the deployment of a political science to new ends" by treating
our "complexity-control capability... as offering a nervous system
for the body politic."
The belief that, as Beer phrased it, "technology is leading
humanity by the nose," is now widespread. A pessimistic atti-
tude toward technological development is not new (such was an
important part of English Conservatism and of the Romantic
Movement in the eighteenth century, for example). But such
pessimism has become widespread only in the middle of the twen-
tieth century. J. B. Bury, in his seminal work on The Idea of
Progress, shows how the burgeoning of technology was the key to
'Stafford Beer, "Managing Modern Complexity," in U.S., Congress,
House, Eleventh Meeting of the Panel on Science and Technology
with the Committee on Science and Astronautics of the U.S. House
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the intellectual revolution by which human history was reformu-
lated as the march of Progress:
"The spectacular results of the advance of science and
mechanical technique brought home to the mind of the
average man the conception of an indefinite increase
of man's power over nature as his brain penetrated her
secrets. The evident material progress which has con-
tinued incessantly ever since has been a mainstay of
the general belief in progress which is prevalent today."2
It was not until modern technology had permeated the lives of
common men and instigated sweeping social changes that history
could be viewed as an open-ended process of change through which
improvement of the quality of life for the masses was a possible
if not an inevitable condition:
"It was not until commerce, invention, and natural
science emancipated humanity from thralldom to the
cycle and to the Christian epic that it became possible
to think of an immense future for mortal mankind, of
the conquest of the material world in human interest,
of providing the conditions for a good life on this
planet without reference to any possible hereafter...
(0)f all the ideas pertinent to the concept of progress,
to the interpretation of what has gone on during the
past two hundred years and is going on in the world,
none is more relevant than technology."3
But the same transformation of ordinary life by technology
which helped to produce and gain acceptance for the idea of
progress, eventually brought pessimism about further technolog-
ical development. Melvin Kranzberg, an historian of science and
technology, has identified broad historical trends which prepared
2J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1932; republzs e	 y Dover Press, 1955), p. 324.
3Charles A. Beard, in an Introduction to Bury's work cited
above, pp. xi and xxi.
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the way for a more critical attitude toward technology.4He
traces the steady broadening of the social context of science
and technological change from the early stages when science was
monopolized by the priesthood of Egypt and used to preserve its
own power, and the era of classical Greece, when.Science was
	
'I[
viewed as a field:of intellectual inquiry with Little.incentive
	
i,Y
to develop practical applications. Enlargement of the scale of
technological application occurred explosively during the: indus-
trial revolution and has accelerated throughout the twentieth
century, Accumulation of detrimental..impacts, such as pollution,
from the overwhelmingly large-scale utilization of technologies
became only in recent decades so obvious as to generate wide
public awareness of such consequences. In the last thirty years
there has also been an increasing assumption of societal respon-
sibility for technology as public institutions became subsidizers
of technological innovation.
Throughout most of history the impetus for technological
innovation was the expectation of direct benefits for the user
and for relatively small segments of society, usually the econ-
omically dominant class (c°s Marx said, the owners of the dominant
mode of production). Social costs, in terms of loss of common
lands, spoilage of local environments, or adverse conditions of
labor were transferred to classes which were excluded from
Melvin Kranzberg, Historical Aspects of Technology Assessment,
The George Washington University Program of Policy Studies in
Science and Technology, Occasional Paper No. 4 (Washington, D.C.;
The George Washington University, .August 1969).
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cottage factory workers); such costs need not be considered and
could almost be said to have been invisible. The plentiful supply
of natural resources and manual labor and -- after the rise of
liberalism in the eighteenth century --- the concept of limited
government, allowed technology to develop relatively free of
consideration of larger social consequences.
After the onset of the industrial revolution, bringing with
it increases in population, concentration of people into work
centers, and increasing economic interdependence, the acceler-
ation of social change attendant on technological deve-'opment
could no longer be ignored. Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and
Karl Marx provide the landmarks in recognition of the effects
of technology on society. Kranzberg notes of Marx:
"He made plain one great truth,: Technology has social
and cultural ramifications far beyond the first-order
effects to which attention had hitherto been directed...
What is more, Marx avoided the confusion between tech-
nology itself and the social system which it had so
profoundly affected. Marx's strictures were not against
technological change ... His effort concentrated not on
mitigating the effects of technology but on rearranging,
by revolution, a socio-economic system which would
enable the benefits of technology to be spread among
the mSsses rather than confined to the profit of the
^z .fc. ^ .
'In the last two decades the social costs, rather than the
benefits, of technological development have increasingly been
the center of attention in the United States. The possibility
of world-wide overpopulation, the ths: ­ t of exhaustion of natural
5 Ibid., p. 7.
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resources, the cumulative effects of overwhelmingly large appli-
cations of technology on the environment, and chemical hazards to
human safety and health have generated acute concern. The deci-
sions which produced these effects were largely marketplace
decisions, in spite of the steady increase in governmental inter-
vention in the economy since the 1900's. Indeed, federal, state,
and local governments are among the heaviest users of technology
and have become increasingly the subsidizers and promoters of
technological innovation.
During the New Deal era in the United States and while totali-
tarian governments in Europe, Asia, and South America occupied
the center of political consciousness, political theorists directed
most of their attention to the threat of all-powerful governments.
More recently political thinkers are again pointing to the seeming
inability of democratic societies to provide what Stafford Beer
called "stable metasystems," for the control of self-directed,
change-resisting social institutions which are powerfully organized
to maintain their internal stability and survival. In the
industrial society such social institutions -- industries and the
specialized interest groups and professions associated with them
will through the dynamics of insuring their institutional survival 	
E
make decisions which a limited government (designed for a less
g
complex society of the past) may lack the power or the initiative
	 #
to make in the public interest. Beer warned a somewhat puzzled
congressional committee:
!I
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"The central thesis of cybernetics might be expressed
thus: that there are natural laws Bove- ping the
behavior of laige interactive systems -- in the flesh,
in the metal, in the social and economic fabric. These
laws have to do with self-regulation and self-organiza-
tion... M b is behavior is governed by the dynamic struc-
ture of the system... outcomes are latent in the dynamic
structure of the systems we have or may adopt: they wil
Victor Ferkiss, in Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality,
also pointed out that the most serious danger to democratic
decisionmaking today is not hypercontrol but chaos:
"The danger is not that industrialism has destroyed
the intermediate group in modern democratic society
but that the group is so strong that the individual,
instead of finding freedom in the interstices created
by group competition, may be crushed between the contending
parties, or that instead of a dominant total government
riding roughshod over an inert society, public purposes
will be lost sight of in the feudalistic struggle of
competing special interests."7
Ferkiss, like Stafford Beer, sees this problem in cybernetic
terms as a failure of control and communication under an overload
of conflicting demands on the body politic due to the complexity
of technological society:
.. M he lines of power and control are more and morei!	 a
l^	 intermeshed... The total social organism has a central
nervous system, but so overwhelming are the desires
and signals from its constituent parts, so involuntary
4	 most of its actions ... that it is impossible to speak
of it as being directed consistently by a single con-
scious will ... The sheer volume of activity leads to
communications problems that make centralized direction
difficult. Indeed, here as elsewhere in technological
civilization, the paradox is that not unifoimity but
anarchy may present the greatest danger..."
6Beer, OP. cit.
7Victor Ferkiss, Technological Man: The M th and the Reality
(New York: George Braziller, 19693, p. 155.
8Tbid., pp. 177-178.
E
r
y1-8
the classical liberal sense is no longer adequate:
"When industry is allowed to follow its own logic,
when technological expansion and economic growth
become exclusive objectives to which others are
sacrificed, and when politics is kept from inter-
fering with the inner imperatives and self-evident
'success' of industrial development, men are apt to
find themselves deprived of effective freedom even
while they are provided with its indispensable
material conditions.
John Kenneth Galbraith, warning that social goals are being
subordinated to the ends of technological growth and economic
expansion, argues for greater use of governmental power. 9 Henry
S Kariel makes a similar argume,zt that limited government in
"Post-industrial" society, Daniel Bell has noted, is charac-
terized by the pre-eminence of the professional and technical
class" and "the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the
source of innovation and policy formulation."" other writers
have pointed out the danger that ordinary citizens and their
elected officials will tend because of the increasing complex-
ity of public policy issues to defer to an elite whose prestige
and influence rest on information and expertise. Robert E. Lane
foresees "a shrinking of the political domain," 12 and Jean k
Meynaud although rejecting the thesis that a "power elite," is
k
gJohn Kenneth Galbraith, The New industrial State (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1957).
10Henry S. Kariel, The Promise of Politics (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966 .
11Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology,"
in Indicators of Social Change, Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert E.
Moore, eds., New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), p. 157. I
12Robert E. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a 	 r
Knowledgeable Society," American Sociological Review 31 (October
2,966) , pp. 649ff.
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now in control, demonstrated how political power may shift toward
technocrats, who have a dangerous tendency to form closed groups
and who exhibit a strong bias toward the interests of managers
and professionals. 13
Galbraith, Taho like Ferkiss and Kariel has called for greater
exercise of public power to counter the economic power of in-
dustries and the competing demands of specialized interests, has
also said that
"(I)ncreasingly, it will be recognized that the
mature corporation, as it develops, becomes part
of the administrative complex associated with the
State. In =^^Ime the line between the two will
disappear,
The fear that government itself, responding to the necessity
of exerting control over increasingly powerful forces of econ-
omics and technology, may centralize and consolidate power to
an extent that destroys individual freedom, goes back to the
	 8
traditions of liberal thought since the industrial revolution.
Writers like Robert Boguslaw, Robert O. MacBride, Donald N.
a
Michael, and Alan Westin contend that this danger takes on new
	 i
dimensions with the possibility of national data banks, infor-
mation systems, and other electronic devices which enormously
^F
13Jean Meynaud, Technocracy (London: Faber and Faber, 1968),
pp. 293-303.
14Galbraith, op. ci t. , p. 393,
f
A
E?
ii
I ^ 	 n
1-10.
increase the powers of a.State for surveillance of individuals.15
Professor Emmanual G. Mesthene (himself gather optimistic about
the.infl.uence of technology on political decisionmaking) formu-
lates the long-standing liberal warn-L-g in modern terms:
"There is:..the problem of what happen's to traditional
relationships between citizens and government, to such
prerogata,ves of the individual as personal privacy,
electoral. consent, and access to the independent social
criticism of the press, and to the ethics of and public
controls over a new elite of information keepers, when
economic, military, and social policies become increas-
ingly technical, long-range, machine-processed, infor-
mation-based, and expert-dominated." (Italics added)16
Recognition that modern governments, whether in opposition
to, or in conjunction with, technocratic elitists and corporate
interests, may irretrievably erode the sphere of individual
choice and freedom, leads many writers to argue (unlike Ferkis,
Kariel and Galbraith) against unnecessary use of governmental
powers. Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener urge tna't:
"...Me try in general to moderate Faustian impulses
to overpower the environment, and to try to limit both
the centralization and the willingness to use accumu-
lating political, economic, and technological power...
so that the inescapable .increase in regulation of human
choices remains in the hands of people who will
15
Robert Boguslaw, The New Utopians: A Study of System Design
and Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1965). Robert O. MacBride, The Automated State: Com uter
Systems as a New Force in Society Philadelphia: Chilton Book
Company, 1967). Donald N. M!chael, "On Coping with Complexity:
Planning and Politics," Daedalus 97 (Fall 1968), pp. 1179-1193.
Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967).
For an excellent discussion of tfese and other writers on the
topic of computer technology and freedom, see Technology and the
Po
.
 lity, Harvard University Program on Technology and Society,
Research Review No. a (Summer, 1969), pp. 31-36.
16 EmanuelG. Mesthene, How Technology Will Shape the Future,
Harvard University Program on Technology and Society Reprint
No. 5, reprinted from Science 161 (12 July 1968), p. 19.
i
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respect its disastrous potential and 4^11 not
unnecessarily centralize it further."
The issues raised by these and many other thinkers may
perhaps be summarized: To what extent is our present form of
government capable of generating direction and control over
technological development which can enable us both to achieve
. social goals and protect. public interests, and to protect indi-
vidual participation, privacy, and options within a guaranteed
and suitably broad sphere?
Technology Assessment
Beginning about 1966 in the United States the concept of
Technology Assessment has been discussed as a. technique for
improving societal control over technological development and
.applicati .ons within the constitutional framework and institu-
tional structure of the federal government. By technology
f
assessment is meant the systematic identification, analysis,
and evaluation of the potential secondary consequences (whether
k
1
beneficial or detrimental) of technology in terms of its impacts
on social, cultural, political, economic, and environmental
systems and processes„ Technology assessment is intended to
provide a neutral, factual input into the decisi.onmaking process. 	 f
17
Herman Rahn and Anthony J. Wiener, "Faustian Powers and
Human Choices: Some Twenty-First Century Technological and
Economic Issi:es," in Environment and Change, the Next Fifty
Years, Will iam R. Ewald, Jr., ed., Bloomington: Indiana
	
r
Un%versitt•
 Press, 1968) , p. 101.
rV .L.
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Assessment techniques may be int.grated into the planning,
designing, and evaluative process used by government agencies
in preparing technology-oriented programs and projects, and
may also provide a critical review of &uch programs and projects
after their injection into the public policy arena.
The present study, Technology and Public Policy, is intended
to provide a descriptive and analytical review of the concept
of technology assessment and the current status of its applica-
tion in the work of federal executive agencies. The remainder
of this chapter will examine the origin of the term technology
assessment, a brief history of its discussion and development
since 1966, and some of the factors influencing that development.
Subsequent chapters will examine the work of federal agencies
concerned with technological programs and projects and the extent
to which they are utilizing or can be expected to utilize the
technique of technology assessment.
It should be noted that many of those who have written about
technology assessment suggest that the technique can or should
be used in private sector decisionmaking. As used in this study,
however, the term technology assessment is limited to studies
which are intended to provide input into or to influence public
sector decisionmaking.
The word "technology" itself requires some comment. The
dictionary definition of "technology" is "applied science; a
technical method of achieving a practical purpose; the totality
y	 ^"
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of the means employed to provide objects necessary for human
sustenance and comfort." 18 The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of
Science and Technology says that technology is "the systematic
use of industrial processes, tools, and techniques for the
accomplishment of specific planned functions." According to
this encyclopedia, science is organized knowledge, engineering
is planning and design based on organized knowledge and aimed at
modification of the physical environment, and technolM is the
technique by which such modification is carried through. Some
thinkers use a much broader definition of technology which
includes institutional or legal innovations. John Wilkerson,
the translator of Jacques Ellul's La Technique (translated as
The Technological Society) describes technni ue as "the organized
ensemble of all individual techniques which have been used to
secure any end whatsoever," and further quotes Lasswell as
defining technology as "the ensemble of practices by which one
uses available resources to achieve values." 19
However, technology_ as used in this paper does not include
processes and techniques which are purely behavioral, legal, or
institutional (such as psychoanalysis, a guaranteed annual wage,
or day-care nurseries). The subject of discussion is the assess-
ment of "hard" technologies involving the use of industrial
18
Merriam-Webster Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1965.
19 JacquesEllul, The Technological. Society, translated from
the French by John Wilkinson New York: Knopf, 1964), p. vi.
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processes, tools, and techniques, and generally intended to
modify either the physical environment or the human body,
although the assessment may deal with the full range of secondary
and higher order consequences.
Development of the Concept of Technology Assessment:
1966-1970
On March 7, 1967, Representative Emilio Daddaric introduced
before the Congress a bill proposing the creation of a "Technol-
ogy Assessment Board" to assist the Congress in making wise
decisions concerning the use of science and technology and to
provide Congress with an "early warning signal" of the potential
good and bad consequences of technological programs. Representa-
tive Daddario stipulated that this bill was intended "not as a
piece of perfected legislation but as a stimulant to discussion." 20
Daddario, whc was than Chairman of'the Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Delrelopment of the House Committee on Science and
Astronautics, 3efined technology assessment as:
y
"... a form of policy research which provides a balanced
appraisal to the policymaker. Ideally, it is a system
to ask the right questions and obtain correct and timely
answers. it identifies policy issues, assesses the
impact of alternative courses of action, and presents
f:4ndings. It is a method of analysis that systemati-
cally appraises the nature, significance, status, and
merit of a technological program... (and) is designed to
uzicover three types of consequences -- desirable, un-
desirable, and uncertain... To assess technology one
has to establish cause and effect relationships from
20
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
"Technology Assessment," Statement of Emilio q. Daddario, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the...,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967.
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the action or project source to the locale of
consequences... The function of technology assess-
ment is to identify...both short-term and long
range (impacts).
In the sense in which Mr. Daddario here used it, the term
"technology assessment" had apparently been used for the first
time in a report of his Subcommittee a few months earlier,
October 17, 1966. 22
 This report was concerned with undesirable
consequences of technology, which the subcommittee noted were
appearing with alarming frequency: technological unemployment,
toxic pesticides, pollution, automobile effluents, forest
depletion, exhaustion of resources, disposal of radioactive
wastes, invasions of personal liberty by computerized informa-
tion systems and electronic surveillance, and the effects of
carbon dioxide on climate. The subcommittee said that, in the
past,
}
i
"...man could afford to look upon
technology with some complacency.
came slowly, they were put to use
and modest fashion, and their side
at a sufficiently relaxed pace to
the innovations of
For the innovations
in a relatively slow
effects developed
permit man to adjust
21
Ibid., pp. 12-13.
22
According to Franklin P. Huddle of.the Science Policy Research
Division of the Congressional Research SerLice, Library of Con-
gress, in a paper entitled "Government Technology Assessment:
the Role of the Social Sciences," presented at a Round Table Dis-
cussion of the American Political Science Association, October 2,
1970. The author is indebted to Dr. Huddle for the use of this
paper in preparing the present historical discussion. The term
technology assessment is frequently used by engineers and other
technologists to mean evaluation of the performance of a system,i.e., assessment of intentional, first order consequences only.
i
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to them -- or to alter his course if the threat were
great enough."23
Under the leadership of Mr. Daddario the members of the Sub-
committee g ad been inquiring into reports of "ecological
disasters" which were appearing in newspapers across the country
and in books such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. 24 According
to researchers at the Congressional Research Service (then the
Legislative Reference Service) who assisted the subcommittee in
these deliberations, the members had been particularly impleJsed
by a suggestion of Col. Charles Lindbergh, an ardent conservation-
ist, that some method was needed to anticipate such detrimental
impacts at an early stage of technological developments. The
term technology assessment was chosen, some observers remember,
in order to assure that any future legislation dealing with such
activity would be referred to the Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development.
When Mr. Daddario introduced his proposal to establish a
Technology Assessment Board, he told the Congress in an accom-
panying statement,
"Technical information needed by policymakers is
frequently not availal-)le, or not in the right form.
A policymaker cannot judge the merits or consequences
of a technological program within a strictly technical
context. He has to consider social, economic, and
legal implications of any course of action."
23
U.S. Congress, House, Committee or, Science and Astronautics,
"Inquiries, Legislation, Policy Studies Re Science and Technology:
Review and Forecast," Second Progress Report of the Subcommittee
on Science, Research, and Development, 89th Congress, 2nd Session,
1966, p. 25.
24 RachelCarson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).
r	 ;
<L 4-
1-17	 r
t ,`
The problem for Congress in dealing with technological
innovation is therefore one of providing itself with infor-
mation about scientific and.tachnological possibilities and
options # in a form intelligible to and useful for nonspecialists
decisionmakers. The Daddario Subcommittee decided to explore
the idea of technology-,assessment further through the holding
o£.semrinars and public hearings, and by commissioning several
studies of the subject, by the National Academies of Sciences
and Engineering and by the Legislative Reference. Service.
In the fail of 1967 the Subcommittee invited a number of
specialists in policy sciences to a seminar on Technology Assess-
ment. President Bowen of the University of Iowa, the former
chairman of the National Commission on Automation, Technology,
and Economic Progress, called attention to another aspect of
the social direction of technology, the need to establish
consensual goals and priorities for the immediate and long-range
future of the nation. He therefore proposed both the establish-
ment of a technology assessment "council" to serve the federal
government, and the establishment of a "commission on national
goals." 25
The Library of Congress Stu4y. The study which the Subcom-
mittee had requested from the Legislative Reference Service was
submitted in the spring of 1969. Technical Information for
25 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
"Technology Assessment Seminar," Proceedings before the Sub-
committee on Scienceg Research, an -Development, Septeiser 21 and
22, 1967, 90th Congress, Ist Session, 1967 revised August 1968),
PP- 5-6.
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'	 Congress, by Dr. Frank P. Huddle, examined fourteen, cases in
which the Congress had acted on issues concerned with technology,
such as the Salk Vaccine, the nuclear test ban treaty, the Mohole
Ji
research program, and water policy formulation. 26
In each of these cases Dr. Huddle examined conflict between
scientific and political decisionmaking, differences between
scientific and political information, and differences between
scientific and political behavior. He concluded that the
technical aspects of political issues should receive priority
attention and that "it is important that the scientific question
or issue be carefully framed so that the answer to it provides
a useful and significant, piece of evidence for guidance in the
consideration of the broader political issue." When the techni-
cal questions are not firmly resolved, Dr. Huddle noted, "the
political resolution of the broader issue tended to be defec-
tive." 27
Perhaps the greatest difficulty which Huddle noted in supplying
Congress with scientific information was that "the lay members
of Congress found it impossible to accept the proposition that
science is probabilistic," and were apt to accept "invalid
hypotheses" (sic) and to .make "improper use of outstanding
personalities." Huddle therefore suggested the need for
26
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Technical Information for Congress, Report to the Subcommittee
on Science, Research, and Development, prepared by the Science
Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library
of Congress. House Document No. 91-137, 91st Congress, 1st
Session, April 25, 1969.
27
Ibid., p. 506.
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information input from a wide range of disciplines, including --
in every assessment involving "the interaction of man and
machine" -- the social sciences; and he stressed that technology
I;	 assessment must be an iterative process:
f'	
"The more time that can be given to this new process,
to the progressive sequences of interactions of new
fact and analysis, the more mature and sound will be
JI	 the ultimate decision."
At the same time, delay in decisionmaking can allow irreversible
detrimental irr acts to occur. Therefore, Huddle concluded, it
is important that the process of technology assessment "should
begin to occur as far upstream as possible," and he urged that
"by institutionalizing and systematizing (the assessment process)
4	 the quality and efficiency of the pro--ess- can be improved."
s.
The National Academy of Sciences Study. A second report on
t-	
technology assessment was submitted to the Committee on Science
and Astronautics by the National Academy of Sciences in July,
Y.
}	 1969.29 This report was prepared by a Panel of the Committee
on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP) chaired by Professor Harvey
Brooks of Harvard University. The report described the existing
process of governmental assessment and decision as "critically
deficient" in several regards:
i
-- Technologies are assessed on the basis of economic 	 i
benefit to the user rather than on the basis of
general social benefits,
y
;^	 r
28
Huddle, 	 Technolouv Assessment,"p. 15.
29Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice, Report of
the National Academy of Sciences to the Committee on Science and
Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, July 1969).
-	 a
r ^'
1-20
M- "External" costs of technological applications,
e.g., pollution, are ignored,
-- In the process of resource allocation, there is a
lack of criteria that recognize "the full spectrum
of human need,"
-- The burden of proof "has tended to fall on those who
challenge the wisdom of an on--going technological
trend,"
-- Waiting until deleterious effects become evident
"entails too high a risk that vested interests --
among both producers and consumers -- will by then
become so entrenched as to make it politically very
difficult or economically very costly to suppress or
modify an offending technology or to develop an
alternative one.
The COSPUP panel outlined conceptual, institutional, and
methodological constraints on improvement of the assessment
process, but it recommended the establishment of new mechanisms
within the federal government whose functions would be the
sponsoring and funding of basic research on technical problems
and of technology assessments, the continuing review of assess-
ments made by other government institutions, and the dissemina-
tion of information about technology assessments. The report
suggested that a technology assessment center be located within
an expanded Office of Science and Technology in the Executive
office of the President, working in close conjunction with a
technology assessment division to be located in the National
Science Foundation. A separate assessment component, the Panel
said, was needed to serve the Congress and provide it with an
independent source of assessment information.
30ibid. , pp. 34-35.
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The COSPUP report also included a first attempt at structuring
a methodology for technology assessment. Recognizing -iat there
was "no unique way to break down so vast a subject," the panel
conceptualized the task in three interrelated subject areas:
the focal points from which assessment should begin, assessment
modes and mechanisms, and patterns of response and action.
The focal points for assessments, the panel suggested, might
be the technology, the environment, or the individual. Technology
was here defined as "a system of interrelated innovations, some
technical and some social, which comprise some sort of coherent
nexus pertaining to systematic manipulation of the environment,"
e.g., automobile transportation or cable television.
Beginning with this focal point an assessment must consider
both economic, social, and legal arrangements which would
facilitate introduction and use of a technology, and arrangements
which could constrain or regulate its use. The assessment must
then examine:
-- the rate of advancement in development of the technology,
-- possibilities for technology transfer to related areas,
-- probable growth in the scale of application,
-- availability of intermediaries or buffers between
technology and user (in the case of drugs, the doctor;
in the case of construction, building codes),
-- degree of departure from existing, accepted technologies,
-- economic concentration of producers,
-- centralization of decision making with regard to the
technology and susceptibility to collective control,
E,.
rf'	
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-- the competitive environment,
-- societal sources of resistance to use of the technology
(legal, social, religious).
Another focal point for assessment is the environment, and
the effects on it of the technology, whether these effects are
aesthetic, changes in ecosystems, or biomedical in nature.
However, the panel said that: "...pending further attention to
definitional and other basic matters, the contemporary interest
in environmental issues will make its major contribution to
technology assessment by providing impetus for action rather than
by furnishing such action with an organizational focus." 31
Assessments might also use as their focal point, the individual.
Here the panel suggested that the assessment should inquire what
effects technology, or a specific technological application, are
having on:
---- the development and socialization of the child,
-- the work experience of the adult,
-- access to material goods and social values,
-- opportunity to participate in decisionmaking,
-- health and safety.
The COSPUP panel concluded that a combination of all of the
three focal points was required in an adequate assessment because
of the possibility of synergistic effects and the possibility
that either important second- and third-order consequences would
be overlooked, or new developments in technology would go un-
noticed.
_	 y
3lfbid. p. 132.
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In discussing assessment modes and mechanisms, the panel dis-
tinguished between internalized assessments, that is, assessment
built into the incentive structure of the decisionmaki.ng process;
and externalized assessments, that is, assessment conducted by an
institution deliberately separated from the front-line decision-
maker. The panel strongly preferred internalized assessments,
s
on the grounds that they tend to "redefine responsibility without
separating it from authority, 1132 although the panel recognized
the need fcr external assessment also in order to make the system
function properly: "Ideally, the effort should be to modify goals
and criteria of success without dictating the means of achieving
them."
The COSPUP panel here failed to explore the problem of insti-
tutional bias in agencies assessing their own projects and
programs. However, the panel also distinguished between negative
assessment, usually performed by agencies with regulatory
responsibilities, and positive assessment, by an agency respon-
sible for evaluating and promoting new technology. This
terminology was revealing in that it seemed to assume a one-sided
approach to assessment calculated to protect the agency's interest,PP	 P	 Y	 ^
and the conclusion reached by the panel was somewhat counter to
its announced preference for internalized assessment: "The
:solution the panel has urged is a second-order assessment activ-
ity performed by an agency with neither promotional tasks nor
risk-preventing responsibilities, an entity ancillary to the
33
activities of all agencies with one or the other kind of bias."
32
Ibid., p. 139.
33 i
ILiu. , p. 140.
Finally, the COSPUP panel considered possible patterns of
response to technology assessments -- chu!Lges or modifications
in introduction, support, or use of technology through: resource
allocation decisions, modifying private initiatives by inter-
nalization of costs or enforcement or standards or regulations,
or the altering of incentives through creation of new legal
rights or other social innovations. The panel suggested that
assessments should be structured so as to be appropriate for the
ends in view and the needs of specific decisionmaking entities.
"2f society persists in its present course," the COSPUP
panel warned, "the future holds great peril, whether from the
uncontrolled effects of technology itself or from an unreasoned
political reaction against all technological innovation." 34
The National Academy of Engineering Study. A third report was
also submitted to the Daddario Subcommittee in the summer of
1969 by the National. Academy of Engineering. A Studer of Tech-
nology Assessment was prepared by the Committee on Public
Engineering Policy (COPEP) chaired by Chauncey Starr, Dean of
the School, of the University of California at Los Angeles. 35
This study went somewhat beyond the National Academy of Sciences
effort in that COPEP performed three "experiments in technology
34
Ibid., P. 118.
35A Studer of Technology Assessment, Report of the Committee on
Public Engineering Policy, National Academy of Engineering, to
the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
July 1969) .
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assessment," preliminary examinations of the technology assess-
ment task in the f..elds of Teaching Aids (instructional television
and computer--assisted instruction) , subsonic Aircraft Noise,
and Multiphasic Health Screening.
In conducting these experimental assessments, COPEP used a
seven-step analytical approach, as follows:
1. Identify and refine the subject to be assessed.
2. Deliniate the scope of the assessment and develop
a data base.
3. Identify alternative strategies to solve the selected
problems with the technology under assessment.
4. Identify parties affected by the selected problems
and the technology.
5. Identify the impacts on the affected parties.
6. Valuate or measure the impacts.
7. Compare the pros and cons of alternative strategies.
In commenting on their chosen approach, the COP],P group noted
that Representative Daddario had suggested that assessment shoui.a
seek to establish cause-effect relationships between a technology
and its impacts on society. 36 COPEP found that a "purely causal
methodology" had certain limitations. There were in fact, two
classes of technology assessment, said COPEP, problem-initiated
assessments and technology-initiated assessments. The first,
exemplified by the subsonic aircraft noise problem, deals with
a large number of variables but is focused on a well--defined
36
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
"Technology Assessment," Statement of Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, 90th Congress,
lst Session, July 3, 1967.
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goal, namely solution of the problem. Here identification
of cause-effect chains, such as is done using the systems
analysis method of engineering, is feasible because "the future
course of events is a converging one, where many causal chains
converge on one or at most toward a few end-points. The process
begins at the large end of a funnel, and the optimum solution
to a given problem is at the small end." In technology-
initiated assessments (such as those dealing with instructional
aids or multiphasic health screening), however,
"The assessment procesz begins with the new technology
at the small end and emerges as a complex pattern of
consequences at the large end. As cause-effect chains
diverge, predictability of events diminishes.. Thus
the farther that predictions ?5etend to see, the greater
their degree of uncertainty."
Therefore the CQPEP study groups tended to convert the technol-
ogy-initiated experimental assessments into problem--initiated
assessments by focusing on a few potential areas of social
concern or of social opportunity which might be significantly
affected by the subject technology. However, the report noted
that this choice was influenced by the constraints of time and
effort in making these experimental studies, and warned "The
uncertainty in this approach is that in making the selection of
problems to be addressed, important social and political impacts
could be overlooked."
In carrying out steps 5 and 6 of their experimental metho-
dology, {identification, evaluation, and measuring of impacts
37
A Study of Technology Assessment, p. 16.
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on affected patties), the COPED study groups worked out a simple
f
scheme for comber-iAson of the judgments of the assessors. Each
assessor rated each potential impact (for example, increased
cost of instruction with the use of television) for each affected 	
i
party (institutions of higher education, students, faculty, 	
rv^.
indu-"ry). Impacts were rated as t-a thcir nature (favorable,
r
unfavorable, unknown), their probability of occurrence (likely,
unlikely), and their susceptibility to federal action (control-
lable, uncontrollable, unknown). The limitations of this
coarse-grained rating scheme were recognized; but, said the
committee:
"...attempts to apply several (more complex rating
schemes) led to the realization that the effort and
judgment required to implement them resulted in
distinctions that could neither be better supported
nor whose combined effects could be assessed more
critically."38
This difficulty points to a critical need which is consistently
recognized in technology assessment studies subsequent to the
COPEP report:: the lack of an acceptable and accepted system of
social indicators for measurement and comparison of potential
impacts which have been identified through technology assessment.
On the basis of its three experiments, the committee reached
fourteen conclusions. 39 These are paraphrased below.
1. Technology assessment: are feasible, and will be useful to
Congress "when prepared by properly constituted, independent,
ad hoc task forces with adequate staff support and time."
38
Ibid. , p. 43.
39
Ibid., pp. 3-5.
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2. They should be free from political influence or bias.
4
I
Selection of a preferred course of action is the prerogative
of the legislator, the assessment group should limit itself to
outlining alternative strategies for action. 	 r,
3_ ASSPGSO_r_s shon1d he chosen for their exnertise and not as
representatives of affected parties or interests.
a. Assessors must necessarily be chosen from public and
private organizations with knowledge about the subject, but
organizational biases of the experts will tend to cancel out and
be neutralized.
5. There should be extensive participation by behavioral and
political scientists; experience shows that engineers, economists,
and social scientists can work together harmoniously,
6. To be of most use, the assessment should take about one
year and be the sole activity of the research group.
7. Congress would be best served by a small management group
which would arrange for technology assessments by diverse research
organizations. No one entity can provide adequate in--house
expertise for all assessments.
8. Cause-effect analysis should be supplemented by "the
intuitive judgments of krnwledgable individuals."
9. Assessments can began through consideration of either a
technology, or a social problem. The procedures for these two
kinds of asses imi nt will differ somewhat; Congress has a greater
1-29
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need for the first, while more fully tested methodologies exist
for the second.
10. Technology-initiated assessment requires a choice between
"diffuse searches seeking some early-warning signal" and "con--
version to a problem-oriented study" that chooses the most
significant (potentially detrimental) impacts for analysis. The
latter choice involves the danger of overlooking hitherto un-
recognized impacts.
11. Long--term forecasts (more than five years) are valuable
for planning and "setting the stage" for consideration of unfore-
seen events, but are likely to be unreliable.
12. Criteria for establishing the priority of topics for
assessment include the breadth and depth of expected social
impact, the visibility of the problems to legislators and to the
public, and the current and expected rates of development of the
technologies.
13. Appraisal of impacts must include the derivation and use
of measures of social value pertinent to the quality of life, in
addition to conventional economic and technical risk-benefit
criteria.
14. Technology assessment can provide the public support
necessary for national programs designed to secure the benefits
and avoid the problems of technological advances.
Unlike the COSPEP report earlier described, which indicated
a preference for internalized assessments (those integrated into
Y
r	 .
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institutional decisionmaki,ng processes), the COPED report thus
concentrated on the need for externalized assessment, "by
properly constituted, independent, ad hoc task forces" of
neutral experts. The COPEP study, unlike the earlier efforts,
made a clear distinction between problem-initiated and tech-
nology-initiated assessments. By clearly preferring the former
(because of the existence of familiar and well-developed
techniques of analysis for such subjects), and by advocating the
conversion of technology-focused assessments into problem-
oriented studies, COPED tended to downplay exploratory, antici-
patory assessment at an:early stage of technological innovation,
when problems have not become obvious and potential consequences
have not yet been recognized. This thrust undercuts the
greatest value of technology assessment as other advocates,
including Mr. Daddario, have conceived it. By focusing on
technology-related problems to the almost total neglect of
potential benefits, this report stressed the negative aspects
of technology assessment and may have fed the anxieties of
critics who were, in 1969, already beginning to talk of technol-
ogy assessment as "technology arrestment." These f(-_ars became
evident at a meeting which provided the next significant forum
for discussion of technology assessment.
1969 and 1970: Discussions and Hearings. Under the aegis of
the Engineering Foundation, a non-profit professional association,
about one hundred persons met in August 1969 for a discussion of the
rE! ! i
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three reports which-had been generated on technology assessment.
Participants included the COSPUP and COPEP members, representa-
tives from the Legislative Reference Service and congressional
committee staffs, and engineers and academicians. During the
discussions, as one participant, Dr. Franklin Huddle, described
the discussion, it became clear that
"...there was a trend toward the polarization of
views into ---
"(a) Those favoring a formal governmental process...,
those concerned with the cooling of technology,
and those concerned with ecological/environ-
mental insults caused by technology,
versus
"(b) Those determined that the creativity of tech-
nology should not be restrained by the strait-
jacket of assessment and regulation; those
attaching high value to the economic importance
of continued exploitation of technology; and
those inclined to discount as exaggerated the
allegation of environmental degradation resulting
from technological 'progress`.1140
Those who take the extreme position that technology assessment
may be "a straitjacket" dampening technological innovation and
starving scientific research by suppressing public support,
cannot be assumed to be callous to societal problems. As one
such sceptic wrote, in a paper entitled "Technology Assessment
or Technology Harassment?":
"Considering the attacks to which science and technology
are now being subjected, the danger is ... that harassment
by an overemotional political process may prevent (new
40Huddle," Government Technology Assessment," p. 26.
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technology) from coming to fruition. Such a risk
may be run, however, to assure that the new technology
will meet jis legitimate purpose of serving the public
interest."
This author, Dr. Leon Green, Executive Secretary of the
Defense Research Board, pointed out in speaking of pollution:
"What generally goes unrecognized...is that the culprit
is not technology per se but persistence in the appli-
cation of obsolescent Fi'f not archaic) technology for
economic reasons, and failure to apply new or existing
technology for the processing of waste products. What
is needed is not less but more and better technology,
thoughtfully applied."
In November and December 1969, the Daddario subcommittee held
hearings on the subject of technology assessment. 42 The Comptrol-
ler-General of the United States and the heads of the National
Science Foundation, the Library of Congress, a National Labor-
atory, the National Bureau of Standards, and the Office of Science
and Technology, described for the subcommittee the readiness and
capability of their organizations to provide Congress with
technology assessments. Other executive agencies, such as the
Department of Commerce and the Food and Drug Administration,
provided testimony about the technology assessment activities
of their agencies. in addition, there was testimony from repre-
sentatives of a number of academic institutions, especially those
41 LeonGreen, Jr., "Technology Assessment or Technology Harass-
ment," unpublished paper presented at a Seminar of the Program
of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The George Washington
University, March 26, 1970.
42 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Technology Assessment, before the Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Nov. 18,
24; Dec. 2, 3, 4, 8, and 12, 1969.
J
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with programs in the policy sciences, which indicated that the
idea of technology assessment had been picked up and explored
and was rapidly becoming a new and recognized area for academic
endeavor. These groups included the Program of Policy Studies
in Science and Technology at The George Washington University,
the Program in Science and Public Policy at Purdue University,
the Program of Technology and Society at Harvard University
(now defunct) , and others.
The activities of the Daddario subcommittee had sparked wide
interest and the concept of technology assessment was being
explored, during 1967-1970, through a flood of articles in
science and engineering publications, professional journals, and
the general media. An annotated bibliography on technology
assessment, prepared by the Library of Congress for the sub-
committee in mid-1970, listed 154 articles, documents, and books
on the subject. 43
Thus, when the Daddario subcommittee reconvened hearings in
the spring of 1970, the idea of technology assessment had
generated wide interest. 
44
Public hearings were held in Los
Angeles, San Francisco, and Webster Groves, Missouri (at Webster
43
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Technology Assessment, an Annotated Bibliography and Inventory
of Congressional Organization for Science and Technology, pre-
pared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development.
91st Congress, 2nd Session, July 15, 1970.
44
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Technology Assessment - 1970, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Science, Research, and Development on H.R. 17056, 91st
Congress, 2nd Session, 1970.
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College) in March to hear representatives of public interest and
scitizen action group , and experts on technological impacts and
	
{ P,	 P	 g	 P
t
critical environmental problems. In May and June the hearings
continued in Washington to hear discussions of how a technology
ht best be structured.assessment mechanism to serve Congress migg	 g
=t	 The Daddario Bill proposed the establishment of a TechnologyE
tr
Assessment Board to promulgate assessment policy, and an Office
of Technology Assessment to serve Congress by initiating assess-
ments, using both the Congressional Research Service and the
	
F'	 National Science Foundation to carry out research projects
	
'	 requested by the Board, the Director of the Office, or the chair-
} man of any congressional committee. This bill, H.R. 18469, was	 )
introduced by Representative Daddario on July 15, 1970, and
subsequently reported out by the House Science and Astronautics
Committee. A counterpart bill, S. 4085, was introduced in the
Senate at the same time. Another bill (S. 4044) had been
introduced by Senator Magnuson a few days earlier, which would
establish an "Independent Technology Assessment and Environmental
Data Collection Commission" to serve all branches of the govern-
ment. The Commission, as proposed, would have much the same
functions described in Representative Daddario's bill with
particular emphasis on providing an "early warning" of detrimental
environmental impacts of new technology. This bill was referred 	
1
to the Commerce Committee of the Senate. No further action was
taken on these balls by the 91st Congress.
i
w
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However tlhe Daddario bill reappeared durinf' the 92nd Cc,^^resy
as Il. R. ' 102 43, sponsored by Representative Davis hd other=
(Mr. Davy s- 'h'ad assumed:- the chairmanship of the Subcomnitte^ on
Science, Research, and Development after Mx. Daddario ret.rec.
from Congress in 1970 to run for another office.) The bi ll
received the unanimous approval of the Committee on Science and
Astronautics and was passed by the House of Representatives ^^
February 8, 1972, by a vote of 256 - 118, and sent to the
Senate.	 The bill would establish an office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) to serve the Congress; OTA would not :itself
perform technology assessments but would initiate and direct
assessments through contracts with nonprofit, academic, industrial,
or ad hoc research groups. Its independence from the Execut.Lve
Branch was stressed; as one of its sponsors told the Congress,
"Let us face it...we in the Congress are constantly
outmanned and outgunned by the expertise of the execu-
tive agencies. We desperately need a stronger sourt,e
of professional advice and information, more immed _o?y
and entirely responsible to use and responsive to the
demands of our own committees in order to more nearly
match those resources in the executive agencies."0-s
The original bill called for OTA to be made up of a Technology
Assessment Board consisting of two Members of the :souse, two
Senators, the Comptroller-General, the Director of the Congres-
sional Research Service, the Director of OTA, and four public
45
U.S. Congress, House, Remarks of Mr. Moshur supporting r:
bill to Establish the Offiowe of Technology Assessment.  Congres-
sional Record, February 8 0 1972 0 H. 867.
5
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members appointed by the President. But in the interest of
{=
	
	 further independence from the Executive Branch, the bill was
 amended on the floor so that the Board would consist of five
Members of the House and five Senators, with the chairmanship
alternating between these twc groups. The Director is to initiate
assessments only at the direction of the Board or of congressional
committees.
A Technology Assessment System for the Executive Branch
Should the Technology Assessment Bill be accepted substantively
by the Senate, the Congress will have established a mechanism
which will provide Congress with technology assessments indepen-
dent of the assessment process in the Executive Branch. Congress
had already passed, at the end of 1969, the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, discussed in a subsequent section of this
chapter, which was designed to improve the planning and evaluation
of technological projects and programs by executive agencies.
The Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development had taken
one further step in this direction by commissioning a fourth
study of technology assessment by the National Academy of Public
Administration. This study was concerned with technology assess-
46
ment in the Executive Branch. 	 This study, which appeared in
July, 1970, concluded that "Technology assessment in the Execu-
tive Branch now suffers from two major drawbacks: (1) the
46 Technology Assessment System for the Executive Branch.
Report of the National Academy of Public Administration to the
Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representa-
tives (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July, 1970).
F.
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participants, institutions, and social interests significantly affected
by the proposed application. Further, each such participant will employ
an alternative-oriented decisional model  to conduct its analysis of the
more promising strategies or courses of action to pursue in order to
achieve the desired assessment outcome.
The System of Technology Assessment comes into operation with respect
to a given application when prompted by an Initiating Event such as a sug-
gestion, recommendation, or proposal from any participant, public or private,
in the System. Or the event may be a crisis or disaster arising from a
technological source or within a social problem context for which a techno-
logical means is sought for its solution or alleviation. Frequently, a
mission--oriented agency will be the initiating entity which sets the System
ti	 in motion, the proposal growing out of its normal planning or R&D activities.
Assuming the usual progression of a promising R&D proposal, the stages will
include: Initiation, Assessment/Planning, Decision/Approval by the Executive
I^
Branch and the Congress, Implementation, Operations, Continuing Appraisal,
and Feed-back. In some instances this Process of Program Implementation
is monitored and regulated by an independent administrative/regulatory
agency. But continuing monitoring and informal assessments will be made by
various entities in the overall System of Technology Assessment/Application.
9
4	 In assessment decisional situations involving the establishment of a statutory
8
See Louis H. Mayo and Ernest M. Jones, "Legal -Policy Decision Process:
Alternative Thinking and the Predictive Function," 33 Geo. Wash. L. R. 318,
354 (1964).
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scheme and an implementing agency, the evolution might be characterized by
the phases of the LLe al/Policy Decision Process of Intelligence, Recommenda-
tion, Prescription, Invocation, Application, Appraisal, and Modification/
Termination.g
It is apparent in locating the evaluative function in the context
of the on-going Effective Public Decision Process that evaluation pervades
the entire process. Assessments are performed for a variety of purposes.10
The evaluation function, including technology assessment, is performed by
a great diversity of public, private and public/private sector entities
with differing authority, objectives, resources, capabilities, experience,
and influence on the decisional process --- evaluation being primarily an
intelligence or enlightenment input of relevant data and analyses. Assess-
ment is carried on by participants having perspectives ranging from the
most exclusive and partisan to the most inclusive and public interest-
oriented. The participants interact in formal and informal forums and in
authoritative decisional arenas. The assessment outcomes of a diversity
of assessment entities must eventually be evaluated by the ultimate
9
Harold D. Lasswell, and Myres S. McDougal., "Jurisprudence in Policy-
oriented Perspective," 19 Fla. L. R. 486, 505 (1967).
10
For example, assessments may be directed to an evaluation of the
total social impacts of a specific technological application, or to certain
specified effects if the application is considered as a source of social
harm or as a means of alleviating an adverse social condition. But the
assessment objective might also be to assess alternative technological
configurations or alternative applications which will conform to a stip-
ulated future social environment, or to make a comparative assessment of
alternative technological applications designed for the same social purpose,
or to make a comparative assessment of alternative technological applications
designed for different or competing social objectives. For illustrations
of various assessments and their particular purposes, see Vary T. Coates,
Exam2les of Technology Assessments For the Federal Government, Staff Discussion
Paper 206, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology o f The George
Washing-on University , January 1970.
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authoritative decision makers, such as the agencies of the Executive and
the Office of Management and Budget, as well as by the legislative com-
mi*tees and sub-committees of the Congress. It would seem essential to
the overall ade quacy of the technology assessment function that thoughtful,
calculated, and understandable national policies be established which will
provide the criteria for evaluation of the social impacts of proposed
technological applications. Otherwise, assessment outcomes, with respect
to particular programs or projects, cannot be evaluated for adequacy and
usefulness by the responsible decision makers. Further, this overall task
of assessment outcome evaluation would seem to rAquire some mutuality of
r.ccommodation among expressed national policies in the major social-
functional areas. 11
But the establirhment of meaningful national policies which can give
guidance to assessing entities is no easy task. Of cou_'se, the assessor
always has the option of measuring effects brought about by the interven-
tion of a technological application in terms of alternative schemes of
social interests or of alternative national policy objectives. This approach
is useful in setting out policy alternatives where no established policy
exists; concomitantly, it may simply stimulate greater divisiveness by
supplying analytical support for more sophisticated advocacy.
See, for example, John W. Gardner, "The Undelivered Message
of John Gardner," The Nash. Post, May 16, 1970, p. A 12, col. 3.
We can t understand our current frustration if we look only at
specific substantive goals in education, housing, employment,
and the like. What is not working is the process and the
mechanisms which should serve us in achieving all of our goals.
- 11 -
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Daniel P. Moynihan has asserted that we are moving from a focus on
;I independent programs which "relate to a single part of the system"i
to policy which "seeks to respond to the system in its entirety."12
He expects this movement to be a definitive trend in the 1970'x.13
In short, we are giving increasing attention to total social problem
contexts or social systems as contrasted with programs directed toward
particular parts of such systems which are not coordinated by an overall
policy. " (A) policy approach to government . . . (seeks) tc encompass
the largest possible range of phenc,nena and concerns. " 14 Moynihan cites
the 1956 Interstate and Defense Highway System as the "largest public
works program in history ,15 and states that the eventual judgment will
be that it has "had more influence on the shape and development of
American cities, the distribution of population within metropolitan
1
areas, and across the nation as a whole, the location of industry and
various kinds of employment opportunities (and in all these, immense
influence on race relations and the welfare of black Americans) than
any initiative of the middle third of the 20th Century. " 16 But he also
concludes that " the politics of getting the Interstate highway Program
enacted, decreed, or at least indicated, the narrowest possible defini-
tion of its purposes and impact . 1117 However one might assess this
judgment, it is correct that President Eisenhower's Message to Congress
12
Daniel. P. Moynihan, "The Concept of Public Policy in the 1970's,"
Speech given at Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1970, p. 5.
13	 14	 15
Idem at 7.	 Idem at 11.	 idem aL 15.
16	 17
Ibid.	 Idem at 17.
r^
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on the National Highway Program of February 22, 1955, attached the Report
of the Presidential Advisory Committee on A Ten Year National Highway
Program which focused its attention on the "Nation's highway system,
other modes of transportation being explicitly excluded. ,18 But within
the social sub-system thus posited, both the Advisory Committee and the
Report of the House Committee on Public Works displayed an intention to
include all significant social interactions and effects of the proposed
"National highway system." As the author of this paper has observed
elsewhere:
The Congressional Committee Report shows that an extremely
wide range of engineering, financial, and social factors
was considered. From our present perspective, however, we
would note that some factors were given no attention what-
ever. The Advisory Committee and the Congress seemed to be
much more concerned with the efficient implementation of the
highway program rather than with cumulative and qualitative
social. impacts, particularly those which might be detrimental.
No consideration was given to increasing environmental pollu-
tion which would result from the growing traffic volume: air
pollution from exhausts, engine noise, resulting aesthetic
debasement, or the derivative health Lazards from the fore-
going sources. Nor was a great deal of attention given to
the relationship between the increased number and size of
motor freight carriers and the possil a increased hazards to
private auto drivers and passengers. l)
The above quoted passage should be considered as illustrative of the
prevailing public concerns (or the lack thereof) of the middle 1950's,
and not as a criticism of the Presidential Advisory Committee and
Congressional evaluators. But Moynihan comments with reference to the
planning and implementation of the Interstate Highway System by the
bureau of Public Roads:
18	 19
Mayo supra note 1, at 18. 	 Idem at 19.
i
s
As bureaucrats, their instinct was faultless. Had anyone
realized %mat they Caere in fact doing, the sheer magnitude
of the interests they were affecting, it is nigh impossible
to imagine that they would have won acceptance. Indeed a
bare fifteen years after the Interstate program commenced,
it is near impossible to get a major highway program approved
in most large American cities. But it is too late: most
systems have been built. In the process -- such at least
would be my views --- quite appalling mistakes were made, but
they were mistakes having to do with issues nominally alto-
gether unrelated to the highwaypr0ogram itself, and so no
one was responsible for them....
Surely it is possible to hope for something; more. Government
must seek out its hidden policies, raising them to a level of
consciousness and acceptance -- or rejection --- and acknowledge-
ment of the extraordinary range of contradictions that are typ-
ically encountered .... Surely also it is possible to hope for a
career civil service that is not only encouraged, but ^Iquired
to see their activities in the largest possible scope.
Despite the foregoing suggestions of lack of policy guidance in
terms of formulations which encompass broad social problem contexts or
inclusive social systems, we do have many commendable policy statements
directed to critical social problem contexts in our statutory schemes,
as for example: Employment Act of 1946, Housing Act of 1949 and sub-
sequent reiterations, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Civil Rights
Act of 1964, etc. So the deficiency may not be entirely due to a lack
20
Moynihan supra note 12, at 17.
21
Idem at 18.
This discussion of the re--assessment of the Interstate Highway
Program suggests the question of the extent to which the new National Rail
Passenger Corporation, which commences management of intercity rail passen-
ger service as of May 1, 1971, has been evaluated for "total social impacts"
with respect to its operations. See DOT Release of Jan. 28, 1971, { 2071.
See also, Tom Wicker, "Rescuing the Iron Horse," N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1970,
p. 15E, col. 4.
3
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of well formulated policy. It is also a matter of determination to carry
out stated policy including the willingness to allocate sufficient resources
for the development of adequate planning and assessing capabilities as well
t,
as to implementation/enforcement functions.22
An intense concern has now emerged for a reorientation of social goals
expressed by formulations such as "the qualitative society," a "livable
	 f
environment," and "balanced social growth." 
23 
There is definitely a trend,
22
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., "The Rhetoric and the Reality," The
Wash. Post, June 4, 1970, p. A 16, col. 3.
Certain indicators raise serious doubts as to the extent of the
public's interest in environmental pollution abatement when actually
confronted with the cost. See Sylvia Porter„ "You Will Pay For
Pollution Controls," in the Wash. Star, Sept. 23, 1970, p. F 6, col. 3.
In an editorial, "Missing the Message on Billboards," The Wash. Post,
Sept. 22, 1970, p. A 20, col. 1, makes the following comment:
	 4
One of the funnier games that politicians occasionally play is to
pass a law one day and then help break it the next. Except that
not everyone finds it funny. In 1965, Congress enacted the Highway
Beautification Act which said, among other things, that all bill-
boards were to come doom by July 1, 1970, from rural sections of the
interstate and primary highway systems. This meant some 800,000 signs
bordering 235,000 miles of roadway. Now, five years and two months
later, the billboards are still up. What's worse, a fair chance
exists that they may stay up.
23
See Institutions for the Effective Management of the Environment,
a Report of the Environmental Studies Group to the Environmental Studies
Board of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of
Engineering, Part I, January 1970.
See also A Strategy for a Livable Environment, a Report to the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, by the Task Foxce on
Environmental Health and Related Problems, June 1967, and the Report
of the National Goals Resea-ch Staff, Toward Balanced Growth: Quantity
with Qualit3r, Washington, D. C.: The White House, July 4, 1970. On the
urgent need for "balanced and purposeful growth" see George H. Brown,
Director of the Bureau of the Census, "Looking to 1985 - and the Dangers
of an Affluent Majority," Washington Post, Dec. 29, 1970, p. A 14, col. 3.
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of which technology assessment is but one aspect, to adopt a more "balanced"
orientation toward social advance. 24 This involves the development of
indicators of social change and the means of measuring and evaluating such
change. This orientation toward the introduction of greater rationality
into the process of applying resources to social goals obviously involves
an increasing degree of selectivity among social goals, deliberateness in
choice of means, and criteria for making such determinations.25
24
A major shift in social value priorities has been urged, that is
from a concept of "The machine-conditioned utopia . . . based on power,
property, productivity, profit, and publicity" to one of "an organic world-
picture in the center of which stands man himself." See discussion of
Lewis Mumford's book, The Pentagon of Power (1970) in Business Week,
November 14, 1970, p. 6.
"For the first time in the nation's history, environmental questions
are figuring importantly in the campaigning in many states in this fall's
elections." N. Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1970, p. 1, col. 6.
25
The strong movement toward the reappraisal of priority social values
is reflected in the following statement concerning Robert S. McNamara, Presi-
dent of the World Bank, Wash. Star, Sept. 21, 1970, A 13, col. 1:
The former U. S. Secretary of Defense hit hard at military expendi-
tures when he told finance ministers and central bank governors
from 116 nations, "That 20 times more should be spent on military
power than on constructive progress appears to me to be the mark of
an ultimate and, 1 sometimes fear, incurable folly."
He said it was "inconceivable" to him that Americans accept a situation
in which they form 6% of the world's population but consume 40% of its
resources and "contribute less than their fair share to the development
of the emerging nations."
McNamara also said population planning is imperative because the world's
present population of 3.5 billion would not become stationary until 2120
at which time it would be at 15 billion.
r^
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We are moving from a situation of relative randomness to one of social
selectivity in technological development. 26
 Neither unalloyed technological
development nor unrestrained economic growth is any longer assumed an unmixed
blessing. 27 Both have been strongly related to and held responsible for a
26
"A Nation Seeks its Goals," The Futurist, Vol. IV, No. 4, August 1970,
p. 116.
"This Nation's relationship to technology may be approaching a
reorientation as drastic as the apparently impending change of
relationship of man to his environment. For the first time,
there seems to be a serious commitment to a deliberate and
cautious approach to the introduction and use of technology."
(Quote from Report of National Goals Research Staff).
The purpose of evaluating the impact of technology is both to
enable society to refrain from introducing technology that might do more
harm than good and to enable technology to be introduced in such a way
that institutional change may be made with greater deliberation.
27
See Edwin L. bale, "The Economics of Pollution," N. Y. Times Magazine,
Apr. 18, 1970, p. 1, and J. Alan Wager, "Growth Versus the Quality of Life,"
Science, June 5, 1970, p. 1179.
See also, Benjamin C. Marble, "Who Needs the SST?" (Review of Technopolis
Social Control of the Uses of Science, by Nigel Calder, New York: Simon &
Schuster), Book World Section, The Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1970, p. 8.
Calder's witty and well-organized study of the relatively orderly
Technopolis we live in now is written to show the consequences of
an uncontrolled, world-wide, slavish adoption, of the philosophy
that more is better. This is a philosophy that assumes the virtues
of genetic prefiguration, the superiority of predominately white,
western peoples, and all the solutions professed during the past
twenty years by the sales-oriented builders of rockets, weaponry
and gross national product. Calder knows that
	 else is
needed, and while he doesn't pretend to have all the answers, he
asks a lot of the right questions in Technopolis.
st`	 ^V
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policy of unlimited consumption and, hence, as direct contributors to
the deterioration of both the social and natural environments. 28 This
emerging public attitude that technological resources along with others
should be emploved to maximize social gains and minimize social costs is
reflected in policy declarations such as that of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969. This Act states in part that we take action
"to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain condi-
tions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony. 	 ."
Such concepts as "social indicators," "social systems analysis," and
"technology assessment," represent the -L:slytical dimension of this quest
for a new value orientation.
28
Hans H. °andsberg, "Villains Obscure Some Rea]. Keys to Pollution,"
The Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 1970, p. B 3, col. 1.
For it is high per capita consumption based on high per capita
income, combined with a sophisticated and powerful technology, that
accounts for the major facets of environmental pollution in the
United States today. Behind technology and income, size and growth
of population run a poor third.
r
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>.	 lI - Contextual Approach to Technology Assessment
What is the critical change in our conceptual approach and supporting
analytical techniques that is implied in the previous discussion? Basically,
it is the need for an inclusive, comprehensive concept of the evaluative
function in the planning and development of new programs and projects,
technological or otherwise, in the support of national policy goals.29
29
See Mayo, supra note 1, at 5.
Consider also the following statement:
People have long known that technology can have undesirable
second-order consequences, the Goals Staff says. What seems
to be new is:
1. Technology is becoming both more voluminous and more
complicated.
2. The complexity of much new technology makes it more
difficult to anticipate how it will do its primary job.
3. As our understanding of biological, ecological, economic,
and social processes improves, we are struck with the com-
plexity of the consequences which technology can produce.
4. We have a growing determination and belief in our capacity
to evaluate the second-order consequences of all our actions,
including the use of technology, and to include their costs
in our policy making process.
"A Nation Seeks Its Goals," The Futurist, August 1970, p. 116.
Another variation is presented in the statement of Charles J. Zwick.,
President of Southeast Bancorporation, Miami, Florida, in Economic Analysis
and the Efficiency of Government, bearings before the Subcommittee on Economy
in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Congress, 1st Sess. Part 1:
Aug. 12; Sept. 16 and 19, 1969, p. 165:
Simply stated, congressional_ interest and capacity are absolutely
essential to major advances in the executive branch of Government,
because of this interaction between congressional interest and the
focus of the senior officials in the executive branch.
As we have seen, this involves the recognition that numerous participants 	 3
having different objectives, resources, and capabilities interact in various
forums and decisional arenas and that these interactions can lead to lost
i i	 opport amities as well as serious social detriments if left unexplored. Such
f
	
	 interactions among participants, institutions, and social values may be
conceived of as a social. system. A system, however, is often perceived as
a relatively stable pattern of interactions which can be identified and
displayed, schematically or otherwise, by cybernetic feed-back loops. Perhaps
it is more useful in the present state of the art to think of a "total social,
impact" or "contextual" approach to technology assessment rather than in
terms of inclusive, comprehensive and highly sophisticated "systems" with
29 (continued)
A second major area for improving analysis capability of the
Government is additional work on the distributional impact of programs.
In bri..ef, how does the program affect various regions and client groups?
Most analyses have ignored these issues. (italics added.)
Economists, in particular, like to emphasize the efficiency aspect
of a program, ignoring the distributional impact of program changes.
If I learned anything in my three and a half years in Washington it was
that Members of congress are very much concerned with distributional
impact. How does it affect their constituents in particular, and more
generally, given their basic political orientation, what groups are
favored and what groups are disadvantaged by a special course of action?
The distributional impact of policy changes should be a standard
requirement for an analysis effort. in the excellent volume the committee
produced earlier this session, Professor James T. Bonnea of the Michigan
State University discusses 4his problem and points out that it is almost
impossible to find data on distributional impacts of Federal programs.
But until analyses provide information on Lhis issue, they will. con"inue
to be politely received and then set aside as not completely relevant to
the serious business of congressional decL ionmaking.
i
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all feedback loops meticulously incorporated in the analytical model.
On the other hand we need not close our eyes to the fact that we are
dealing with social systems. The social impacts of an application on
participants, institutions, processes, and social interests, and the
accompanying interactions may not only induce modifications in the pro-
blem context delineated for examination with respect to the design,
operations, regulation, and use of the posited application, but also
affect related social problem contexts. Changes induced in other social
systems may ultimately feed back into and affect the primary social
problem context.
Attitudes toward and concepts of the evaluative function will
certainly differ. 30 But in any event, the contextual approach of
30
No doubt the controversy will continue for sometime over the
advantages and limitations of decisions based on the intuition of exper-
ience on the one hand the rational/contextual approach on the other.
Kenneth Boulding has stated that:
The great danger of rationality is of course suboptimization, that
is, finding and choosing the best position or part of the system
which is not the best for the whole. Too many people, indeed, and
especially too many experts, devote their lives to finding the best
way of doing something that should not be done at all. Decision
making by instinct, gossip, visceral feeling, and political savvy
may stand pretty low on the scale of total rationality, but it
may have the virtue of reing able to take in very large systems in
a crude and vague way, whereaa the rationalized processes can only
take subsystems in their more exact fashion, and being rational about
subsystems may be worse than being not very rational about the system
as a wholes. I would not argue, of course, that rationality about
the system as a whole is impossible. On the other hand, the economist
has a certain mind-:;et in favor of hi-s own skills, and it is easy
for him to leave out essential variables with which he is not
femiliar. Here, indeed, a little learning may be a dangerous thing,
or even a little rationality.
1
w	a
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attempting to trace through systematically, insofar as practicable,
the full social implications of a technological application as it
affects participants, institutions, resources, and social interests,
seems a definite advance over narrowly defined and exclusive "systems"
which have characterized most assessment efforts in :he past. 31
30 (continued)	 r
Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Economics of Knowledge and the
Knowledge of Economics," Paper given at the American Economic Associa-
tion, Dec. 29, 1965, p. 14-15.
Consider the following statement by Daniel P. Moynihan:
I refer to what Jay Forrester has termed the "counter-
intuitive" mature of social problems. We learn to think,
Forrester assures us, in simple loop systems. Social problems
arise out of complex systems. The two are not alike, so it is
asserted by men who ought to know. There are fundamentally
different properties, such that a good common sense judgment
about the one will lead with fair predictability to illusions
about the other. Thus Forrester: "With a high degree of
confidence we can say that the intuitive solution to the problems
of complex social systems will be wrong most of the time."
Moynihan, summa note 12, at 20.
31
See in this connection Garrett Hardin, "To Trouble A Star:
The Cost of Intervention in Nature," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Jan. 1970, p. 20:
Economics employs partial analysis to reach its decisions.
This defect is not essential to the subject of economics, but
it is traditional. Because of the increasing pressure of
population and because of our greater knowledge of the conse-
quences of our actions, economics is being rapidly altered
away from its classical mold in the direction of ecology.
The public interest in every proposal will in the future weigh
more and more heavily in reaching decisions on the expenditure
Of public moneys. Cost-benefit analyses must be carried out
within an intellectual framework that comes closer to incorpor-
ating the total system.
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Policy statements in statutory schemes and executive orders usually
set forth broad social objectives. Such policies are in turn supported
by one or a variety of programs and projects directly and indirectly
through programs designed primarily to serve related social policies.
Policy guidance with respect to national social goals therefore provides
the measurement standards which would be employed (at least as one scheme
of social values) in a total social impact assessment of a particular
program or project. As is evident, however, from the previous exposition
of the Effective Public Decision Process and the System of Technological
Assessment/Application, a comprehensive framework for technology assess-
ment of a major intervention into the social process will involve a
sequence of analytical operations of which a national social policy
or policies will provide only one of multiple inputs.
Recognition of the need for a reinforced technology assessment
function and its regularized application is only the first phase of what
must be a continuing process. The really critical point is the adequacy
with which assessments are performed. The notion of adequacy can be
understood only with an appreciation of the full scope of operations
involved in the assessment process.
Assessment tasks can be expected to differ considerably depending
upon many factors, such as the study parameters set by the sponsoring
agency or by the initiating assessment entity, by the nature of the
particular application, and by the resources of the assessing entity.
:fence, we can anticipate a variety of assessment methodologies. If we
assume for present purposes that a major new technological 1^)plication
f
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large metropolitan areas) are proposed for introduction into a future
social environment, then it would appear that the following types of
organizational/analytical operations are essential:
Preparatory Phase:
• 'Tentative specification of the time sequence of tasks to be
performed in order to achieve the objective of the assessment.
• Provisional organization of the assessment group staff into
Social Impact Task Units related to social sub-processes
(Institutional-value contexts) as contrasted with conven-
tional academic disciplines or professional identifications.
For example:
Effective Public Decision Process (National and
International)
• Economic Institutions and Processes
Knowledge and Skill Institutions and Processes
• Urban and Regional Developmental Processes
Social Behavioral Patterns: Standards of Conduct,
Interpersonal Relations, etc.
Processes for Exercising Volitional Options in the
Social Environment: Well-being: Access to goods,
services, etc.
• Processes Affecting the quality of the Natural Environment
• Instruction of the assembled staff in the overall methodology of the
study and techniques for evaluating social impacts.
Execution Phase:
• Establishment of baseline data on the existing Social Environment.
Establishment of baseline data on the R&D status of the relevant
technology or technologies.
• ProJecti.on of future social environments within the prescribed
time frame: extrapolations, deliberate interventions, and
contingencies.
Imposition of the proposed technological. application (or alter-
native applications) on the projected future social environments.
f
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Identification of the significant effects or changes which will
necessarily, probably, or possibly occur during the initiation,
implementation and operational stages of the application (or
applications).
Selection of those effects to be fully analyzed and evaluated 	 r
to determine the social impacts of the application.
' Identification of the participants, institutions, processes, and
	 t
social interests affected by the changes brought about by the
introduction of the application into the projected future social
environments.
• Social impact analysis of such effects in terms of their probability,
magnitude, duration and social desirability or undesirability with
respect to the affected participants, institutions, processes, and
social values.
' Measurement of the social impacts in such manner (as aggregates or
particularized) as to render them usable inputs into a rational
decision process.
Presentation of the assessment outcome in terms of 1) an overall
social cost/benefit ratio; or in terms of 2) critical policy
issues which take into account the significant changes flowing
from the technological intervention and the social impacts
resulting therefrom; or by 3) the alignment of basic findings
with R&D requirements and with further social impact assessment
needs.
The foregoing operations seem .logical and straightforward, but one must
be aware of the uncertainties and difficulties involved in certain of the
operations, particularly the evaluation of social impacts. Various projec-
tions must be made. Not only must technological development foretaste
be made, but assumptions are required with respect to the conditions of
operation, managerial skills to be applied, and the reaction to such
operations by those who will be affected. Models of the manner in which
participants (individuals and organizations) will behave or be expected
- 25 -
to behave must be posited. Serious .deficiencies now exist in our
capability for "future--oriented" thinking.32
Further, the degree of social impact will depend u pon the extent
of use, or what is assumed to be the extent of use, of tha subject
technology. We have often in the past probably seriously underestimated
the scale of application (private automobiles, television, etc.). 33
The scale of use varies with such factors as the perceived utility, the
affluence. of the society, and the number of people or entities in the
"market." The aggregate use of technologies by an American citizen is
many times greater than that of the average Indian citizen. Hence, the
32
On the need to develop new professional skills to diagnose complex
social systems in modern, dynamic society, see Edgar H. Schein, "The Role
Innovator and His Education," Technology Review, October/November 1970,
p. 34. See also, Erich Jantsch, "Planning and Designing for the Future,"
Futures, September 1969, p. 440.
33
The automobile had a relatively slow start. See the interesting
discussion of the evolution and impact of the automobile on American soci-
ety by Samuel Eliot Morison in The Oxford HistoEy of the American Peo le,
The Great Change 1907-1939: "1. The Auto and the Ad Man," 419 (1965)•
To introduce a touch of humor into otsr predictive capability, or
better, fallibility, we might reach back even further and consider a quote
from Scientific American for July 1899 which appears in Reason Awake: Sci-
ence for Man by Rene Dubos (1970), p. 95.
The improvement in city conditions by the general
adoption of the motor car can hardly be overestim-
ated. Streets clean, dustless, and odorless, with
light rubber-tired vehicles moving swiftly and noise-
lessly over their smooth expanse, would eliminate
a greater part of the nervousness, distraction, and
strain of modern metropolitan life.
k
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potential for both technological abuse as well as technological benefit
is Ysr greater in America than in India. 34 From the foregoing discussion
it is apparent that there are limitations on what'can be expected from 	 ff
Technology Assessment. But this much can at least be said: 'technology
Assessment can alert all affected participants to the probable social
impacts of a given application unier specified conditions. 35 This in
itself is an advance toward more rational social behavior.
34
Sae W. H. Davis, New Republic-, Jan. 10, 1970, p. 13; also
Frank S. Hopkins, "America and the World: The Future," (:address
delivered at the 2nd Annual Institute of Sociology at Muskingum
College, New Concord, Ohio, March 8, 1970), in an attachment to
the World Future Society Bulletin., Vol. III, No. 9, Sept. 1970, p. 3.
35
See generally Lederbexg, Joshua, "TA Can Help Prevent Some
Historic Mistakes," Washington Post, January 24, 1971, p. B 2, col,. 1.
r
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IV - Social Problems and the "Technolo&Leal Fix"
The previous section has alluded to a variety of questions which
would be posed and examined in a comprehensive assessment of the prob-
able future implications of an adequate technology assessment function.
This section will be limited to a discussion of special aspects of the
potential implications of assessment outcomes for social action programs.
Specifically, what might be the implications for the selection of means
of coping with social problems and how will such means (in particular
technological applications) be related to or integrated with prescrip-
tions concerning control over the mode of introduction, manner of
operation, and restrictions on the use of resulting products or services?
This formulation encompasses two tdpi.cs'which have usually been treated
separately: 1) the impact of a reinforced assessment function on techno-
logical innovation and 2) the concept of "technological fix."
One of the principal arguments that has been made against an enhanced
technology assessment function is that it will have an inhibiting impact
on technological development. 49 While it certainly may, in given instances,
tag
The National Goals Staff cautioned that:
Technology assessment must not become "technology ar_estment ."
Fortunately, parallel to the technology assessment movement, there
is an emerging "technology transfer" movement dedicated to finding
a fuller range of uses for existing and new technology.
"A Nation Seeks Its Goals," The Futurist, Aug. 1970, p. 116.
See also, Leon Green,
The Attacks on Scied.ce and Technology. Paper presented at Professional
Seminar Series on the Processes of Technology Assessment, The George
If
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have limiting implications as to how or when or where a technology is
to be applied and to the level of operations, one of the main contentions
49 (continued)
The following views of Edward E. David, the President's science
advisor, are relevant to this matter:
LOSING OUR NERVE TO EXPERIMENT?
Eduard E: David, Jr., the President's science adviser, believes
this country is losing its technological nerve.
David told a science writers seminar last week that the American
public is becoming increasingly alienated from rational ways of thought.
"There are many evidences that society does not believe that technology
can be controlled in a rational way," he said. "Because of that,
society is losing its courage to experiment. This trend leads to
disaster for it divorces our decision-makers from reality."
David said that "sae must not place limitations on biological
experiments" despite warnings from Quch eminent scientists as
James D. Watson, Harvard Nobelist, that genetic engineering may lead
to test-tube babies and a host of ethical and social problems. David
also reiterated his opinion that we should build two prototype super-
sonic transports (SST's) to determine whether the-technical and
environmental problems can be overcome so that it.becomes feasible
to build a fleet of SST's. Finally, he cited the negative reaction
given by the National Academy of Sciences to suggestions by Nobelist
William Shockley that research should be performed in an effort to
identify characteristics peculiar to different races.
"Make no mistake," he said, "a limitation on experimentation in
whatever cause is the beginning of a wider suppression. When we fail
to experiment, we fail. In failing, we bring the best part of
American society as we know it today to a'halt.
"Already we see timidity in new undertakings,." David continued.
"We require overanalysis before we are willing to find out what are
the real possibilities. If these trends progress, our society will
become dull, stodgy, and altogether stagnant." --P. M. B.
Science, March 5, 1971, p. 875.
i
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made herein is that technology assessment may have far more serious
implications for general social behavior, individual and organizational.
It is not just the technological/industrial sector which may experience
limitations on the promotion of an aver-expanding market through popula-
tion growth and the stimrs.Lation of demand through advertising, lobbying
activities, and political manipulations. 50 Almost all segments of society
will in some measure be affected, beneficially and adversely, in this
effort to apply science and technology like other resources in the rational
pursuance of priority social needs. In many areas, RFD for technological
progress should be expedited, not slowed. 51 We certainly need some
alternative to the conventional internal combustion engine and a quieter
aircraft jet engine. We need better means of public transportation,
better means of waste disposal, better housing and sanitary facilities
50
Robert Gomer, "The Tyranny of Progress," Sullettn of the Atomic
Scientists, February 1968, p. 4, 7.
For the technological revolution, negative feedbacks have so far
been feeble or lacking, in large measure, of course, because the
gains have been enormous and visible; the ill effects have been
slower to make themselves felt, and have been obscured or justified
by the gains. On the other hand there are strong positive feedbacks
which tend to spur uncontrolled, unplanned expansion. Chief of these
is economic pressure -- pressure for doing things most cheaply regard-
less of ultimate cost to the society, and pressure for stimulating
population growth in order to increase consumer markets.
51
We have hardly begun to make effective use of cybernetic concepts,
automatic data processing, and simulation techniques. See the various
suggestions in: John S. Saloma, "System Politics: The presidency and
Congress in the Future" Technology Review, December 1968, pp. 23-33; and
E. S. Savas, "Cybernetics in City Hall" ' S6ience, May 29, 1970, p. 1066.-*
ai
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Automobile Pollution Olean up the exhaust of
the car; support pri-
vate enterprise in
this attempt.
Lowrie, Ritchie P., "The New Religeocology:
Salvation or Soporific?", Social Policy, July/
August 1970, pp. 46, 48.
for much of our population. But perhaps we do not need to drive a private
auto as much; or live as close to airports; or dispose of so much trash;
or continue uncoordinated zoning practices; or abide archaic institutional
positions which stand in the tray of introducing needed socio-technical
innovations; or expand the population without limit.52
52
The number of cars, trucks mind buses registered In this country
is increasing twice as fast as the human population, according to
figures released by the Department of Transportation.
"Vehicles Outpacing Human Population," N. Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1970,
p. 85, cal. 1.
One observer views the matter in the following perspective:
In rsummary, the new religeocology to date promises more soporific
than salvation precisely at that time when salvation may be rapidly
escaping attainment. This situation will continue so long as
politicians and other leaders see the ecology crusade as merely
a way in which basic problems and schisms can be forgotten and as
long as citizens insist upon life as usual with a minimum of disrup-
tion and inconvenience. However, as the recognition of the real
nature of these problems develops in many groups and the ecology
crusade begins to seek radical solutions, we can anticipate a
heightened politicization of the issues and an increased conflict
with vested interests and privileges. Americans should not be afraid
of this possibility, since that is the direction in which true salva-
tion may lie.
For example:
Ecological Problem
	
Religeocology Answer 	 Radical Questions
Shouldn't we consider
abandoning the auto-
mobile as a meaningful
mode of mass transpor-
tation? Even if we clean
up exhausts, what about
traffic congestion, noise,
accidents, and the dis-
posal of abandoned cars?
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Presumably the great benefit of technology is that it provides an
increasingly effective and flexible means of satisfying human needs and
aspirations; it provides -- or should provide --- for an ever improving
social environment, not merely a greater selection of technological options.
Technology assessment is advanced as a means by Which we can better employ
technology for expanding social options such as access to goods, services,
and the enjoyment of social-cultural amenities. 53 But some observers
53
In this connection consider the following comment on the views of
Buckminster 'Fuller in the Wash. Evening Star, Oct. 23, 1970, p. B 1, col. 3:
Basic to the game is Fuller's idea that mankind still functions --
badly -- on the Malthusian concept of scarcity of resources. This
concept, he believes, is the phychological underpinning for nation-
states and the cause of such things as "pollution." Such local
political units and problems will disappear, he predicts, when men
become aware of the availability of natural and man-made resources
on a worldwide basis.
TECHNOLOGY TO ACT
Most importantly, perhaps, Fuller obviously believes man now
possesses the technology to act, once he is provided with inform-
ation on the scale that the computer has made possible.
The results of the World Game, he says, will be to enable "all
humanity to enjoy the whole planet Earth without any individual
profiting at the expense of another and without interference with
one another."
Of course, action programs following from certain persuasive assess-
ment outcomes could in fact reduce certain kinds of social options
(in terms of individual choice), i.e., imposition of birth control
regulations or restraints on land use.
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suggest that since we have let technological innovation, application, and
use, expand without heeding the full social consequences, it is already
too late to introduce a strengthened assessment function. 54 Of course,
it is not too late for this effort, but it may very well be too late for
us reasonably to expect a continuing enlargement of social options during
the short term. 55
 Assessment outcomes over the past few years have clearly
54
See Moynihan supra note 12, at 18; and consider the review of
The City by John V. Lindsay (New York City: Norton Press, 1970) in which
Harold Lavine states:
Yet, as every New Yorker can attest, the city is becoming more and
more unlivable -- even for the upper middle class. Crime in the
streets is steadily increasing; the streets themselves are becoming 	
;k
dirtier and noisier; and traffic, more and more tangled; the schools i.
are continuing to deteriorate, and heroin addiction among the young`>
has grown alarmingly in middle-class neighborhoods. More important
	 f
still, the feeling of helplessness and of alienation is spreading.
"Book Review Section," Saturday Review, Apr. 11, 1970, p. 25.'
55
For a stimulating discussion of possible impending crises over
the next few decades see John Platt, "What We Must Bo," Science, Nov. 28,
1969, p. 1115.
As far as the long term is concerned, Frank S. Hopkins comments in
"America and the World, The Future," (Address delivered at the 2nd Annual
Institute of Sociology at Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio, Mar. 8,
1970), in an attachment to the Bulletin of the World Future Society,
Vol. ITT, No. 9, Sept., 1970:
I am more optimistic about 2001 than I am about 1984, since it seems
to me that we have more options open for the more distant date and
more lead-time in which to set in motion necessary social reforms
which will be vital to our destiny. p. 6.
Hopkins is less optimistic about the near future:
Bat when I think about 1984, I find myself beset with many gloomy
thoughts. It seems to me that it is going to take the leaders and
policy-makers of the world, pr-dded on by all thoughtful people,
1
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demonstrated that severe curbs must be imposed on the application and use
of certain technologies If we are not to greatly diminish certain desirable
social conditions, such as a non-polluted environment which we have enjoyed
in the past. This does not necessarily inhibit technological innovation as
a continuing process. It may mean that the direction .of future R&D will be
subject to certain guidelines or constraints. And it could mean that the
operators-managers and the users-consumers will find certain traditional
areas of autonomous, volitional behavior severely constricted.
Technological applications surely contribute to the enjoyment of life,
i.e., recreation, mobility, health services, etc. 	 But it is also apparent
that modern medical technology has helped sustain a growing population.56
55 (continued)
most, if not all, of the next 14 years to change their attitudes
toward the future.	 Mankind must learn to think in completely
different terms from the ideologies of the past if our civilization
is to survive.	 In the next 14 years we must change many of our
traditional value systems and execute many basic social and political
reforms.	 This will not happen automatically.	 We are going to have
'
0
to endure many grave crises before we make up our American and global
minds as to the nature of our problems and challenges and the kinds
of policies we are going to have to pursue. 	 In short, things are
going to have to get worse before they get better, and 1984 may well
be just about the low point, the true nadir, of the history of Western
ii civilization.	 (P- 9)#
56
Egypt, like developing countries around the world, is undergoing
a runaway population growth as a result of the impact of improved health
care, medicines, vaccines, disinfectants and insecticides in reducing
s,
centuries-long high death rates. 	 {
ti
Raymond R. Anderson, "Egypt Turns on Her Internal Enemy:	 The Birth
Rate," N. Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1970, p. 4, col. 1.
y k
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Our increasing population, while demanding the products and services
provided by modern technology, in turn produces much of the environ-
mental pollution incidental to the use of such teLhnologies. This con-
sumer pollution is supplemented by the wastes and pollutants of the
industries essential to produce the desired consumer products and serv-
ices. Hence, we are confronted with an ascending spiral of technology,
population, and pollution. 57
 Might advancing technology itself provide
the means by which we can extricate ourselves from a seemingly hopeless
situation? Waste water can be recycled, purified and reused. An elec-
tric-powered auto could replace the gasoline combustion engine and sub-
stantially abate air pollution. But while we may be able to clean up
waste water by purely technological means without causing serious immed-
iate or long-term side-effects, it is not so clear that an efficient
and economical electric car could replace the internal combustion engine
within a brief time span without serious dislocations in the economy.
The existing institutional structure, including manufacturers, component
suppliers, dealers, fuel and repair servicing organizations, and related
activities of lending institutions, insurance companies, and consumer
groups can hardly be phased out or drastically-restructured over a few
years without serious social costs.
The technology assessment function will ultimately not be judged
from the standpoint of the degree of control imposed on technological
innovation but by the measure of its contribution to the advancement
ii
i
k
57
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of major national goals. The latter, broader standard of performance
of the assessment function clearly encompasses some degree of guidance
or control over society's use of technology. A regularized assessment
function would not likely introduce a serious inhibiting factor on
research activity or even on applied research to the development stage. 	 f;
But the assessment function would probably lead to much closer scrutiny
of the likely effects which would be produced by new technologies as
they are moved into the implementation and operational stages. Conceiv-
ably such appraisals could feedback into the R&D process and diminish
the aggregate level of R &D resources. On the other hand, the assessment
function may have no effect on the level of research and development
activity but rather on the type of R&D undertaken. Much more study and
experience will be needed before such questions can be satisfactorily
answered. But as heretofore stressed, the impact of the assessment
function on the process of technological innovation cannot be viewed
apart from the social contexts in which the application operates or is
to be introduced. These contexts involve p Cple, their functions,
desires, and associations. Technology assessment must apply models of
how ail affected participants will behave in response to the introduction
of an application into a future social environment through the initiation,
implementation, and operational stages of the new application. Significant
participants will be circumscribed in their own sub-context of other
a
interacting participants with given functions, objectives, resources and
constraints, and available forums and decisional arenas in which claims
are asserted for preferred outcomes. Radiating effects are of all kinds,	
a
certainly not restricted to simple, direct cause-effect relationships. 	 {
r
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The basic lesson which will most likely be driven home by a vigorous
technology assessment function is that the correction of a social dis-
location, or the achievement of a new, significant social objective,
will involve an intricate context of interrelated participants, institu-
tions, processes, and social interests. We know this, supposedly, but
we do not always talk as if we do and we seldom act in accord with this
obvious proposition. For example, we still tend to talk in terms of a	 r
"fix," technological or otherwise, as if there are unlimited potentialities
for one-factor solutions to complex social problems. But as noted, assess-
went outcomes will most likely be translated into social action programs
which will have far-ranging implications, including deprivations, on
numerous entities, population segments, and institutional frameworks --
not solely on the technological system. There may be situations in which
the solution or the alleviation of a serious social problem will revolve
around a technological innovation or can be provided by a legal inter-
vention, or by economic manipulations. But most solutions will require
an articulated combination of means. 58
{
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De Jouvenel seems to agree:
P'	 Se warns "against a mindless extension of forecasting practices
from narrow technical problems where they may be applied, almost auto-
matically, to more complex social and political realms where there must
i be a premium on wisdom and sophisticated insight."
"Only through profound insight into the political process and
the transformation of ideas can we progress to sound estimates of
social change on a large scale. Thus planning is not for technocrats
but for humanists deeply respectful of the human condition and its
social manifestations."
r
is that the one--factor "fix" for social problem abatement or solution should
j
be approached with some degree of caution. But this is not to dismiss the
r;
`	 notion of the 'technological fix." Indeed, if a single means appears to
provide an approximate solution to an existing problem or the achievement
i
of a Q__ia oi.A.,... e___	 z_
.,,I..cti-Ya, hea Lhe accompanying economy of effort and sharpness
isy•^-^
58 (continued)
Philip C. Ritterbush,.reviewing The Art of Conjecture by Bertrand
de Jouvenel, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1967, p. 34.
Those who have undertaken to analyze complex social problem areas
recognize the need for the contextual approach,
i
	
	
Resolution of the Florida jetport question with least environmental
cost the study group found required consideration of population
i	 growth and location, protection of water supplies, proper allocation
kof resources for agriculture, sound development of public transpor-
tation, insurance of attractive living conditions, and "protection
of . . . unique national resources." The diversity of considerations
necessarily involves a multiplicity of agencies whose decisions
contribute to an environmental effect; this is the governmental lesson
drawn from the case study and addressed in the report.
"An Unusual Study Points to Institutional Complexities in Environmental
Management," News Retort of the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Academy of Engineering, February 1970, Vol. X-X: No. 2, P. 8.
A total social impact approach has apparently now been taken with
respect to the siting of electric generating plants. See the Report on
Electric Power and the Environment (1970) sponsored by the Office of Science
and Technology. This Report is discussed in "hand Use: Congress Tiking
Up Conflict over Power Plants," Science, Nov. 13, 1970, p. 718. It is also
evident that weather modification and control will involve far more than
a "technological. fix." See references to the international organizational
aspects of this matter in "The U. N.'s Coming Role: Internationalizing
Technology," The Wash. Posit, Nov, 15, 1970, p. B b, col. 3.
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of purpose may offer substantial advantages over a more elaborate "socio-
political" process solution. The unique advantage in the "pure }f techno-
logical fix is that it solves or minimizes a problem by changing the
environment rather than human behavior. As noted previously, however,
the import of the contextual approach is that some measure of control
over human and organizational behavior must usually be applied along
with other means in dealing with difficult social situations.S9
59
Even a specific means (fix) for problem solution or program
implementation may need to be implemented through coordination of a
variety of jurisdictions or agencies having both public sector and
.!	 private sector characteristics or components. Murray L. Weidenbaum in
#	 "Toward a Modern :Public Sector," The Conference Board Record,
September 1970, Vol. VII, No. 9, p. 17, 21 states:
The Post Office Department and the Railway Express Agency both
deliver parcels; again, one is public and the other private.
The mixed economy that is now developing is different. It is
characterized by :nixed organizations, each of which possesses
characteristics of both public institutions and private organiza-
tions. The most obvious examples are the large defense contractors
and the not-for-profit research laboratories that do most of their
business with the federal Government.
"The modern public sector that is developing is hardly somethingf=	 	 p	 y	 g
}	 aloof and entirely separate from the private sector; rather, in its
usual pragmatic fashion, the United States is fashioning policy tools
not for the sake of their intrinsic beauty, but to achieve a growing
3`•.	 variety of difficult and far--reaching national objectives.
It would appear likely that in coming years increasing proportions
of federal funds will be disbursed via state and local governments,
inter-governmental agencies, government -oriented curporations, quasi-
private institutions, and perhaps even newer organizations possessing
both public and private characteristics. The typical federal Agency
t indeed will probably be a policy formulator and overseer of programs
dealing with operations which have been decentralized in a variety of
ways and over a wide span of the American economy. This will provide
a very considerable strength and resiliency to American institutions
4	 during a period of substantial stress and change.
^i
i^
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Further, the notion of a "fix, 1° technological, legal, economic, medical, etc.,
smacks .too much of the narrowly focused social process models of the conven-
tional academic disciplines and professions. 60
 These models tend to be
partial; distorted, and artificial, and are far more suitable to the display
of specialized esoteric professional skills than to adequate social problem
analysis, In this connection Kenneth E. Eoulding has stated:
At -the basis of the whole general systems enterprise is a
faith, if we might call it that, that the empirical world
is one, and that the division into different disciplines
is more a property of the subculture of science than it is
60
The normal connotation of a "fix" seems inconsistent with the
observable dynamics of the ongoing social process. Donald A. Schon
asserts that:
The practical consequence of the loss of the stable state is that
we must see any programmatic solution to a problem as a learning
system capaole of shifting over tune; no solution can be effective
if it carries with it an organizational, institutional or program-
matic definition pertinent only to the state of affairs at the
time the program was invented.
The principal problem of design is the design of learning systems,
or systems able to transform their own behavior over time.
Schon, Donald A., "Implementing Programs of Social and Technological
Change," Technology review, February 1971, p. 48, 49.
Schon rejects "once-and-for--all" solutions to social problems and
the mythology that there is a "one-to-one correspondence between the
problem and its solution". Idem at 49. He seems to favor an approach
described as "an incremental system which consists of a set of short-
range solutions, tied to a monitoring of people's behavior in relation
to those solutions. 	 ." Idem at 51.
Apparently lawyers and "politicians" can be just as addicted to the
"quick-fix" approach as technologists. See quote in "Environment Unit
n1_ _P	 - n--l.. _J - .	 nss.__ el-- __I	 .... a.... 'n-1.24.J-- II..4...... Q..J........ t1
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a reflection of any properties of the empirical world. 	 one
may perhaps back down a little from that grand statement and
suggest that there are different systems levels, at least in s
regard to degree ofr. complexity, within the empirical world,
so that the division of disciplines by systems levels would
not be wholly arbitrary. 	 One might perhaps distinguish four
or five systems levels of the empirical world -- the physical,
j the biological, the psychological, the social, and if we are }r.@
} very ambitious, we might add the transcendental.	 Within, each
t of these levels the traditional b?yadaries between the discip-
lines are rapidly becoming fuzzy.
i
61
Kenneth E. Boulding, "General Systems and Interdisciplinary Studies,"
p. 2-3, in Richard V. Ericson, (ed.), Toward Increa ginS the Social Relevance
of the Contemp_orar Universes (Scheduled for 1971 publication).	 One of a
series of essays deriving from the 1968-69 Interdisciplinary Systems and
Cybernetics Project, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, I
The George Washington University.
The influence on economic thinking is postulated by one observer as
II
follows:
Economics, as it has been practiced by most economists since the
f....„
time of Adam Smith, has had as its purlieu the customary arrange-
i'i? meats of systems.
	
The systems in question have been the subsystems
of individual business enterprises. 	 'Those who paid the piper called
r '. the tune.	 With some exceptions, economists have assumed that
i "whatever is, is right," to quote William Graham Sumner, who was
quoting Alexander Pope.	 Ecology, neither so fortunate nor so unfeort-
unate as to have patrons, has taken a larger view. 	 The ecologist
` studies all impute and outputs, regardless of who pgays for them or
who benefits by them.	 In the past, the ecological eye has been
focused only on nonhuman economic situations.	 The focus is now
changing as ecology engulfs economics.
! Logic dictates this engulfment, but logic alone does not determine
history.	 Power relationships also must be favorable.	 I think the
power relationships now favor a change.	 In the past, economics was
to a large extent the handmaiden of business.	 The vast majority of !,
! economists were either employed directly by businesses, or had jobs
in university departments of .economics that were unusually sensitive
to business interests.	 In recent decades, the steady increase in
EE the number of economists employed by governmental and quasi-govern-
mental agencies points toward the day when the tunes played by
economists will be different. 	 A different sector of society is
ii
r
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How then should we evaluate the potential of the "technological fix" as a
resource-means for.achieving "balanced" social development? The term "fix"
with respect to social problem management suggests a complete or essentially
complete solution by means of a one-factor operation, i.e., auto self-
starter to remove the effort and dangers of cranking, telegraph to avoid
delay in long-range communications, incinerator to remove solid wastes
(though it produces air pollution), development of the fusion process to
provide an unlimited, economical supply of electrical energy, development
of a "quiet engine" to remove or substantially abate jet engine noise, etc.62
61 (continued)
paying the piper. Whether this means that economists will enjoy
greater intellectual independence is not clear and may well be
doubted. However, the shift in the balance of power should favor the
development of a broadly ecological view among economists and that
will be a social Gain.
Garrett Hardin, "To Trouble a Star: The Cost of Intervention in Nature,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1970, p. 18.
62
In his article, "Political Arenas, Life Styles, and the Impact of
Technologies on Policymaking," Policy Sciences: An International Journal,
No. 3, Fall 1970, p. 275, 277, Dean Schooler states:
Phyaical technologies, stemming from and produced by the physical,
medical, biological, and engineering sciences, involve an operating
system comprised of material,.nonbehavioral components. 'these
technologies are external to individuals and groups and at most
merely require those individuals or groups to passively use them
or allow their use. Specific physical technologies, many already
built into public policies or hailed as "quick technological fixes"
to social problems, include the "pill," air conditioners, automobiles,
weapons, drugs, street lights., teaching machines, gene controls,
antismoking pills, new fuels and food sources, personality control
drugs, smog control devices, rainmaking procedures, desalination
techniques, mace, and seat belts or air bags for automobiles.
Behavioral technologies involve not mechanical or chemical techniques
but rather types of human relationships and behavior (9). Behavior,
personality., social relationships, or individuals and groups' store
V,y ,
r
r
i
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But technology is only one means (resource) for solving, abating, or
controlling social problems, including those of which one or a combination
of technological applications may be the maJor cause. So why stress the
potential of the "technological fix" as contrasted with a "legal fix" or
"economic fix"? One might object that laws, being officially enforced
standards of behavior, are not as conclusive as a technological fix might
be, the very purpose of the latter being to avoid the necessity for control-
ling or modifying human behavior. One must concede that the imposition of
a 50 m.p.h. speed limit is not as effective in keeping all motorists within
such limit as would be a uniform engine design limiting maximum speeds
to 50 m.p.h. But a "Legal fix" can often be an extremely effective means
of bringing about desired corrective action. Federal licensing of radio
stations was used to eliminate the electronic interference among stations
in the early days of radio breadeasting. 63 But the contemporary problem of
air pollution with the primary source identified as the automobile internal
combustion engine presents an instructive illustration of the significance
of context and process and the need for application of a combination of
means through time to gain control over a technological abuse. 84 Legal
62 (continued
of values comprise the operating system of the technology and must
change with new technologies. Such technologies emerge from the
political, social., psychological, and economic sciences. They
involve organization, decision,-malting patterns, and values.
63
See Network Broadcasting (1938) Cha. 3, Report to the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Jan. 27, 1958, U.S. House of Representatives,
85th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 27, 1958.
64
The range of legal, fiscal, and technological means which are needed
In order to substantially reduce air pollution from automobile exhausts are
suggested, though not extensively treated, in the following two articles
- 54
standards have now set a technological (RO) target date fo: drastic
65
reduction in exhaust pollution by 1975.	 A tax on leaded gasoline has
been advanced as a means of inducing gas*Une producers to shut to other
means of increasing octane rating.	 While little has been done or pro-
posed to data by Bray of restricting the use of- private automobiles, the
public Is being condi.Zoned to this possibility. 67 it might be inferred
from this action that technological innovations do not just happen; they
ofteo need to be planned its part of the strategy for a combined attack
64 (continued)
from the Bulletip, of the Atumic Sci,an,ti,sta, November 1970: Bruce M.
Russett, "Licensing: For Cars and Babies," p. 15; Murray L. Wei.denbaum,
"Hots To Buy A Cleaner Environment," p. 19.
65
See Amendments to the Clean Air Act, December 31, 1970, Public
Late 91-604, 91st Congress.
66
See "Welcome '.fax on Smog," The Wash. Post, Editorial, Sept. 12,
1974, p. A 18, col. l; see also William Steff, "Gas Tux 'Essential' to
Smog Fight," Wash. Daily News, Sept. 18, 1970, p. 14, col. 1.
The Administration's proposed tax on lead added to gasoline --
about 2.3 cents a gallon -- is a crucial test of the American
people's will to curb air pollution, Treasury Under-secretary
Charles E. Walker maintains.
The tax, he told a news conference yesterday, is a "first essential
step to cleaning up the atmosphere.."
The Treasury and OST experts agreed the critical point about the
tax was that it offered "the only way" the auto industry could
meet new air pollution standards for its 1975 models.
67
The possibility that legal action will be required to limit the
use of automobiles in the largest cities by 1975 has been suggested by
Dr. John T. Middleton, Director of the Air Pollution Control. Office of
the Environmental Protection Agency. See Washington Star, January 34,:
1971, p. A 1, col. 4.
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on a social objective and as.a part of . a socio-political process through
time. Similarly .j ,.. theta .is no "technological fix" . at the present time for
jet aircraft noise. Such a technological solution-:appears to be many
years o.ffa .	 But a combination of techniques articulated in an overall
approach' -to the problem could do much to alleviate this environmental
intrusion. These means would include.:.: accelerated . R&D on alternative
"quiet engiue" technologies, design of new airports based on noise con-
tours with zoning adjusted to . .acceptabl:e noise levels for various activi-
ties, and modi.fi.ed flight.patterns.and runway locations for existing
airports . 6
What can. . then . be . said, even on .a tentative basis, of the promise
and utility of the notion of the "technological fix." Surely there is
much to be said for the resolution of social problems by means which do
not require severe restraints on human behavior or which avoid possibili-
ties-for mis-management or irresponsible use. What then are the
68
See "The SSTs May Not Be as Noisy as They Sound," The Wash. Post,
Nov. 15, 1970, p. B 6 9 col. 3. This article by Claire Sterling raises
i	 i	 f h	 .1 t	 i	 dimplicitly theo merest ng quest on a t e most appropr a e t me an
"state-of-the-art" for the introduction of a technological application
in order for it to meet with official and.public approval.
69
It is clear that the one-factor "legal-political fix" threatened
by New York City Mayor Lindsay will not suffice to resolve the total
Supersonic Transport controversy. See David S. Broder in . The Wash. Post, 	 r.
Oct. 6, 1.970, p. A 21, col,. 6, "N. Y. Resists SST Squeeze," quoting	 r
Mayor Lindsay; "As Mayor of the City of New York, 1 am prepared to do	 i
all in my power to prevent any SST from landing at New York's airports
until it is. proven safe both to .our environment and to the heal.th .of our	 -!	 '
citizens." Some of the great variety of variables involved in the siting
of airports are noted in "Boston Debates Airport Growth," N. Y. Times,
Nov. 15, 1970, p. 84, col. 6.
., .
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remeaXest The concept or the " t'echnol.ogical tix" and its application to
social problem areas has been discussed with a high degree of understanding
of its potential and limitations by Dr. Alvin Weinberg, Director of the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Dr. Weinberg states: "I do not wish to
overstress the role of the physical sciences in this new, social-problem-
oriented world. The technological fix is certainly not a panacea."70
But he goes on to say that "If one accepts the technological fix as one
means of alleviating social problems, then surely our reorientation
toward social problems ought not to diminish our interest in certain
technologies and their supporting sciences."' 1 Several examples of
existing or prospective technological fixes are discussed by Dr. Weinberg
as illustrated by the follofging extract:
Today's social problems -- like population, poverty, pollution,
and peace -- possess important technological. components. How
can we look at world population without at the same time examin-
ing the development of the remarkable new high-yielding strains
of corn, wheat, and rice? How can one consider ways of stabiliz-
ing the world order, of achieving peace, without including
possible developments in spy satellites and AM4 , S?72
kI have gone further and urged that in more cases than our
traditional social thinkers are prepared to concede there
may be "technological fixes" that could circumvent a seem-
ingly impossible social problem, or at least to so alter its
dimensions as to allow new social approaches. Let me illustrate
with one "technological fix" -- the Gangetic plain project of
..	 Perry Stout of the University of California at Davis (8).
^I
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Alvin M. Weinberg, "In Defense of Science," Science, Jan. 9, 1970,
	
p. 141, 144.	
771	 2
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Ibid.	 Idem at 143.
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As all of us know, feeding the growing masses of India had,
up until 3 years ago, bees, considered to be totally impossible.73
The missing element in Stout's plan is energy, energy to
PUMP water and energy to manufactura nitrogenous fertilizer. 74
Here is `a technological fix: a technologically based scheme,
involving new discoveries in agricultural science and in
nuclear energy, that could buy significant time in the face of
am urgent social problem. This is not to say that this techno-
logical fix gets at the "heart" of India's social problem which
is over-population. On the other hand, it seems to me to be a
much more humane and practical approach than the one advocated
by some social planners: to force India to control its popula-
tion even if this means incredible famine. We technologists
are not infallible, and Stout's scheme may not work.; but neither
are the social planners, such as the Paddocks, who only a few
years ago were willing to write India off.75
f.
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one can easily think of many other "technological fixes" -- such
as large tankers as a means of defusing the political sensitivity
of the Suez Canal, or the intrauterine device as a means of reduc-
ing the social motivation required to achieve birth control. In
every instance the fix achieves remedies rather than rooting out
causes; and on this account this line of thought has been attacked
as being insufficient or inhumane. Yet social problems are never
really solved permanently -- one only exchanges one social problem
for another, hopefully less pressing, social problem . . . Any
resolution of a social problem basically 
Auys 
'time: I see nothing
wrong with using technology to buy time.
If theta, through technological means we should apply our efforts toward
"reforming the environment and stop trying to reform people" 77 what are the
I
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'	 interplay between two variables: technological innovvation. and the political
process. Thus, Sayre and Smith in Government, Technology and Social, Problems
	
.I	 state:	 a
It would advance our understanding if we could begin to
identify a spectrum of social roblems.ran 	 `; +
	
.:^	 y	 p	 P.	 ging..froin. those
that are ready for a technological "quick fix". (i.e., -..
politically amenable and within the state-of-the art techni-
cally) all the way to those problems that e-io.transigent
;.,	 in both political and technological terms. 	 {
i^
They employ as a "first approximations' of such a spectrum a . two-dimensional	 `..
	'k	matrix fort ident?.fying social problem areas which are politically ready or
	
► ;	 79
unready and technologically ready or unready.
	
1	
The authors provide many useful insights into the conditions which 	 j
tend to make a technological. innovation (primarily a - "quick fix") acceptable
to the political process. Among the factors noted are the readiness and
attractiveness of the technology itself, the stimulation of "crisis" events,
the manner in which the "problem" is perceived and formulated, the effect of
pre-conditioning of the political decision makers through "education," the
nature of the social interests involved and the extent to which such interests 	 f
are supported by institutionalized processes, the focus and character of the
decisional process involved, the role of "leadership," and the "timing" of
i
the introduction of the proposal into the decisional arena.
r
78
Wallace S. Sayre and Bruce L. R. Smith, Government Technology
and Social Problems, Columbia University: The Institute for the Study
of Science in Human Affairs, Occasional Paper, 1969, p. 12.
79
Ibid.
f
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There are many dimensions to the task of identifying the contextual
conditions which may be favorable or unfavorable to the approval of a
technological fir as a social problem solution. Where a problem is the
result of a single cause, the desired solution is clear, a consensus r ti-
exists on the need for a solution, and an , apparently effective technolog-
ical means is available, conditions would seem highly favorable for such
a ssolution. 80 Perhaps the introduction of polio vaccine is a classic
illustration of a fix applied to such a situation although there was
considerable controversy over the mode of distribution. 81
 Ordinarily
the situation is not so simple. Social problems will not be perceived
and defined by all potentially affected participants in the same manner.
80
These conditions would be generally applicable to any type of
one-factor "fix" whether technological_, economic, or legal. Requiring
exact change for bus fares (or provision for scrip only as change)
to relieve bus drivers of the need to carry cash has proven to be a
relatively effective "economic fix" for the problem of bus holdups.
And with respect to the potential danger of cancer the "Delaney Amendment's
und.,rtakes to provide a "legal fix" by prohibiting the marketing of all
cancer-producing food additives (cyclamates, for example), the provision
stating that no fcod additive shall be deemed safe if it induces cancer,
when ingested, in any animal..
On the latter point see, Alan Kaplan and Robert H. Becker, The
Process of Technology Assessment in the Food and Drug Administration.
Paper presented at Professional Seminar Series on the Processes of
Technology Assessment, The George Washington University: Program of
^.	 Policy Studies in Science & Technology, #7, Mar. 5, 1970.
81
See "Chapter Twelve - Congressional Response to the Salk Vaccine
for Immunization against Poliomyelitis," in Technical Information for
i
	
	
Congress, Report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop-
ment of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U. S. house of Repre-
sentatives, 91st Cong., lst Seas., Apr. 25, 1959, p. 309, by the
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress; Science Policy
Research Division.
L	
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Depending upon the problem definition, the resultant context of affected
participants, institutions, processes , , and social interests will shift.
Even where there. may exist a broad consensus on a general goal, there
may be sharp differences in the precise objective to be achieved, as for
exa"le, with . air. pollution. control standards.$
Dean Schooler in his article on "Political Arenas, Life Styles, and
the Impac.% of IC- chnologies on Policy Making" analyzes the likely accept-
ability of technological solutions (physical and behavioral) to social
problems in tests of how affected individuals or groups perceive the
"impacts" of the application, i.e., whether such impacts will be
redistributive, regulative, self-regulative, or distri,butive.83
Thus, a policy building upon or employing a particular
technology may readjust wealth, status, or power among
major groups; requite or prohibit certain activities;
allocate desired values to individuals or groups; or
enhance or allow individuals or groups to shape their
life styles . or public policies affecting them.84
Schooler suggests that physical technologies are normally seen as distri-
butive and generally beneficial since they are "means of solving social
85
problems without a commitment of time or personality." 	 an the other
hand, behavioral technologies evoke the "specter of redistribution or
regulation" and are "likely to engender conflict and opposition, "86
82
David Bird, "Two Court Cases on Pollution illustrate Sharp
Differences Over How Clean the Air Should Be" N. Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1970,
p. 57, Col. 2.
83
See note 62 supra, at 277.
84	 85	 86
Ibid.	 idem at 278.	 idem at 279.
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especially when behavioral technologies involve "structural" changes
including the "basic rules" which determine the outcome of policy making.
^
i Technologies affecting such structure would include hiring
^	 practices, reapportionment, cooperative ownership schemes,
systems analysis, social indicators and social reports,
i	 cost--effectiveness techniques, and other tools or processes
of decision making.
I	 These conflicts over structural issues (metapolieymaking)
11 	 are much more sensitive than conflicts over substantive
issues (policymaking)
^a	 1F
Like reapportionment, efforts in the "policy sciences" may
be perceived as threatening established procedures for
policymaking and reallocating the distribution of power and
respect within a policymaking system.8
However, our concern here is not so much with the acceptability of
a given means of solving a social problem, whether such means be a physical
or behavioral technological application, as it is with the notion that a
one-factor fix of whatever nature can supply a satisfactory solution to an
existing social dislocation or provide the means of achieving a basic
community goal. Professor Schooler does not elaborate on this specific
question. While he does not dismiss the value of the "technological fix"
as a means of dealing with human problems, 88 he strongly supports an
g
87-
Tdem at 280.
88
Schooler states at 283, note 62 supra;
Physically technology can be used creatively to solve social problems.
Amital. 8tzioni has argued for physical technology as a "shortcut" to
I	 social change (24). He contends that the "ideal" solutions to human
problems require prohibitive sums of money or commitments. Furthermore,
no evidence has been cited to show that "quick technological fixes" are
I
E,
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analytical concept which seems quite similar to the contextual approach
89
treated herein.
Problem perception and definition which circumscribe the social
problem context (or system) to be examined, have infinite variations.
Presumably the birth control "pill" should provide the technological fix
for population control -- assuming its safety and efficacy. But it is
not such a "fix" (at least not at this point in time) for some fairly
obvious reasons. Defftiencies of purported technological fixes can
usually be disclosed by asking a series of questions eettin,, forth the
social context: What technological means, designed for what specific
purpose, to be utilized and managed by what participants, affecting what
institutions, practices and social values in what manner and to what extent,
88 (continued)
failures. Perhaps, says Etzioni, street lights and policemen. on
buses do indeed reduce total crime rather than shift it to dark
streets and subways.
One might at least ask, however, that some explication be given to the
concept of social problem conceptualization before being expected to
systematically discuss the assertion that "no evidence has been cited
to show that 'quick technological fixes' are failures."
89
School.er states at 283, note 62 supra:
Increasingly , the most useful policv-oriented research will emerge
from a multidisciRlinaxy base. If the physical technologists have
a contribution to the solution of social problems, then sociology,
psychology, political science, and economics must ,loin them in a
cooperative effort. Properly designed physical technologies will
require evaluation of people's response to the technology, diagnosis
of people's present behavior without the technology, and accurate
statements detailing exactly what variables the technology must
affect. Solutions must be multidisciplinary in their construction.
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is proposed? Certainly all participants will not view the problem in the
same perspective. From some institutional viewpoints, no population
(	 problem exists. Some participants may view population increase as a
.j	 problem but one that little or nothing can be done about whether the
Y difficulty arises from lack of availability of the means for economic
reasons or otherwise, or for reason of institutional constraints, or by
virtue of personal value preferences. Effective population control will
--i'	 involve a combination of means, some short term, others long term. The
l
^	 e
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ti
m
If
}	 selection of means will be one of proportion among means, not one of
exclusiveness of means. 90 Put another way, the more enmeshed the problem 	 f
in the social. process (the greater the number of influential community
groups with a diversity of perspectives on the matter) the less likely
k
=1l
that a one-factor "fix" will provide an adequate solution. It has
taken much more than a simple legal declaration rejecting the "separate but
equal" doctrine to make significant headway in achieving racial equality.91
i
90
5
William P. Bundy, "The Tortuous Road to Population Control," 	 3i
The Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1970, p. B2, col. Z.
91
James T. Wooten, "Confusion But Still Progress in South's Schools,"
	 '!
N. Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1970, p. 10 E, col. 1%
Thus, the struggle, the bewilderment and the confusion continue. It
is a matter of figures, yes; but more, it has now become a battle of
strategems, and caught in the conflict are the children and the public
education systems of the South.
Nearly a century ago, George Washington Cable, a white southerner
of progressive persuasic::;, wrote that man would walk on the moon
before America solves hcs racial problems. That one-half of his
prediction should now be fact is no reason to believe that the
remaining portion soon shall be.
- 64
Another aspect of the technological fix to which useful attention
might be given relates to the decision process leading from the prescriptive
hp ase_of.formal approval to the application phase of actual use. Put other-
wise, what are the characteristics of the formal--authoritative decisional
process which are involved in the approval or rejection of the technological
fix as a means for social problem solution? Does the approval to use the
91 (continued)
Of more interest with respect to the deficiences of a hard and
fast "legal fix" to complex social problems is the reported question
of Justice Black of the Supreme Court in a recent "school desegregation
busing" case:
At what point would busing to achieve exact racial balance
be required?
More questions were asked about that than were answered in three
days of Supreme Court hearings last week. No ingenious solutions
to the dilemma of de facto segregation were offered; indeed no one
seemed sntxious to fully examine the subject. There was perplexity
in Justice Black's question to a civil rights lawyer, "How can you
rearrange the whole country?" Discrimination because of race should
be corrected, he said, but "it disturbs me to try and challenge the
whole living arrangements and way of life of people all over the
nation. You're challenging the place people live."
Wash. Evening Star, Oct. 19, 1410, p. A 9, col. 1.
Similarly, the "legal fix" represented by the "Newspaper preservation
Act" is only one of multiple factors which may contribute to diversifica-
tion of news and opinion in the nation (planned effect).
Declaration of Policy: Sec. 2 of the Newspaper Preservation Act,
Public Law 91-353, 84 Stat. 466, July 24, 1970:
"In the public interest of maintaining anewspaper press
editorially and reportorially independent and competitive in all
parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to be the public
policy of the United States to preserve the publication of newspapers
in any city, community, or metropolitan area where a joint operating
arrangement has been heretofore entered into because of economic
distress or is hereafter effected in accordance with the provisions
of this Act."
v
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technological means encompass formally or practically the follow-on
decision to actually apply this means? Or can the decision-approval
phase be clearly distinguished from the application phase in that an
entirely different group of decision makers is involved? These types
	 ;r_.
of questions not only relate to the application of the technological fix
but extend to the appraisal phase in that they suggest evaluations of
the effectiveness of the approved means. j
The decisional process patterns relevant to the initial evaluation,
promotion, decision-approval, and application, of a technological fix to
a social problem will vary widely. Reference to the System of Technolog-
ical Assessment/Application will sustain this observation. one need
think merely of the combinations of social problem areas, technologies,
participants, assessment forums, and decisional arenas to appreciate
the variety of contexts which may be involved. For example, if the
objective is to recapture national prestige by establishing technological
superiority as with the Apollo program; if the focus of decision is with
a small group of decision makers at the highest level of authority; if
the decision of approval is inclusive of the application; and if the
technology is available and other resource support can be assumed, then
implementation of the technological fix can be moved along rapidly. 92
92
John M. Logsdon, The Apollo Decision and Its Lessons for Policy-
mtakpra_ Tha nAnrPA Wgshineton tlniversitvc Proeram of Poliev Studies
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A second and much broader contextual pattern applies to public
service projects such as the construction and operation of new highways,
subways, airports, and power plants. Normally, the required procedures
provide for a sequence of decisions by a multiplicity of public and
private sector participants, including hearings for those segments of
the public which will be beneficially or adversely affected by these
projects. Hence, the decision, for example, to issue or reject the
application for a construction permit for the construction of a nuclear
power plant may involve a contentious and drawn-out struggle among
competing interest groups. But once the final decision of approval is
made, the construction and operation of the plant is assumed as is the
consumption of the energy produced.93
A third general category of decisional contexts are those in which
the decision approving use is distinct from the decision or decisions
to actually apply the technological means. The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration has approved the use of the "pill" but actual application is
finally determined by individual or family decisions and the aggregate
of such decisions is the measure of the application -- or effectiveness.
r
93
As the demand for more electrical energy increases and the
accompanying concern for environmental quality intensifies, controversy
can be expected to continue even beyond the construction permit stages
especially with respect to nuclear power plants. See "Maryland A-Plant:
Boon or a Menace?" with reference to the Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant.
The Washington Post, Aug. 26, 1970, p. 1, col. 1. See further comments
in Washington Evening Star, Editorial, January 1, 1971, p. A 4, col. 1,
"Calvert Cliffs Decision," and the New York Times, January 24, 1971,
p. 42, col. 2, "Maryland Atom Plant Gets a Permit."
^t
Here, individual human beings are involved in volitional choices. The
one-factor fix cannot be assumed with the same finality as in the first
two decisional patterns above if the objective of the use of the "pill"
^.:	 is considered to be overall population control. Highly charged social
ii.
	
	
interest conflicts emerge in this context which question our value
priorities, especially the current demands for a "quality environment."
Are we really more concerned with the goal of an optimum social environ-
ment than with the "natural" or "constitutional right" of the husband
and wife to determine family size, even with the prospect of eventual
intolerable human congestion? If the latter situation does evolve,
then the issue will be whether to impose authoritative controls over
family size (to modify or control human behavior). In this instance
legal sanctions would be essential to the application of the technolog-
ical means. Required use of seat belts is also an example of the legal
imposition of a technological means to reduce automobile fatalities and
injuries. 94 The continuing flouridation controversy represents a some-
what more complicated context Involving the decision of approval and the
decision .to apply dichotomy since, like the "pill," it raises issues of
community imposed control versus individual volition. 95 It is a context
94
Similarly, the new requirements for installation of "air bags"
for crash protection involve both legal and technological means of
implementation. See Washington Post, March 6, 1971, p. 1, col.. 4.
95
See Michael Wollan, "Technology Assessment and the Law," (Section
on Fluoridation), 36 Geo. Wash. L. R., 1145, 1125 (1968).
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which will present continuing difficulties since alternative technological
means may be available for achieving the same objective, one applicable on
the community or governmental level and.the other available for individual.,
volitional application. In other types of public/private sector decisional
contexts, a consensus fix may be demanded... .. .
96
See Aaron Latham, "Hot Tenants Protest back of Air Cooling,"
The Washington Post, Sept. 18, 1970, p. C 1, col.. 1.
The protesters, most . of them more than 60 years old, marched
yesterday with the aid of canes, crutches and braces. Like more
youthful demonstrators might, they carried signs, but they walked
slowly because their doctors had warned them not to over-exert.
The marchers, numbering about 50, were protesting the lack of air
conditioning in Claridge Towers, 1221 M St., N. W., a public housing
high-rise apartment building for the elderly that was considered a
national model when it opened three years ago.
Monteria Ivey, the acting director of the national Capital Housing
Authority, Washington's public housing agency, attended the demon-
stration and told the elderly marchers that he hoped their building
would be air-cooled by next summer.
He said that regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development once forbade air conditioning in public housing but
that HUD recently changed its mind: in the future, the elderly
will be allowed cooling. Public housing families, however, must
continue to live with the heat.
Ivey said that the elderly need air conditioning more than families.
The marchers yesterday agreed.
"The ambulance comes much more often in the summer," Roberto Wallace
said.
The Claridge, opened with great fanfare in 1967, was the nation's
first "turnkey" housing project, meaning that NCHA agreed to buy
it immediately on completion from a private contractor. The
10-story building has 343 units.
process involved.
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If a technological fix-..Js .eft to individual volition for application
can it be appropriately termed a "fix?" This type of arrangement will
4i
often, lead to great disparities. in application. If individuals view the
	 `+	 gR
"fix" as depriving them of a more cherished social value than that perceived
to be gained by the technological means, then it is not.likely to be applied.97
But the thrust of the above comments has been that the extent to which a given
means will . provide an effective Solution to a social end can be evaluated only
with respect to the specific social context and effective public decision
	 }
96 (continued)
Sometimes the "public" insists on the development and application
of a "technological fix." See for example, The Washington Post, Editorial,
Sept. 24, 1970, A 10, col. 1, concerning the Senate vote of 73 to 0 for a
	
t
bill requiring a 90% reduction in automobile produced pollution by 1975.
97
The requirement for a warning on cigarette packages that smoking
may be injurious to one's health is certainly . a. questionable fix for the
substantial reduction of cancer resulting from cigarette Smoking.
The approval of methadone as a means of alleviating heroin addiction
by no means assures that this method will result in an appreciable net
social gain.
For conflicting views on the methadone "fix," see the Washington
Daily News, March 6, 1971, p. 5, wherein a study group of the Washington,
D. C. methadone programs Stated that "it is providing therapy on a scale
unmatched elsewhere in the country" while a prosecutor of a nearby
Virginia County remarked that methadone is a greater threat than heroin..
i
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D - Some Implications of the Contextual Approach for
Social Problem Perception, Definition, and
Evaluation of Alternative Solutions
The discussion thus far strongly suggests that an effective technology
assessment function could impress significant changes on the effective public
decision process by identifying the full range of participants, institutions, <.,
processes, and social interests affected in substantial technological under-
4
takings.
	
But in this paper we have been concerned primarily with the impli-
cations of technology assessment for our attitude toward the applicability
of one-factor fixes as satisfactory means of dealing with existing social
problems or for achieving desired social goals.
The Sayre and Smith analysis $ focuses primarily on the "political"
process through which a technological "quick fix" must be "filtered" before
it can be applied to a social problem context.
	 Their concern is with the
conditions which tend to be favorable or unfavorable to the acceptability of
a technological means.	 Of course, the task of adapting an available tech-
nology to a relevant social problem area is a matter of critical importance.
However,	 the "implementation feasibility" element is only one aspect of
an adequate technology assessment function. 	 Simply because a technological
means seems appropriate, the technology is available, and the political
climate is amenable, is not conclusive as to the desirability of the
application. 99	In fact, innumerable technological projects implemented
i!
98
Sayre and Smith, supra note 78.
99
Perhaps the SST is a good illustration of a situation wherein
technical feasibility and initial, provisional political approval clearly do
not satisfy the criterion of considering all prospectively affected interests.
As the Washington Evening Star has stated editorially, "the first considera-
tion had to be the total impact on the nation and the world." Dec. 4, 1970,
p. A 18, col. 1.	 See also "The SST: What ' s the Hurry?" Washington Post,
Editorial, Dec. 3, 1970, p. A 18, col. 1.
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in the.past with only these considerations.iu mind have. either resulted in
i.	 unsatisfactory ,.treatment of. social problems, increased social conflict., or
k	 introduced new detrimental elements into the environment. Technology assess-
men. involves. much more_ . than an:examination of the political feasibility of
approving a technological fix. An adequate assessment.can not only identify
all of the significant effects.which might flow from the introduction of.
the proposed technological fix, but can also clarify other available options
for dealing with.the particular problem and the social benefits and costs
which can be anticipated.from the applicati.on.of each such alternative.
Technology assessment contributes to the decision as to whether a`technolo-
gical fix or some other means should be adopted.ia terms of serving the
totality of social needs or demands, as contrasted with an appraisal: of
whether the technological fix can be moved through the political process.
The probability of implementation of a particular means or alternative
means is but one aspect of the technology assessment function.
The foregoing comments concerning the relationship of the contextual
approach to technology assessment have served to discourage the application
of simplistic remedies to complex situations of social stress and conflict
grounded in multiple causes. However, it is neither asserted nor implied
that one-factor fixes have no utility in particular situations. But this
is precisely the point which needs further examination and elaboration,
namely, the identification of adequate means for dealing with "social
problems." This in turn requires a conceptual inquiry into haw problems
should be defined for assessment, planning, and program implementation
purposes, as well as an examination of the manner in which problems are
!f
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in fact defined in most situations today. The means of dealing with a
"problem" are, of course, a function of the way in which the problem is
defined. But problem conceptualization is a huge and complicated subject,
the scope of which can merely be suggested in this discussion.100
As a practical matter the operational initiative for the considera-
tions herein discussed commences with 1) a perceived problem, and 2) one
or more provisional means of solving the problem. Our attention has been
given-t6 the general notion of one-factor fixes as appropriate means of
dealing with complex social problems. The "technological fix" is often
an attractive means for getting at the primary planned effect sought, 101
whether it be the alleviation of an adverse social impact or the attain-
ment of a desired social objective. As has been suggested, difficulties
arise with changes which may be imposed upon various participants (and
associated value-institutional processes) which are not identified and
taken into account when the assessment focus is limited to the primary
r
100
See Mayo, Louis H., The Problem-oriented_A pro_ach to Legal-Policy-
Institutional Innovation (Internal Reference Document of the Program of
Policy Studies, The George Washington University, November 1970).
101
The "skyscraper" may be considered a "fix" which satisfies the
need (planned effect) for huge groupings of offices required of vast
business enterprises and also a means of avoiding inordinate land costs,
but the implications for such functions as efficiently moving urban
populations, assuring a cen-inning supply of power, and providing for
adequate fire protection are substantial. Further, psychological
adaptation is a problem for those who do not feel comfortable when the
towers sway in a strong wind. See J. A. Engels, "Skyscrapers; No Refuge
in Superlatives," Washington Post, November 21, 1970, p. E 1, col. 1. 	 x
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objective as the only significant effect.
	 Further, technological feasibility
and even political, economic, and social acceptability (if the latter is
limited to the desire to attain the prime objective) do not necessarily f
assure an inclusive public interest solution...
An adequate technology assessment methodology will assure that those }`
professionals (or the entity) performing the assessment relate the
requisite analytical tasks to the realities of the Effective Public
Decision Process.	 This perception forces the assessing entity to recognize,
among other things, that the various participants in some manner affected
by the proposed application will propose alternative courses of actions in o
each of the phases of the policy formulation/program implementation continuum.
Put otherwise, an adequate assessment methodology will assure that all of the
Effects or Changes which will necessarily, probably, or possibly eventuate
(based upon explicit assumptions and models) will be identified from the
3
comprehensive examination of the interactions of participants, policies,
institutions, and processes. The significance of this observation is that
when the assessing entity undertakes to apply the methodology advanced in
Part II, supra, it must consider the actions and responses which will occur,
or probably, or possibly occur (based upon such parameters as the technolog-
ical configuration being assessed, the future social environment posited,
the goals sought to be Implemented, and models of individual or institutional
behavior assumed, etc.) during each phase of the Policy Formulation/Program
Implementation Process. This process can be represented by an approach to
r- 74 -
effect identification by reference to the Initiation, Implementation,
and Operational stages or through the following phases if governmental
action is substantially involved:
Perception of the " roblee'
Formulation/definition of the problem and the
problem context;
Assembly ofrelevant iYnformabion
Consideration of alternative means, i.e.,
statutory scheme, organizational arrange-
ment, social action program, etc.
• Evaluation and recommendation/promotion of
selected outcome
	
._
Formal prescription of new law or authorization
of new pro&ram
42plication of new statutoEy scheme in appropriate
decisional contexts or the implementation of the
prescribed social action program
Appraisal of the effects of the apElication
of the statutory scheme or of the operation
of the social action program
• Modification or termination of the statutory
scheme or the social action program based
on continuing :monitoring and appraisal
These functions, variously phrased, tend to be sufficient to cower the
sequence of phases involved In any governmental decisional context. The
.	 decisional phases in technological projects initiated and developed
primarily in the private sector will differ somewhat.102
102
The private sector would be concerned with basic research,
development, production, distribution, and market response decisions
among others.
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The assessment phase must include a provisional judgment and assumptions
with respect to all of the succeeding phases. A given technological means
might be considered a "fix' s to the extent that it maximizes social benefits
and minimizes social costs associated with the total Policy Formulation[
Program Implementation process. It would seem that facilitating actions of
some sort will normally be required in each phase. In short, few fixes ---
legal, economic, or technological -- are self--executing.
The essential point here stressed is that effects or changes in
various value-institutional processes with respect to certain participants
occur or may occur at any or all phases of the Policy Formulation/Program
Implementation Process. A thorough contextual assessment must take into
account such effects. Limiting an assessment merely to the operational
phase may result in ignoring some of the most significant changes which
will occur in the establishment of a new program or technological project.
For example, should a proposal be made to construct a center-city STOLport
f
to meet urgent demands for more efficient and flexible inter-urban short-
haul transportation, it is clear that serious community decisions would
be required relating to resource allocations among various goals and that
vigorous public controversy might likely result. Assuming approval of
such a project, the displacement and relocation of businesses and residences
would be only one of several substantial effects during the implementation
phase. Such effects as improved mobility or increased aircraft noise would
not appear until the operational phase. Instances abound of new technological
projects which require positive action or generate critical reactions
in the initiating and implementation phases. 103 Such actions and reactions
are effects which convert into beneficial or detrimental social. impacts.
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It should be evident that the designation of stages of the
overall developmental and application process as Initiation, Implementation,
and Operational is not meant to imply that such stages are separate and
distinct or even fully incorporate all of the decision/action operations
involved. Sometimes the stages m,ay be essentially distinguishable, but
in perhaps most major projects a variety of developmental sub-processes
link and overlap these stages. For example, considerable basic research
may necessarily precede the overt Initiation stage. See Washington Post,
March 9, 1971, p. A 4, col. 1, re test of the "H Machine" ^ ia the experi-
mental phase of developing nuclear fusion as an energy source. Pre--
Initiation activity may also raise serious controversies which can lead
to significant decisions with respect to a large pattern of scientific
research and technological applications. See Victor Cohn in the Washington
Post, January 29, 1971, p. A 1, col. 1, with respect to genetic engineering
("test tube babies"). Further, implementation may be taking place at the
same time the authoritative Initiation/Approval decision is being debated
or made. Huge investments were made by various oil companies in the North
Slope Pool of Alaska long before the current controversy over the formal
decision to approve or disapprove the Alaska Oil Pipeline. See "Alaska
and Oil: Tough Questions," in the New York Times, February 28, 1971,
1:. 55, col.. 2. While the "national data bank" issue continues to be argued,
personal data is being rapidly computerized. See "When We Get All The Data
In One Place," New York Times, February 28, 1971, p. E 4, col. 3. Never-
theless, the identification of stages or phases of the overall policy
formulation and program implementation process normally provides clarity
and precision to analysis.
it should also be recognized that a decision can be made to reverse
an Initiation/Approval determination well into the Implementation stage
of a project. See "Florida: Nixon Halts Canal. Project, Cites Environment,"
Science, January 29, 1971, p.357. This project also demonstrates the fact
That major effects take place in the Initiation stage (investment in rights
of way and the construction of barge terminals and other canal facilities)
and that Implementation effects include both increased job opportunities
and destruction -- to some degree -- of the natural environment.
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Hence, even if the means of satisfying a social demand is primarily
I
	
	 technological and can be plausibly called a "fix," in most if not all
cases the inevitable, probable, or possible effects will involve support-
ing initiatives in the various value-institutional process areas in order
r^
to increase the benefits or minimize the costs or perhaps even to enable
the technological means to be applied at all. 104 An adequate technology 	 A
assessment methodology will disclose such effects and the nature of the
t
active or passive impact which will result. Furthermore, testing out a
proposed one-factor fix by applying the contextual assessment methodology
may disclose, for example, that:
'j
	
	
The fix selected affects a much wider social sub-system
(context of interacting participants and value-institutional
t-^
processes) than the context initially subsumed under the
problem as perceived.
^i
The fix is not sufficient in itself to solve the problem or
advance the social goal -- that it must be supplemented by
facilitating techniques at one or more of the phases of the
j;	 Policy Formulation and Program Implementation Process.
r
• The assessed implications of the fix suggest problem context
redefinition. The assessment outcome may show that the fix
can be effectively applied to a more narrowly focused social
104
As noted, a "fix" may be considered as a means of solving an
existing social problem or of achieving a social goal.	 But it soon
s becomes obvious upon examination that if weather modification is selected
as a means of increasing the water supply in a given river basin, there are
numerous legal, jurisdictional, organizational., and financial arrangements
-
which are essential to the operational efficacy of this means for the simple
s' reason that there are innumerable effects or changes which will result from
or which are advisable to take in order to maximize the benefits.
t Similarly, the so-called "housing problem," with which Project Break-
' through of the Department of Dousing and Urban Development is now concerned,
can by no means be solved with the most advanced housing/construction
technologies alone. 	 Difficulties here are rooted in traditional legal
^. doctrine, real estate transaction practices, mortgage and investment
institutional procedures, housing codes, union practices, industry decisions
related to the size of aggregated markets, and so forth.
i
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objective or that the fix, in combination with other techniques,
has the potential for effectively achieving the solution to a
broader social problem context than that initially posited.
The fix is applicable only to a short-term solution and other
means must be employed for a complete solution or for continuing
control of the problem. The analysis may further suggest altern-
ative strategies for securing the objective sought as by the
application of various techniques, appropriately introduced
into the policy formulation and program implementation process
and coordinated through time.
* A fix (whether technological, economic, legal, etc.) is not a
satisfactory solution for the problem context posited and that
nothing short of a drastic modification of individual or organ-
izational behavior (not provided by a simple fix) will suffice
to achieve the desired social objective. Of course, several
significant questions are raised by this implication. Should
it be assumed, for example, that a technological short-cut which
avoids the need for change in human attitudes and social behav-
ioral patterns is always to be preferred? 105 Many observers
105
In "Man the Magician: Watch Us," The Wash. Post Book World,
Aug. 16, 1970, p. 4, Edward Edelson states:
Technology has failed us because we let it run wild. Instead of
following human logic, we have followed technological logic. If
something could be done, we have done it without considering the
human consequences. We need a basic change of attitude. The
engineers must start thinking about the human uses of technology --
giving the greatest benefit to the greatest number, not creating
the biggest machine for its own sake.
The rest of us need an equally basic change of attitude, toward
the objects of everyday life. Here is one example of what must
be done:
In the past few years, most middle-class Americans have become
accustomed to air conditioning, at home and at work, now even
in automobiles. Air conditioning is an avid consumer of electric
power, and all power pollutes, either by adding to air pollution
or by disrupting a wild area or by adding too much heat to water.
The people who protest today about pollution do so in air conditioned
c mfort. They shave with electric razors and use electric can openers.
T zy buy eight-cylinder cars and insist on power steering. With every
gesture, they make more pollution necessary. Then they sign petitions
to make the problem go away.
^' J
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thin1t, to the contrary, that drastic shifts in social attitudes
and behavior is the really crucial issue.-106
105 (continued)
It is useless to double our consumption of electric power every tan
years and demand lase pollution. The only real solution is to use
lass of everything --- really, y2! thin¢. And that, of course, is
an economic disaster.
See also on the same theme, "Environment., The Human Element,"
Review and Outlook Column, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 1, 1970,
p. 12, col. 1.
All sorts of environmental problems could be solved if people were
more friendly to the ideas of paying a bit more to incorporate the
cost of protecting the environment into manufacturing processes. In
other words, as we have pointed out in these columns before, solutions
to the problem of the environment so serious to the cities may lie
most basically in effecting changes in individual values and tastes.
That is no easy job, even when serious discomforts and inconvenience
grow to critical levels for the whole society. For the moment it
seems to present policymakers with a bleak choice. They can let
the drift to crisis go until the day when catastrophe creates popular
demand for change, perhaps at the price of lost life and massive un-
happiness. Or they can try to force the change to avert catastrophe
by moving against the will of the people, which in a democracy, after
all, must be considered valuable, too.
Perhaps there is some happier third choice which would yet come clear
(popular response to gradual limits) on auto use in New York City,
for example, has been encouraging. But we doubt if new technologies
or their management will play much role in finding better solutions,
however well they are managed. For it is the human problem that is
the heart of the matter, and the real cause for worry when multiple
crises stritte a city.
106
See The New York Times, September 20, 2970, p. 13, col. 1, "Maxims
Are Cut Down by English Economist (Prof. Edward J. Ptishan)"
"Everything I say goes against people's democratic instincts, twhy
shouldn't we choose what we wantV they say. ghat people want,
however, is not wisdom but immediate gratification. They have been
taught by the system to be myopic, and when they have power they
corrupt themselves. What they need is not power but strength of
character and morality. In this they are not well served by the
Establishment.,,
:.E
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Assuming that some degree of flexibility exists in the consideration of
the social objective sought and in the means (resources) to be applied, then
106.(continued)
Victor Cohn in "Scientists' View of the Future," in The Washington Post,
January 4, 1970, p. A 3, col. 5, comments:
Science then is undergoing a change -- for morality. Will the public?rA^. E
The specific question, maintained many speakers, is: Will the public
pay the bill for survival? Or will it make other, "less moral," choices?
Scientists who said population must level off also said this will
require much sacrifice by wealthy nations and families to bring
health, social security and higher living standards to poorer
nations and families. Oniy then, it was stated, will the insecure
stop producing huge families as their only social security.
"We the prosperous," it was widely agreed, will have to give up big
cars, big defense budgets and big man-in-space programs to pay the
required economic and social bills.
But Americans, predicted S. Fred Singer, physicist and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, will refuse to pay even the
environmental clean-up bills, when they realize how big they must
be. Already, noted Dr. Philip Lee, Americans are refusing to pay
the bills "for quality education and adequGte health care" of the
25 million people added by the baby boom of 1947-57.
On the population/birth control problem, Colman McCarthy writes in
"Ecology and the Bias for Living," The Wash. Post, January 15, 1970,
p. A 17, col. 3:
As arrogant as the industrial and commercial polluters are, they are
still only serving a public which demands more cars, planes, textiles,
chemicals and comforts for more "civilized" living. In the end, it
is man who pollutes. Thus, the pollution problem runs parallel to
the population problem: the more people, the more pollution. The
day is past when theologians can stand back and argue against birth
control on grounds of morality. An over-polluted overpopulation
must not only argue for birth control, but must perhaps seek to
legally enforce it -- on grounds of survival.
'Unless massive birth control is practiced immediately, no amount
of public money or private worry can keep the earth from becoming
what Buckminister Fuller called, "the planet Polluto." In a grim
f s
r
the foregoing observations tend to emphasize the provisional nature of the
policy analysis (technology assessment) function. There will probably be
a continuing interaction and adjustment between alternative concepts of
the relevant social context (participants, values and Institutions affected)
and the alternative configuration of resources (means and techniques) to be
employed. This determination of the "best" or of a "satisfactory" arrange-
ment may, of course, differ as between the assessing entity's outcome and
that of the ultimate political decision makers when the program is finally
approved.
Therefore, from the foregoing discussion one might reasonably conclude
that with respect to almost any social problem of consequence for which a
provisional means has been selected, such means should not be adopted for
the simplistic reason that it coincides with one's intuitive judgment as
to the suitability or applicability of one-factor fixes generally.
106 (continued)
way, the backlash of nature may well inflict, in the absence of
birth control, universal pollution as a form of death-control.
on the significance of the population problem see Claire Sterling,
"India: The Nightmare Demographers Warn us About," The Washington Post,
Sept. 2, 1970, p. A 22, cal. 3, indicating that the population of India
has doubled in the past 30 years and may double again in the next 20:
This is the nightmare demographers have been warning us about, the
sudden, terrifying leap in population that comes of staving off
death without restraining birth, the inexorable statistic that could
rake life very nearly unbearable on our planet in our lifetime . . .
For some time now, and especially since 1966, the Indian Government
has been trying to control human birth on a scale, and in a style,
that has never been tried before. The difficulties are so tremendous
that some observers have already written off the campaign as lost.
They are mistaken, I think, if only because a campaign like this can-
not be decisively won or lost. Every baby that might have been born
and isn't puts India that much ahead -- a fraction of a hundred-
millionth, perhaps, not much but more than nothing.
^ 4T
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Unfortunately, there often exists an irresistible urge to reduce
	 8
problems to the narrowest possible context and to consider the
simplest types of alternative solutions. Such thought processes
tend to focus upon only a single or limited pattern of anticipated
consequences which are of paramount interest to the particular
participant. Emphasis on specific consequences further leads to the
selection of means related directly to such consequences. Instances
of this type of thinking are frequently exhibited in the public
decision process. 107
The value of the contextual approach to assessment set forth in
Part II, supra, is that such an assessment of even the most limited
type of means or fix proposed for a social problem solution can dis-
close not only the deficiencies in such means for the social problem
as initially posited but the configuration of means appropriate to
its solution or the need to redefine the social content which can
107
In the Congressional debate over the proposal to continue
work on tbs! development of two prototype SST's (estimated overall
cost of $1.3 b 1I.lion) the Washin ton Daily News reported on
December 1, 1570, p. 9, col. 1, that the Citizens' League against
the Sonic Boom argued that the SST would have a "signific pn*
 impact"
on marine life in the Atlantic while
The principal argument advanced by proponents of the SST
is that the Anglo-French Concorde and the Russian TU 144
have already flown at supersonic speed, and thus the ques-
tion boils down to whether the U. S. airlino.? will be able
to buy a U. S.--built SST or will be compelled r buy one
manufactured abroad.
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most appropriately be treated at the particular time with the resources
available. 108 In short, the contextual approach provides a systematic
and reliable method for determining all of the effects and interactions
associated with the application of specified means to achieve particular
goals within the relevant social problem context.
An adequate technology assessment function should make a significant
contribution to the task of clarifying alternative courses of action,
most of which, with respect to complex social problems, will combine a
mix of technological, economic, political, legal., and social behavioral_
means. An adequate assessment can greatly assist in the determination of
the social benefits and costs which will flow from the adoption of each
alternative. Assessment outcomes which do provide such clarification
should exert considerable influence in authoritative decisional arenas
where decisions are ultimately made for the allocation of resources, the
distribution of benefits and costs, and the prescription of legal rights
and duties. This evaluation of the ultimate impact of the assessment
a
108
In this connection see the Report of the National Academy of
Sciences/National Academy of Engineering, Jamaica Bay and Kennedy
Airport: A Multidisciplinary Environmental Study (February 17, 1971)
which "considered as many significant factors of urban life as it
could" and explicitly rejected the simplistic and misleading definition
of the problem of whether to expand the airport by further fill of the
bay as one of "Birds versus Planes" or "Jobs versus Pollution." See
WTAO JWTAT TT,,..,., v.,....,,.r 4:--	 1071 -1,4..1k 4-1-A-- a nnm n,r ^n tl,e
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function on the national policy process assumes, of course, effective
implementation of the assessment function. 109 Prospects for effective
109
This is clearly a questionable assumption as the following comment
from Dan Greenberg, New Scientist, Sept. 10, 1970, p. 552, suggests:
DuBridge's successor, Edward E. David Jr., arrives with sound
professional credentials, but the record is blank on whether he
possesses the guerilla instincts so indispensable for operating
from a narrow power base in Washington. The big agencies, with
their massive spending power and allies in Congress, can bulldoze
the route to their objectives. The White House science office,
on the other hand, must rely on a whispered comment to the Bureau
of the Budget, a discreet exploitation of a presidential prefer-
ence or interest, a judicious bit of testimony harmonizing with
what a congressional chairman thought anyway.
The above statement, however, seems to make an assumption concerning
the role of the OST which has not yet been resolved, i.e., which entity
in the Executive Branch will have the ultimate technology assessment
responsibility: the Office of Science and Technology, The Council. on
Environmental Quality, the Domestic Council, the Office of Management
and Budget, etc. In this connection see the recommendations of the
Report of the President's Task Force on Science Policy, Science and
Technoloa: Tools for Progress, April 1970 which suggests the OST and
the Report of the National Academy of Public Administration, Technology
Assessment System fox the Executive Branch, to the Committee on
Science and Astronautics, U. S. House of Representatives, July 1970,
which recommends the Council on Environmental Quality.
Hugh Folk questions whether "additional information will improve
policy making in technology and science." He doubts the validity of the
underlying premises of technology assessment: "that the government wants
to make good technological policy, has the power to make good policy,
and would recognize a good policy if one were proposed. The premises
are at Least questionable, if we interpret 'good' as meaning in the interest
of the survival, prosperity, and liberty of the mass of the population. Many
powerful politicians . . . have no concern for the national interest at all,
but serve the parochial interests that permit their political. survival."
"I can only conclude that neither the Administration nor the Congress
want a rational system of policy assessment. Politicians are elected at
vast expense because they serve powerful interests not all of which are
compatible with the public interest."
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implementation are briefly considered elsewhere by the author. -lfl So long
as assessments are performed on an ad hoc and incidental basis, there is
little reason to expert that they will contribute a substantial added
increment of rational control over the direction and rate of social change.
An adequate assessment must be recognized as a crucial element in the planning
phase of the proposed introduction of any new application into the social
process. ill Implementation will then require the necessary resources of
analytical skills, Information networks, and the coordinating mechanisms
which can produce a systematic integration of inputs from a variety of
assessing entities. 112 The assessment function can then provide effective
109 (continued)
". . . they (politicians) understand that sound Policy assessment
might limit their freedom of action and their ability to serve their
masters in good conscience and political safety."
Hugh Folk, The Role of Technology Assessment in Public Policy (Paper
presented at AAAS Annual Meeting, Boston, Mass., Dec. 29, 1969), pp. 1-3.
1.10
See statement by the Program Director in the 1969-70 Annual Report,
The George Washington University: Program of Policy Studies in Science
and Technology.
ill
Walter Sullivan, science reporter for the New York Times, wrote
recently:
"In essence the United States has reached the stage where no one
element of civilization can be developed on a large scale without
critically affecting other elements." Unless techniques of "techno-
logical assessment" are brought into play, he says, "the Great Machine
of our civilization will increasingly work at cross purposes."
"Environment: The Human Element," Review and Outlook Column,
The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 1, 1970, p. 12, col. 1.
112
See generally, Gabor Strasser, Developing a "Technology Assessment"
Capability: New Analvsis and Planning Methods with a Scope Much Broader
than Technology, Executive Office of the President: Office of Science and
Technology, May 1570.
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guidance for developing deliberately selected conditions of fu^cure
_	 social environments.113
,t
;r
f	 It is apparent that "ideal solutions," in terms of treating the most
^E	 relevant problem contexts, ;ire not always feasible for reason of political,
budgetary, institutional, technological, or other constraints, including
analytical/planning deficiencies. One-factor fixes are frequently the
only recourse -for dealing with crisis situations. Further, the complexity
of the socio-political process, including the vast uncertainties involved
in long-range projections, is a compelling reason in the judgment of many
decision-makers for adopting cautions, short-term, partial measures rather
than comprehensive arrangements for coping with major social problems
through time. In many social problem areas we simply do not know enough
to assess the situation and develop appropriate means for adequately
dealing with the matter as an overall problem. Even so, such means as
are selected for application should be fully assessed for planned and
derivative effects. Only in this manner can such means be appraised for
actual net contribution, if any, to the solution of the problem posed.
It is submitted that the contextual approach to technology assessment
E?	 (which recognizes the dynamic processes of society such as the Effective
Public Decision Process and the Process of Policy Formulation/Program
is
Implementation with respect to given undertakings) will prove more
113
i'	 Louis H. Mayo, "Comments on H. R. 17046," Technology Assessment --
!
	
	
1970: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop-	 3
ment of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, 91st Congress, 2d. Sess.,
May 20, 21, 26, 27; June 2-3, 1970, p. 210.
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,e attainment of inclusive public interest goals than
ping at short-cut, one- factor fixes. While no social
bout costs, an adequate technology assessment function
.st the efforts twaru policy formulation and program	 ;;
,y clarifying optional means or combinations of means	 ra
,ocial benefits and minimize social deprivations.
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It is clear that technology assessment--even a preliminary tech-
nology assessment--means balancing the desirable against the undesirable.
The Council of Economic Advisers to the President says "while it might
be tempting to say that no one should be allowed to do any polluting,
such a ban would require the cessation of virtually all economic
activity."14 It is characteristic of much of the concern over second-
order effects that many proponents look only at adverse consequences of
programs without balancing these against the desirable results. Clearly,
this balance must be struck in every administrative decision, and to do
this requires integrating not only information on second-order conse-
quences, but also the desirable consequences which are the primary
purpose of the program.
Technology assessment cannot re4sonably be considered to be the
whole analytical scope of program analysis. There is, therefore, a
need to integrate the results of technology assessment with other
program analyses. The essential consideration is that the results of
technology assessment be supplied in a form that permits integration
with other information.
'them is a need for consistency of definitions and classification
schemes. It is the usual practice in cost-benefit analysis to discount
future costs and returns. Official guidelines prescribe the discounting
rates. Cross--the-board consistency in program analysis depends on
- 33 -
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uniformity of the rates so that if technology assessments use discounting,
it should use the rates currently in use for related program analyses.
In aerospace-type systems analysis, establishing the compatibility of
analyses is one of the functions of systems engineering--a coordinating
role.
Some part of the notorious difficulty of successful interdisciplinary
research results from the incompatii,I pity of data outputs from various
disciplines, as they are normally produced. Only in a few instances
and for some disciplines have successful bridges been built. For
example, certain elements of the behavioral sciences are now fairly
well integrated into the work of some economists, though others resist
the integration bitterly. In a classic article, Hollis Chenery showed
how the results of an engineering analysis, expressed in the format
t
traditional to engineers, could be transformed into the format useful
to economists. ls
 Dorothy Rice has, in a well-known study, transformed
life expectancy data into a form useful in economics and cost benefit
I
#	 analysis.16 Technology assessment must be interdisciplinary, and the
integratability of analysis is crucial. Interdisciplinariness in
research does not mean merely a willingness to listen and respect each
other. The results of analyses tend to be data, and an interdisciplinary
1	 analysis must meld---and not merely report on alternate pages--results
from a number of disciplines.
Can Technology Assessment Produce Results?
For technology assessment to be worthwhile, the decisions and follow-
on actions of governments and other organizations must somehow be different
- 34 -
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}	 than they would have been otherwise. It
impact of planning studies, which are mar
fE	 ment--indeed, it is possible to consider
^f
amounts to a broadening of the focus of p
The frequency with which planning st
!
.j
istructive to examine the
akin to technology assess.-
technology assessment
ing.
s have been ignored by
studies is sometimes at fault, it would appear that the most commcn
difficulties lie in the relationship between the planning body and the
e decision makers.	 Planners often fail to include plans for irplemonta-
F; Lion.	 Indeed, planners who perceive their role as technicians severely
.r
I:.
limit their willingness to deal with and make explicit recommendations
for implementation.
These same considerations are bound to affect the degree to which
F: technology assessments affect public decision processes, although it is
presently difficult to see the technology assessment specialist as a
policy-neutral technician.	 While some---and perhaps considerable--lack
of consideration and utilization of technology assessment must be
expected, every effort should be made to minimize it, if only to increase
through utilization the efficiency of the analytical effort of technology
assessment.	 Efficient use of analytical resources is certainly a worthy
objective; everyone would agree that it can be enhanced by the efficient
. organization and implementation of studies, be. 	 unless final reports are
to be the end products, applying the criteria of report quality to a
i s planning effort is a suboptimization; a more meaningful criteria is
obtained by comparing benefits to society that flow from decisions with
i'
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the study and without it. In these terms, a mediocre study by profes-
sional criteria may actually be superior to glittering gems of analysis,
undecipherable to nonprofessionals.
As to the means by which technology assessment can be efficient
in these terms, there is room for considerable speculation. I would
advance a few propositions:
• technology assessment will have more impact when the analysis
is competent.
• it will have more impact when it conforms to the values and
Philosophies of decision makers.
• it will have more impact if its results are communicated to
decision makers before they become committed to specific programs,
• it will be more acceptable when it is relevant to the high-
priority decisions which are the immediate responsibility of the
decision makers.
is it will have.more impact if it does not threaten the power
or prestige of the decision makers.
:han
it will have more impact if it presents alternatives rather
 calling for or demanding one rigid course of action.
The last point is particularly debatable, since it runs counter to a
highly popular strategy--namely the presentation of a single program
as the only possible course of action, around which all available sup-
port can be marshalled; presentirig alternatives may dissipate support
for any action at all, and indeed is a common tactic of opponents
-3b-
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of any action. But the function of technology assessment is not advocacy,
but to give decision makers a larger and better hand from which they can
select their trump cards.
Implementation in the public sector as a political process is often
left out of planning. The implementers, as elected officials, are
oriented toward widely varied emphases, systems of values, and reflect
different balances of community interests. In a typical public deci-
sion-making body a large number of points of view are involved, and the
resulting decisons are typically a compromise. There is, therefore,
rarely a single cohesive set of value judgments, preferences and
community interests which can serve as a starting point for the planning
process.
Technology assessment is an exercise in value judgment as well as
in the development of hard factual information. Second--order consequences
may be the hard information part, although the fact that a program will
rouse opposition because it runs counter to the value judgments of some
part of the community is hardly irrelevant in the planning of mission-
oriented agencies.
It is on this point that the mission--oriented governmental agency
is confronted with one of the dilemmas of the American political process.
'	 ^	 3
There is still considerable adherence to the doctrine that value judg-
ments are the prerogative of Congress and that the bureaucracy implements
programs consistent with those judgments. Agencies hesitate to estab-
lish identifiable, wholly effective capabilities for selecting and
^f
t+	 implementing their own value judgments.
f^
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If analysis had nothing to contribute to the formulation and imple-
mentation of value judgment, this would not be serious--but it has.
Persons in agencies concerned with value judgments rarely have much 	 i
analytical support for this part of their function. The process is an	 i
under-wraps activity of top administrators and political appointees whose 	 ;.
status gives them a special basis for the exercise of value judgments.
{
Perhaps their most available forums are coequals from other agencies, 	 t
although performance may be seriously handicapped by interagency rivalries. 	
r
The points made above suggest that no single technology assess-
went is likely to be satisfactory to the entire structure of decision
makers. Public decision making is str , ctured; within the executive
branch there is a hierarchy of task and mission-oriented agencies which
differ in their prescribed area of activity. Offices lower in the
hierarchy generally have restricted areas of operation and mission.
The principal thrust of their effort must inevitably be on carrying
forward the program which is their principal assigned responsibility.
Performance will be judged in those terms.
In short, technology assessment directed to mission-oriented agencies
must be restricted to the scope of agency interest and responsibility;
otherwise it loses relevance to that agency. but, from a public point
of view, assessment in these terms is too narrow. A management-oriented
approach to analysis means also limiting the depth of analysis to the
point where reasonable bases for management decisions have been provided.
Analysis on this basis often lacks completeness and elegance. Some
part of these faults can be remedied through technology assessments
38 -
produced for elements of government with multi-agency points of view.
At the apex, within the executive branch, and the client for truly
broad technology assessments, is the President and the executive
office.
Taken as an entity, the Congress might be considered to be the
client for broadly oriented technology assessment, and the general
public for even broader efforts. But to view the Congress and the
public as entities is surely an error. The principal work of the
Congress 4 s in come tees, and the client in Congress for technology
w	 assessments is not primarily the Congress as a whole, but various
committees. As their functional areas are limited so are the scope
of the technology assessments which will appear to them to be rele-
vant. There are, to be sure, Congressional committees which habitually
take broad points of view and for whom broadly oriented technology
assessments will appear to be relevant. Much the same problem would
appear to exist with respect to the public. Nonetheless, given our
political processes, the public audience for technology assessment
cannot be neglected if technology assessment is to fulfill its promise;
and the means by which the public can be reached are as yet unresolved.
The relationship between the pro g rams and actions of governmental
agencies and the milieu in which government acts will ultimately have,
f
much to do with the contribution made by technology assessment. Rela-
tionships between the character of government programs and second-order
i;	 effects are often subtle. For example, prohibition of liquor, narcotics
or cigarettes tend to create black markets, to support a criminal
;{	 -39-
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element which in turn corrupts others. These effects are, quite appro-
priately considered second
-order effects of any kind of prohibition.
An additional determinant is the degree to which the social needs
to which programs and sought- - for first order effects are satisfied. So
long as the need is desperate and pressing, it will be difficult to con-
'.	 r i^
ii
	 vince many that second-order effects need to be taken seriously.
4
In Summary
In summary, it is a mere platitude to note that societ y is ever
changing its techniques, and that the effect of the changes are far-
reaching. What is new is the effort to predict the whole structure U^
change, to evaluate it, and to identify the best of the apparently-
available alternatives. It is perhaps too early to'say that there is
new emphasis on implementing the results of such assessments of tech-
nology, though clearly there is a new determination to preserve what
is best in our environment.
As yet, this determination has been poorly focused, short on analy-
tical support, and uncertain as to how to make the tradeoffs among
desirable alternatives. In the emphasis on evaluating the consequences
of scientific research the proponents of technology assessment miy very
k
well have made a sound strategic decision, but the impact of change from
other causes Is often equally important and so Inextricably bound up
with science that it is not really useful to restrict technology assess-
ment to the products of science.
Potentially nne of the more serious shortcomings of technology
assessment may bi an unawareness of Important second-order relation . dilps.
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It would seem that a far-reaching preliminary search for possible
relationships should proceed analysis in depth. Following t v 's, the
main thrust of analysis must be problem oriented, must avoid Being
discipline-bound, and must be comparable in structure to systems analysis.
System models, the framework of such analyses, typically are simplifi-
cations achieved by explicitly setting aside second-order effects, and
because these are the heart of technology assessment, a different model-
ling approach is called for.
Technology assessment must not attempt impossible precision. The
structure of the future consequences is largely stochastic, meaning
that an array of possible outcomes, appended by probability estimates,
should be the sought-for result. Forecasts and predictions developed
in this way lend themselves readily to the methods of decision theory
which may well become a basic element of technology assessment.
The means by which technology assessment can be integrated into
decision making are still unresolved,'and crucial. Let us hope that
there will be no repetition of the experience of planning, in which the
results of analysis have so often been ignored.
a^
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT
OF TECHNOLOWi ASSESSMENT
E. Social Impact Evaluation:
Some Implications of the
Specific Decisional Context
Approach for Anticipatory
Project Assessment (APA)
Louis H. MAYO
November 1972, pp. 1--18	 `
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r.	 CONTROL OVER SOCIAL CHANGE
THROUGH ANTICIPATORY PROJECT ASSESSMENT
It seems a plausible assumption that man has always, to
a greater or Lesser degree, undertaken to grasp and maintain
some control over his environment through anticipatory assess-
ments of proposed actions. Two basic questions are involved:
1) What changes in the social environment will be brought
abr,ut by the contemplated action which would not otherwise
-iccur? and Z) What will be the social significance of such
changes?
/ L:
J
While the effort to impose some measure of control over
the direction and rate of social change has a long history,
the prospective evaluative function has come to unusual promi-
nence in the past decade in large measure as a result of the
perception of incompatibility between uncritical expansion of
industrial-consumption practices and the new urgency for access
C
	 to and enjoyment of a much broader spectrum of social values.
The resulting need for more careful allocation and applica-
tion of available resources to pressing, and competing, social
needs is evident. This being so, we are understandably becom-
ing more concerned with the inability of influential decision-
making entities to identify and evaluate the full range of
consequences which will or may flow from new public or public/
private initiatives - technological or otherwise.
. r_
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Anticipatory Project Assessment, whether expressed as
n	 4
policy analysis, social impact evaluation, or technology
assessment, can be characterized as the capacity to perform,
and the disposition to take into account in relevant decisional 	 i
arenas, the following operations:
Identification of the significant effects (necessary
or inevitable, probable, or possible) which will
result from the introduction of a specified project
configuration into alternative projected future social
environments during the planning, implementation and
operational stages.
Evaluation of such Effects in terms of Social Impacts
on 2fected participants and social value-institutional
processes in accord with spec4fied concepts/standards
of Social Justice, i.e., schemes 2.)f social value weight
and distribution.
Presumably, from the perspective of the ::- ,ountable, public
sector decision maker, this evaluative function will contribute
an appreciable increment of control over the direction and rate
of social change by: 1) facilitating judgments as to when or
when not to take particular innovative actions; 2) ?roviding
insights into the advisability of taking major, all-out efforts
as contrasted with incremental response to changing conditions;
and by 3) suggesting the more preferable project confivurations
(alternative means) to apply to the achievement of objectives
consistent with intended (or acceptable) concepts of Social
Justice.
y
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II,	 THE NAWONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969:
A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE
k
ANTICIPATORY PROJECT ASSESSMENT FUNCTION
t
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA 1969)
provides a useful framework for evaluating the prospective
t development: of the Anticipatory Project Assessment Function in
that the conditions and trends previously noted will have con-
siderable effect on its implementation. 	 This Act would seem
to have substantial utility as an instrument for moderating the
direction and rate of technological innovation as a component
of social change.	 It also has considerable potential for
advancing the public policy analytical capability of the
!
i
nation.	 First, however, we should consider the possibility
' that the §102(2)(C)
	
"environmental impact statement" require-
r;
mentfor all major Federal actions could be a delusion to the
extent it becomes form rather than substance.	 But assuming
that this requirement can be a tremendously potent instrument
E
f
for anticipatory project assessment, one must look closely at
the prospects for the development of this potential. 	 Environ-
mentalimpact statements have been required since January 1,
f
19.70, it is to be noted, but without benefit of the organiza-
tional resources and conceptual and analytical skills which
f
NEPA explicitly recognizes to be necessary.	 §102(2)(A)	 directs
agencies to:
utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which
will insure the integrated use of the natural and social
sciences and the environmental design arts in planning
and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's
tF
i
i
environment;
A	
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	 and §102(2)(B) directs that agencies develop methods, procedures,
and techniques
which will insure that presently unquantified
<<	 environmental amenities and values may be given appro-
priate consideration in decision-making along with
economic and technical considerations; . . .
r'.
	
	 The establishment of an assessment requirement by NEPA
has some initial value as a means of focusing attention on
4	 the assessment function and in creating a "market" for a needed
capability as well as project evaluation outcomes. However,
it remains a fair and critical question as to how we can
reasonably expect adequate anticipatory assessment outcomes
in form of §102(2)(C) statements when the resources made
available for developing the requisite analytical capability
remain at a precariously low level. Perhaps only catastrophes,
persistent court actions to implement legislation requiring
impact statements, and angry citizen protests of particular
projects (with resulting delay and increased costs) will
eventually stimulate the necessary support for an adequate
anticipatory proj ,.rct assessment function.
For present purposes, however, let us assume that resources
wail be made available for APA and examine some of the questions
which will arise in the analytical operations of an assessment
function. Attention will be directed to the implications of
9102(2)(B) since this subsection refers to the analytical com-
ponent of the
	
assment process. The injunction that Federal
agencies develop techniques which will "insure that presently
4! ^ l
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unquantified environmental amenities and values . . . be given
t
appropriate consideration," presumably in a rational process
7^
M
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of decision, obviously obscures and ignores a great deal more
1
than it illuminates.	 For example, §102(2)(B) refers to
"environmental amenities and values" which must mean that certain
7 "values" should be given explicit recognition and some measurable
Ei
degree of social significance in the public decision process.	 If r
i
I so, then @102(2)(B) refers to only the final step in a rather
intricate methodology of anticipatory assessment. 9102(2)(B)
suggests no distinction between the effects (changes or
consequences) which might flow from the introduction of a
technological application into a future social environment,
the widely varying types of effects, the participants and
social interests which might be affected by each change, and
the social impact to be attached to each of these changes
on participants and value-institutional processes. Further,
the task of giving some measurable or operational significance
to affected social interests will vary with the characteristics
of the Decisional Context.
Put otherwise, 9102(2)(B) is without discrimination as to
Decisional Context, stating only that techniques be developed so
that "presently unquantified environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decision making."
(italics supplied) The same effect, as for example noise from 	 '^)
transportation systems, will clearly differ with the decisional'
situation. Noise can be measured or quantified in physical 	 j
" 'I
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terms on a decibel scale and by various facilitating constructs
such as NEF and CNEL. Further measurable dimensions can be
given to noise effects by such means as determining the number
of people residing within a given NEF contour. While this is
a means of measuring the magnitude of the noise effect it is
not an evaluation of the social significance of the noise or
conversely, the degree of social interest in noise abatement.
The social significance will depend upon a number of factors
such as competing social interests involved in the particular
decision context. One might plausibly take the position that
no social value can be "quantified" in terms of operational
social significance without relating it to a specific decisional
situation.
Presumably, the underlying rationale of §102(2)(B) is that
by giving some measurable dimensions to environmental values
and amenities an ultimate decision on a proposed "major Federal
action" can be based on an approximate social benefit/cost
assessment. Some court cases have construed the purpose of
§102(2)(C) statements as ?support for such decisions although
the NEPA is basically a "full disclosure law" rather than a
decision making mechanism. As was stated by the D.C. Circuit
in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC:
The sweep of NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compelling
consideration of any and all types of environmental
impact of federal action.
However, in the same opinion the court stated that
i7 -
NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgment
on the part of federal agencies. In each individual
case, the particular economic and technical benefits
of planned action must be assessed and then weighed
against the environmental costs; alternatives must
be considered which would affect the balance of
values.
and in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc, v. Corps of Engineers,
the court asserted that it was the intent of the Congress
through NEPA to require the agencies of the Federal government
to objectively evaluate all of their projects,
regardless of how much money has already been
spent thereon and regardless of the degree of
completion of work. (Emphasis added).
The language of certain court opinions would indicate
that the Congressional intent with respect to NEPA was to
assure a total social impact assessment of particular projects.
However, it is also clear that the courts consider the politi-
cal branches of government to be the final decision makers.
The opinions also tend to recognize that elements of "judgment"
must be left with the ultimate political decision makers.
As noted in the EDF v. Corps of Engineers, the Court stated
that:
The methods of calculating cost-benefit ratios
are innumerable and in many cases esoteric. The
Court's judgment as to sound procedures in this
regard might well not be in accord with the
judgment of Congress.
Secretary of HEW Elliot L. Richardson has stated in this
f
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connection, we do need to "be able to measure the cost of
each alternative (but) our skills in this area are seriously
underdeveloped." He continues:
I
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	,J:	 The hard choices, in the end, are bound to depend on
some combination of values and instincts - and, indeed,
	
^I	 it is precisely because the content of choice cannot be
	
j	 reduced to a mathematical equation that we need the
political forum to reach the final, most difficult
	
^3k	 decisions.	 }	 r
To recognize this, however, reinforces the importance 	 R4'`
of being honest and explicit as possible in articulating
the non-measurable considerations that transcend the
limits of objective analysis.
If we accept the Richardson proposition that we need im-
proved social cost/benefit analysis in order better to clarify
policy options for decision makers but that there are limits
to the analytical approach, then certain questions arise. For
example, what conditions, including analytical disabilities,
impose such limits? Is it the unavoidable uncertainty associ-
ated with the projection of future social environments? Is it
a lack of ability to identify the effects (consequences or
changes) which will result from the introduction of , a proposed
project into a future social environment? is it a lack of
ability to measure the probability and magnitude of such effects
if identified? Is it due to , a lack of ability to determine the
interaction of effects (does a given effect reinforce or reduce
other effects in the decisional context)? Is it a lack of
conceptual ability to determine when effects must be aggregated
or isolated and fragmented in order to render them "operati.onal"
for purposes of evaluating their social impacts? Is it a lack
of consensus on social values or on priority social needs which
1'.
precludes accord in the calculation of the social impacts of
the effects of the proposed action?
- 9 -
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The foregoing questions suggest deficiencies in future-
oriented conceptual thinking and in analytical skills but are
hardly satisfactory operational criteria for determining the
"limits of analysis" with respect to any given problem assess-
ment. It is likely as indicated throughout this paper that
the "limits of analysis" will differ with each specific decisional
context when measured, for example, by the extent to which	 r
"demonstrable data" can be effectively applied to the identifi-
cation of effects of proposed projects and to approximation
of their probability and magnitude or to the establishment
of the conditions under which and the parameters within which
realistic discretion can be exercised (or differing social
value positions registered) in the establishment of normative
standards. Or the question might be one of determining what
effort and expense is justified in acquiring additional
"demonstrable data" for a specific assessment. Will the incre-
mental contribution such data will make to a rational process
of decision justify its cost? For instance, will it reduce
elements of uncertainty? When data and analysis can no longer
contribute to the reduction of uncertainty as to effect
	 i
identification and measurement or to the social impact evalua-
tion of such effects or otherwise to the clarification of
optional choices, then the assessing entity must resort to
other less objective techniques and procedures, including
various forms of adversarial system.
a	
-- .4
Why must the assessor be concerned with notions of social
justice? The sufficient reason is that whether effects of a
given action (and their distribution) are considered social
benefits or social costs and to what extent will depend upon,
in varying degree, the social value perspective (notion(s)
of social justice) of the participant evaluating the action
outcome. By expressing, simplistically, the social impact of
an identified effect as the product of the probability of the
occurrence of the effect (resulting change, consequence), the
magnitude of the effect (by relevant dimensions of measure-
ment), and the degree of social desirability (or undesirability)
of the effect, then it is evident that techniques for giving
some measurable dimension to social desirability must be
applied in the process of anticipatory project assessment.
Alternative concepts of social justice reflect different
preferences as to social value weight and distribution. Hence,
the degree of social desirability attached to the social value
(or values) associated with a given effect will differ with
the social justice concepts invoked by affected participants.
It is recognized that the social value orientations of most
participants may be only partially explicit and by no means
constitute a comprehensive rationale of political system.
other aspects of the relationship of social justice concepts
to anticipatory project assessment should be recognized in
iaddition to the fact that participants will make divergent
evaluations of the effects of actions and projects reflecting
their differing social value perspectives. In our pluralistic
society there are numerous generally accepted notions of
social justice including those prescribed in the Constitutional
structure and otherwise formally sanctioned. The relevance
or applicability of such concepts will vary somewhat with the
institutional arena (courts, legislature, regulatory agency,
executive, etc.) and the precise decisional context (including
the arena, the issue or proposed action, the participants,
the social values involved, and the alternatives open to the
decisional entity). Further, what constitutes compliance
with a specified social justice concept (which may have general
relevance in various decisional arenas) will also vary with the
precise context.
In a public decision process with a strong adversarial
component various participants will advance different concepts
or standards of social justice, often expressed narrowly and
explicitly in terms of specific social interests which support
a preferred decisional outcome. Further, anticipatory project
assessments made by the diverse participants in the public
decision process with respect to a given project may range from
the most exclusive (and narrowly focused, often for purely
partisan purposes) to the most inclusive (undertaken from an
impartial perspective and designed to include consideration of
w,
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all affected participants and value--institutional processes).
The essential point is that inclusive total social impact
assessments of given projects inevitably require explicit-
ness in selecting and identifying the social justice concept
or standard (or combination thereof) by which the social
costs and benefits of the assessment outcome are to be measured -
if the assessment is to include social iml2act evaluation in
addition to mere effect identification. It would not seem
inaccurate to state that this aspect of assessment methodology
has received scant systematic attention to date.
This is not presumed to be a simple task as the frustrations
of the National Academy of Engineering's Committee on Tele-
communications amply illustrate in the Committee's effort to
define the public interest with respect to electromagnetic-
spectrum management. The Report states in part:
The ideal system, as defined for this search, would be
a systematic procedure that could be applied to deter-
mine and assess the social and economic values associ-
ated with the spectrum management decisions. The
answers obtained by such a system should be independent
of those carrying out the procedures. The decisions
indicated should be in the public interest and should
contribute to the general welfare. Our search found
no such system. It was concluded that some type of
formula employing numerical values represented the
only hope, but the study led to the conclusion that such
an ideal system does not exist nor can it be formulated.
The most basic reason for the failure of a formula
approach is mathematical. A function cannot be simul-
taneously maximized for several dependent variables.
The greatest good for the greatest number of people,
or the greatest value for the least cost, simply does
not exist.
This statement of exasperation is understandable under the
f
is
circumstances but does little to further the development of
Committee did
a subcategory
rience "well
	
National Academy	 m
of Assessment
f
As in any problem calling for evaluation of a proposed
resource allocation or distribution, the assessment of
a contemplated technological development raises vexing
issues of welfare economics, political theory, and
ethics. Economists, philosophers, and lawyers have
debated these matters among themselves and with one
another for generations. Surely it would be unrealistic 	 ^j
to suppose that this report could somehow resolve them.
Nevertheless, this analytical challenge cannot be escaped. It
a
is crucial to the Anticipatory Project Assessment Function.
The Purpose of anticipatory assessment is to clarify policy
and project options in terms of their social implications in
order that intelligent choices can be made by responsible
political decision makers.
Yet, it is apparent that while such fundamental concepts
of social justice as promotion of the "general welfare" or
"equal protection of the laws" or "fairness" or provision for
"maximization of individual autonomy consistent with similar
exercise by all" may be prescribed as the guiding social pur-
pose of particular actions or projects, such standards are not
usually operationally adequate means of measuring and evaluating
f'	 the actual outcomes of such nro-iects. The translation of the
an adequate policy evaluative function. The
consider that its work was "to a degree. . .
of technology assessment" and found its expe
expressed" by the following paragraph of the
of Sciences Report on Technology: Processes
anri rhni r+c
hfit
E ^
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more general social justice concepts into explicit social
value or social interest schemes will often facilitate the
assessment task. Social interest schemes can be useful in
suggesting possible consequences of a given action and hence,
can contribute 'to effects identification. Such schemes can
also be designed so as to reflect the social value emphasis of
alternative concepts of social justice and thereby provide a
means of evaluating the social impacts of the consequences of
an action.
Nevertheless, should there be any lingering doubts con-
cerning the relevance of social justice concepts to the task
of total social impact assessment, reference can be made to 	 1
^	 a
selected existing problem areas and emerging policy decisions
having clear social justice implications. Any situation in-
volving the allocation of scarce resources raises social
justice questions as, for example, selection of criteria for
i
regulating access to the currently inadequate supply of arti-
ficialkidney (dialysis) machines, and, more generally, the
selection of criteria for allocating "scarce medical care."
Apportionment of costs for a given public need raises similar
questions. A great variety of situations involving the
"safety" factor, frequently placed in a "risk/benefit" frame-
work, directly involve questions of what participants should
r	 ^^
_.)e protected to what extent and at what cost to whom? The
social justice implications of safety measures have been
or
explicitly treated by the National Transportation Safety
'N
y
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Board. The numerous inquiries now being raised with respect
to medical ethics and the patient in extremis, as well as
inquiries into the implications of genetic engineering,
require evaluations which are either explicitly or implicitly
based upon some notions (if not systematic schemes) of
social justice, and consequently, of what are social bene-
fits, what are social costs, and how they should be distri-
buted. Both the relevance and complexities of social jus-
tice considerations are vividly projected by the current
efforts to find rational modes of establishing the "value
of human life" for application in public policy planning
decisions.
Every proposed action or project clearly has social
justice implications, since by whatever concept of social
justice applied, there will be benefits, there will be costs,
and such benefits and costs will be distributed among various
groups in society. Those who bear the costs of a,given
action are frequently not the direct or primary beneficiaries.
It is also of the utmost importance to note that alternative
means of achieving a specified objective may have quite differ-
ent consequences for affected participants or even involve
radically different groups of participants. The total social
impact would thus vary with the means used to reach the
specified objective. This being so, notions of social justice
may strongly influence the alternative means selected.
- 16 -
Perhaps in most situations of anticipatory project assess-
ment some guidance will be given the assessment entity as to
the social justice concept (project objectives or criteria) to
be applied to social impact evaluation. For example, statutory
authority of Federal agencies will provide Statements of Policy
as to what is sought to be achieved by projects performed 	 V
pursuant to such authority. Frequently these policy directives
are broad, ambiguous, and may encompass conflicting -- if not	
I
downright contradictory - policy objectives. However, regu-
lations of agencies and the decisions in the various arenas
of legal process may provide a fairly satisfactory scheme of
social objectives which can be employed by the assessing entity
as social impact evaluative criteria. More specifically,
Agency guidelines for the submission of Environmental Impact
Statements pursuant to NEPA 1969 0102(2)(C) and Agency Requests
for Proposals are sources of evaluative criteria.
Occasionally, inclusive, impartial assessment entities may
be requested - or undertake on their own initiative -- to
make an anticipatory assessment of a proposed or potential
project without guidance or limitations on criteria to be
employed for social impact evaluation. It is then up to the
assessing entity to develop or select and posit criteria.
Such criteria would most likely reflect the "controlling"
norms of the Constitutional framework, cultural traditions,
and social practices, though the assessing entity may not
7
a
is
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feel obliged to adhere strictly to these constraints. tJhzt
is required is that the social justice concept employed be
made explicit.
The notion of social justice has been introduced to
demonstrate the relevance of social value perspective to the
analytical operations of anticipatory project assessment,
that is, that the evaluation of effects for social signifi-
cance depends upon the social justice concept adopted for the
assessment. While the public decision process yn operation
is :frequently little more than a contest between contending
parties asserting narrow, strictly partisan interests, it is
certainly obligatory upon our authoritative decisional entities
(courts, legislatures, regulatory agencies, administrators, etc.)
to apply recognized and acceptable notic,as of social justice.
In any event, this analysis, unless otherwise noted, will pro-
ceed from the perspective of such authoritative entities,
presumably undertaking to arrive at acceptable public interest
outcomes. Further, the assessment function will be viewed
from the perspective of an inclusive-oriented entity, com-
mitted to providing the authoritative decisional entities
with outcomes which will assist such entities to arrive at
determinations consistent with specified social justice
concepts. hence, assessment entities, from this perspec-
tive, are obligated to produce outcomes in accord with ex-
plicit concepts of social justice (whether posited by the
entity or otherwise prescribed). Through this approach,
_.r	
6 
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assessment outcomes have meaning for all affected partici- 	 I
pants. The outcome would not be represented as the pre-
ferred course of action by the assessing entity. It;, function
in the public decision process is to establish an analytical
standard by which other alternatives can be evaluated by
affected participants in the relevant decisional context.
^'
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INTRODUCTION
The assessment study is a form of planning research that seeks
to anticipate the secondary social impacts that might arise from:
(1) The application from some new technology.
(2) Government or private programs to cope with a major social
problem like poverty, environmental pollution, or public
safety.
(3) A concerted national effort to achieve a widely supported
specific goal like landing a man on the moon or finding a
cure for cancer.*
From the point of view of methodology, I see nothing to gain from
distinguishing among the three types of studies identified above. The
process of tracing secondary reactions is pretty much the same whether
the initiating force is the application of a new technology (e.g.,
two-way Cable TV, genetics engineering, or a revolution in food pro-
duction methods) or an innovative social program (a major change in
taxation, a national health insurance program, or a "landmark"
Supreme Court decision relative to civil rights).
A key task in any assessment study is the generation of social
impact scenarios that seek to trace in some structured fashion the
interactions among various social forces. However, before an analyst
is ready to generate such scenarios, he must first address three pre-
paratory tasks that are common to all assessment studies, and, in
fact, to most paper-and-pencil public policy research. These pre-
paratory tasks are:
A recent MITRE paper speculates about both the potentialities and
complexities that might be associated with an intensive effort to
dramatically increase longevity in the United States. See: Social
Priorities - The Dilemma of Quality Versus Quantity (Martin V. Jones
- MITRE MTP-364), December 1971.
I
(1) IDENTIFY RELEVANT QUESTIONS. The analyst's first task is
to identify and make explicit a whole host of heterogeneous
essentially unstructured questions that must be answered
relative to the nature of the technology or problem being
assessed, and to exogenous forces that are related to the
technology or problem.
(2) SYSTEMATICALLY STRUCTURE QUESTIONS. The second task is to
arrange those questions systematically so that they can be
a basis for hypothesizing cause-effect, problem-solution,
action-consequence relationships.
(3) COLLECT DATA. The analyst's ability to draw inferences,
however, depends upon his ability to develop answers to
the specific questions that he has identified and structured
in the first and second steps. This means that he must
collect data that will guide his intuitive judgements in
deriving these answers.
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the notion of
assessment studies is not new. For years, disciplinary research has
produced assessment studies. Economists have made assessments of the
impacts of new legislation (e.g., tax measures) on the national income
level, market researchers have assessed the impacts of new products
on a company's sales, sociologists have assessed the impact of a
proposed change in the parole system on the crime rate, educators
have assessed the impacts of a major curriculum innovation on student
achievement, etc.
Similarly, interdisciplinary analyses in recent years have
"assessed" the comparative merits and shortcomings of alternative
courses of action for solving or alleviating specific problems. In
the category of this interdisciplinary research there has been opera-
tions research, cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis,
systems analysis, management ,science, computer simulation, the Program
2
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Evaluation and Review Technique, the Program-Planning--budgeting
system, and the so-called "Policy Sciences."
However, a major characteristic of most of this disciplinary
and interdisciplinary research is that it has sought answers to a
relatively narrow list of questions. Economists have usually con-
fined their efforts to appraising the impact of a particular measure
on the nation's economic well being, market researchers have primarily
been concerned with the effect that a new product would have on a parti-
cular .company's or industry's sales or profit position. By the same
token, most interdisciplinary studies have compressed the entire
decision-making criterion into some simple cost-performance ratio,
i.e., the dollar cost per patient serviced in a medical treatment
center.
One way of describing the contribution of the technology assess-
ment movement is to refer back to the first of the three analytical
tasks listed at the beginning of this paper. Those who have pioneered
the technology assessment movement have insisted that the analyst
must vastly increase the scope and the number of questions to which
he seeks to develop answers. This point has been succinctly stated
by Professor Mayo:
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the concept of tech-
nology assessment is that it is, and is meant to be,
consistent with the notion of Total Impact Assessments,
i.e., the identification of all social ikzpacts of a parti-
cular application rather than selected i,n,iacts. P
Louis H. Mayo, Scientific Method, Adversarial System, and Tech-
nology Assessment, November 1970, Program of Policy St=dies in
Science and Technology, George Was'aington University Monograph
No. S, p. 3.
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H	 THE MITRE-OST PROJECT
1
I believe that our recent MITRE methodological studies for OST
I
made a first step toward addressing in a generic context the first
j	 two tasks listed above. First, we tried to suggest, as comprehen-
sively and as explicitly as time would allow, how the concept "total-
impact analysis" might be defined. In defining "relevant considera-
tions" we consolidated lists of highly diverse societal characteristics
iE
in a somewhat different way than, to our knowledge, has therefore been
done in either disciplinary or interdisciplinary studies. In so doing{
we drew extensively from the published research of others in many
fields for the component items of our lists. These lists of societal
characteristics - covering such matters as values and goals, demo-
graphy, environment, economic factors, social elements, and insti-
tutional parameters - provided a beginning master list of areas of
interest about which the analyst should raise questions when he begins
the process of making a total impact assessment study.
	 f
In the MITRE-O5T study we also tried to contribute in a generic
way to the second task identified at the beginning of the paper. We
provided a seven-step procedure which, we believe, can help an
analyst to integrate the diverse checklists of questions so that he
can begin to trace in a comprehensive fashion the initial and secondary
impacts of any major technological application or of society's attempts
to respond to or redirect that application. Exhibit I provides an
analyti-al overview of the seven-step procedure and some of the
supporting checklists.
4
0	 SEVEN MAJOR STEPS IN MAKING A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 	 M
t	 DEFINE TRL ASSESSMENT TASK
z	 DFSCII ISE R E LE VANT TECHNOLOGIES
I DE V	 OF SDCIE I  ASSUMPTIONSELOP STAT E
4	 JOE NTIFY IMPACT AREAS
ACTION OPTION EVALUATION CRITERIA
CRITERIA DEFINITION
I CONTROLLABILITY
2 WORT"
3. PRIORITY
4. EFFECTIVENESS
5 COST ISPONSORI
6. COST ISPILLOVERI
T. NON FINANCIALPROBLEMS
B-INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES
9 UNCERTAINTY
STEP6
SCOPE OF STUDY
anEADTH
OF
STUDY
...	
DEPTH TO WHICH
STUDY COVERS TOPIC
MAJOR MINOR NGNF
RANGE OF TECHNOLOGIES
RANGE OF TOPICS
GROUPS AFFECTED
TIME PERIOD ANALYZED
TYPES OF IMPACTS
LEVELSOF IMPACTS
IMPACT MEASUREMENTS
—_
—
—
—^
—
STEP I
5	 MAKE PRE LFMINARY IMPACT ANAL YSI$
S	 InFNTIFY POSSIRI F ACTION OPTIONS
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TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTION BACKGROUND STATEMENT
JAATTERSAODRESSED COVERAGE
t PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL
DESCRIPTION
2 Cu RnENTSTATE OF THE ART
Z INFLUENCING FACTORS
A RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
4 FUTURE STATE OF THE ART
6 USES AND APPLICATIONS
STEP 2
STATE 0FSOCIETY AND MAJOR IMPACT CATEGORIES
CATEGORIES TYPES
VALUES
ENVIRONMENT
DEmOGRAPHV
ECONOMIC
SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS --.T
STEPS 3 AND 4
KEY IMPACT COMPARISON
WITH AND WITHOUT ACTION OPTIONS
TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
APPLICATION
SOCIETAL IMPACT
SOCIETAL IMPACT
ACTION OPTION
BRIEF DESCRIPTION
IMPACT CHARACTERISTICS
IMPACT
WITHOUTACTION
OPTION
WITHACTION
OPTION
AF F ECTEO GROUP
HOW AFFECTED
LIKELIHOOD
TIMING
41AGNITUDE
DURATION
DIFFUSION
SOURCE
CONTROLLABILITY
STEPS 5 AND 7
This set of displays extracts portions of the selected checklists used in the MITRE
studies for OST to summarize important aspects of the tachnolog; mossmant methodology.
The sewn steps listed in the canter of the page depict the total methodotDgy.
The key questions that must be addressed in accomplishing each of the sewn steps
are shown in the remaining exhibits. Some of the exhibits apply to two v cps (other then
one—e .g., the third and fourth steps and the fifth and seventh steps are displayed together.
Each stop and its applicable key questions are discussed in separate chapters of the MITRE
study.
EXHIBIT T
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT:
A METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW
5
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ILLUSTRATIVE SOCIAL-IMPACT SCENARIOS
During the last year our thinking at MITRE has moved toward
increasingly explicit social impact scenarios. Most of the scenarios 	 i
in the study for OST were essentially simple and qualitative. For
instance, Exhibit 2 lists in a relatively straightforward manner a 	
r
partial series of historical events following the introduction of
man-made fabrics. Exhibit 3 uses a flow-diagram technique to depict
some multidimensional impacts that might follow an accelerated auto-
mation in industry. Exhibit 4 in a similar way depicts some conse-
quences that might ensue if mariculture (sea-farming) were successfully
applied to reduce malnutrition in developing countries.
In Exhibit 5 we speculate about one set of consequences that
might follow the introduction of two-way Cable TV in major cities.
This exhibit elaborates the scenario process by documenting the
rationale that led us to hypothesize the series of events shown.
In Exhibit 6 we carry the methodology substantially further in
that:
(1) we attach four important qualifying and elaborating bits of
information to each successive event:
(a) how probable is it that the interaction will, in fact,
occur?
(b) in what direction will the interaction occur, i.e.,
will the happening of the earlier event cause the
later event to increase or decrease?
(c) what will likely be the ma nitude of 1-he interaction
a
if it occurs?
(d) what will be the tind.ng of the interaction? How ],ing
after the earlier event r-Il the later event occur?
i
(2) we show multiple consequences flowing from one prior event
rather than a single consequence.
6
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EXHIBIT 2
SELECTED IMPACTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF
MAN—MADE FABRICS ON CITIES
less use of cotton in clothing manufacture
decline in sales of U. S. grown cotton
reduced employment opportunities for unskilled
blacks in southern cotton fields
stimulated migration of southern blacks to
northern cities
great expansion of welfare costs in northern
cities
financial crises in northern cities involving
huge increases in city obligations without com-
mensurate increases in the tax base and revenues
steady exodus of northern urban whites to
suburbs
7
SOME POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES
OF A RAPID INCREASE IN INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION
1 and 8
TECHNOLOGY
Increased Automa-
tion in Commerce
and Industry
INSTITUTIONAL
Legislation Pro-
viding Re-Training
Education,
Shortened Work
Week, Lowered Re-
tirement Age, New
Jobs, Etc.
VALUES
Education As
Leisure-Time
Pursuit Promoted
4
	 6
DEMOGRAPHIC
	
ENVIRONMENT
Shift of Segments	 Increased Use of
of Population to	 Land for Recre-
New Locations	 ational Purposes
SOCIAL
	
ECONOMIC
Increased Leisure	 Decreased Employ-
Time
	
	
ment Among Factory
Workers
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TECHNOLOGY
Interactive TV is applied increasingly
to make available to inner-city children
a quality of education equaling tt • . pro-
vided by suburban school systems.
2	 ]
DEMOGRAPHY	 VALUES
6
Historically, the urge to obtain better 	 The U. S. has frequently been labeled the
ECONOMIC	 education for their children has been	 "throw-away" society and often citizens
The economir prosperity of the inner-city
	
one of the leading incentives in causing 	 have seemed to prize newness for newness sake
will be enhanced because fewer of ti;e
	
many of the more ambitious inner-city 	 in their housing, automobiles, and other
articulate, relatively affluent families will
	
families (both white and black) to move	 material possessions. This tendency may be
	
a
be leaving. This may halt, and even reverse,
	
to the suburbs. By providing better	 substantially reduced if thousands of ambi-
the steady erosion of the tax base that most
	
education to inner-city children, inter-	 tious inner-city families decide to renovate 	 x'
! major cities have suffered in the last several
	
active TV may slow down or halt the 	 and refurnish their existing alder homes,
decades.	 population exodus to the suburbs. 	 community facilities, etc.
3
	
4
ENVIRONMENT	 SOCIAL
If the more ambitious, articulate families	 These same families, if they decide to
decide to stay in the city, they will 	 stay in the city, will also insist that
take steps to insure that the urban en-	 more aggressive steps be taken to rid
vironment be cleaned up relative to air 	 the inner-city of major social problems
purity, noise, aesthetic nuisances, etc.	 such as drug addiction, crime, etc.
EXHIBIT 5
ONE SET OF CONSEQUENCES OF INTRODUCING
TWO-WAY CABLE TV IN LARGE CITIES
INSTITUTIONS
Major overhauls in the structure of
local government may be brought about
if aggressive efforts are made to clean
up both the plysical and social environ-
{ents of the inner-city while at the
same time making the total urban poli-
tical process more responsive to an arti-
culate citizenery.
F
W. +. 5, 13-24) VALUES
Senior Citizen Morale
(.6. t, H, 1-121
GA, +, N, 25-36)
(.8, -. M, 13-24)
(.2. -w V. 12-24)
Sac"
Rcelth: pressure to pro-
vide rare numerous and
sophisticated emergency
care 9erVlees5
REALTR CKWAL)
Incidence of sulcidesg
ECONOMIC
Jab market competition
V= MC
Disbursements from Civil
cage:
Probability of Occurteccel Direction of Change 
From 0.1 to 1.0 + inuroaae
- Decrease
Marltude of Change Timing3
S - Strong 1-12 Mooths
M- Moderate 13.24 Mucha
W - steak ?S-36 Months
0vr • 35 Months
f
EXHIBIT 5
SOME REPERCUSSIONS THAN MIGHT FOLLOW
FROM RAISING THE MANDATORY CIVIL
SERVICE RETIREMENT AGE
{ • S, - . V. 13-24)
	
INSTMUTIONAL
Reed for "walfara" retire-
mat homes
(.9. +, M, I-12) 	 ECORQMIC
Employment of persons
aver 65
IMMVATEON
Mandatory Federal Civil
Service Retiremant Ago
Raised from 70 to 754 DIMOCRAPSY
population moveecat from
northern states to Florida
sad Par Vest
(.6. -, M, over 36)
gum: !	 Service Retirement Fund
1 Estimated probability that the event will occur with the magnitude
and tlmiug show. yg0L0fy
2 No value judgtreac is Implied whether the indicated direction of Pressure to redesign
move-.Lent is, an not balance, socially favorable or unfavorable. (,4. t, if,arr35) equip%ene to stemma-•	6
"+In other uords, iacrLmned job competition (indicated by a 	 " data the employed aged.
sign) is not lnforred to be either "goad" or 'bad" -	 I
3 The time period afrer the prior event during which this event will j
reach the magnitude of itpact indicated
4 After 15 years of service
5 Older people get sick Cara often and more seriously than younger --{.3^ *^ p. over 36)
people.	 One consequence of a larger number of employed people
-	
over 65 is that a greater percentage of al' coronary heart attacks
will occur away from home - at work, on public transit, etc.
!	 6 E. S.	 The steepness of the step up into a bus may have co be .
reduced.	 Also, there coy be greater pressure to develop and pro-
.	
Vida special therapeutic menus for the employed aged in platen of
I	 emplaytent and restaurants
MVIRORMEST
IIIL	 7 Pr assure to clean up the air soy be increased as cony elderly pressure Co clean up the
persons, who would otherwise have moved to Arizona (etc.) for
7
-	 i	 respiratory ailments, decide to remain in northern, urban centers
where they ate employed
I
4	
g There is. for a variety of reasons. a higher incidence of suicides
gang elderly people than amang the population generally. 	 the
~raising of earale as a result of the subject innovation should
reduce suicides in Chia age group
!,
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POSSIBLE METHODOLOGICAL REFINEMENTS
There is, as I see it a-distinct advantage to the increasingly 	
1
explicit scenarios as one moves from Exhibit 2 through 6. A scenario,
like Exhibit 6, is much more informative as to exactly what conditions
an analyst is, it fact, projecting. Traditionally, a shortcoming of 	 1"
many scena•cios and projections is their non-explicitness. Because it
is botb explicit and discrete, a scenario, like Exhibit 6, makes it	 r
^_.	 possible for other analysts to concur with, or take exception to,
specific entries in the scenario without I-aving to acceptor reject
the scenario totally.
	 j
i
Although Exhibit 6 is much more informative than Exhibit 2 or 3,
Exhibit 6 is also simplified as to the scope of information that
I
should ideally be shown in this type scenario. For instance:
(1) Other factors that would either reinforce or dampen the
specified sequential relationships should be included in
.:^
	
	 the scenario. For instance, in Exhibit 6 disbursements
from the Civil Service Retirement Fund are likel y to be
!
	
	
influenced by many other factors besides .hauges in the
mandatory retirement age - e.g., changes in the number of
persons reaching 65 years of age, changes in the price
level, etc.
E; (2) Exhibit 6 shows only 11 interactions. A scenario that
truly aimed to model the real world might require 50, 100,s.
or more interactions. For instance, if the muvement of
tr the aged to Florida and the Far West were slowed, this
would lead to (+) impacts on the economic prosperity and
the political power of northern states vs. Florida and
r	 the Far West. Similarly, lower-level . impacts might be
IF	 anticipated - the demand for winter clothing would be
a
increased and that for golf and fishing equipment reduced. 	 !
i
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(3) Exhibit 6 shows only one-way interactions. An indepth
scenario would aim to include dual or two-way interactions,
e.g., not only do economic events influence demography,
but demographic events cause economic impacts.
(4) Obviously, in any given case, what is required is not a
single scenario, but a whole series of them. The qualify-
ing coefficients to the events specified in Exhibit 6 are
	 r
all single-valued. However, each of the matters covered
is characterized by uncertainty. An alternative scenario
is needed to trace the chain of consequences if a given
probability of occurrence were to change from, say, 0.9 to
0.5, or, if, the magnitude of change were to bc . weak
instead of strong, or the timing 25-36 months instead of
1-12 months.
(5) The qualifying descriptive bits of information attached to
each sequential event should be expanded beyond the four
shown in Exhibit 6 - probability of occurrence, direction,
magnitude, and timing of impacts. Other information that
might be shown includes: the duration of the impact, the
diffusion of it across society totally or among members of
a specified target group,* and the estimated extent to
which the impact may be amenable to social. control.
Research in developing more explicit, sophisticated scenarios
should be accompanied by parametric empirical research that would
* For instance, the "aged" are not a monolithic group. Some are rich,
others are poor; some are well, others are sack; some desire to work,
others do not; some are highly trained, others are unskilled; some
are married, others are not; some live in cities, others on farms,
etc. The specific impact that a new; technology or social program
would have would vary greatly according to the socio-economic con-
d3.tion of the aged person involved.
a 4^
help an analyst estimate the probability, direction, magnitude,
timing, etc. of the various entries in the scenarios. For instance,
a major initial concern is whether the period of application of a
new technology will be quick and short or slow and protracted.
Exhibit 7 lists some of the factors that can influence the length
of this application period. Similar parametric lists should be
developed that would help an analyst to estimate the probability,
direction, magnitude, and timing of the secondary consequences that
follow from the initial application of the innovation.
Going beyond the qualitative parametric relationships just cited,
the next step is to quantify the relationships, wherever possible.
The MITRE reports for QST cited, illustratively, a wide variety of
such quantitative relationships that have been developed in many
fields -- economics, demography, environment, public safety, health,
etc. (See: Volume 1, pp. 87-92). As one specific example, Exhibit 8
extracts a small portion of a computer analysis that was conducted for
the MITRE mariculture pilot assessment study. This analysis projects
quantitatively the potential impacts on 26 different socio-economic--
environmental conditions of mariculture applications in 67 developing
countries.
I
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EXHIBIT 7
FACTORS THAT WILL INFLUENCE HOW LONG IT WILL
TAKE TO APPLY A NEW TECHNOLOGY
FACTORS EXPLANATION
People vs. Things If a new technology initially impacts on the material
world, such as the transistor did, there will probably
be less delay in its widespread adoption than if it
impacts in a major way on people physiologically.
There almost surely will be a delay if the product is
one that people would ingest, as a new powerful drug,
that might have serious adverse side effects.
Nature of Decision Making Centralized decision malting, such as in the military or
space programs, is conducive to more rapid application
than diffused decision making involving many checks
and balances, as is currently the situation in certain
new health technologies.
National Commitment If the new technology would satisfy a "crying need" (a
cure for cancer) or a national goal (to land a man on
the moon), there will normally be a tendency to assume
risks or surmount obstacles that would otherwise block
or delay an application.
Reward for Innovator Since most innovations in our private enterprise
economy are made by entrepreneurs, how the rate of
application affects entrepreneurial profits is import-
ant.	 Sometimes, for various reasons, it has been in
the interest of the innovator (e.g., Corfam, substi-
tute for leather) to prolong the application period.
In other cases, where imitation has been easy and pro-
duct differentiation difficult (as in the fashion
field), there has been a tendency to exploit the market
quickly.
Capital Required All other things being equal, the larger the capital
investment required, the more restricted the number of
organizations that can participate in the application,
and hence, the slower the rate of application.	 The
increasing capital investment required for the develop-
ment of birth control devices is one of the reasons
that the period of application of new technology in
this field may lengthen.
Competition Closely linked to several prior considerations is the
extent of competition in both research and production.
In many industries, smaller companies whose fortunes
in the industry are rising set the pace for rapid
application of new technology. 	 In other industries
where the industry structure is stabilized or mori-
bund, innovation is slow.
Institutional Climate ASain, similar to several of the above, the extent to
which vested interests can conspire to stymie innova-
tion will greatly influence the rate at which innova-
tion is applied.	 The building industry is, of course,
the classic case where contractors, labor uni pns, and
local building codes have for all practical purposes
throttled major innovations.
. ! li
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IMPACT AREAS	 UNITS OF MEASURE	 1975	 1980	 1985.	 1989
Mariculture Acreage	 Millions	 16	 31	 38	 42
Mariculture Production (Total) 	 Millions of Tons	 2.0	 9.5	 17.0	 19.0
Mariculture Production (Exported) 	 Millions of Tons 	 2.0	 9.0	 14.0	 14.0
Value:	 Mariculture Export	 Billions of Dollars	 9.3	 42.0	 -,';.3	 65.3
Jobs Created by Mariculture	 Millions	 3.84	 7.44	 9.12	 10.08
Income from Mariculture ()	 l of Nat. Income	 0.6	 i.9	 2.2	 L9
Annual Protein from Mariculture	 % of Total Consumed	 0	 2.0	 9.0	 13.0
Malnutrition Abated
	
Millions of Cases	 0	 75	 449	 748
Infant Deaths Prevented 	 Millions of Cases 	 0	 37	 224	 37,
Training Required	 Millions of Hours 	 96	 186	 228	 252
Water Pollution Index 	 Index Number**	 25.5	 31.0	 37.6	 44.2
x This is an abridged version of one of twelve different scenarios that Caere generated in the MITRE
Mariculture Pilot Study. Each scenario reported on 26 different impact areas as compared to the 	 '
12 impact areas shown above. The different scenarios reflected the effects of varying the mari-	 3
:f	 culture acreage and the production yield per acre.
j
k	 ** Lowa number is good; high number is bad.	 i'
DATA COLLECTION
In the first and second tasks leading up to the social-impact
scenarios that we have discussed thus far, we illustrated some of
the social characteristics that should be related in an assessment
study. We also identified, again illustratively, some of the para-
meters - like probability of occurrence, direction of change,
magnitude of change, and timing of occurrence - that should be traced
for each of the interrelated factors. The third task is to collect
data that will make it possible to assign the coefficients to these
parameters in any given case. Should the probability of occurrence
of one event following another be designated 0.1, 0.5, or 0.9?
Should the timing be placed in the 0-12 months range, 13-24 months,
or over three years?
The MITRE study for OST, primarily because of time limitations,
did not explore this issue of data collection to the same extent as
it did the first two tasks, identifying the questions to be addressed
and structuring these questions systematically for analytical purposes.
Actually the task of collecting data for a technological assessment
study is not essentially different than that of any other future-
oriented, public-policy-issue, paper-and-pencil study. Probably the
major difference, as noted previously, is that in an assessment study
information would have to be collected on a much raider variety of
matters -- values, demography, economics, environment, social issues,
and institutional considerations -- than in a typical disciplinary
or even interdisciplinary cost/benefit study. For some of these
matters - like values and institutional. considerations - it is also
more difficult to collect "hard data" than it is in the typical
economic r{search or market analysis survey.
However, rarely, for any of these matters is the choice one of
data vs. no data at all. It is rather one of data of various shades
of relevance and validity. It may also be a question of documented
17
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data vs. undocumented ("expert opinion," "authorative source") data.
Other things being equal., documented data are preferred to undocu-
mented data because it is normally easier to doublecheck and verify
documented data. However, often ocher things are not equal.. For
instance, in dealing with new somewhat unique projects, undocumented
expert opinion data may sometimes be just as good or better than
`	 documented data because the so-called undocumented data are more
current and relevant. For instance, a carefully developed "guessti-
mate" from a well--known gerontologist might provide a sounder
estimating base relative to the effect on senior citizen productivity
and morale of raising the compulsory retirement age in the United
States than would a written report prepared at an earlier date in a
different country with a somewhat different cultural heritage. In
recent years new methods have been developed for systematically
reaching a consensus of expert opinion on a given subject, including
future forecasts. The best known of these methods is the Delphi
'technique.
In searching for data, the assessment analyst should make use
of all of the analytical techniques that economic, technological, and
other forecasters have been using for years. There is no point to
discuss these techniques in detail here. The MITRE study for OS'T
(Volume 1, Chapter XII) has a brief chapter on forecasting, and, of
course, the literature abounds with long gooks on the subject. As a
source of possible interest relative to my own views on forecasting
methods, I have reproduced in Exhibit 9 a one-page recap of fore-
casting methods that appeared in the referenced chapter.
In the realm of documented data, the conventional planning factor
which expresses the quantitative historical relationship between one
type of event and another is certainly a useful forecasting tool for
the assessment analyst in tracing both the timing and magnitude of
societal interactions. Economists, of course, have a large inventory
1S
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EXHIBIT 9
A RECAP OF FORECASTING METHODS
(Hypothetical Question: What Percentage
of U.S. Physicians Will Use Computer
Diagnostic Services by 19850 .
FORPGASTING HETHODS
DEFINITION mLurPLE
immrrION Experts at an extemporaneouu workshop session of a
Joint.physician, computer-industry oymposium predict
A forecast based on the that by 1965 approximately 65% of 1). S. phyaiciano
subjective ,judgment of the will employ computer diagnostic services. 	 They cite
forw-aster, as evidence the increasing experimentation with the
use of automated techniques in the medical
profession.
TREND EXTRAPOLATION Statistics show that over the pant 15 yearn the per-
centage of physicians using computer diagnostic
A forecast based on the services increased from 4 to 27%.
	 Continuing that
assumption of the continua- trend for the next 15 years indicates that by 1985
tion into the future of some approximately 65% of physicians will employ computer
discerned pact trend, diagnostic services.
TREND CORRELATION Historical data covering the last 10 years ahoy that
the percentage of physicians with access to computer
A forecast of the future diagnoa'_ic consultation in well correlated with
status of some phenomenon in three other factors:
	
the increase in private group
terms of a consistent rela- medical practice, the percentage of the population
tionship of that phenomenon covered by medical insurance, and the percentage of
to some other phenomenon in doctors graduated from medical schools offering in-
the past whose future status otruction in medical applications of computers.
has already been projected. Projections on these three factors are available
through 1985.	 Using these projections as a basis, a
statistical correlation analyuia indicates that by
1985 65% of physicians will have access to computer
diagnostic consultation.
NOELS
 (STATISTICAL) An in depth study of physicians who have already
adopted computer diagnostic consultation cervices
This method is a much elab- shows that ouch uange to related in a complex way to
orated version of the his- some 10 different variables such as physician work
torical trend correlation load, degree of medical specialization, the access
technique described above. to and use of other consultative service*. the coat
It often involves the use of of the computer service, etc. 	 Well documented
dozens, and eametimeo of studies make it possible to predict the growth
hundreds, of estimating factor through 1985 for these 10 governing variables.
equationo--all integrated Using this later study and the cited historical re-
into a unified forecasting lationship, it is possible to predict that 65% of
method. physicians will employ computer dia(;nostie consul-
tation in 1985.
ANALOGY In terms of many management and scientific services
the medical research field has been about 25 years
This method predicts the ahead of the practicing physician. 	 In 1960 approxi--
future by drawing a plaus- mutely 65% of the nation'o medical research faciii-
ible parallel between the ties were using computers for data analymio and
future and some presumably synthesis tasks similar to those involved in phyoi-
similar prior event. clan computer diagnostia consultation. 	 On this
basis it to predicted that by 1985 approximately
65% of physicians will cnploy computer diagnostic
consultation neroices.
rj.
of such relationships that are expressed in "multiplier" and
"acceleration" principles. Usually these factors express the quanti-
tative relationships between investment, production, employment,
income, spending, etc. 'There are also temporal relationships involv-
ing market and social behavior. For instance, changes in wholesale
prices usually precede changes in retail prices by several months.
Demographers, environmentalists, sociologists, medical technicians,
traffic engineers, and other specialists have similar inventories of
rule-of-thumb planning relationships.
The appropriate caveats applying to such relationships are well
known. All such relationships are developed from historical (hopefully
analogous) experience. Since we can say for sure that the future will
seldom be a carbon copy of the past, at best, such historical relation-
ships can be taken only as approximate guides to future relationships.
Also, in most cases these quantitative relationships only describe
the past in highly gross terms. In spite of the arithmetic precision
with which these relationships are often expressed, they usually are
simple averages that conceal much variation, and sometimes experts
even disagree as to what the average historical relationships are.
notwithstanding these caveats, the assessment analyst must use these
planning factors. If he discards them completely, he is left with
nothing but unadulterated intuition and heresay, and normally he
has no sound basis for selecting one unsupported intuitive judgement
over another.
In the months ahead, we at MITRE hope to explore further the
possibilities of new methods of data generation for making assessment
studies.
20
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PROPOSAL
for
RETROSPECTIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: SUBMARINE TELEGRAPHY
The Program of Policy Studies (PPS) proposes to conduct a retrospective
Technology Assessment of Submarine Telegraphy, in response to NSF Program 	
f
Solicitation-74-34 	 Co-Principal Investigators for the project would be
	 d
Dr. Vary T. Coates, a political scientist and Associate Director and Head of
	 do
the Program's Technology Assessment Group; and Dr. Bernard S. Finn, Curator	 ^ b
(Electricity) of the Smithsonian's Museum of History ana Technology who is
conducting a definitive historical study of submarine telegraphy.
Th	 1	 th followin to ics•
	
e proposa covers e	 g p
Sec. I - Introduction
A. Objectives in Conducting Retrospective Technology Assessments
B. Criteria for Selecting a Subject Technology
Sec. II - Pationale for the Stud
A. Submarine Telegraphy as a Subject for Retrospective Assessment
B. Overview of Proposed Study
Sec. III - Narrative of Development of Submarine Telegraphy
Sec. IV - The Study Plan
A. Focus of Proposed Research
B. Proposed Tasks: Outline and Comments on Methodology;
Logical Sequencing; Time Schedule
Sec. V -Management  Plan and Qualifications of Research Team
A. Management Plan
B. Qualification of Research Team
C. Use of Consultants
a
Sec. VI. Dissemination and Utilization of Results
Sec. VII. Proposed Budget ( 15 mos.)
y
	
SECTION I.	 INTRODUCTION
i
Technology Assessment is interdisciplinary, problem-oriented research,
intended to provide a firm scientific/technological information base in
support of decisionmaking and policy formulation. As a way of analyzing
r_omnlax nrnbl pms Tpchnoloav Assessment seeks to combine (a) the quantitative
-2-
sciences  and (b) the methods of behavioral analysis developed within the
social sciences with (c) the analytical tools used in the policy sciences.
'Technology Assessment as a formal, organized activity began in the
late 1960's. The body of experience in this area is not large, although it
is now accumulating rapidly., largely as a result of NSF- funded comprehensive
assessments during the last two to four years. Methodologies have been inno-
vated or adapted from related fields of inquiry to fit the technology or
problem definition of Assessments as found necessary and appropriate by the
investigating teams and project sponsors.
At this stage of development it is appropriate that the state of the
art of Technology Assessment methodologies should be evaluated and some
tentative conclusions advanced as to their adequacy, appropriateness, war-
rantability, and effectiveness. This endeavor poses theoretical problems be-
cause Technology Assessment is an anticipatory activity. Most technology-
oriented Assessments have dealt with new and emerging technologies, of which
the full range of societal impacts has not yet been realized. Testing the
results and evaluating the findings of recent Technology Assessments there-
fore cannot be dona empirically until such period as the predicted conse-
quences do or do not occur as anticipated.
At that time, sons years in the future, another problem will arise:
an effective Assessment -- that is, one which successfully influenced the
direction of policy formulation and decisionmaking -- will have provided
the.means for avoiding possible detrimental outcomes which it was able to
anticipate. Thus it will have changed the future, the Assessment's effective
anticipation of which is to be evaluated; this is the reverse of the
_. t
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A. Objectives of Retrospective Technology Assessment.
Retrospective Technology Assessment offers one way to avoid this dilemma.
Choosing a technological development which began far enough in the past for	 f,.
its societal impacts to have matured and be widely disseminated, one would
attempt to identify and measure these impacts and determine the extent to
which they were predictable during the period of inception of the technology,
given the state of knowledge and the investigative and analytical tools then
available. One would also investigate the extent to which analytical tech-
niques available today would have enhanced the potential for anticipating and
measuring such impacts.
This statement of objectives obscures a number of pitfalls and fallacies
which may lie in wait for the unwary investigator and which may be both the-
oretical and practical. There is an assumption that societal impacts which
later developed can be regarded as inevitable (aside from their predictability
or identifiability) -- that is, there is an assumption of a simple cause-
effect relationship rather than randomness or the effect of highly involved
concatenations of converging trends. The concept of retrospective Technology
Assessment may also conceal an unstated presumption that there are close analo-
gies between the course of past technological developments (and their unplanned
societal consequences), and those likely to occur at present or in the future.
This is an hypothesis which badly needs empirical investigation, and any con-
tribution to this effort may in fact be the most valuable byproduct of retro-
spective Assessments. Some Technology Assessment methodology, such as Delphi
and other consensual techniques, can not be applied retr ngpectively, although
some adaptation, such as role playing, might be attempted.
Technology Assessment has developed under the handicap of a major
theoretical deficiency, namely, the lack of an appropriate and useful model
-	 E
j 	 y
.-4-
of the relationship between technological change and social change. No one
retrospective assessment is likely to produce a universally acceptable model;
however, cumulative experience in reLi -ospective assessment may make substantial
contributions to development of a model. It should be noted in passing that
much retrospective Technology Assessment is impli.ciit in the literature of the
history of science and technology, and '8n a few cases retrospective assessments
have been attempted on a preliminary and tentative basis; see, for example, an
early Program of Policy Studies publication, "Early Experiences with the
Hazards of Medical Use of X-Rays: 1896-1906 -- a Technology Assessment Case
Study," by Barbara S. Marx (1968); and The Rail road and the Space Program: Ali
Exercise in Historical Analogy, Bruce Mazlich (ed.), MIT Press (19G5).
Two safeguards against the pitfalls of retrospective Technology Assessment
are especially important: involvement of trained and experienced historians of
technology, and careful formulation of the questions to be asked. Tentatively,
the investigation should ask at a minimum (terms used are deliberately
anachronistic):
o What assessments or forecasts of impacts were made at the
period of the inception of the technology?
o What formal and informal techniques were used in making
such forecasts?
o What unplanned consequences or societal impacts resulted
from the technology?
o To what extent were they inevitable given the technology
and its eventual level of dissemination and use?
o To what extent were contemporary forecasts (if any)
correct and inclusive?
o To what extent did contemporary forecasts (if any)
prevent or enhance the consequences which were antici-
pated?
i
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o To what extent were other consequences, which were
not predicted, in fact potentially predictable,
given the knowledge of the physical universe then
available?
o To what extent would they have been predictable given
the subsequent advances in physical and social sci-
ences and analytical methods?
o If predictable, could the eventual impacts have been
altered (either modified, avoided, or enhanced) by
policy intervention?
B. Criteria for Selection of a Subject for Retrospective
Technology Assessment
On the basis of this reasoning, PPS has postulated the following minimum
criteria for selection of a technological development.for retrospective assess-
ment:
(a) The technology selected should be amenable to historical investigation
and description.
It should be one which originated in a discrete and definable tech-
nological innovation within the designated time period (roughly, the
last century). Contemporary records of its inception and the subse-
quent course of its technical development, dissemination, utilization,
and societal impacts must exist and be accessible to the retrospec-
tive assessors.
(b) The technology should be one which provided a significant new capa-
bility, or an order of magnitude improvement in historical capability.
(c) The technology should be one which is (in 1974) mature and widely
utilized.
(d) The societal consequences should provide a rich and textured field of
investigation -- that is, it should have produced significant: and
measurable impacts over a range of aspects of society: impacts which
.. 4
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can be clearly attributed to the subject technology.
(e) There should exist an historical record of "assessment," that is,
formal or informal predictions from knowledgeable contemporary	 r
sources as to its potential costs and benefits.
(f) Preferably the technology should be one which was viewed at its
inception as provocative or controversial because of its potential
impacts; and this controversy should have had policy implication.
SECTION II: RATIONALE FOR A RETROSPECTIVE
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF SUBMARINE TELEGRAPHY
Since the discovery of Columbus nothing has been
done in any degree comparable to the vast enlarge-
ment which has thus been given to the sphere of
human activity.
-- The (London) Times, 6 August 1858
A. Submarine Telegraphy as Subject of Retrospective Technology Assessment
Until 1865 the swiftest communication possible between North America
and Europe was about two weeks (Fig. 1, p: 6a). With the laying of the
first successful transAtlantic cable, this was reduced to a matter of minutes.
This achievement, barely twenty years after the first electronic long-distance
communication, demonstrates that submarine telegraphy provided a significant
new capability to human activity (though perhaps not,as the Times enthusias-
tically proclaimed, the most vast since the discovery of the New World). Though
seriously challenged in the 1920`s by radio, and more recently by satellite
communication, submarine telegraphy -- having undergone a major transformation
of its technology with the laving of the first repeater cable in 1956 -- is
today a highly utilized, mature, but still developing technology.
*The Lightning set the record -- 13 days, 19 1/2 hours, from Boston to
Liverpool on her maiden voyage in 1854.
,w
appear in the following decade had even greater band-width capabilities.
The result has been that less than two decades after the laying of the
first transAtlantic cable with repeaters the old long distance telegraph
cables have been abandoned, the specialized equipment dispersed and'the tech-
niques discarded:
	 f
E
(e) Potential Contributions of the Study_
Subjectivity must enter as taxonomies of impact dimensions and factors
are defined and associated to infer impacts; we cannot relive yesterday nor
recreate nineteenth century man. This is a fundamental limitation to all
retrospective Technology Assessments. However, all assessment procedures use
generalized past experience and scientific knowledge in order to sketch the
anticipated pattern of likely future developments. Therefore, retrospective 	 g
Technology Assessments should sharpen our understanding of past events, the de-
gree of novelty of the present, and the degree of uncertainty inherent in con-
temporary assessments.
The exploratory retrospective Technology Assessment of submarine telegraphy
could contribute to important understanding in the following regards:
o The degree to which intuitive or unsystematic expressions of
probable benefits and negative impacts in reality anticipated
the true consequences and avoided worse consequences than
those which ensued.
o A measure of the likelihood of anticipating consequences when
measured by their degree of novelty with respect to dominant
trends and supposed invariant principles of behavior. Are
most significant consequences so unique and unprecedented that
prediction is unlikely; is the increase in complexity of the
decision process and the companion business world or political
arena as well as the articulated societal interrelationships
a major factor in being able to assess and respond to conse-
quences?
r-2V-
o. An understanding of the mechanisms by which anticipated
consequences affected or did not affect policy.
o Whether or not considerations of completeness and thorough
analysis in establishing the taxonomy of impact dimensions
and factors, in scanning the interrelationships between
-Factors and the self-consistency of implicit scenarios, and
the affect on related technologies and ventures would have
been sufficient by t,.emselves to greatly improve assessment
performance and hence the consequences of introducing the
technology.
o The degree, the mechanism, and the timing of the involvement
of impacted groups into the decision process as related to
the intensity of detrimental (beneficial) impacts; did
most groups become a..are of the impacts long after the critical
decision point had been passed?
o The changing character of the consequences of the technology
in the successive stages of development; i.e., invention, pro-
motion, and approval; implementation and diffusion; growth and
dominance; maturity to homeostasis and subordination to the next
generation of technologies.
Technology Assessment evolved as an articulation of an ever more
complex decision process within an ever more complex culture. Do we have
the right to expect that the historical sources of our experience, learning,
concepts, values, attitudes, and subjective judgment, no matter how cleverly
generalized, will prepare us to anticipate and guide the continued evolution
of our culture? A deeper understanding of the performance of our forefathers
and the mechanisms by which they became aware of the societal consequences of
technology must help us perceive the trends within the assessment process in
its policy formulation context.
All technologies mature. All growth subsides. The limits to growth
are encountered by all systems. But are the impacts of technology in these
later stages similar to those of the growth phases? This is a critical but
largely unexplored issue of Technology Assessment. What policies are there,
T
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what policies should be used and how, at these later stages of development?
Is the demise of mature technology inevitable or is it the result of neglect
and ineptitude of the management and regulatory process?
Marine telegraphy offers a unique opportunity to learn in all of the above
areas. It covers a broad span of history and is still a viable industry; it
was a booming growth technology that dominated international communications for
sixty or more years; it is currently a mature technology which has come to grips
with the limits of its growth. As a technology its impacts were widespread, yet
they are sufficiently well defined and contained to yield to this analysis. Fi-
nally we have a rare opportunity to assist and build upon e:;tensive focused his-
torical research already several years in progress.
SECTION IV - THE STUDY PLAN
A. Focus of Proposed Research
A brief overview of the study plan appeared in Section II. The focus
of the proposed research is the production of three elements, defined
below:
o An Historical Assessment
No formal comprehensive Technology Assessment on Submarine
Telegraphy as an emerging technology was done in 1851, 1861,
1920, or at any other time. Nonetheless, some of the ele-
ments of an assessment appeared both formally (e.g., the
British Government report of 1861, cited on page 8 above)
and informally in contemporary writings, newspapers, scientific
letters, etc. The emphasis will be on informed opinions_of re-
sponsible parties (decisionmakers, affected parties, and public
opinion leaders).
The individuals and institutions who were the decisionmakers
relevant to the development of submarine telegraphy will be
identified.
i
Those who were perceived (at the time) as potentially affected
parties will also be identified. 	 s
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I - Technology Assessment: Context and.lqeeds
Substantial attention has been given to the needs of Congress
for more adequate technology assessment support. Alternative notions
about the specifi6 functions and organizational arrangement to supply
this support have also been given systematic consideration. The
purpose of this paper isto examine briefly,.through the means of a
hypothetical assessment structurd, certain operational implications of
a CongregsionAl: Assessment Component.
Many of the controlling or influential conditions are readily
apparent. Technology assessment is a vast and pervasive function
engaged in by a multiplicity of participants in both the public and
private sectors Assessing entities differ as to objectiv6s,
resources, capabilities, practice s, and outputs. Such entities are
usually concerned with some special aspect of.the overall Policy
Analysis, Project Planning, Program Implementation, Regulation, or
Monitoring-Evaluation process. Some assessment entities deal with
numerous technologies; others deal with only one application of a
given technology; perhaps most are concerned with a narrow, specialized
dimension of 6 given application. Few entities in our assessment
structure deAl with the full spectrum of social impacts of a given
technological application. Even when the outputs of all existing en
tities in some way associated with the assessment of a particular
application are combined, we cannot assume that a total assessment of
all the significant social impacts have been identified and evaluated.
In short, our assessment function is highly fragmented. A deficiency
exists in our information management capability for assuring adequate
total impact assessments or for providing the continuity of assess-
ment data which will identify those social impacts which need to be
given attention in specific assessments. Our present assessment or-
ganization and procedures do not assure that the outputs of the
multiple assessment entities constituting the assessment system for
any given technological application will interact in the normal course
of events for will be consciously integrated at given intervals) so as to
effectively combine assessment outputs. assuming that such integration does
periodically occur, one must still ask whether the outcome constitutes
a total impact assessment of the given application. It would seem to
be fairly well agreed that the Congressional Committee Hearing--Forum
has not always been an adequate mechanism for integrating the relevant
information into an understandable, cohesive whole.
A further factor to be noted is that numerous assessments are
made by entities other than Congress which, for all practical
purposes, are final. Through statutory authorization various Boards
and Administrations within the Executive Branch are the loci for such
assessments as are those regulatory agencies which deal with technologi-
cal problems. In many instances, as with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion and the Atomic Energy Commission, a highly institutionalized assess-
ment system for relevant applications has been developed. Where such
regularized assessment systems are performing adequately, there would
seem to be little need for Congressional concern other than with peri-
odic oversight to assure continued satisfactory performance. In many
areas of technological development serious deficiencies do exist, however,
s
which would seen to require more intensive Congressional attention, at
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least to the extent of assuring the establishmei•': of assessment pro- i
cedures which will provide adequate assessments, total impact or other-
wise, as needed.
The great variety of assessment: demands and assessment
tasks in conjunction with the diversity of assessment: entities icT
raake it difficult to grasp the scope of the assessment F;:
function which should be undertaken by a reinforced Legislative assess-
r
ment component.	 Put quantitatively, what professional capability and
supporting resources are required through what period of time to ade-
quately perform a specified assessment task? 	 Numerous variables are
involved in our assessment practices:
• The character of the technology to be assessed
• The particular application to be assessed and the specific
operational context in which such application is located
• Fhe objective of the assessment: 	 feasibility, costs, pro-
spective social uses, possible social harms, need for
further research, need for safety precautions in use,
need for continuing regulations, etc.
i
• Limitations on resources for the assessment (time and pro-
fessional talent)
• The social indicator/evaluation scheme or schemes to be
employed in such evaluation
The possibility of finding precise equivalencies between the given
assessment task and the time, facilities, and professional manpower
required is not encouraging.	 Often resource constraints define the scope
of the task whatever the ideal magnitude of support might be. 	 Arbitrary
constraints on time and professional support are imposed out of simple
necessity to define the scope of the task and to assure its execution.
One need only mention the following recent assessments in order to gain {
some notion of the variety of arrangements (including subject matter,
objectives, and organizational structures) involved in the assessment
function:
_s
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A. Executive Branch;
1. Noise - Sound without Value. Federal Council for Science
and Technology (Committee on Environmental Quality), Sep-
tember 1968.
2. Considerations Affecting Steam Power-Plant Site Selection.
Office of Science and 'Technology (Energy Policy Staff), 1968.
3. Environmental Impact of the Big Cypress Swamp jetport. U. S.
Department of Interior, September, 1969.
4. Potential Mechanization in the Flue--Cured Tobacco Industry
with Emphasis on Human Resource_ Adjustment. Department of
Agriculture iEconomic Research Service), September 1969.
5. The Automobile and Air Pollution: A Program for Progress.
Department of Commerce (Commerce Technical Advisory Board,
Panel on Electrically Powered Vehicles), October, 1967.
6. Tomorrow's Transportation: New Systems for the Urban Future.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (Office of
Metropolitan Development, Urban Transportation Adminis-
tration), 1968.
r ^;
B. Legislative Branch:
7. The Search for a Low-Emission Vehicle. U. S. Senate, Com-
mittee on Commerce (Staff Report), 91st Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, 1969.
8. Administration of Project Mohole by the National Science
Foundation. A Report to the Congress by the L. S. Comp-
troller-General, April 23, 1968.
C. National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of_Engineering,
i1S.af- irinai Raaaarrli^ C'.nTSnr-f i.
9. Useful Applications of Earth-Oriented Satellites. Summer
Study on Space Applications, Division of Engineering, Na-
tional. Research Council, NAS-NAE, 1969.
10. Drug Efficacy Study. A Report to the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs from the Division of Medical Sciences, National
Research Council, NA5 NAE, 1969.
i
11. Environmental Problems in South Florida. A Preliminary Report
of the Environmental Study Group to the Environmental Studies
Board, NAB-NAE, September 16, 1969.
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our preliminary probes into the technology assessment process in
r.
is
the Program of Policy Studies at GWU strongly indicate that to this
point we have hardly made an impression on such conceptual challenges
as that of defining an Adequate Assessment or on the analytical task
of relating the adequate assessment of a given application to the level 	 d4',
f,
of resources required. 	 This is said with full recognition that the
-'^ studies initiated by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics
SE
(the Technology Assessment Reports by the National Academy of Sciences
i4
and the National Academy of Engineering and the Report ox. Technical
Information For Congress by the Legislative Reference Servit.:e) have
I greatly advanced ou: thinking on these and other critical assessment
'E questions.
My comments will be directed to the following topics:
	
1) The
positing of a hypothetical Technology Assessment Component for legis-
lative support; 2) The posing of a number of questions relating to the
' operational context of this assessment component including the Organi-
zakional/Operational Framework, General Operational Problems, Access
to Relevant Information, and the Utilization of Assessment Data and
Analyses; and 3) Some selected comments relevant to the questions posed. 	 y
r
While the content of these remarks are cautionary with respect
to potential operational difficulties of a legislative assessment sup-
port component,	 it should be understood that such comments
do not reflect a negative attitude toward the need for an improved tech--
' no'ogy assessment: structure. 	 To the contrary, the purpose is to advance
same questions which are likely to arise with the operations of a new
_'. assessment component, however general may be the support for its proposed
f
ii
_g..
'	 functions. That substantial reasons lend support to the need for a
better structured technology assessment function seems clear. That some
observers question whether such an arrangement will make an appreciable
i
improvement in the performance of this function is, however, a point not
to be lightly dismissed. Further, existing entities may be concerned'
over a loss of status or of function as a result of the implementation
of any new effort to more adequately assess the social benefits and costs
of advancing technology.
i
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11 ConSress$.otal . Technolog)r AsseadmeAt'Coaipdrtent:
A Hypothetical Structure
The intensification of professional attention to the technology
assessment function over the past few years would seem to be based on
three primary assumptions: ' l) That advancing science and technology should
be applied in a better informed and more deliberate manner so as to
maximize social benefits and minimize social costs; and 2) That the
technology assessment function can be more adequately perforated than
is now the case with a resulting net gain in the social benefit/cost
ratio of technological applications; and 3) That the Congress needs
an independent technology assessment capability of its own. Bence, we
need to know which technology assessment systems are performing adequately
and why and which technology assessment systems are not working well and
why. Sever--. deficiencies are apparent to those who have given attention
.`	 to this problem, as for example, the lack of coordination among relevant
assessment mechanisms for particular applications and the inability, for
this and other reasons, to perform total impact assessments of such appli-
cations, With an understanding of the more serious deficiencies, it is
?.	 feasible to move to the question of what can be done to improve the ade-
quacy of the assessment function. This basic question can be reduced
further to inquiries relating to the conceptual, organizational, and
operational aspects of a new mechanism or arrangement for achieving an
improved assessment function.
It is evident that the range of organizational alternatives which
ii
might be employed in order to provide more effective technology assess
ment data tQ the Congress is extremely broad. Certain suggestions have 	 e
5
been made by the recent reports on Technology Assessment of the National
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Academy of Sciences and the.National. Academy of Engineering and by the
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress on Technical
Information For Congress. It might also be noted that many other sug-
gestions have been made by Committees'of the Congress as well as-by
individuals. Ellen Galloway discusses the topic of Scientific Advice 	 ^§
for Congress in "An Analysis of Three Proposals" which is included in
the book Knowledge and Power, edited by Sanford A. Lakoff (1466), All
such proposals have certain recognizable disadvantages as well as ad- 	 a
vantages. All leave considerable areas of uncertainty as to how useful
such mechanisms would prove to be in actual operation. No doubt, any
additional alternatives will have similar characteristics. The task,
however, is to examine as thoroughly as possible beforehand
the means of maximizing the adequacy of the assessment function while
minimizing insofar as practicable, the legal, jurisdictional, and other oper-
ational difficulties.
In recognition of the reluctance to establish new agencies out of
fear of simply adding further bureaucratic impedance to the govern-
mental assessment circuit some observers no doubt feel that the sensible
approach is to locate any additional assessment capability in an existing
organization. Yet, the NAS/NAE Reports on Technology Assessment suggest that
new mechanisms are needed. The NAE Report states in its Summary of
Findings:
Technology assessments on a broad range of subjects are
feasible and can be expected to be useful to the decision-
making processes of the Congress, when prepared by properly
constituted, independent, ad hoc task forces with adequate
staff support and time. (P ^T.—
3
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A management organization, controlled by and.anawering.
to the Congress, should arrange for the . preparation of
technology assessments for Congressional purposes. No
single, permanent organization can be envisioned that
could provide adequate inn-house expertise to execute
assessments in all of the fields that maybe required
by Congress. Therefore it would be useful to contract
for or to administer and organize the assessment task
forces. (p. 4).
The HAS Report gives attention to several organizational alter-
natives. It was agreed among this panel that there should be important
assessment components in both the Legislative and Executive Branches.
With reference to the Congress, one alternative considered was that
of a Joint Congressional Committee on Technology Assessment supported
by a highly qualified staff. Another separate alternative was that
of a Technology Assessment Office serving the Congress as a whole.
The WAS Report states that: "The panel is not prepared to recommend
a choice between a Congress-wide unit and a joint committee."
In view of the fact that possibilities for a new assessment arrange-
ment are almost unlimited and that subsequent operational character-
istics would depend to a substantial extent upon the particular arrange-
ment selected, it is felt useful to posit a hypothetical Congressional
Technology Assessment Component for purposes of this discussion. The
arrangement here posited is not necessarily offered as the most desirable among
the various alternatives. It has been selected for two primary reasons: 1) The
basic structure is easily grasped; and 2) the interrelationships which would
be involved in the operations of such a component raise a rather broad
range of questions which probably merit consideration preparatory to
the design of a new mechanism.
In the barest, skeletal form the Assessment Component posited
• 1%
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1. An Office of Technology Assessment which will perform a
variety, of assessment tasks In support of Congressional
decision making
2. A .joint Select Committee on Technology and Society which
will focus attention on the general problem of the appli-
cation of technological resources to social needs as well
as perform consulting, advising and oversight functions 	 r
in connection with the operations of the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment.
A more detailed exposition of the concept, functions, and organizational
aspects of the Congressional Assessment Component are as follows:
F
t^ J
t,
ASSUMPTION,
	 That the Congress is in need of improved
informational and analytical support on
legislative matters involving substantial
scientific or technological components.I
An assessment arrangement with the below noted charac-
teristics is 2osited for anal tical.
	 ur oses,	 i.e.,
the I gal/political implications which r.:.iX arise from
the operations of a Technology Assessmc..'.t Components
dc a `may
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CONCEPT AND FUNCTIONS;
A Congressional entity which can perform the function
of assembling and analyzing data relevant to an
overall evaluation of the effectiveness of the pro-
cess of applying technological resources to National
social goals.
An assessment service which can assure the Congress
and its Committees that the full range of social
impacts have	 (or have not) been identified and the
magnitude, intensity and persistency of such effects
measured re significant technological applications;
_
and provide (if requested and appropriate) evalua-
tions of the social desirability or undesirability
of such impacts in accord with an explicit scheme
or schemes of social indicators.
An assessment service which performs primarily an
"integrationist" function, making maximum use of
the assessment data from various existing technol-
ogy assessment systems so as to provide Total
Impact Assessment data to the Congress with the
greatest effectiveness and economy.
An assessment service which can evaluate for the
Congress the adequacy of assessment systems for
existing or prospective applications,	 identifying
deficiencies ii	 existing "regularized" or "insti-
tutionalized" assessment systems and recommending
means for correcting such deficiencies. 	 (for ex-
ample, the lack of reliable data on certain obvious 3
social impacts or the failure to provide a forum
for all affected segments of the public to advance
claims or complaints re technological applications).
An assessment service which can provide the Congress
with initial assessments on new or prospective
a
applications if no regul a rized assessment system
exists for such task ane such assessment is not
forthcoming from other reliable sources.
4^
ri
1
9
^^ A
-12-
An assessment service which can advise relevant
Committees of the Congress (when requested) inform-
ation on segments of the public t•fhich should be
represented by witnesses in the ultimate assessment
forum (Congressional hearing).
,An assessment service which can provide for an
information service by which assessment information
can be accumulated in an orderly, current, and usable
fashion.
r
3
3
6. Provide for joint consultation with the National
Science Foundation on Institutional Grant Support
to Universities, National Laboratories, Policy
Analysis Groups and similar Organizations which .
can provide continuing developmental support in
specialized areas of technology assessment.
z=	 4
7. Provide for a Joint Select Committee on Technology
1.-	 and Society which will perform the-following func-
tions.
a. Keep fully and currently informed on the
status and prospects for the application
of technological resources to national
social goals.
b. Provide a forum for the evaluation of the
f:	
overall impact of technological applications
i
I'	 on the full spectrum of social needs. 	 j
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ORGANIZATION- (PRESCRIBE BY STATUTE)
1. Set out declaration of Congressional Policy
(Concept and Functions as noted above).
2. Establish an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
to carry out the desired functions.
3. Provide for a Director of the Office to be
appointed by the President for an extended term
(10-15 years).
4. Provide for the Director to obtain from all
Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government
pertinent assessment information on technological
applications. (primarily non-defense) which the OTA
may from time to time require in the performance
of its responsibilities (with exceptions minimized
and noted).
5. Provide contractual authority for the OTA with
respect to Project Research Support.
c. Encourage the use of analytical approaches and
information management techniques in the assess-
ment of technological applications which will
support an overall system of social accounting.
d. Consult and advise with the Directo_• of the
Office of Technology Assessment on the policies,
objectives, tasks, and assessment practices of
the Office,
e. Review periodically the performance of the
Office of Technology Assessment.
f. Recommend to the Committees on Government
Operations the annual budgetary support for
the Office of Technology Assessment, including
joint programs with other offices or agencies.
g. Maintain the closest practicable liaison with
the Executive Office of the President and
agencies of the Executive Branch responsible
for the application of technological resources
to social needs.
rr+'
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:.	 One point merits attention before proceeding to more specific
	
'	 questions. While this assessment arrangement is not posited 	 f
as a model to be advocated to the exclusion of others but,rather as
^f
an analytical reference, there is one conceptual thrust to this arrange- 	 .-
r ^^
meat which justifies brief elaboration and strong
emphasis. The rationale underlying the Joint Select Committee on Tech-
nology and Society is not that it serve merely as a link between the
Congress and the Office of Technology Assessment, undertaking Congress-
jonal coordinating functions re public issues involving significant
technological components, processing requests from various Committees
directed to the OTA, performing as a consulting and oversight Committee
e
for the OTA, and providing a mechanism for facilitating the OTA's in-
formation exchanges with other governmental agencies and private sector
^ entities.	 he JSC w^	 d	 ah	 r p	 y T	 oul  ave a broader es onsibilit  than technolo gy
assessment ir the sense of identifying the impacts of given applications
and evaluating the social benefit/cost ratio of such applications.
This type of analytical task would be the province of OTA.	 The
Joint Select Committee would assume the responsibility of keeping fully
and currently informed on the total national potential for the appli-
r`:
cation of technological resources to social needs. 	 Technology assess-
ii meat is only one aspect, however important, to this more general function.
j'
The outcome of a total impact assessment of a prospective technological
application under specified conditions is, of course, essential in de-
i;
termining whether and how such technology is to be applied. 	 However, thisi
analytical task is, or should be with new technologtes, only one sig-
nificant phase in the process of getting the technology applied if
i
^'s
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it does have real potential for eliminating certain social harms
or for contributing to various social objectives. Put another way;
the mere- positing of a technology against relevant social needs is
only a beginning of the process of moving such technology into an op-
erational program. The process of technology application is a social/
political action process, not just an analytical task which
involves the recognition of the interaction of such elements as:
• Participants in the relevant socio/political context in which
the application is to be applied
• The Perspectives and ResourcEs of such Participants
Influential Contextual Conditions and Trends
• Situations of Assessment (Forums) and /or Decision (Arenas)
• Alternative Strategies employed by Participants
• Alternative Outcomes of Assessment Forums or Decisional Arenas
• Probable Social Impacts of such Outcomes
It is not suggested that the JSC have any direct legislative authority
with respect to the actual process of getting socially useful, available
and prospective, technologies applied. It is suggested that it perform
an informational integrating function and provide a forum whereby an
approximate accounting can be continuously conducted on the effectivencos
with which our technological resources are being applied to social goals, for
example, how our national laboratories, scientific institutes and also-
;::
	
	 -
ciations, the universities, R & D firms, and so forth, can best con-
tribute their facilities and skills to social,objectives.
A compelling reason for this suggestion is that a positive thrust
should be given to scientific and technological enterprise which
s `,
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'i. 	 represents one of our great national resources. The assumption of a
i
responsibility to review and appraise the effectiveness with which we
.are applying such resources to pressing national social needs would
ill	
fill a neglected policy,
 function. Further, it would serve as a counter-
balance to any tendency to become negatively oriented in the technology
g
^	 assessment function, i.e., to emphasize detriments to the neglect of
the social benefits flowing from particular applications.
j
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Office of 'Technology Assessment:
Responsibilities, Powers and Operations
The following questions are focused upon the operations of the
hypothetical Office of Technology Assessment although the relation-
ships necessarily involve the posited Joint Select Committee on	
1 a'
Technology and Society, other Committees of the Congress, the Legis-
lative Reference Service, the General. Accounting Office, the Executive
Office of the President, various Departments and Agencies in the
Executive Branch, the Regulatory Agencies, and private vector entities.
A. ORGA s IZ:\TIONAL/OPERATIOi'AT, FRAN'1EWORK
1. Assuming ',he Technology Assessment Component posited,
should the statutory scheme provide explicitly that the
final authority for setting the assessment tasks of the
OTA are to be with the Director of the OTA? Should such
authority be qualified by requiring consultation with the
JSC on Technology and Society at stated intervals, i.e.,.
annually, semi-annually? Since the JSC would be repre-
sentati- ,e of the entire Congress, how might the process
ofagenda formulation be organized?
2. What criteria of priority should be employed in selecting
assessment tasks?
3. Would the acceptance of the foregoing method (A.I.) of
"setting the agenda" necessarily preclude responses
to assessment requests from other sources? Indivi-
dual Congressmen? All Congressional Committees hav-
ing jurisdiction over social problems areas or gov-
ernmental activities involving significant scientific
or technological. components? The President (BOB,
OST, etc.)? Executive Agencies, Programs, or Admin-
istrations?
4. Should the OTA be directed by statute to maintain a contin-
uing information interaction with the OST/BOB in order to
coordinate assessment efforts and maximize the productive-
ness of assessment activities in both the Executive and
Legislative Branches? If so, how might this be accomplished?
5. Will the OTA be expected to coordinate only with OST/BOB or
to maintain continuing assessment information arrangements
with all executive and regulatory agencies as well as pri-
vate sector entities as a means of assuring the optimum
use of assessment capabilities?
r
-	 :3
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6. Should provision be made for "public hearings" by the OTA?
Under what circumstances might such hearings be required?
For what purposes should the OTA otherwise initiate hear-
ings?. Uhder what conditions might hearings be initiates!
Abn. petition" and by what "interested parties"? If forinal
hearing authority should be provided, under what circum-
stances would witnesses be placed under oath? If a witness
is compelled to testify, would he have the right to counsel?
Should counsel be privileged to cross-examine witnesses
giving evidence contrary , to his client? Would testimony
or communications from witnesses or correspondents with
the OTA be privileged? As an alternative to OTA hearings,
might the public hearing function be conducted only by
the Joint Select Committee on Technology and Society?
7. In order to maintain the "independence" and "integrity" of
the assessment function, what proscriptions, if any, should
the Congress place on the Director and Staff of the OTA with
respect to associations and relationships with other assess-
ment entities or interested participants?
8. Will reports of the OTA have any special legal standing in
civil or criminal cases against government officials or pri-
vate companies responsible for the application of technolo-
gies which have resulted in alleged harm to a complainant?
Will the director or members of the OTA be subject to sub-
poena as witnesses in such cases?
B. GENERAL OPERATIONAL PROBLEM=S
1. To what extent might a skeptical attitude toward the social
utility of a Congressional Assessment Component hinder the
operations of OTA?
2. To what extent might the critical/cautious attitude arising
from jurisdictional conflicts or additional administrative
inconvenience hinder the operations of OTA?
3. What "image" should the OTA attempt to cultivate? While the
basic thrust may be toward the establishment of a non-
partisan, non-political entity of recognized capability and
competence, in what respects must the OTA inevitably assume
a "partisan" stance? Will it be an "active" or "passive"
ombudsman? What type of role should it play and what "repu-
tation" should it seek in order to maximize its usefulness
in the legislative process?
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4.. What would be the likely implications should the'OTA assess
not merely technological applicationsap r se (assuming com-
petent and responsible administration and management) but the
quality of the management of the application as well?	
i
5. What general guidelines should be provided, and by whom, for
the division of responsibility for technology assessment
among OTA, the Science Policy Research Division of the
Legislative Reference Service of the 'Library of Congress,
the General Accounting Office, and particular Committees
of the Congress, if any, which may wish to provide or con-
tinue with their separate assessment functions?
5. Hotta might the OTA provide for the acconnodation of ad hoc,
special, "non-programmed" assessment activities? Even
should the Director of OTA attempt to minimize the ad hoc
obligations of the Office, how could he respond in a
practical sense re:
• Permitting OTA staff to appear as witnesses
before Congressional Committees on specific
bills?
• Providing special reports on specific bills?
• Making temporary assignments of OTA Staff
Members to Committees?
Making temporary assignments of OTA Staff
Members to Executive Agencies?
i. -What type or types of Assessment Data Systems should be
initiated and maintained by the OTA? Will the OTA, in gen-
eral, tend to apply its resources to the task of closing
deficiencies in existing institutionalized assessment data
systems and in designing and initiating new data systems
for prospective technological applications?
3
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C. ACCESS TO RELEVANT INFORMATION.
I. What will be the scope of the responsibility of the OTA
for technology assessment? Will it have defined areas
r ^	 for inquiry or will it be given the broadest type of 	 }
charter for inquiring into every facet of technological
	 l4,
applications (existing and prospective) on a Total Impact
Assessment basis - that is, looking at all the social
interactions of a given application? This is a basic
question having implications for subsequent questions.
2. Will the'OTA be provided with formal authority (similar to
the GAO) which is essentially co-extensive with its
responsibilities or might the compulsory authority of the
OTA De deliberately minimized in order to encourage the
development of mutually beneficial information exchange
relationships? In-other vo rds, will the strategy be to
persuade, appealing to the net gains from the technology
assessment function, rather than to compel?
3. What should br: the nature of the authority granted the OTA
by.Congress so as to facilitate its access to relevant
information in the Executive Branch? In the Regulatory
Agencies?
]	 4. What would be the nature of the formal authority conferred
on the OTA by the Congress so as to facilitate its access
to essential data in the private sector: competitive
information, private/personal information such as hospital
or nursing home records, etc.?
5. What would be the position of the OTA if, subsequent to the
establishment of the OTA, one or more of the Committees
of the Congress now having oversight responsibilities for
a given technological, area refused to cooperate and dir-
ected the relevant Regulatory Agency and the regulated
industry entities not to cooperate (re providing relevant
f	 assessment data) with the OTA?
&. What if the Secretary of an Executive Department should take
a similar position and the President, while refusing to per-
mit the exercise of Executive Privilege in the situation,
remained indifferent?
7. Assuming that in some limited circumstances the OTA should
have the subpoena power or should have access to informa-
tion through the direct subpoena power of Congress, what
guidelines should be provided which would define such lim-
ited and justifiable circumstances so as to withstand legal
challenge?
i,l ,.. -
-21-
8. Should the OTA have to resort to BOB "clearance" of its
information surveys with private sector entities? Should
the OTA have to resort to information filed with other gov-
ernment agencies rather than make direct demands on private
industry?
9. What will be the procedures and criteria employed for
"contracting out" special assessment studies or other tasks?
To that extent might it be required to do such contracting
out on a competitive basis? Will contracting out (especi-
ally if the OTA should undertake to utilize a large number
and variety of contractors) tend to aggravate the informa-
tion assess problems with the Executive Agencies and private
sector entities (imposing upon such Agencies and entities
an increasingly greater burden in terms of informational
requirements)? What might-be done with respect to selecting
topics and contractors to minimize this burden?
10. What should be the procedure and criteria for selecting organ-
izations or institutions which might qualify for continuing
"institutional grants" to carry on segments of an overall
"systems approach" to technology assessment?
11. What role will "experts" or advisory committees have in OTA
bperat ions?
12. How can the OTA handle . various types of "conflict of interest"
problems which might not arise as a legal issue but for
reason that full and candid information from a uniquely
qualified individual would place him in a difficult position
re his relationship with his associated organization or
institution? Would the OTA activity bring up any new "con-
flict of interest" questions? What would likely be the atti-
tude of the OTA re well informed people who are acting as
regular consultants to various mission-oriented Government
agencies?
13. Would any unique problems arise re the collection and
retention of certain types of information under "for offi-
cial use only10 categories? Would problems be different from
those which arise with the Census or with the Regulatory
Agencies which do maintain the confidentiality of financial
statements of the industrial groups regulated? .
m	 -
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D. UTILIZATION 'OF ASSESSMENT DATA ANM ANALYSES
1. If the OTA is to be primarily an assessment support activity
for the Congress, will it nevertheless be assumed to be
generally accountable to the Public? If some segment or
participant in the "public" is dissatisfied with OTA per-
formance, to whom can the complaint be made?
2. Which Committees will regularly receive the reports and
statements of the OTA? Which Committees will receive par-
tictilar'reports and
	 what basis? Which entities of the
Executive Branch? What private sector entities?
3. What will be the responsibilities of the OTA to inform rele-
vant Committees of the Congress with respect to the Optimum
Social System (effects and interactions) which should be
examined when specific bills come before such Committees?
This matter has special relevance to proposals involving
continuing technological developments for which many of
the relevant impacts have already been given attention
in .previous assessments?
4. Are there any types of assessment reports which will not be
generally available to the Congress, the Executive Agencies,
or tc any segment of the public? Will the OTA direct its
activities only to "non-security" problems? Will some
reports be limited in distribution if "ciassified" material
has been used but the report itself is not classified?
5. Who will be able to complain to whom in what forum and under
what circumstances if the OTA undertakes to disseminate
assessment data that may be considered by the complainant
to affect national security or to involve private competi-
tive information (trade secrets, etc.)?
b. Who will be able to complain to whom in what forum and under
what circumstances if the petitioner asserts that relevant
information (not necessarily his own) has not been taken into
account in an OTA report that has been or' is planned for gen-
eral dissemination or to a Committee of the Congress?
7. While an OTA would not take any direct action to follow up its
assessments where a recommendation is made explicitly or
implicitly which is harmful or is allegedly harmful to the
present or future activities of a private entity, might the
OTA nevertheless be compelled (pressured) in some instances
to hold rebuttal hearings for such projects?
E
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8. What might he the possibility of instances arising in which
advance notice of as assessment report (having substantial
detrimental, implications for a private entity or entities)
would motivate the initiation of a suit for injunction to
bar the release or publication of such report? How could
such a suit be instituted?
J!	 9. Various problems of governmental immunity are herein suggested.
What might be the liability of the OTA Director or Members
.	 i	 of the Staff for people who have relied upon the safety of
an application explicitly found beneficial by the OTA but
^-° Y	 which turns out to have serious adverse effects? is there
'
	
	 any precedent for personal or governmental liability of an
	
f
analysis/advisory group such as OTA which has brought hatm
upon a private person or corporate person through arbitrary
or irresponsible action?
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IV - Selected Comments; Assessment Performance Criteria
It is evident that the foregoing questions do not slide into
precise, discrete slots as might be indicated by the groupings used.
In a sense they are all interrelated. It is therefore useless to pan-
der long over the proper sequence. Yet it is imperative to be con-
cerned about certain fundamental considerations; Just what assessment
functions are required to satisfy the legislative needs of the Con-
	
r
gress? Assuming a basic organizational structure, how can such Com-
ponent be employed to most effectively perform these functions? If
one is inclined to feel that resistance to the performance of these
functions will be serious and persistent then the Component should be
armed with sufficient formal authority to assure access to relevant
information. If, on the other hand, one is disposed to believe that
the effectiveness of the operation depends almoat entirely on the
s
promise of mutual benefit for the various assessing entities then the
strategy would be directed toward the cultivation of cooperative, non-
abrasive relationships with coercive tactics reduced to a minimum.
In short, the scope of assessment responsibility provided or assumed,
the formal, compulsory authority with which the OTA is provided, and the
manner of implementing the assessment function are all closely enter-
twined with the "image" of OTA which will evolve.
The desire to be appreciated, even admired, may not be wholly
consistent with the tasks which must be performed. Is it wise, there-
fore, to assume that the success of the Congressional Assessment Com-
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nonent will depend larcely upon the di gnnsitinn of rhn nTA rn r-v0t4vnf-n	 9
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"hard line" assumption be just as plausible? Or should the statutory
scheme provide the broadest assessment responsibility with hack up
formal authority in the event certain intractable situations develop, in
other words, provide the widest range of options in operational pro-
cedure? Rather than wallow in the "image" question and the general
operationai policy to be pursued, it.is
 probably more profitable to
think of essentials and examine how certain of the questions posed
might relate to characteristics such as:
• Capability of the OTA to perform assessments as comprehensive
and in as much depth as Congress may desire with respect to
a given technological application 2er se or in the context
of a given social problem
• Ability of the OTA to select assessment tasks and arrange, with
the assistance of the 3SC, for the allocation of assessment
tasks among the LRS, GAO, Executive Agencies, and private
sector entities so as to most expeditiously and economically
perform the desired Congressional assessment support role.
• Provision for access to the essential information sources for
the assessments desired
• Provision for full representation of affected participants in
the assessment process
• Capability o5 Lhe OTA to manage the intricate informational
networks which are indispensable for the assembly of that
data upon which adequate assessments for Congressional pur-
poses can be made
• Provision for sufficient detachment of the OTA from the political
decision making process to assure independence of analysis
• Provision for the linkage from OTA to the political process
which will provide effective analytical svpport to decisional
arenas
• Provision For continuity of the assessment function
• Provision for continuing encouragement ot Ln4., °` rr..fessirn;ali-
zation" of the assessment function
_26_
It would seem advisable to restrict consideration of the questions
posed in III above to a brief comment on the interrelationship of such
questions to the following Assessment Performance Criteria:
• Defining and Limiting the Assessment Tasks of the OTA
• Notion of "Independence" of the Assessment Function
Representation of Affected Participants in the
Assessment Process
Discussion of the first criterion relates to such questions as:
A2, A3, A4, A5.
B4, B5, B7.
Cl, C3, C8.
Discussion of the second criterion relates to such questions as:
Al, A3, A6.
B3, B6.
Cl, C2.
Discussion of the third criterion relates to such questions as:
A3.
C4, C7.
iE
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a) Defining and Limiting the Assessment Tasks of OTA
What are the critical assessment needs of the
Congress? An exhaustive answer would take some time. Clearly,
Congress needs to be in better position to assess the technologically
oriented proposals of the Executive Department. Congress needs con-
tinuous updating on prospective technological applications and their
full social. impacts. This Subcommittee itself has expressed such
needs in part,but emphatical.ly,in its Report on "Managing the Environ-
ment" (Report of the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development
to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics of June 17, 1968)
wherein it was stated:
Regardless of improvements in Executive Branch
Organizations, the Congress needs an independent
and comprehensive source of information and
advice ... (p. 36)
Congress (has) a unique responsibility in obtaining
objective and complete information on technological
consequences...(p.2).
i
The intent of Congress ... is to avoid arbitrary
regulation and to establish a fact-based, rational
decision-making process which integrates all the
needs of society... (p. 6)
The best means of gaining long-term rational management
is to generate an informational base and provide a
i`	 policy to all operational programs which will cause
individual decision makers to act in harmony with the
entire system...(p. 29)
j
3-
and finally;
%i
The Congress should proceed to develop an independent
{f
	
capability for assessing the impact of technology on
the environment. (p. 8)
	 ?
r
e
i
^i
«2$_
It is. apparent that the Congress needs Special Purpose Assessments
of various technological applications related to environmental man-
agement and similar support for other social problem areas as well;
it also needs Total impact Assessments which examine the full social
consequences of given technological applications. These two assess-
ment approaches-are interrelated. But whatever technologies are
selected for total impact assessments and whatever social problem
areas are selected for the investigation of technological applications
as the cause or cure of such problems, there are other types of assess-
meat activities which must be given attention. The JSC and the OTA
would need a firm grasp on the existing technology assessment struc-
ture, the major social problem areas, technological resources which
are available for the advancement of social goals, technologies which
are contributing to social problems, technologies which are available
for abating or controlling social problems, and ways in which the assess-
ment .function can most adequately be performed. If the OTA wished to
be comprehensive and systematic about this preliminary appraisal, it
might proceed with some approximation to the following;
1) Systematic grouping of major technologies.
2) Systematic organization of social goals, needs
or problem areas.
3) Matching technologies to relevant or potentially
relevant social needn so as to facilitate the
identification of existing and prospective tech-
nological applications.
_29-
4) Examination of the existing Technology Assessment
Structure in order to determine:
a. Which of the existing (or potential)
technological applications has a regular-
ized (and adequate) technology assessment
system?
b, which of the existing (or potential.)
technological applications do not have
an adequate technology assessment system?
(Not capable of producing a total impact
assessment or an optimum social sub-Evstem
for assessment with , respect to a particular
problem or issue)
c. Which technological applications have a
potentially adequate technology assessment
system with the need being only to make
adjustments in assessing entities or in
the assessment process to bring them up to
an adequate level of performance?
d. Which technological applications represent
both the level of effort and the character-
istics of uniqueness which requires special
treatment/assessment either by the new OTA
structure or by special ad hoc assessment
groups, boards, or commissions?
From this analysis the JSC/OTA will be in position to determine more
accurately the level of effort required, the type of support needed,
and the more promising internal and external organizational arrange-
ments which should be developed.
This initial appraisal would provide an assessment information
base which would show all of the assessing entities constituting the
assessment system for major technological applications and for major
social problem areas with appropriate cross-referencing. Since we cannot
foresee all the possibilities under which social conditions will interact
Al
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with particular technological applications, it would seem all
the more essential to develop this comprehensive assessment information
system so as to provide	 maximum sensitivity for detecting both
opportunities for the application of technological resources to social
needs and early warning signals of impending detrimental impacts.
Having taken this approach, we are immediately beset with a further
critical question: How can the JSC/OTA Component be utilized so as best
to achieve Congressional aims with the most economical and proficient
use of resources? One point upon which all tend to agree is that a
new assessment component should reinforce and refine the assessment
function rather than attempt to duplicate existing activities. But how
can this notion be reduced to organizational and operational terms. While
tee OTA might be given the broadest assessment responsibility and com-
mensurate formal authority to assure the execution of assessment functions,
it should restrict its tasks to those which need to be performed
but which are not now being performed. It should also develop procedures
for assuring that all existing technolop^ assessment systems are operating
in an adequate manner.
A few illustrations should suffice to demonstrate how the assessment
burdens of OTA can be limited to the essentials. Certain points have
already been suggested. With respect to existing applications where a
regularized assessmew! system now exists with the capability of performing
adequately, the OTA would have no more than a monitoring and information
integration function to assure that suitable assessment data is provided
the Congress. The OTA should constantly strive to develop coordination
within those highly fragmented assessment systems which provide no focal
^;	 E
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point for the integration of the total span of social impacts so as
to regularize the system for performing adequate assessments. In
short, the OTA should encourage, by whatever means are available,
performance of assessment tasks by other entities actually or poten-
tially capable of doing so. The OTA should take a strong anticipa-
tory orientation toward technology and obtain, through study contracts
or grants, comprehensive assessments of such technologies, especially
in cases where developing partisan interests may subsequently preclude
access to relevant data or deliberately distort the issues involved.
The OTA should also develop a scheme of priorities of assessment
tasks which will assist in assuring that the more significant or criti-
cal matters are given attention. Both the NAS and NA?. Reports on
Technology Assessment attempt to provide some guidance in this connec-
tion. It is also evident from the previous discussion that assessment
tasks should be located primarily in those entities best equipped to
perform them. The development of such operational policies by the OTA
should make its assessment responsibility more manageable.
for example, that the Legislative Reference Service performs a partic-
ularly useful job for the Congress. More specifically, the Science`
Policy Research Division produced an excellent study on Technical Informa-
tion for Congress. The list of technology assessment projects now in
progress, as outlined by Mr. 7ayson in these hearings on November 24,
1969, is certainly impressive. It is also to be noted that the research
staff assists the Committees of Congress in identifying witnesses, pre-
paring reports, and serving as consultants to the Committees. As was
indicated by Mr. J ayson, however, the management and monitoring of a
technology assessment function as he envisages the emerging need `twill
require a substantial commitment of funds" in order to support a vastly
enlarged assessment capability. In sum it would seem that an Office of
Technology Assessment would be required with new responsibilities whether
attached to the Legislative Reference Service or not. In any event,
the type of service now provided by the Science Policy Research Division
is essential. Since this capability already exists there would be no
need for an OTA to duplicate it. Further. as noted subsequently, the
establis ►ied practice of the Legislative Reference Service (SPRD) in
responding to the requests of any Committee of the Congress may not be
a procedure the OTA might deem advisable to follow. Yet, the "on call"
procedure certainly appears to be a most useful one and will undoubtedly
be continued by the Legislative Reference Service.
Implicit in the Report on 'technical Informatica for Congress is the
cautionary theme that technology assessment not be viewed as a simplistic
process. There are endless ramifications. One which should be of concern
is the necesGity for and extent to which management considerations of
j'	 a
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technological projects will or should be encompassed in the concept of
assessment. The management of a technological application can make a
vast difference in the resulting social benefits and costs of a project. 	 ;:r
,Fw
Au article in the Washington Evening Star of November 25, 1969, p.12, 	 ;;f
col. 1, illustrates this point. In connection with an investigation by
the National Transportation Safety Board on "the carriage of large
quantities of hazardous materials through populated areas (where)
supposedly effective safety controls do not work," the.Board is quoted:
Many of the failures of safety controls are
attributable to ineffective planning, design,
and management of safety controls involving
government and private industry.
Management considerations also suggest the activities of the General
Accounting Office. While not normally thought of as a technology assess-
went entity, the GAO performs occasional studies which are clearly
a
germane to technology assessment even though primarily directed to fiscal
and administrative aspects of technological projects. For example, the
GAO made a Report to the Congress on the "Administration of Project
Mohole by the National. Science Foundation" (April 23, 1968). The Annual
Report 1968 of the Comptroller General (of the U.S.) states:
i
Among the underlying factors which led the Congress to
discontinue funding Project Mohole (a project to pene-
trate the mantle of the earth) was the steady escalation
	 f
of the estimated cost and time to complete the project.
These estimates increased from $46.7 million to $127.1
million and from 5 to 8k years. The report contains an
analysis of the Lcasons for these increases and points
out that under the approach followed, the Foundation-
was not in a position to determine adequately that the
project objectives were worth the money and resources
that were necessary to attain them. Yet it was totally
	 =
committed to the project.
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We suggested an alternative approach to be used by the
Foundation in future maior research and development
projects involving totally new or exploratory concepts,
calling for the projects to be conducted in a number of
sequential phases. Each phase would represent a specific
limited agency commitment whereby it would determine the
feasibility of the project objectives, the means to attain
these objectives, and whether the objectives would be worth
the costs.involved before a contractual commitment was made.
A recent report of the GAO.was Airected to an "Examination into the 	
r
Effectiveness of the Construction Grant Program for Abating, Controlling,
and Preventing Water Pollution" (Federal Water Pollution Control Admini-
stration, Department of Interior)(November 3, 1969). This Report states:
(p•3)
RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of the
Interior require that the States, in establishing
priorities for the construction of waste treatment
facilities, and FWPCA, in approving grants for
such construction, give consideration to (1) the
benefits to be derived from the construction of
the facilities and (2) the actions taken, or
planned to be taken : by other polluters of the
waterways.
FWPCA should consider utilizing systems analysis
techniques in the planning for and implementation
of water pollution control programs. FWPCA should
consider also the practicability of providing,
through its storage and retrieval of data (STORET)
system (see p. 96), data needed by the States in:
--determining their water pollution control
requirements,
--identifying alternatives available to solve
water pollution problems,
--formulating water pollution control plans,
and
--establishing implementation schedules and
priorities for the construction of waste
treatment facilities.
r T
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Another report of the OAO reldLing to the operations of a
Agriculture Research Service of the Department of Agriculture
.^ illustrates how GAO functions involve not only the mechanisms and
processes of assessment but also the potential for conflict-of- ^^a
,I! interest situations to arise in the use of private consultants.
' (Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1969, p. A2, col. 1.). 	 while most GAO
- investigations relating to technology assessment pertain to completed
or existing programs, some are anticipatory in character_ such as the
,f special study made of some of the legal, competitive, consumer
service, and other probable implications of the sale of AEC gaseous
^i
diffusion plants to private owners. 	 A further example is the clas-
sified evaluation made to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of
^I the Nike X/Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system in terms of econ-
omy, efficiency, and effectiveness.
i
The GAO has not developed a special capability for technology
i
' assessment nor is its professional staff broadly representative of
professional skills in comparison, for example, with the Legislative
o Reference Service. 	 However, the GAO's long experience in the appraisal/
evaluative function, its movement toward enlarging its skill base so as
l
t
to take into account a broader spectrum of social costs and benefits,
1
and its increasing emphasis on the systems approach to major public
projects are definitely compatible with a more comprehensive technology
assessment function.
	
Even the existing fiscal and management analysis
capability of GAO would provide indispensable support to an OTA in tak-
t
inga comprehensive view of given applications.
d
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Yet, however substantial the services now performed by the LRS
and the GAO in technology assessment, neither is organized presently
to perform the types of functions that a Congressional Component such
as that posited herein could perform. Neither is really a technology
assessment manager in a comprehensive sense. The bolstering up of
either of these organizations would, in effect, require that a new
organizational entity be established. The question then becomes whether
there is promise of greater net benefit from the grafting of the expanded
technology assessment function onto one of the existing organizations
or by establishing a separate entity. The latter approach may add
somewhat to the complexity of the organizational structure, but it
would provide visibility for the assessment function which would not
likely emerge if such function is subsumed in the existing LRS or GAO.
Further, a new organizational entity would provide the conditions for
the unique tasks with which OTA would be charged. For example, it would
not be expected to serve a "mass of masters" as does the Legislative ?
I`
Reference Service.
	 To put the matter differently, if the Science Policy
Research Division were given the amplified assessment job, would it be
able to meet its "on call" obligations while at the same time perform-
3
ing; the information management tasks which will be required of the OTA?
No doubt the GAO could also develop a comprehensive assessment capability,
7
but would not this effort inevitably be subordinated to traditional GAO
g
fiscal and management functions?	 What the Congress would seem to need
and the JSC/OTA would provide is both the management apparatus and
the "feel" of being in control of the situation.
	 This latter element j
of establishing confidence in our understanding and control of the move-
.
ment of technological development is perhaps the most significant objective
of all.
	
In brief, the Congressional Technology Assessment Component posited
'	 herein would fully utilize the assessment capabilities of the LRS and the GAO
and, in so doing, provide for an effective allocation of assessment tasks.
ii
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'	 A further massive allocation of assessment responsibility (which will
r: !
F
	
	 facilitate the performance of the JSCIOTA component) can be made to the
Executive Branch Departments, Administrations, and Programs which
are deeply involved with technological applications. One of the primary
tasks of the OTA will be to assure comprehensive total impact assessments
of given applications, as well as special purpose assessments for partic-
ular social problems. The most logical loci for total impact assessments
^	 are those agencies having primary authority over relevant technological
applications such as DOT in transportation technology. Here is where
the basic data relating to technological applications are or should be
assembled, analyzed, and reported. Apparently, DOT does not yet have
-	 i
f	 this data management system, but surely it is the locus for total impact
assessments of transportation projects, not the OTA. The recent Report
s`
i
on "Transportation Information" to the Committee on Appropriations,
3i
.`	 U.S. House of Representatives by the Secretary of Transportation of
}
May 1969 states:
Good decisions depend on careful analysis of
pertinent information, yet decisions involving
billions of dollars in transportation expenditures
are frequently based on inadequate information.
Without adequate information, the chances of costly
errors in these decisions are greatly increased. (p.vii)
Present transportation information is characterized
by significant gaps, fragmentation and incompatibilities.
It is not possible to examine the transportation system
as a whole or in terms of its related parts. The inform-
ation problem is so great that considerable efforts will
be required to bring about needed improvements in trans-
portation information. (p.vii)
The magnitude of expenditures involved in many decisions
on transportation items is so great that even relatively
small savings - resulting from the information program -
will in large in absolute terms. These savings will pay
1i
for the cost of the information program many times over (p.xi)
Measures of the performance of the transportation system
(in aspects besides safety) do not exist. There has been
recognition recently of the need for national social indi-
cators to parallel the long-established economic indicators.
Indicators of the performance of the transportation system
are a most important element in a general set of social
indicators 0,127)
7
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The foregoing relates only to one major technological application
area. It demonstrates the truly staggering proportions of the informa-
tion management task. It is not only undesirable that the OTA assume this
entire task but would appear wholly infeasible for it to do so. Assess-
ments made by the Executive agencies might to some extent be discounted
by the ingrained skepticism of the Congress. But it would be the task
of the OTA to evaluate such assessments. The implementation of the
operation of the J5C/OTA component may require the reorganization of
the information/assessment structure of the Executive agencies to a far
greater extent than is herein posited for the Congressional Assessment
Component. It would seem that these two assessment developments must
proceed concurrently and in coordination. Being highly interdependent,
the Congressional and Executive Components must closely mesh if the
overall .assessment function is to be effective. There must be a high
degree of concurrence on what data is sought, means of identifying such
data if existing, and means of specifying data which needs to be generated.
A real difficulty exists, however, in connection with making total
impact assessments of many, perhaps most, technological applications.
The formal authority for operations of those government agencies which
are the most likely candidates for a total impact assessment responsibility
re a particular application or applications is not necessarily co-exten-
sive with either the full scope of effects of the application nor with
the totality of aspects of the social problem context. As has been
pointed out, fragmentation of the assessment function is basically a
reflection of assessment entities with different authority, objectives,
and capabilities. Hence, each might reasonably ask why it should
ac--ept responsibility for a total impact assessment. The Highway/Motor
A4,`:
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Freight Carrier application and the Aircraft Noise Problem are excellent
examples of this division of formal authority and assessment responsibil-
ity.	 This is not only evident as in the fragmentation of authority in
1	 i
u
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the federal government but also as between the Federal, State, and
^ i local levels of authority. 	 Since operational programs with specified
i ,
I
and usually narrow authority constitute a substantial segment of the
t:
assessment entities- in most technology assessment systems having to do
jj with major applications, the crucial problem of the OTA will be to inte-
grate the outputs of such entities into a Total Impact Assessment.
,c
In view of the need for most the the assessment burden,
t
particularly with respect to governmentally sponsored technology, to be
performed by Executive Branch entities, will not the effective function-
ing of the Congressional Technology Assessment Component depend upon
a viable focal counterpart in the Executive Branch?	 Highly pertinent s
j
r
to this point is an article on "Presidential Staffing in the Sixties
and Seventies," by William D. Carey (Public Adminis-tration Review,
September /October 19 69, at 450), who has long experience in Bureau of
the Budget affairs.	 After noting that "The modern President must cope
with shortened decision intervals and reaction times, and his responses
to domestic and foreign challenges must be immediate and certain,"
Mr. Carey states flatly:	 "The Presidency is wear in policy analysis" and
follows up this discussion by pointing to a "second flaw" in these terms:
In an age noted for advanced theory and
technology in organizing and applying inform-
ation, the presidency has no information
system whatsoever. 	 (p. 452)
`s
4
r'I
?I
` -40--
He further states;
It is hard to see how the presidency can grip the policy
dilemmas of the 70's with its present shaky staff struc-
ture. There are limits to what can be asked of the Bur-
eau of the Budget, which is staffed at the level it
reached 20 years ago. The Council of Economic Advisors
limps . al.ong with barely a score of professionals, while
the Office of Science and Technology with some 35
employees cannot even begin to reshape national science
goals. These units, together with the immediate White
House staff, constitute the troops. (p. 457)
The NAS Report strongly emphasizes the need for an Executive
Assessment Component as a focal point of Executive Department Assesr,ments
and as the locus of a comprehensive information system. One might
question whether Congress should rely solely upon this data source. The
NAS Report does suggest that the Congress might wish to establish an assess-
ment data system of its own. It would seem that the JSC/OTA component would
feel considerably more confident if it had control of its own overall
data source, although such system should make use of OST assessment data
instead of duplicating the data generation process. In any event, the OTA,
even if agreeing w:i.th the impacts identified by the Executive Component
re a given technological application, may have quite different notions as
to the social significance of such impacts, if measured against social
indicators reflecting a Congressional rather than an Executive perspective.
A total Impact assessment capability in the OST,for example, which would
undertake to integrate the outputs of Executive agencies and departments
and private sector entities into total impact assessments would surely
lend tremendous assistance to the OTA. If such capability is not establishes
on a regularized basis then there would seem to be no alternative for the
OTA than to develop direct communications links with all relevant Executive
Departments and Agencies.
r
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b) Notion of "Independence of the Assessment Function
Considerable attention has been given to an assumed relati .ship
between the credibility of the assessment process and the establishment
F
of appropriate conditions for detached, non-partisan performance of the
assessment function. This relationship has several facets and has been
expressed in different ways. In this presentation it would have specific
reference to the posited Office of Technology Assessment. The Report of
the National Academy of Engineering on Technology Assessment is relevant
to this matter:
Technology assessments should be produced in an
environment free from political influence or pre-
determined bias. It can be inferred from the pilot
studies that the selection of a preferred course of
action, among alternative strategies derived from
the assessment, is not a suitable task for the tech-
nology assessment group. This function should remain
the prerogative of the legislator after he has been
provided with the bases for the application of his
judgment. (p.3 )
Members of a technology assessment task force should
be chosen for their expertise but not as represent-
atives of affected parties or special interests.(p.4 }
Experience shows that the task force members possessing
a wide range of personal interests have been able to
focus on the public interest and to set aside the biases
of the organizations with which they are associated.
( p •4) )
The NAS Report on Technology Assessment makes a number of observations
and suggestions with respect to this matter:
(A) central deficiency of existing mechanisms for
assessment is that they fail to separate promotion
or protection from evaluation, and thereby compro-
mise both their integrity and their credibility.
To overcome that deficiency, any new mechanism we
propose must be carefully insulated from direct
policy making powers and responsibilities. (p. 80)
The Report also states that granting a power to "censor all technological
developments" could not be insulated from external political pressures
and further:
r^
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(E)ntrusting such sweeping powers to a new assessment
entity would rob it of any special claim to objectiv-
ity and would render its judgments at least as suspect
as those of any other regulatory body. (p. 81)
More directly to the point, the Report states:
Anv new assessment entity we oropose, therefore, should
be empowered to study and to recommend but not to act.
It must be able to evaluate but neither to sponsor nor
to prevent. We confront, however, something of a para-
dox, for though we wish to assure the neutrality of the
new mechanism, we wish also to assure that it be influen-
tial. The panel has no thought of urging the creation
of another organization simply to add one more voice to
the many that already cry out for change. Thus, while
it must itself seek to be apolitical, any new assessment
mechanism must be located close to the centers of power
in the political process; given the vast powers of the
contending interest that will surround it, any organiza-
tion less centrally situated would have no realistic
hope of materially influencing public policy. (p. 82)
The most we can hone for in creatin g a new mechanism
for technology assessment is to introduce a greater
degree of objectivity into the process and to inject
a body of criteria and assumptions that reflect a wider
set of interests and values than do the specialized
organizations currently engaged in fragmented assessmem
activities. (p.
The thrust of the foregoing extracts from the NAS and NAE Reports
seem clear enough,although some of us might wish to substitute other
terms such as "non-partisan" for "neutral" and the concept of "adequacy
of assessment" for "objectivity of assessment." Perhaps the critical
issue in addressing the proposed OTA function would be the reference
to the "paradox" confronted in attempting to design an apolitical
mechanism which will exert an appreciable degree of influence on the
political process. What we must do, it would seem, is to brush away
the "logical impasse" and get on with the job of designing the most
s
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creditable assessment function feasible for the express purpose of
introducing useful and reliable assessment data into the legislative
process. This does not eliminate the inherent difficulty, but it does
present a socially desirable task rather than a verbal "hang--up."
The GAO statutory scheme and practices are instructive in this
connection. The Comptroller General is an "agent of the Congress."
Among other things, the GAO has the authority and the responsibility
to "make such investigations of revenue, appropriations, or expenditures
as ordered by either House of Congress or any Committee having juris-
diction over such matters." (31 USCA 53(b)). The Comptroller General
also has the responsibility to report to the Congress, and if requested,
to the President, including "recommendations concerning the legislation
he may deem necessary to facilitate the prompt and accurate rendition
and settlement of accounts and concerning such other matters relating
to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds as he may
think advisable." (31 USCA 53 (a)). One might contend that such matters
are more susceptible to consensual agreement, that is,less controversial,
than the subject matter of technological assessments, i.e., the identifi-
cation and evaluation of the full range of social values affected. But
certain investigations and reports of the GAO are clearly politically
sensitive. Nevertheless, it is my impression that the GAO generally enjoys
S
r
r
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a reputation as a highly competent, reliable, and non-partisan activity.
The high respect status enjoyed by the GAO is perhaps largely attributable
to an intelligent use of discretion by the Comptroller General and his assoc-
iates as to what types of investigations and reports the GAO capability can be
_	 a
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applied usefully as distinguished from those which are so highly
politicized as not be be amenable to analytical treatment. It is
also my impression that the National Transportation Safety Board of
the Executive Branch (DOT) is gradually building a similar reputation
for its impartial, delibarate process of accident investigation.
:a
Measured against the criteria offered by the NAS/NAE Reports
and the experience of -he General Accounting Office, how might one
evaluate the prospects for the effective functioning of the Congressional
Assessment Component posited herein?
Would not the establishment of both a Joint Select Committee on
Technology and Society and an Office of Technology Assessment provide
an organizational focus of attention commensurate with the significance
of advancing technology to social problem areas? This would provide an
instrument for taking a total systems view of the interaction of technol-
ogy with relevant participants, institutions, and values.
The Office of Technology Assessment is envisioned as an assessment
support group directly responsible to the Congress through the Joint
Congressional Committee on Technology and Society. It would be an
entity separately identifiable from the staff of the Joint Committee.
Would not such an arrangement provide organizationally for independence
of function and operations by the OTA while at the same time providing
for a direct link to the legislative process through the Joint Select
Committee? In view of the Enormity of the task that will be required
if any substantial increment of assistance is to be provided the Congress
on technology assessment, it would seem abundantly clear that an Office
of Technology Assessment is needed in addition to the Joint Select
	t	 i
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As noted, the NAS Report warns against the assumption of too
extensive a power over technological development and attempts to clarify
	
{ i;	 the conceptual conflict between the maintenance of a non-partisan stance
e;
and the exercise of influence on decision making. But it would appear
	
j`	 that at a certain point on the curve the two characteristics can be
	
r
	
..-^	 mutually supportable. Once an entity has gained a reputation for useful-
.,
	
i	 ness snd credibility, meaning that it is "listened to," it is also
likely to be strengthened in its "independence" since the preservation
' of conditions for a detached analysis is recognized as serving the needs
I°
of all concerned.	 Again, it would appear that the GAO has come close to
I
approximating this status. 	 But the achievement of this status is not
i
simply a matter of organization.
	
Other variables are evident 	 First,
	
i
3
the recognition by the Congress of the significance of our technological
a
resources and the disposition to assure t.,eir effective utilization is
essential.	 The OTA will have to be given broad authority similar in scope
f
to that of the GAO in order to establish the importance of the OTA function
and to assure access to relevant assessment data. 	 Provision must be made
for a staff which will provide an assessment capability of the highest
	
r;
order.	 A strategy of implementation must be designed which will gain
the support of relevant assessing entities,
	 including opportunity for
general public participation in the assessment function.
	 Ultimately,
independence of operations, as well as influence on decisions, will be
achieved through performance and through public confidence resulting from
professionalization of the assessment
	 function.
re+X
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One mark of independence is the degree of control over the
. activities of an entity.
	 Surely, the broader the range of controllers,
in the sense that an official or organization is in position to request
^i
or demand the performance of certain tasks, the less control the entity
I°
has.	 if all Congressmen or even all Committees can call upon the OTA
for assessment tasks, then the independence of the OTA will clearly
become diluted.
	 This does noc mean that the OTA would operate entirely
i
outside the perimeter of Congressional needs.
	 Such needs can be expressed
through the JSC,and periodic consultation can keep the OTA currently
apprised of Congressional needs.
	 Nor would occasional ad hoc requests
f
of Congressional Committees through the JSC necessarily be excluded.
But the point is that the Director of the OTA should have the final
.	 ^
determination of what assessment activities the OTA can usefully under-
take.	 Consultation with the JSC, as well as the requests for assessment
assistance which will inevitably be directed to the OTA, will surely
i
keep the latter finely attuned to the types of assessment tasks which
i
the Congress and other agencies consider of importance.
	 The Director
will surely wish to be responsive 	 to the Congress, but he must be in
F
position to make 	 a determination on the basis of an informed judment as to
what the more urgent existing and prospective needs are, and he should have
the statutory authority to do so.
	 It would seem that a workable
	 accommoda-
tion can be made.	 GAO experience is to some degree relevant here.
	 The
Comptroller General is not obliged by statute to respond to every individual
Congressional request
	 but apparently undertakes to do so within the limits
of GAO capability.
3
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Two processes are always working in conjunction:	 the political,
partisan, adversatial system on the one hand and the non-partisan,
a
detached, professional, "respected source of information and analysis"
approach on the other.
	 The first is nurtured by partisan interests, by
differences in attitudes toward priorities in social values, and by
uncertainties as to facts, predicti*ns,	 and !-oc:ial consequences.	 The
second has its source of strength in the need for a trusted source of
information ana in the need for the positing and explication of public
interest-oriented standards of judgment against which partisan claims
and demands can be tested and judged. 	 In the assessment component posited,
the JSC provides the link to the political decision process while the
OTA provides the second, informational-analytical need.
The critical problem is to develop an OTA that is useful and
credible.
	 The danger of the OTA's abusing its powers appears remote.
When an entity becomes influential,
	 it simply means that it has an appreci-
able effect on immediate or ultimate determinations of legal rights and
duties or of the allocation of resources,	 i.e., benefits and costs.
	 Hence,
those who are or may be affected will demand having either an input
to the assessment forum or the opportunity to challenge assessment out-
comes which may be contrary to their interests
	 Such provision must be
made, of course.	 But in addition, it would seem a reasonable assumption
that the wide diversity of interests represented in the Congress would
effectively curb any undue exercise of influence over political decisions
by the OTA,	 Furthermore, whether obliged by statute or not, the OTA would
surely follow the information access and dissemination policy as set si
forth in the Freedom of Information Act (5 USCA 552).
This practice would not only be desirable in order for the OTA to
-48-
develop effective working relationships but for the purpose of
establishing its credibility with relevant governmental and private
sector entities.	 Such informational practices themselves are
effective constraints on arbitrary or thoughtless action.
EEF
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C. Representation of Affected Participants in the Assessment Process
The concept of total impact assessment of *technological
applications requires that the full spectrum of social interactions
	
r
r
be explored by the OTA. The staff of the OTA, representing all
	 r.
"	 y
relevant professional and disciplinary skills, will be in position to
identify most likely impacts of an application. However, this internal
process of analysis may not in many instances provide a fully confident
basis for assessment even though one purpose of the OTA in using assess-
ment project contractors, institutional grantees, advisory groups or
special ad hoc commissions will be to assist the OTA in identifying
the social impacts of given applications or of alternative technological
projects and making determinations on the magnitude, intensity, and
persistency of such impacts.
	 In addition to the identification of
a
effects, however, there is the further dimension of assessment which
will arise in connection with some assessment tasks, i.e., the evalua-
tion of the social desirability or undesirability of such impacts.
Certain segments of the public may well view such impacts as benefits
i or threats in quite different ways.	 y	 Every application involves both
1
benefits and costs, but it does not follow that those segments of the
s public which share the benefits necessarily coincide with those segments
of the public which must bear the costs.
	 It is often difficult to gain
full appreciation of these considerations without direct inputs from f
j such affecteduE blics.	 Perhaps in a majority of situations those seg-
ments of the public affected will have an organizational channel for
expressing their views which will come to the attention of the OTA.
t
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It is likely, however, and especially with prospective applications,
that segments of the public will be affected which are not represented
by an organized interest group or such group might not have perceived
the implications of the application. Hence, the question arises as
to how the OTA is to be assured of data on the full span of actual
or probable social consequences.
Some sort of modified public hearing procedure which would invite
relevant informational inputs during the assessment process need not
be incompatible with the concept of a professional, impartial, public
interest-oriented entity such as the OTA. A question does arise as
to the extent such procedure should be formalized. Many entities shy
away from the judicialization of what are essentially assessment determin-
ations, feeling that the rigid procedures characterizing the formal
adjudicatory adversarial process deter rather than facilitate access to
relevant data. The view is sometimes expressed that the adversary pro-
1	
cess is not suitable to the temperament of those whose profedsional
1	 modes of inquiry tend toward the dispassionate search for "truth" rather
ii
than to the extraction of the "facts" through partisan, sometimes compul.-
1
sory questioning. One must face the reality of those assessment situa-
tions, however, where the assessment concerns existing applications as
contrasted with prospective projects. In these situations, the assess-
ment outcome will inevitably affect legal rights and duties or the
allocation of power, political or economic. This situation invites
controversy and demands to assert partisan claims.
ti
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It would not seem advisable for the OTA to be made subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act or that it pursue hearing procedures which
would require the imposition of similar processes. The Congress is, of
course, specifically excluded from the definition of "agency" provided
in the APA. Further, the OTA would not have any "rule-making" or "adjudi-
catory" functions. In such hearings under the APA "A party is entitled
to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to sub-
mit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be
required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." (5.556 (d)). Pos-
sibly relevant as a "policy" to follow in OTA assessment processes, how-
ever, is the provision in Section 556 (e) that "When an agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence
in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity
to show to the contrary." Yet, even the APA provides in the same Section
that "Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as
a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immater-
ial, or unduly repetitious evidence."
Probably something is to be learned from the procedures and practices
of the National Transportation Safety Board in connection with "public 	
y
hearings." The Board is an unusual type of assessment entity, the Depart- 	 j
ment of Transportation Act specifically stating that in the exercise of
its functions the Board is charged with a continuing review of the safety
situation with respect to all modes of transportation. (Public Law 85-670,
Sect. 5). The Act further states that the Board in the exercise of its function
a
x	
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	 powers, and duties shall be "...independent of the Secretary and other
offices and officers of the Department." Section 5 (b) of the Act
prescribes that the Board shall have responsibility for determining
cause or probable cause and reporting the facts, conditions, and cir-
cumstanres of accidents investigated under authority transferred to
the Secretary of Transportation. Reports and recommendations of the	
r
Board, as well as special studies, must be made public. The Board is
concerned with the fullest possible information. It is not concerned
with authoritative determinations of placing fault or assessing legal
liability. Its findings are not admissible in court. In order to
obtain the most candid and uninhibited evidence feasible it is my un-
derstanding that adversarial procedures have been discouraged.
This operation raises an extremely interesting and critical ques-
tion, however, relating to the status of an independent, non-partisan
entity rendering assessment decisions which may ultimately have an
influence on the allocation of benefits and costs in the political
process or in the determination of rights and duties in the legal process.
The NTSB is responsible for establishin g the probable cause of accidents
and this finding is directly related tc fault and liability. In acci-
dent investigations the accident has occurred. Liability for certain
parties and remedies for others potentially exist. The Board's rec-
ommendations have been generally accepted; thus its assessments sub-
stantially influence official decisions. Hence, various participants
have a stake in its findings or may feel they do. This encourages
a partisan approach which may inhibit full disclosure of facts. In
such circumstances, it should be expected that partisan interests will
demand to be heard.
Y
,. But the Board has also employed so-called "public hearings" to
evaluate means of solving problems.
	
This is more or less equivalent
r^
to the assessment of a prospective technological applicat ion rather
than an existing one. 	 On October 31, 1969, "The National Transpor-
tation Safety Board—announced that more than 18 aviation organiza-
tions and government agencies (would) testify during the Safety Board's
(` r
..-#' public hearing beginning November 4th seeking to find ways and means
to define and correct the national aviation problem of midair colli-
sions." (SB 69-88).	 Rather than following the somewhat formal pro-
.
i'
ceedings of accident investigations, the Board set forth the rules
to be followed, namely that the hearings would be a "seminar- -type pro-
ceeding" and that "only Board Members will question witnesses."
	 This
procedure would seem to fit more closely Section 5 (d)(2) of the Trans--
; portation Act providing for "special studies" than to Section 5 (d)(4)
i of the Act pertaining to "accident investigations." 	 Yet even the ini-
tiation of the latter is limited to those the Board "deems necessary
and appropriate."	 But the point of interest is that by structuring
a hearing in this manner the NTSB provided a means of assembling rele-
vant data from affected participants without being burdened by the
legal apparatus of a formal hearing. 	 Subsequently, of course, should
a recommendation of the NTSB be implemented by the FAA, then a rule
making proceeding would be initiated in accord with the APA. 	 Does
this suggest that the OTA should restrict its "public hearings" to a
similar essentially informal procedure and avoid efforts to .judicialize
the information gathering function? This approach would accommodate
a modified adversarial system enabling relevant partisan interests to
register their views on the technological application involved. It would
	 F
t
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avoid most of the inquiries raised in Question A6 in Part III, although
it would not eliminate the situation implicit in Question C7, i.e.,
data needed from a non-cooperative private sector entity. The experience
of the National Commission on Product Safety (.joint Resolution 33, 90th
Congress, November 20, 1967, Public Law 90-146) should be reviewed in this
connection. :the Commission was authorized to hold public hearings, to
require private participants to submit reports and answer surveys, to
administer oaths, and "to require by subpeona the attendance and testimony
of witnesses and the production of all documentary evidence relating to
the execution of its duties," (Sec. 3 (a), 81 Stat. 467). Several public
hearings have been conducted by the Commission which apparently have been
instrumental in securing official or voluntary action on behalf of con-
sumer protection. ('Progress Report on Results of Commission Work," National
Commission on Product Safety, November 18, 1969).
e
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
B.	 ome Implications of the
Technology Assessment Function
for the Effective Public
Decision Making Process
Louis H. MAYO
May 1971, pp. 16--22
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IV - Technology Assessment: Some Illustrative Effects
Some of the probable or possible results of technology assessment can
be illustrated by reference to the phases of the Policy Formulation and Pro-
gram Implementation Process. These projections should be considered as hypoth-
eses to be tested rather than predictions.
Problem Perception	 r
• Development of a systematic Early Alert Sensing Function
for:
Seeking out incipient crisis situations or
social problem areas and matching, on a provis-
ional basis, the means of preventing or of other-
wise coping with such conditions
Seeking out promising opportunities to apply
resources, technological or othercaise, to the
achievement of desired social goals
• Identifying prospective implications of proposed
new technological applications
Problem Definition and Formulation
a
of the Problem Context
• Continuously improving capability to apply 1°contextual
thinking" to social problem analysis, as for example:
Skills and techniques (including systematized reference
materials such as comprehensive lists of effects related
to social problem contexts) applicable to the task of
identifying affected participants and value-institutional
processes with respect to particular technological appli-
cations and the nature of such effects (planned or deriva-
tive; direct or indirect; immediate or remote;
	 inevitable,
probable,	 or possible; etc.).
Greater sensitivity to "process thinking it
 with respect to
technological applications, as for example, in terms of
the effects which will occur during the Initiation, Imple-
mentation, and Operational Stages or in the phases of the
Policy Formulation and Program Implementation Process.
r.	 .!l
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• Improved capability to perform "Quick Response" preliminary
assessments (after brief inspection of the relevant social
problem context involved with a given technological applica-
tion) which will provide rough policy guides without serious
risk of ignoring significant implications
(;,formation Assembly and Management
Assuming the development of structured data management sys-
tems in the major mission-oriented agencies such as DOT and
the development of an effective capability through the NEPA
of 1969, Section 102 (2)(C) experience to utilize ad hoc and
informal, semi-structured assessment data "networks" within
and between various levels of government, the tendency of
individual agencies to spin off into autonomous orbits can
be partially counteracted. Such assessment data networks
will also assist in overcoming organizational deficiencies
which hinder total social impact assessments of major techno-
logical applications.
• The more comprehensive and "in - depth" assessments become,
the more aware various participants will become of the dis-
closure and use of ;information which may be considered harm-
ful, i.e., claims of unjustified exposure of private compet-
itive data or claims of invasion of individual or institutional
privacy. Continuing attention will necessarily be given to
control over access to data banks and to the dissemination of
assessment outcomes,
• The rapidly growing information on assessment outcomes and
assessment methodologies will require the initiation of a
Reporter System which will systematize assessment experience
in such manner as to make such data and methodologies applied
available to the "assessment community" in readily usable form.
This will gradually lead to regularization of the Technology
Assessment Function and to "professionalization" of assessment
skills. Failure to initiate such a Reporter System will likely
result in stifling assessment methodology development.
Invention and Development _ of Alternative Means
'	 (i.e., Resource Configurations [ technological or otherwise ,
Statutory Schemes, Social Action Program organization and
Procedures)
i
• There will be an identifiable shift in emphasis from narrow
issue, rule-oriented, programmed thinking to contextual, prob-
lem-oriented, alternative thinking as more adequate methodologies
are developed for performance of the assessment function.
k	
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• One of the most significant effects of applying the
contextual approach to Technology Assessment will be
a gradual shift from 'one-factor-fix" thinking (legal,.
economic, or technological) to "problem context" and
Initiation-Implementation-Operations Process thinking.
The analytical implication of this shift will be, for
example, that with respect to proposals for new techno-
logical applications, the relevant assessment policy
makers will consider means in terms of the Total Techno-
logical configuration (the combination of facilitating
and supporting resources through time: legal, political,
economic, social, etc.) rather than in terms of the tech-
nologyep r se.
• Excessive emphasis on socio-political constraints in
particular assessments may, on occasion, inhibit tech-
nological initiative and innovation. Overall, however,
assessment activities will create an increasing number
of opportunities for innovative technologies to be applied
in combination with other resource/means in order to allev-
iate existing social dislocations or to achieve desired
social goals.
The continuing development of the Technology Assessment
Function in the various agencies of the Federal Executive,
the Regulatory agencies, and in the Congress, as well as
in entities at the State and local levels; will gradually
bring about a regularized system of hearings or other mech-
anisms by which orderly inputs can be made by all community
participants affected by or who might be affected by a new
technological project. In addition to this "adversarial"
input to the assessment function, an increasing number of
"inclusive assessment outcomes" should be available from
university policy analysis groups and other entities having
no partisan stake in the assessment other than its adequacy.
Evaluation, Selection and
Recommendation of Means
• Assessment methodological concepts and skills will provide
more reliable (adequate) outcomes. Analytical skill levels
will improve appreciably with respect to:
• Problem perception and formulation
• Organization of assessment data
Development of Alternative Configurations
(Means, technological or otherwise) for
F
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attaining a specified social objective
or set of objectives.
• Projection of alternative future social
environments reflecting all major value-
institutional processes.
• Development of more useful models of indi-
vidual and organizational behavior for
application in the contextual/process
approach to assessment.
f
• Simulation of changing social process/
F	 environment through time, including the
interrelationship of conditions and trends.
Both complex and simplistic assessment methodologies
will be developed within the next fev- years, the former
to accommodate comprehensive, inclusive, in-depth efforts
and the latter for preliminary assessment testing or for
"cuicr- response" outcomes for urgent policy decisions.
o One of the most difficult assessment tasks will continue
to ::e the conversion of effects into measurable social
un{nec"	 Reference NEPA of 1969, Section 102(2)(B).
The T.i . cessity to introduce certain social value schemes
into the assessment process in order to translate effects
into mersur:-ble social impacts will require that much
greet°r attention be given to alternative concepts and
tecl.-?niias of designing social value schemes as empirical
inputs into the assessment process. This required assess-
ment input can also be viewed and posited as alternative
concepts of Social Justice, i.e., alternative ways of dis-
tributing social costs and benefits (including resource
allocations and the assignment of legal rights and duties)
among affected participants.
. As a general proposition it is likely that Technology
Assessment as a regularized function will gain more rapid
acceptance and application in the Executive Agencies and
Departments than in the Congress. It is only sensible for
the mission-oriented agencies, for example, to make use of
inclusive, non-partisan assessments to identify objections
and sources of opposition to new proposals in order to cor-
rect the configuration of the proposed project or otherwise
minimize difficulties with the development of socially use-
ful technologies. However, we shall no doubt see various
participants in both the Public and Private sectors apply
such comprehensive, inclusive assessments as a technique
for more sophisticated advocacy of partisan positions.
"
r	 i
20
Q As the Technology Assessment Function develops,
mission-oriented agencies will continue to be
caught in a difficult position as to their assess-
ment responsibilities. They are designed to promote
research into and the development of technologies
which presumably advance the public interest. But
this general objective often involves an innFr contra-
diction. The mission agency cannot act as freely part-
isan as many partici*pants who might be affected by
a new application. On the other hand, it may consider
that its primary role is to adapt technology to social
uses as it sees the problem rather than to attempt to
be an impartial participrnt in the research and devel-
opment process. The latter is the role of non-partisan,
inclusive-oriented analysis groups such as university
programs. Hence, the mission agencies will continue
to be confronted with this eternal dilemma between pro-
motion of its cognizant technologyeP r se and develop-
ment of such technology in terms of a supposedly general
public interest. Regulatory agencies, cA the other hand,
would seem to have a clear mandate to make inclusive
contextual assessments rather than to prefer the develop-
wcnt of its regulated technological applications over
other equally desirable social interests.
Formal Prescription of*a New Statutory Scheme
And/or Authorization of a
New Social Action Program
• The decision to approve or disapprove technological
projects can be expected to depend, in many instances,
Ripon assessment outcomes. Such outcomes, especially
those based upon an inclusive approach, if persuasively
documented so as to show a clear net social gain or a
clear net social loss with respect to a given project
could be dezisive. Assessment outcomes will also be
utilized in making determinations as to whether a greater
social beAefit will result from the allc;ation of resources
to one social problem context rather than another.
e Technology assessments will probably be influential in
shaping the specific provisions of new statutory schemes
authorizing public programs in that the assessment of
alternative implementing means (as to organization, mode
of operations, regulatory schemes, etc.) will disclose
that certain implementing arrangements offer a greater
net social gain. Assessment outcomes will also assist in
the development of more adequate statutory standards, i.e.,
standards/criteria which are clearly relevant to the social
objective sought, which are adaptable to the operations
Ir a'
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under scrutiny, which are "measurable" for decisional
purposes, and which readily provide for detection re com-
pliance.
Application of New Statutory Scheme and/or
Implementation a_nd Operation^of
New Social_
 Action Program
• Administrators, managers and operators of programs and
projects which have been designed and implemented with
the assistance of adequate assessments will be increas-
ingly cognizant of the full scope of effects of the pro-
gram ' s operations and will therefore be in posit',n to
maximize the social benefits and minimize the s.,cial
costs to suppliers, users, and other participants affected.
• ki adequate assessment function will lend useful support
to all agencies (Federal, State and local levels) having
a regulatory or enforcement function by providing reliable
data for matching appropriate offical action with relevant
social problem contexts.
ARpraisal of the Effects of the A2plication of the
New Statutory Scheme or of the Operations of the
New Social Action Program
• Anticipatory technology assessments will inevitably lead
to post - implementation appraiso 13 of new technological
applications and public programs involving significant
technological components in order to determine if the
degree to which application/operation produces effects
consistent with those projected; such application /opera-
tional appraisals will also evaluate the effects of such
programs for their consistency with the achievement of
national policy goals in related areas of public interest.
. This amplified evaluative function will place continuing
and persistent pressure on all entities (Public and Private)
required for the assessment, implementation and operation
of public programs to coordinate their activities so as to
maximize social benefits and minimize social costs. This
pressure will serve to counter the natural, inevitable,
tendency of individual entities to maintain their activi-
ties as an autonomous "closed system" for purposes of juris-
dictional sovereignty and bureaucratic survival.
• one :significant resultant of the regularized Technology
Assessment Function will be the development of alternative
and increasingly refined concepts of what constitutes an
"adequate assessment" in various patterns of social prob-
lem/technological application contexts.
r'
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Modification or Termination of the Statutor y Scheme
or the Social Action Program as Outcome of
Continuing Monitoring and AAAraisal
e When appraisal subsequent to program implementation
and operations discloses the desirability for abrupt
or premature termination, such result may mean that
the original anticipatory assessment was inadequate
or in some manner faulty or that conditions which
existed and were appropriately projected have, for
unforeseen reasons, changed substantially. In any 	 r
event, continued attention to the assessment function
will disclose that continuing appraisal is as indis- 	 Z
pensable to the overall Technology Assessment Function
as anticipatory assessments.
The essential point with respect to the relationship
of continuing appraisal to program modification is
that an increasingly greater degree of control can
be maintained over the relationship between program
output (performance) and the social goals the program
was designed to promote. Put otherwise, the overall
Technology Assessment Function, which includes consid-
eration of all phases of the Policy Formulation and
Program Implementation Process, is the means by which
feed-back (cybernetic) control can be applied to the
Effective Public Decision Process.
.r
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CHAPTER 9
Limitations On Implementation Of Technology Assessment
Harold Green began the discussion by briefly reviewing the r
history of the concept of technology assessment.* He felt that
.	 Congressman Daddario introduced the notion of technology
assessment .	 .	 .	 because he was concerned that while technology
was developing very rapidly in many areas, the adverse
consequences of technology were also increasing at a very rapid
rate.
	
Somehow our system of social control was not keeping pace
with the risks of technology. 	 In the early days, 	 it seems clear
to me, technology assessment had more of a negative than an
affirmative thrust.
	
Congressman Daddario was somewhat more
interested in protecting our society against the risks of new
technologies than he was in trying to assure that we had the
x,	
maximum possible benefits from new technology.
But the notion of technology assessment began to change:
Whereas Daddario clearly regarded technology assessment as
something which would assist Congress in making decisions by
trying to give Congress a fair dose of the adverse, negative,
risk factors of technology as well as the affirmative or
beneficial factors of technology, the more people that talked
about technology assessment, particularly in the scientific
community, the more people came to think of it as the kind of
exercise which might help in the making of correct decisions.
[That is, they thought of it as] 	 something which would
insure that rational, logical, correct decisions would be made.
Professor Green was puzzled by the idea that the results of technology
assessments should be implemented. 	 To talk about the "implementation
of technology assessment"
.	 .	 . we have to talk about a technology assessment that is
performed by a body of great stature 	 ..Therefore I am
rather skeptical	 that the mere fact that a committee of PSAC,
for example, undertakes a study of the supersonic transport or
DDT or what have you, and comes up with some conclusions, ought
to justify an assumption or belief that the particular result
ought to be implemented.
*	 The full pa per is printed in a separate appendix.
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We have never had a "really authoritative technology assessment
group" which is recognized as such by all members of the society.
But even if a group of such character existed, there would be
important limitations on the extent to which the results of that
group's deliberations ought to be implemented.
Part of the difficulty, Professor Green held, lies in determining
just what the "results" are. Are they a "balanced assessment of
r
benefits and risks? If so, "there's really nothing to implement."
Are they a "range of possible alternatives which might achieve the same
beneficial end?" Are they "recommendations or a ranking of
alternative courses of action in terms of a net appraisal of benefits
and risks?" The limitations described in the seminar paper are
"applicable, at least to some degree" to all of these results.
Professor Green turned to a discussion of the "inherent limitations."
The first of these is "the limitation on the identification and
measurement of benefits,"
I don't think that it is possible in any real functional sense
for one person to reach a valid conclusion about what another
person would regard as a benefit	 This problem is tremendously
complicated and exacerbated when one is trying to ascertain what is
a benefit to a community or what is a benefit to a nation. There
you are really coping with the summation of a very large number of
individual judgments as to what is and is not beneficial. When a
technology assessment body attempts to identify and measure benefits,
it does so by reference either to the assessor's ow p value system
or to the assessor's opinion of what the value systei, of the
community is. I would suggest that there is no poss9tle way that
any assessment body can accurately ascertain what the community as
a whole would regard as a benefit.
The second limitation is "on the identification and measurement of risks:
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I think the difficulty there is that it is virtually impossible
to measure the risks of a new technology. It may be possible
to identify risks just by letting your imagination run. But
they are only possibilities. Until you have actually tried
something and have some experience with it, it seems to me that
there is no way you can tell for sure whether or not there is
a risk. One may be able to say with validity that the risk is
small or the risk is large. For example, the Congressional
Research Study of the SST characterizes the environmental risks
of the SST as minor. But there is always a problem of the risk
which is attributable to uncertainty. I would suggest that one
of the most difficult jobs that one has in identifying and
measuring risks is to place a value on the degree of uncertainty
one is willing to assume.
Then there is a limitation connected with "any attempt to balance,
either implicitly or explicitly the benefits against the risk."
Professor Green noted
. . . The fact that in the early stages there is usually
absolutely no evidence of risk and the fact that in the
early stages of a technology there is always immense promise
of benefit. This means, it seems to me, that in almost every
technology at an early stage the benefits are going to outweigh
the risks.
He drew a distinction between a privately financed technological
development and a publicly financed enterprise. In the latter case
there is a tendency to "force the development beyond the level that
the market place would permit."
Professor Green called attention to the fact that it is difficult
to stop an already established technology:
The reality of the matter is that it is very easy to start a
technology going; all you have to do is provide the money.
But when people's jobs become dependent upon it and when
people become accustomed to the benefits . . . it becomes
quite a difficult exercise to turn off the technology. It
is almost impossible to turn it off before very subFtantial
harm has been done.
In addition to the inherent limitations already discussed,
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Professor Green called attention to the "political limitation."
He used the example of cigarette smoking which was presented in
the seminar paper. In this case, in addition to the purely
"technology assessment elements" there are a host of political
limitations:
There is the problem of the people whose livelihood is
dependent upon growing tobacco and manufacturing cigarettes.
There is the problem of people who really enjoy smoking
cigarettes and who don't care if they die ten years earlier
because they are having fun while they are doing it. There
is the problem of liberty -- whether the government ever
ought to interfere with what a person does with his own
body. And so on.
He continued:
Any technology assessment, of necessity, has to be only a
very small . . . part of the totality of the interests of
individual Congressmen and the Congress as a whole. No
matter how important a technology assessment may appear
to the assessors or to particular government officials 	 .
it really is a small part of the total picture. There is
no way for a technology assessment to make the kinds of
trade-offs that have to be made by people who are concerned
about the total picture . . [In addition] each member
of Congress has his own particular value system. Some of
them . . . have no interest in life whatsoever other than
to advance the economic interests of their own constitutents.
And some of them, on the other hand, don't care much about
their own constituencies and are interested only in being
statesmen. Some are mainly interested in agriculture and
some are mainly interested in space exploration. I think it's
only to be expected that a Congressman will respond to any
particular technology assessment in the light of his own
particular interest and priority of values.
He concluded his opening remarks by stating that
. in a democratic society like ours, with pluralistic
interests, one cannot expect that truth and logic and
rationality are going to prevail in legislative decisions
+k	
_
155
about anything. Why therefore should we be particularly
concerned about singling out policy for science and
technology and ask that it be rational. I am not advocating
irrationality. I am simply saying that in the democratic
process, where tremendously diverse interests have to be
taken into account	 . , you cannot expect to have uniform
rationality. Rationality is, I think, more of an exception
than the rule. And if one looks at the tremendous range of
important decisions that are made in our society, like, for
example, what our policy should be with respect to the
Vietnam War or who should sit on the Supreme Court
I think it kind of anomalous that we even think about
singling out policies for science and technology and expect
that we should have a higher order of rationality or
correctness in that area than in these others . . . . I think
that technology assessment is vitally important . . . . But
I think we are doing the concept of technology assessment
and our whole political system a disservice if we try to
cast technology assessment . . . as some kind of rational,
error-free orthodoxy to be imposed upon our political system.
We ought to concentrate our efforts with respect to technology
assessment on trying to give the Congress the kinds of
information that can enable it to do a better, but certainly
not an error-free, job in enacting laws.
A. Values, Politics. and Assessment
A lawyer agreed with the speaker that technology assessments
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generally contain value judgments:
I think that what the paper is pushing for makes eminently
good sense. to surface the value decisions that are in the
assessment itself, in addition to those which are made after
the assessment is delivered. The values that are implicit
in the assessment have to be surfaced somehow if a reasonable
or responsible, but not necessarily rational, debate is to
proceed.
A university researcher saw many of the recent technology
efforts as seeking to do this by increasing
. . . the number of points of contacts between the overall
political system and the scientific and technical community.
In earlier days, decisions that were made within the
scientific and technical community were viewed by society as,
i
on the one hand, so highly technical that the public at large
could not really understand them and, on the other hand, not
of much general, immediate significance to the society	 .
In that period, it was thought that you could have some sort
of perfect technology assessment which would just yield a
solution which could be imposed. We are now at a point where
. . science has got to become an integral part of our
overall society just like any other segment of tie political
community in America.
A government official felt that it was possible to separate
questions of value from questions of data and facts in assessments.
Many issues "are perfectly well subject to analysis and experiment."
He cited certain environmental effects of the SST as being amenable
to such analysis. He continued;
It simply takes a willingness to invest a certain amount of
thought to find out what the factual information is and to
lay. . such questions to rest. Now that's the kind of thing
that Ican see as a totally do-able assessment project. That
is where the questions involve hard, empirical data that you
can simply go out and get if you have the willingness to do so.
They are quite different from the questions that are measures
of the public will and public policy. I think it is necessary
to make reasonably sharp distinctions between those things
that you can pretty well settle on the basis of numerical
evidence and experimentation and those things that are
primarily normative. We have institutions that already are
sVoposed to worry about most of the technical issues.
A university professor, however, was "not sure that we can dispose
of the technical versus the political that easily." He too referred
to the SST controversy and cited the Congressional Reference Service
Study "which was intended as a technical report . . . but which has
some very interesting political implications." The report, which
minimized the environmental effects of the SST, "raised some interesting
questions about the involvement of an agency like the CRS in a very
fi
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sensitive legislative issue." He noted that "you are really
involved in the political process just by the act of giving
a technical report on a very sensitive issue." A Loidressional
Research Service representative agreed that Congress makes
decisions by a
. . . process of negotiating, of bargaining, of kicking
around ideas -- some of which are highly technical and
some of which are highly emotional, political, normative,
value judgments. There are all kinds of reasoning
processes that go on all the time in the Congress or in
the public.
The Congressional Research Service SST study sought to "help the
Congress ask the right questions" and not "to argue in favor of
the SST." The study tried to point out that the economic
problems, rather than the environmental ones, were the crucial
ones. A member of the National Academy of Sciences staff,
however, felt that the selection of environmental data used in
the study prejudiced its conclusions. The choice of data and
the choice of issues to be considered make the process of
assessment a "value-laden" one, "even though there is a sincere
attempt on the part of the assessors to make sure that value
considerations are excluded."
B. Limitations on Assessments
A government official and'futurist' disagreed vehemently with
Professor Green's contention that there are limitations on the
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analysis of benefits. He commented that the notion that an analysis
of benefits cannot be made
flies in the face of roughly forty years of sociological
and social psychological investigations which tell you that,
in fact, there is no aspect of human behavior or human
enterprise which cannot be effectively evaluated and scaled.
It is "not impossible to establish benefits." As for risks, he
continued
. there is a whole enterprise called Bayesian probabilities
which is designed to deal with the very area that the paper says
one cannot deal with; namely, subjective probabilities. This is
a quantitative, well regarded, respectable academic enterprise.
Another government official sought to pursue the role of
empirical evidence in the assessment process. He called attention
to the fact that the seminar paper indicates that
. . risks cannot really be identified and measured with any
real confidence until the technology has been used sufficiently
. . . to provide a basis for empirical judgment. I wonder if
we could expand at all on the prospect for having an empirical
approach play a larger role in the kind of questions that are
addressed by technology assessments. Is it feasible to get the
society in a state in which we will try a little of something
and observe the consequences before we try a lot?
Professor Green enlarged upon this point:
There is no substitute for experience. I do not think that
the mind of man is capable of predicting events with the
degree of accuracy required to provide assurance for the
protection of the public interest.
But a university professor saw problems in such an approach. Some
effects of technology are irreversible.
. If something is reversible, then we can let society
respond to it and read to it; but there are some things
that we are dealing with or will deal with in the future
where a yes or no decision may be catastrophic.
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It may be difficult to know, in advance, which decisions will have
disastrous results so that the decision to experiment may be
fraught with danger
C. Other Comments
°"-	 There was brief discussion of the differences, for the
assessment process, between privately and publicly funded technology.
One participant disagreed with the seminar paper's contention that
private financing will necessarily result in slower development than
public funding. He cited the introduction of large numbers of Boeing
747's in 1970 and 1971, as evidence that "investment decisions are
made from the viewpoint of optimizing the return on investment and
they don't necessarily imply a very systematic or orderly introduction
of new technology." He continued:
People who have been involved in environmental controversies
think that sometimes it is better to oppose private projects
and other times it is better to oppose a government project.
It just depends upon the power of the particular agency and the
resources and political savvy of the industry involved.
Professor Green felt that perhaps too much significance had been
attributed to "my so-called dichotomy between public and private;"
but that
. . . generally speaking, I would defend the proposition that
it is easier to shoot down a privately financed technology than
a publicly financed technology. On the other hand, I would also
make the point that a technology assessment is really required
when the Congress has to make a decision on whether to appropriate
a large sum of money for the supersonic transport; and you don't
necessarily need a technology assessmei,C when Boeing or Lockheed
makes a corporate decision to spend a large sum of money.
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In all	 likelihood, we would not feel any need to have a
technology assessment of a privately funded SST until the
plane was about ready to go into the air.
One participant saw a basic problem in "an imbalance in
the sources of information available to decisionmakers."
r.
Opponents of new technologies, he held, often are unable to
r zr
generate and present information to the same extent that
proponents can.
A lawyer drew an interesting parallel between attitudes
toward technology and attitudes toward assessment:
+	
I would suggest that one's attitude toward technology
assessment reflects one's attitude as to whether technology
holds the promise of solving the perceived problems in the
society.	 Those who think technology holds many or most of
the answers
	 . are likely to be more generous in their
treatment of technology assessment; and those, including
myself, who are Mess satisfied that technology has in it
solutions to existing problems are likely to be much less
charitable towards the concept of technology assessment.
He went on to hold that it is necessary to develop ways to achieve
I
a greater pluralism in examining the effects of technology;
"what is needed .	 .	 , is to have a wide variety of people giving
their own views on the likely consequences of technology."
	 The
failures evidenced to date indicate that "we haven't had enough
variety.^^
One government official 	 and 'futurist' attacked `che speaker
for an alleged lack of logic in his paper and presentation, and
voiced his distress at
.	 the absolutely incredible anti-intellectual	 tone of the
whole discussion, largely because the people who are involved
in the discussion have absolutely no appreciation of the limits
of science and technology and are primarily wedded to technology
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as pictured in the textbooks of 1920 . . . . The discussion
has essentially reflected the attitudes of lawyers and soft
scientists toward what technology means. There wasn't a
single discussion . . . that mentioned such things as computer
simulation which is a major input into anticipating outcomes.
There wasn't any discussion of the place of m delling in
addressing these questions. There was no discussion of a
calculus of values. Now all of these are fundamental to what
we are talking about; but they nowhere entered into the
discussion and I don't think that you can adequately address
the issues without drawing on them.
"Technology assessment" has been so broadly defined that it can
credibly describe almost any analysis o-' the impact of a technological
application. The diverse phenomena classified as technology assessment
tend to a corresponding diversity in the processes by which assessments
are linked t4 action. This chapter consists of five case studies of
specific technology assessments and the ways in which they influenced
(or did not influence) the development the assessed technology. These
case studies were chosen to illustrate the variety of situations which
must be analyzed before any generalizations regarding the assessment-
acceptance-implementation process can be advanced. The case studies are:
A. Jamaica bay/Kennedy Airport
B. Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement
C. Nuclear Power Plant Radiation Standards
D. Cayuga Lake Power Plant
e. Storm King Power Plant
The Jamaica Bay/Kennegyd  Airport case, which involved a study of the
environmental impact of an extension of the runways at Kennedy International
Airport into Jamaica Bay, is a good example of the potential influence of
expert opinion and public sentiment which coalesce in the assessment-
acceptance -implementation process. The assessment was performed by a multi-
hid1sczplinary team of experts operating independently of the Port of ew Yor
Authority, the agency which initiated the study. Contributions from the
public were encouraged and numerous public groups were involved in the per-	 5
formance stage of the assessment. The results of the assessment were widely
r
disseminated through local and national media, thus providing a focal point
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for aggregating public opinion. The results of this comprehensive assessment
and the anticipated public reaction to it were responsible for the Port
Authority's decision to abandon its plans for a runway extension at Kennedy
Airport.
The Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement study involved action by both the
executive and legislative branches of government. The assessment in question
was initiated in the Executive Office of the President. Members of a White
House Jet Aircraft Noise Panel performed the assessment and recommended a
comprehensive plan for solving the noise problem. The Congressional response
to the panel's report was to authorize the Federal Aviation Administration
to prescribe rules and regulations for the control and abatement of aircraft
noise. The absence of significant organized public involvement and the
problem of communicating highly technical information to a non-technical
audience resulted in the public's virtual exclusion from the assessment-
acceptance-implementation process. A concomitant result was a dispropor-
tionate amount of pressure from the aviation industry on the FAA and its
rule-making process. The result was a piecemeal approach to the jet noise
problem, one which lacks both sufficient evaluative criteria and the coordina-
tion necessary for generating workable and effective regulatory standards.
The Nuclear Power Plant Radiation Standards case illustrates clearly
the potential problems created when various biases (or appearance of biases)
are introduced into the assessment-acceptance-implementation process. The
same analysts initiated and performed the assessment. The distinction
between the regulatory and promotional roles of the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) became blurred in both the performance and presentation stages of the
assessment. The influence of special interests, accompanied by their own
group biases, reached its zenith during the decision-to-act stage. Such
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biases were evident, however, throughout all phases of the study and highlight
the role of the adversary process in the conduct of technology assessments, as
proponents and opponents of existing standards present conflicting points of
view. The public had little direct involvement in the assessment; the pre-
ponderance of experts and interest groups favorable to the development of
nuclear power as well as the promotional bias of the AEC and the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy were powerful forces contributing to the AEC's decision
to formally reject the assessment.
The _Cayuga
_ Lake Power Plant case was distinguished by a lengthy and in-
tensive performance stage marked by a variety of investigations into the New
York State Electricity and Gas Co (NYSE&G) plans to build a nuclear-fueled
powerplant on the shores of Lake Cayuga. In addition to NYSE&G, analysts,
groups of scientists, public-interest groups, and state policymakers and
regulators actively participated in the performance stage. Numerous viable
alternatives to the nuclear powerplant were presented. Yet, while each of
the parties involved appeared prepared to promote its own alternative, none
gave much consideration to the other alternatives. NYSE&G eventually decided
to postpone activity on its construction permit application to AEC as a cross-
current of pressures flowed from the various participating groups, The case
illustrates the problems which may accrue from the absence of any integrative
mechanism for bringing together the results of alternative assessments and
for funneling those results into the policymaking process.
The Storm King Mountain Power Plant case, which involved an attempt to
balance the requirement for increased electric power with the need for a
greater effort to protect the environment, highlights the importance played
by the nature of the initial assessment in the acceptance-implementation
process. None of the major parties involved in the Storm King controversy
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had the capacity or the responsibility for performing the broad assess-
ment that was required. Even if such a capability and accompanying mandate
had existed, the absence of a hierarchy of priorities for environ-
mental policy would have made it difficult to assess accurately alter-
native policies and programs. The case is still being argued in the
courts and the uncey cainty of the litigation has forced Con Ed
to delay project implementation. In the meantime, the assessment
process continues and new problems are being identified. The case
illustrates how problems associated with the performance of the
assessment can continue to affect the implementation process.
In order to provide a common framework for the description and
analysis of these case studies, they are each organized in terms
of a single analytic framework. This framework is constructed in
terms of steps in the assessment-acceptance-implementation process
and the participants in that process. Eight steps in the process
have been identified:
1. Initiation--the stimulus or situation which leads to the
conduct of an assessment. This could be as specific as
a directive from an appropriate authority to perform a tech-
nology assessment or a statutory requirement to do so or as
broad as public reaction to a situation which makes an
assessment desirable.
2. Performance of the Technology Assessment---the actual analysis
of the consequences of applying a techno ogy. Since this
study is not primarily concerned with the conduct of a
technology assessment Mr se, the consideration of this step
will be limited to those factors realted to later steps in
the process.
3. Presentation of Results--the report of assessment findings and
recommendation, if any. The assessing entity presents
the results of its analysis to other interested parties,
formally and/or informally.
F^
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4. Decision to Act--the determination that an action is warranted.
Legitimate authorities formulate a decision on the issue
to which the assessment was directed. Such a decision may
or may not reflect the findings of the assessment. The
decision to act may incorporate some aspects of the assessment
or use information or data generated in the assessment.
5. Planning of Action--separate (at least analytically) from
the decision to act. .A plan of action is developed which
implements the assessment findings.
6. Approval of Plan--acceptance of the plan of action. The
plan of action is approved by appropriate authorities.
7. Implementation of Plan--The plan is put into effect by the
appropriate participants.
8. Monitoring and Evaluation--determination of the effectiveness
of the action. The impacts of the plan are recorded and
compared to the desired impacts.
Seven participants in the assessment-acceptance-implementation process,
differentiated in terms of their roles in the process have also been identified:
A. Developer/User/Promoter---These participants have direct,
usually economic, interest in the application of the technology under
consideration, because it would provide some positive benefit to them.
B. Analysts--These participants carry out the assessment and monitor
and evaluate its results.
C. Policymakers --These participants have the legitimate authority and
responsibility to make decisions initiating courses of action
legally binding the opoulation and/or affected segments thereof.
D. Administrators--These participants are responsible for executing courses
of action recommended by policymakers.
E. Regulators--These participants are responsible for applying general
standards established by policymakers in order to control
operations or activities covered by those standards.
F. Adjudicators--These participants have the responsibility for resolving
conflicts which result from the execution of the policy decision or
from the application of standards to specific cases or situations.
G. Public/Public interest Groups--These participants are identifiable pri-
marily by their absence from the other six categories of participants;
specifically, public interest groups are those organized entities which
purport to speak for some segment of the general populace.
The analytic portion of each of the following case studies uses
these concepts as a tool for extracting from the case studies potential aspects
of general relevance to the assessment-acceptance-implementation process.
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CHAPTER 4
Automotive Air Pollution
And Problems of Implementation
of Technology Assessment
John Esposito began the discussion by stating that he operated
on the "assumption that the automobile is here to stay." * He noted
that in examining the problem of air pollution from automobiles we
are
. attempting to deal with an unforeseen consequence
of what is a giant enterprise in the United States. For
two-thirds of this century, the automobile industry has
not been subject to any really substantial regulation.
I think this results in there being a large vested
interest in warding off government regulation and
retaining the freedom to do things pretty much as the
industry pleases
	 It is a natural tendency
on the part of organizations to want to operate as
freely as possible.
He felt that the central thesis of his paper bore repeating:
I	 . emphasize the structure and self-defense mechanisms
of the auto industry because I believe that the making
and implementing of technology assessments is an
intensely political process. A system of politics
requires that government make choices from among the
demands of competing interests. In short, in its role
as arbiter of a particular controversy, government must
decide which groups will win and which will lose. When
power, access to government, and control over information
are virtually monopolized by one group, the outcome will
by
 predetermined. With a relatively few insignificant
exceptions, this is what has occurred in the field of
automotive air pollution control.
* The full paper is printed in a separate appendix.
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The speaker then reviewed the stages in the automobile industry's
response to the air pollution problem:
First there was a period of outright denial . . . on
the part of the industry which said that there was no
evidence to indicate any real connection between the
automobile and health hazards. This is, I think, a
standard pattern in the sense that the general thrust
has been to assume that the public has the burden of
proof as far as health hazards are concerned and that
industry will continue to do pretty much what it
pleases until the government has proved rather
conclusively that the activity is a dangerous one.
When scientific evidence began to mount, the industry
entered a second stage and that is the study stage.
The next stage was an acknowledgment that there was
an air pollution problem and it was related to the
automobile, but that it was confined to Los Angeles
because of L.A.'s particular topographical and
meteorological patterns,
The next step, when the forces of government and the
public began to close in, was an attempt to delay
regulation.
Mr. Esposito felt that the lesson to be drawn from this sequence
is that "a tightly oligopolistic market does not respond to demands
which it has not created." He continued:
It seems clear that the industry meticulously limited
the dissemination of information concerning its capacity
to control pollution and was shaken out of its complacency
only when it found itself under the gun.
A major impediment to the implementation of programs designed
to reduce automotive air pollution was the inclusion, in the National
Emission Standards Act of 1965, svr the phrase
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. "technological and economic feasibility." In
other words, in setting the standards, the Secretary of
KEW had to take into account the technological feasibility,
as far as the industry was concerned, and the economic
burden that it might place on the industry. This sounds,
at first blush, like a perfectly reasonable position to
take except when you are dealing with a situation
where the sources of information are so tightly controlled
as they are in the automobile 'industry. As a consequence,
. . . Federal standards were not very ambitious. But
even these rather modest standards were not effectively
met by the automobile manufacturers.
The speaker discussed two "rudimentary technology assessments"
of recent years: the Morse Report which concluded that electrically
powered vehicles were not presently feasible and which "rather strongly
endorsed the potential for steam engines and the turbine engine;" and
the report of the Senate Commerce Committee entitled "The Search
for a Low Emission Vehicle" which "emphatically endorsed the steam
engine as a feasible alternative to the internal combustion engine."
There has not been a great effort on the part of the manufacturers
:j	 to develop alternative engines. Chrysler has done a great deal of
work with the turbine engine
j
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. . . but it is my feeling that we are not about to
see the introduction of the turbine engine by the Chrysler
Corporation. This is directly related to the structure
of the automobile industry. Although Chrysler is the fifth
or sixth largest manufacturing corporation in the United
States . . . it cannot realistically make any innovations
that the General Motors Corporation does not accept.
General Motors, in effect, calls the shots in the automobile
market. It sets styling trends; it has enormous advertising
budgets; and it can effectively divert consumer choices
away from those areas it does not want to see emphasized.
J1
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Mr. Esposito charged that "the automobile industry has spent
irresponsibly small amounts of money on air pollution control." He
s
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repeated the questions raised in his paper about whether even the
small amounts spent in this area go into a "sincere effort to develop
effective pollution control devices" or into discouraging the
discussion of innovative proposals.
He felt that
.	 much of the monolithic stand of the industry could
be traced to a cross-licensing agreement which has
existed since 1955. Very simply, that was an agreement
among the automobile manufacturers to pool all of their
information resulting from research in air pollution
control and also, very importantly, to jointly assess
I
	
	
patents offered by outsiders to any one of the companies.
I think this effectively disarmed the inventor of any
bargaining power he might have had and effectively
precluded competition in the area of air pollution control.
The paper outlined the charges made by the Justice Department in its
complaint filed against the Automobile Manufacturers Association and
the four major automobile manufacturers. The case was settled by
consent decree, and
. . I think there are some questions about the
rLmedial effect of the consent decree. I don't think it
reached all the questions raised by the complaint itself.
Secondly, I think the consent decree foreclosed the
opportunity for what was probably the first really open
discussion in a court of law of at least one very important
aspect of the self-defense mechanism of the automobile
industry.
The speaker endorsed the concept of legislative standards for
pollution control and noted that the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments,
which set such standards, indicate a change in attitude from the past:
In the '30`s, I think reformers tended to see the
administrative process as the answer to all problems.
They saw the judiciary as the enemy, and such notions
as due process and the rest as being unnecessary devices
'	
y
i;
;r
}
s
i
k
79
in bringing about social change. Now there is a great
disillusionment with the administrative process; there
is a feeling that it has become antiquated; it's
atrophied; it has become a.captive of the regulatees,
and the points of access are monopolized by those who
are supposed to be regulated. 5o I think that what occurred
in the Muskie legislation, the idea of legislating a
specific deadline, is excellent. This is something we
may begin to see in many other areas. It is interesting
to note, also, that in the lobbying it was . . . the
automobile companies and other industries that lobbied
for continued administrative discretion in these areas.
Mr. Esposito concluded his opening remarks by noting the three
areas in which he feels public policy decisions must be reevaluated:
the scope of the assessment, which should be greatly broadened; the
size and structure of the automobile industry, which must be
considerably altered; and Federal research into alternatives to
the internal combusion engine, which must be expanded.
A. Alternatives to the Automobile and the Internal Combustion*Engine
Mr. Esposito called attention to the need to develop an
alternative to the internal combusion engine:
I think that one of the reasons for the push toward
alternative sources of power is that it makes such
good sense to put an engine which has inherently low
emission characteristics into an automobile. Such an
engine can be compared to the internal combustion
engine which is a "Rube Goldberg," and which is a
very complicated engine and a very dirty engine. Then
you tack on a device, a cork, and charge $50, $75, or
$100 for that cork. And you are not sure whether that
cork is going to work. Why not go to a propulsion system
that has inherently low emissions as part of its operating
characteristics.
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An industry representative pointed out that all of the alternative
sources yet proposed are either difficult to develop or cause
environmental problems themselves. For instance, electric vehicles
would produce less pollution from the automobile itself, but would
cause pollution problems from the huge generating capacity required
to provide electricity for charging the batteries. But a
Congressional aide found this to be a specious argument:
The easiest place in the world to control pollution is
in an enormous electric plant where you can afford to
install all kinds of . . . equipment. This is the
place where economies of scale help to control pollution.
Mr. Esposito granted that there were problems connected with all of
the alternatives to the internal combustion engine, but he felt that
these problems could be resolved more readily than could those of
the internal combustion engine. He agreed with the point about
controlling pollution from the generation of electricity:
Electric cars . . . would provide a way to concentrate
the environmental problems in the sense that you might
be able to control emissions from a utility or from a
relatively small number of power stations that might be
located throughout a city more easily than you could
chase after every single driver in the city.
A Congressional aide raised a more basic question: "Isn't
there a better way of moving people around this world than in
automobiles of one sort or another? A university professor agreed
that this was an important question to address for
. . . it never fails to amaze me that the American
people are so devoted to this uneconomical and
rather bizarre transportation system to the extent
that they will fight traffic jams and parking jams
morning and evening.
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When one participant attributed this acceptance of the automobile
to the fact that "they don't really have many alternatives" a
university professor pointed out that
i
. you can't really say that other forms of transportation
didn't exist. They did exist but they couldn't survive.
There was a time when mass transportation was well-
developed and extensive, but it just couldn't survive the
competition of the automobile.
	 You have to ask the
question of whether the failure to survive was essentially
economic or political. I think that it was economic.
Now you can ask whether mass transportation was driven
out because the automobile was given a sufficient
unfair advantage through various subsidies. I don't
know if that's true. I really do suspect that
competing forms have disappeared because they couldn't
stand the competition in view of consumer preferences.
You see this going on in Europa. Europe still has well-
developed and attractive pub;1c transportation systems.
But look at the way the use of automobiles is escalating
in Europe with the growth of incomes there. They
are going through exactly the same sort of thing that
we went through twenty or thirty years ago.
A university researcher agreed: ".
	 the fact remains that no
matter how good a mass transportation system you have, it can never
offer the mobility and flexibility of cars."
Several participants attributed the lack of viable alternatives
to the automobile to the fact that the automobile manufacturers,
with their powerful lobby, have made certain that attractive alternatives
are not made available. But a university professor was
. . . not so sure that General Motors is not doing
precisely what the overwhelming majority of the
members of the American public want it to do. I think
that a very strong argument tan be made that the
automobiles which are being manufactured today, from the
exhaust to the asbestos brake lining, are precisely
what the American public wants
	 . If the American
public were confronted with all of the facts about air
pollu tLion, the effects of air pollution on health, and
02
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the economic costs of eliminating air pollution, I have
serious doubts that it would opt to eliminate air
pollution if the costs were going to be substantial.
What is happening today with respect to General Motors
is precisely what the political system is permitting
and encouraging. I don't think we should damn General
Motors.
Mr. Esposito did not agree;
I think that your universe is too narrow when you say
that GM is doing precisely what the public wants. You
are assuming consumer sovereignty. But the options
have not been offered to the public. I would like to
see the results of a referendum taken after a thorough
analysis and a comprehensive scheme and real options
were offered to the people. Until then, I think that
of all the principles or assumptions one could adopt,
the assumption of consumer sovereignty is one of the
weakest.
He added that "Detroit, and others who have profited from the
automobile, have foreclosed or have tried to foreclose our options."
A Congressional aide agreed. He called attention to the fact that
. . . when you try to talk about a rational transportation
program in Congress, the way the automobile lobby descends
on you is really frightening to see.
B. The Need for a Broader Assessment
Mr. Esposito noted that
. we have never had a wide enough scope of assessment
so that the other options are made available. I don't
think you can really say that the people will inevitably
choose the automobile if, in fact, they have a comfortable,
low-cost, and non-dehumanizing form of mass transportation
available. But no assessment has presented a series of
options from which to choose.
But a university researcher insisted that
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. . the fact is that you are all contaminated with that
American idea that you can do anything that you want
to do. But at Any point in time, it's possible that
some problems are insoluble.
While this speaker was referring to the possibility of producing
attractive alternatives to the automobile, a university professor	 3
was bothered by a similar attitude toward cleaning up the
automobile:
I am sort of intrigued by the tremendous amount of this
19th century faith in technology as being able to solve
every problem. `here is the assumption in this discussion
that technology can solve the problem and make a clean
car if you ,lust put enough money in it. This isn't
necessarily true.
But Mr. Esposito insisted that such comments were of limited value
because the scopo of the assessment to date has not been broad
enough: "All the issues you raise are legitimate issues and should
be evaluated in a rational way;" but we are not assessing things in
a comprehensive enough manner today to arrive at definite conclusions
about public choice or the ability of technology to help solve the
pollution problem.
C. Setting Standards and Enforcing Regulations
An interesting exchange occurred between an industry representative
Pon" ,
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set inorder to preserve a certain level of air quality. Thus, it
is not -important that all cars meet the standards; it is only
important that the total of all emissions from all cars be less than
a certain standard. He noted that
. . . when the regulations were set up, they were
supposed to take care of the atmosphere. The
atmosphere is the greatest averaging thing there is.
Thus, the intent of the regulations is to maintain an acceptable
level of environmental quality, which will prevail if the average
emission from all cars is low enough. He claimed that the emission
from any single car is insignificant; thus it is not essential that
any particular car meet the.
 standards.
When the industry spokesman tried to explain his point by
claiming that emissions from automobiles fall on a "bell-shaped"
curve, Mr. Esposito noted wryly that "the bell has a tremendous crack
in it." It was clear to him that the meaning of the regulations was
that each and every car must meet the standards. In fact, if this
were not the case the regulations would be absolutely unenforceable.
He pointed out that there is no provision in the regulations that
only some of the cars produced must meet the standards. Although
the limiting of total emissions of all cars may well have been the
intent behind the regulations, the actual regulation as written
requires each car to meet the standards. This is the only way that
the regulation can be realistically enforced.
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D. Role of the Economic System
An industry representative felt that it was somewhat
"incongruous" for defenders of the consumer to argue for increased
pollution control since
.	 in the kind of society we are in -- no matter
who might pretend to pay for thing -- it is the
general public which pays for everythin in its taxes
and in the price of products. So this ?pollution
control] ends up being a price that the public is
going to pay somehow or another.
But Mr. Esposito noted that the public is already paying for pollution
control devices -- he estimated that one and a half billion dollars
has been paid for the "clean air package" and the like -- but that
those devices do not work. In addition, while he agreed that "the
consumer will have to absorb the additional cost of pollution
control," he claimed that
. . . there is a strong likelihood, to say the least,
that the costs of pollution control as they affect the
consumer don't reflect the cost to the manufacturer.
He related this point to the nature of competition in the
automobile industry:
I think that until we return to some semblance of a
true market situation here, costs will be passed on to
the consumer with no guarantee that they accurately
reflect costs to the manufacturer, Part of the
reason is that the industry is not subject to
traditional market restraints.
However, a university professor wondered whether breaking up the
oligopoly was any solution. He wondered whether
1''
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. the chances for pollution control or any other
protection for the consumer might be greater in a
market which is concentrated than in a cut-throat
market which is very competitve. I wonder whether
firms in a competitive market would want to add to
the costs of business. It would seem easier for a
company . . . to absorb the cost if it could control
the market.
But Mr. Esposito believed that
. the larger the number of industrial units we have,
the more difficult it is 	 . for industries to come up
with unanimous positions. In addition, in a de-concentrated
market you will have increased the possibility that you
will have some diversity, in quality as well as choice.
In a more ideal market, some of the competitors might
see pollution control as one of the ways of getting
competitive advantage.
In response to a question about the amount of funds which
industry is spending on pollution control, an industry representative
said that "there has been no limit on the amount of money that we
want to use in any project as long as it's for emission control."
This led to the following exchange between a university researcher
and the industry spokesman
Researcher: Are you really asserting that if the
government were to offer GM and the other manufacturers
an additional $150 to $300 million for R&D on this, the
companies couldn't find ways of using it?
Industry Representative: I meant what I said. We get
all the money we want.
Researcher: People always cite the space program as
an example. Why is it that the country could move to
a budget of billions of dollars so quickly in areas
which are much more difficult and require much more
innovation? Why is it that it is so difficult to build
the pollution control effort into a more extensive
and effective effort more rapidly?
l
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Industr Representative: The know-how basically to do
the job was known when tine goal was set to be on the
moon in ten years. We knew, but we didn't have the
hardware developed. The money was involved in the actual
hardware development, not in developing the principles
for doing the job.
Researcher: So the actual technical principles that
you have to contend with are more difficult than those
in the space program?
Industry Representative: We don't know some of them yet.
One participant was bothered by industry's "self-righteousness" and
arrogance in dealing with its critics. He doubted that industry
was really serious about pollution control. A Congressional aide,
however, saw no reason to be surprised by the attitude of the
automobile industry:
It is naive for people to believe that General Motors
is acting as a good citizen, it is equally naive for
people to believe that General Motors should act as a
good citizen. The job of the corporation, as it functions
in our society, is to make a certain amount of money.
The only reason it would possibly change its policy would
be that it becomes more expensive to do business
without a change'.
E. Industry and the Political Process
A university professor saw two ways that industry could react
to the problem of automotive air pollution:
One which is the undertone of Air. Esposito's paper, is
to use its power within the confines of the political
process to undercut any effective government regulation.
The other is to respond to coercion, such as government
subsidies to them^ competitors, and to actually do
f
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something [to reduce pollution]. This second course may
be the one which the industry is following. You know,
large organizations want to avoid having government
sitting on top of them. If the most effective way that
they can see that avoided in the near future is by
developing some kind of process that will make government
keep off their backs, rather than exerting their
weight in the political province, why not give them
the benefit of the doubt?
But several of those present felt that the industry's record in the
past made clear that no benefit of the doubt was deserved. A public
interest lawyer noted that
. many of us feel that the automobile industry
doesn't seem able to meet the pollution problems; it
doesn't seem able to meet the safety problem; it
doesn't seem able to meet the repair problem. It
will not make a cheap, easily repairable model which
does not change its design from year to year. What
do you think of the suggestion that the design of
automobiles be taken away from industry and be
given to government agencies with the industry
simply allowed to contract to make the automobiles?
Mr. Esposito saw this as a "potential option;" but a Congressional
aide felt that this would be a disastrous alternative "since Federal
agencies very quickly become the satraps of Oe industries they are
supposed to regulate." We quipped, "I'd be very leery about setting
up a Federal agency to do something better than GM because I suspect
they'd work out an agreement in restraint of trade."
A university professor felt that the problem under discussion
had profound implications for our political system:
We all have ideas about the values and precepts
that should underlie a Constitutional system which
says that there is a public sector and a private sector
and the job of the public sector 	 . is to arbitrate
among competing private interests. But "private
E-
sector" isn't the right phrase when you speak of
General Motors . . . . The whole set of values that
	
underpin our political system don't tell us a.thing	 z
about how [the relationship between GM and the
government] should work. We need a new system of
thinki ng about our political values.
t.
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E. The Relative Roles of Administrative Bodies and Legislatures
i
i
A government official took issue with Mr. Esposito's critical
remarks about the role of administrative bodies concerned with the 	 -
environment. He noted, for example, that the Environmental
Protection Agency was newly formed and to call it "antiquated,
atrophied, or the prisoner of the reguiatees is not quite fair."
This led to the following exchange:
Mr. Esposito: You said that EPA is not atrophied yet?
Government Official: I suggested that it would be unfair
to assume so at this point.
Mr. Esposito: It is basically an umbrella organization
for a whole host of atrophied agencies.
Government Official: That's a provocative way of
putting it.
Mr. Esposito: Maybe some life can be injected into
them.
An industry representative saw need for a . regulatory body of
i
some sort:
Because the auto industry supports the administrative
approach to the application of regulations, it is assumed
that the administrative approach must be wrong. I don't
know if I necessarily agree with the logic.
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He endorsed the basic procedure whereby government should set
clear requirements for the industry to satisfy. But
. . . our problem here is that we need some people in
the regulatory group (whether it turns out to be
legislative or administrative) that understand the
technical part of the problem. We don ' t have those
kinds of people in the Legislative Branch today.
If you are going to propose that we do all future
regulation by legislation, then let's get the
technical expertise into the legislature. After all,
the business of building an automobile is a technical
one.
Mr. Esposito responded that
. . there is a need for additional expertise, but I
think this is a basically political judgment. I think
the Legislative Branch is the appropriate branch to
resolve this . . .
The industry representative claimed that the Legislative Branch
. . . usually doesn't have the time or staff to
assess the technical problems. For example, if Congress
should decide that there should not be any more
automobiles because the air pollution problems are
so bad, that would be a technical decision.
Mr. Esposito disagreed:
I think it is a clear-cut political decision. If
Congress should decide to ban the automobile, there
are not many technical questions to be raised. I
think it pushes all technology aside.
A university professor emphasized the political nature of the
decisions involved. He argued that
. . . it is misleading in the extreme to talk about a
particular technological impact, such as air pollution
from the internal combustion engine, as being good or
bad, right or wrong. Whether it is good or bad or right
or wrong is a political question. It's not really
susceptible to factual analysis in any meaningful publi-;
policy sense. The problem lies at the doorstep of the
political process which has allowed it to exist. Everything
in our society is controllable through the political process.
The real problem is how to perfect the political process . . . .
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CHAPTER 15
	
c	 AN OVERVIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT-
ACCEPTANCE-IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS.
In order to discuss the acceptance and implementation of technology
	
.`	 assessments, it is first necessary to identify briefly various types of
technology assessments. This is so because the notion of accepting and
_t
3
implementing an assessment implies that, explicitly or implicitly
L
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the assessment includes findings or conclusions which point to a particular
policy choice. Thus, a summary discussion of assessment-acceptance-
implementation requires an analysis of how the findings of the assessment
influence policy formation, selection, and execution. Yet, not all assess-
ments are designed with this function in mind.
Coates differentiates three types of assessments: (1) a neutral
r
analysis;	 (2) a search for desirable choices;
	 (3) an advocate's tool.
A neutral assessment would be an "application of scientific analysis to
	 A
} future outcomes and alternatives."
	 This type of assessment, says Coates,
is "raw material" for those who wish to influence policy choice.
	 The
second type of assessment is one that "goes a step beyond the even-handed
analysis of consequences" to "highlight various desirable policy options."
The final variant of assessment is one which is used to support "whatever
position an advocate chooses to take."I
:_ Obviously, what is meant by acceptance and implementation of a tech-
k nology assessment varies with the type of assessment involved. 	 If the
assessment is a neutral one, with no explicit policy recommendations,
^i
then its acceptance means that some partisan of a particular course of
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action either has become convinced that that course is desirable because
-__	 of his evaluation of the assessment or that the assessment's findings
reinforce his own preferences. If the assessment is one which identifies
}
desirable choices in its conclusions, then its acceptance means the acceptance
of its policy recommendations. Finally, if the assessment is an advocate's
tool, designed to support a preselected point of view,. its acceptance
means that the advocate's viewpoint prevails in the conflict over policy
outcomes.
The five case studies in the preceding chapter can be separated
according to assessment type.
1. Jamaica Bay/Kennedy Airport
This assessment probably comes closest of the five cases analyzed to being
a neutral analysis. It concludes that "runway construction will damage
the natural environment of the Bay and reduce its potential use for
conservation, recreation, and housing. ,2 Even this assessment, however,
was reported in a document which then went on to outline recommendations on
issues beyond that of runway construction including plans for the management
of the Say and the improvement of service at Kennedy Airport. All of the matters
considered in the assessment had been and continue to be matters of great
public and political interest. This may suggest that "no matter how objective
an assessment might be, it will become embroiled in political controversy if
3
the matter is important."
2. Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement
This assessment is clearly an example of the second type--a search for desirable
choices; it assessed the sources and consequences of jet noise and recommended
a comprehensive set of policies required for noise abatement.
a
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3.	 Nuclear Power Plant Radiation Standards --
This assessment is also an example of the second type, although it is much less
clearly so. Gofman and Tamplin's initial analysis seems to have met most of
the canons of scientific inquiry, and their findings and the conclusions could
have been challenged by challenging the scientific validity of the research
which led to 'them. however, the challenge took the form of attacks on the
analysts and their actions, and in later presentations Gofman and Tamplin
began to treat their analysis more as an advocate's tool than as the result
of purely scientific inquiry.
4. Cayuga Lake Power Plant--
This assessment was in fact composed of a set of partial assessments.
Without analyzing any of these in great detail, it is probably valid to
conclude that the overall assessment has elements of both the second and
third of Coates' types. Some, perhaps most, of the partial analyses were
performed by competent scientific teams and the findings of these analyses
led to specific conclusions regarding preferable courses of action. But
apparently, there were also elements of partisanship in the design and
execution of some of the studies, particularly those commissioned by the
promoters of the nuclear power plant.
	
5.	 Storm King Power Plant --
In this assessment, which again was a series of partial analyses con-
ducted by different performers, elements of advocacy seem to have been pre-
r	 .
h
valent. This is probably because most of the analyses were conducted with-
in the context of the proceedings of a regulatory agency and a court. As
Coates comments, those who see assessment primarily as an advocate's tool i..
"see the courts and regulatory agencies as taking the lead in managing
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technology. Since the last operates on an adversary basis," he says,
technology assessments tend to be "structured to fit that pattern."'
A. The Political Nature of An Assessment
One conclusion that emerges from the preceding discussion is that,
viewed from the perspective of its acceptance and implementation, any
effective technology assessment is, in part, political. * that is, in order
LO have influence (to be acted upon) , an assessment rust be are element
in the public policy-making process. That process, through
which a course of action is selected from among competing alternatives,
is, itself, always political in that its outcome is determined, at least in part,
by considerations of power. Acceptance and implementation, in this view,
are "socio-political processes flowing from and anticipated by early
phases of the policy process. This... is recognized in the consideration
of technical, economic, and political feasibilities in the rational analysis
and political negotiation leading to the formulation of policy content."5
Even "neutral" technology assessments imply decisions, and decision-making,
as Bunker notes, is a combination of rational analysis and political nego-
tiation. Etzioni suggests that "the effectiveness of a decision will
I'	 depend as much on its power-backing as on the validity of the knowledge
and the decision-making strategy which were used," 6 If an assessment is
s	 viewed as an input to, and thus a part of, decision-making, then it is
possible to analyze the assessment-acceptance-implementation process in
'-	 terms of how its early stages initiation and performance of an assessment--3
.}	 affect the later stages of acceptance and implementation. As Etzioni comments:
i
The two processes [decision-making and implementation]...
are closely interwoven, with decisions affecting implementations
and initial implementations affecting later stages of decision-
making—There is a continual give-and-take between decision-
making and implementation.
* This theae runs throughout the seminar discussions in Part I, as well.
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Moreover, "early decisions shape the power which affects later decisions,
and the more the initial decision took relevant power into account, the
more effective implementation is going to be." 7
 Folk makes the above point
specifically related to technology assessments: "If viewed as part of the
policy-making process,...technology assessment must be adapted to the
existing political process in which special interests, restricted and
fragmented government jurisdiction, and untrustworthy advice flourish."8
At a recent meeting on technology assessment, Anthony Wedgewood Benn,
a Member of Parliament in the United Kingdom, emphasized strongly that
policy-makers and decision-makers wil l ignore technology assessments as long
as assessors feel that their work can be done in the seclusion of ivory
towers, divorced from the realities of the political process and from the
wants and desires of the constituents of elected officials. He urged that
technology assessment be viewed not as a purely academic pursuit but rather
as an input to policy and decision- making
 
responsive to the needs of govern-
ment decision rakers and their constituents.g
If the assessment-acceptance- implementation process is viewed as Folk and
Benn see it, that is, as one type of the general relationship between analysis,
policy choice, and policy execution, then it is possible to consider that
process in terms of more general discussions of public policy-making.
One basic issue that arises immediately is: how do policies get selected
and executed in a pluralist political system in which power is widely
distributed? The accepted answer is that pluralist policy-making is
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based on a dynamic process of the formations and dissolutions of coati--
tuns in support of a particular course of action. Bunker comments that
"policy activation cannot be achieved on a command basis, but must be
accomplished through mobilization of support and the interweaving of
both information and performance contribuions from a variety of sources." 10
Lindblom describes the effects of pluralism: "power is always held by a
o ^_
	 number of persons rather than by one; hence policy is made through the
complex processes by which these persons exert power or influence over
each other."" If this perspective is valid, then the assessment-
acceptance-implementation process can be analyzed in terms of how an
assessment is involved in the formation of the coalition of interests
and/or power which leads to its acceptance and eventual implementation.
The issue can be stated somewhat differently: at what stage of the
assessment-acceptance-implementation process should coalition formation
occur if an assessment is to be acted upon?
There seems to be a consensus in the policy studies literature that
the likelihood of policy execution is increased if coalitions in support
of such action are formed during the early stages of the policy process.
Dror notes that
Identifying a "good" best policy and executing it
are two different phases; the second does not necessarily
follow from the first. Some "motivation"...must be
introduced for executing the policy, allocating resources
to the executing, and "pushing" the executing...
Giving or withholding such motivation is a main
function of political power- Gaining the necessary
support for a policy irvalves building a coalition
of power centers that together control most of the
power that is concerned with the problem the policy
is about.
f
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coalition strong enough to motivate its execution, and this allocation
distinguishes such policy-making from 'utopian' policy-making" and that
f
"groups which are most likely to be in the coalition often should be
involved very early in the policy-making activity itself." 1 '2	Bunker
f ed:
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suggests that " policies which emerge from the interaction of rational
analysis, political leadership, and administrative discretion are not
r
t
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. only more likely to be made operational; b6t a policy process charac-
terized by active involvement of participants from these functions is
:j
ol
likely not to be so fragmented as to impair capacity for execution." 13
It is necessary at this point to attempt to specify the acceptance ='
and implementation outcomes of the cases studied.
1i 1.	 Jamaica Bair/Kennedy Airport --
-
This assessment was accepted and implemented.	 The logic of its analysis
_ i
called for : .he abandonment of plans for a runway extension; 	 this recom-
mendation was acted upon immediately after receiving the assessment.
{
2.	 Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement_--
This assessment was accepted by both the President and the Congress, but
its implementation, which was the responsibility of the Federal Aviation a
Administration, has been partial at best.
f
3.	 Nuclear Power Plant Radiation Standards --
r` This assessment was rejected by those with legitimate authority to take
actions based on its recommendations but these same authorities did later
take actions closely resembling those recommended by the assessment.
i€
4.	 Cayuga Lake Power Plant
This assessment was conducted in the context of an adversary process in
f	 ^' which many positions were taken.
	 Thus it is not easy to speak in terms
of acceptance and implementation of an assessment, since there was no
f:
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one such analysis. Rather, the assessments here were integral parts of
the process of policy debate, not outside i nputs to it. The decision not
to continue to seek a construction permit from the AEC represents the
i
acceptance and implemenation of what came to be the "majority"
	
`' I	 view among the performers of assessments in this case. The meaning
of "majority" is crucial here; Given the perspective adopted in this
chapter, it can mean only that greater power was held by the coalition
of interests opposed to the power plant than by the plant ' s supporters.
5. Storm King Power Plant
The assessment of the Storm King Power Plant, like that of Cayuga Lake,
was conducted within an adversary process in which many positions were taken
and most of the preceding comments on the Cayuga Lake case apply to it.
However, in the Storm King case, the power held by those supporting and opposing
the construction of the plant varied with the forum in which the debate
took place. The ultimate outcome--rejection of the opponent ' s analyses
and at least the interim approval of the Storm King project--seems linked
to the fact that the project ' s promoters performed a successful enough
"counter-assessment' to undercut the advantages the opponents had gained
	
i	 in the judicial forum.
	
4	 Different coalition -formation strategies were followed i n each of
the cases. . In the Jamaica Say study, there was prior agreement that the
findings of the study would be publicly disseminated. The issue was
highly salient to the media, interested citizen groups, and the general
i
public. This tended to assure that the public would be made aware of the
assessment and that public opinion would support any assessment finding that
reinforced existing attitudes. The study team, although it conducted the
assessment in isolation from day-to-day outside pressures, did actively
r.-1 k
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seek citizen involvement in its deliberations, This meant that, at least
in part, the assessment could be said to reflect a public consensus (or
the study team's perception of a public consensus). When the findings of
the expert analysts turned out to parallel that consensus in most respects,
a powerful coalition of experts and the public was formed, and given the
political and environmental context of the time, it was impossible for
PONYA to make any decision except to abandon plans for runway extensions.
The coalition between expert and citizen illustrated in this case is
becoming an increasingly powerful one, especially with respect to environ-
mental issues. A National Academy of Sciences study of technology assess-
ment recognized the importance of extensive citizen participation in the
assessment process both for practical reasons and in the light of demo-
cratic theory. That study suggested that early citizen participation
helps avoid belated citizen opposition and that "objective evaluation"
of social costs and benefits is impossible unless the diverse views of
interested parties are considered. 14
In the jet noise abatement case, acceptance and implementation were
dependent on the support of different sets of participants.* Analysts and
policy-makers cooperated in initiating, performing, and accepting the
assessment, but the resulting implementation plan delegated authority to
administrators for its execution. As is often the case, the most influential
clientele of the administrators was directly affected by the policy
the administrators were supposed to implement. The coalition of interests
and perspectives between bureaucrat and clientele groups is often strong
enough to resist major policy shifts imposed by top level policy-makers,
r'	 even with expert and some public support. The delegation of implementing
s
* The participation of various interests in this case is also discussed
r	 on pp. 141 ff., above.
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authority to administrators often results in potentially significant policy
shifts being transformed into incremental changes only.* This was the
situation in the jet noise abatement case.
A similar description fits the radiation standards case. Here expert
analysts consciously attempted to create a coalition in support of their
views because they recognized the power of the opposing coalition, which
consisted of the ACC ( in a joint promoter -regulator role), nuclear
industries, the"establishment" in nuclear science, and the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy. In their attempts to form a coalition based on Congressional,
professional, and especially informed public support, Gofman and Tamplin
alienated the opposing coalition to the extent that a compromise on
the explicit acceptance of their recommendations became impossible. As
the case study suggests, it is not possible to state unequivocally that
the power of the "Gorman-Tamplin coalition" was great enough to force
informal acceptance and implementation of the analysts' conclusions.
The Cayuga Lake case was marked by the development of a variety of
positions ranging from relatively uncritical interest in the construction of
a nuclear power plant on the lake to virtual oppotion to the project.
A central role in the assessment was played by.an ad hoc citizen group,
The Citizens Committee to Save Cayuga Lake. This group attempted to play
a mediating role by organizing a coalition which would agree on a plan for
the construction of a power plant modified to reflect opponents' criticisms.
Ultimately, the attempt to organize such a moderate coalition failed, and
opponents of the plant were able to persuade its promoter to end the
quest for a construction permit. It appears that the extreme positions
in support of and opposition to development of the plant had become so
* Milton Katz commented on the relationship between administrative discretion
and administrative power in the discussion of his paper, p. 126.
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firm during the course of the assessment that it was impossible to bring
the various parties into a compromise agreement.
The coalition-formation strategy in the Storm King case was even More
marked by the polarization of positions. Like the Cayuga Lake case, an
ad hoc citizens group was formed, the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference.
But unlike the Cayuga Lake group, this group served as a focal point for
organized opposition to the power utility's plans and the government
*4	
regulatory commission ' s support of those plans. The task of allocating
values between promoters and opponents of the plant went to a Federal
I^
Court of Appeals. Reliance on a formal mechanism for resolving the
conflict, rather than-on the informal process of negotiation and bargaining,
mitigated against any tendency to compromise on the part of the plant's
opponents, who felt that the courts gave them a means of achieving
their desired end--abandonment of plans for the plant. However, the
majority of the court became satisfied that the plant ' s supporters had
so modified both their plans for the plant and their analyses supporting
their plans that there were no grounds for court intervention in the
i
licensing process. In so doing, the court in effect joined the coalition
of interests in support of the plant ' s development,
i
It is apparent then that in the one case in which an accepted
assessment was not -implemented- - the Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement case--
those involved in implementation efforts were not included in the coalition
of power which had supported the performance and acceptance of the
assessment and its findings. One analyst suggests that "from the point
of view of facilitating the utilization of analysis, mutual adjustment
the case in the assessment of strategies for jet noise abatement nor even
in the formulation and passage of legislation to accomplish that end. The
insertion of the "economically reasonable and technologically practical"
clause in aircraft noise abatement legislation represented the emerging
influence of the user/regulator coalition late in the policy formulation
process. This type of coalition was able to use that clause to delay
implementation of stringent noise standards for aircraft engines. The
situation here illustrates Theodore Lowi's complaint that "modern law has
become a series of instructions to administrators rather than a series of
commands to citizens. Delegation has been elevated to the highest of
virtues.... Bargaining must be preferred over authority at every level and
phase of government.06
In the other four cases, there were attempts to form coalitions between
analysts, public interest groups, and/or the public. In one of these cases,
Jamaica Bay, the technique used was to ensure in advance that the results
of the study would be publicized and then to actively involve citizen groups
in the assessment itself. To the degree that the assessment findings
would reflect the citizen input, the assessors could feel confident of public
A
support, even if PONYA decided not to accept those findings. The Authority
recognized this, i t seems, and decided not to try to advance its plans
over thr combined opinions of citizens and experts. By contrast,
Gofman ar^ Tamplin performed their assessment without public involvement,
it:k.	
and then tried to mobilize broad support behind its findings. It is not
3
1
clear that they were completely successful in this attempt. This may suggest
that citizen involvement in the performance of the assessment itself can contribute
importantly to the acceptance and implementation process, particularly
i
Ii
1
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when the policy-makers involved in policy choice and execution are in
postions relatively more susceptible to influence by public opinion.
The separate roles of expert analyst and public interest representative
collapsed into a single, joint role in the Cayuga lake and Storm King	
r c•'.
cases. Here the performers of many of the partial assessments were experts
who had been motivated to carry out the assessments by their concern as
citizens and were interested.in
 the assessment findings because they
would be useful tools in the conflict over whether the power plant (in
each case) would be built. This is a good example of what Lindblom calls
"partisan analysis." In this form of assessment, "policy analysis is no
longer an alternative to a play of power; it becomes largely an instrument
of influence or power." Such analysis is practiced by interest groups,
including public interest groups,'which wish to influence those with the
ability to make policy choices. This is particularly true when policy-
makers must "look realistically into the merits of alternative policies
and. ..demand competent analysis" 17 in order to be able to decide which
alternative is most desirable. In both power plant cases, the original
assessments were prepared by those with a vested interest in the tech-
nology application under consideration, and it was not until opposing
"partisan analyses" appeared that those with the power to decide were
forced to consider not approving that application. The judicial
process, of course, provides an institutionalized forum for "partisan
analysis," since decisions are reached only after assessing. the merits of
opposing arguments.
Lindblom argues convincingly that it is "unrealistic" to expect
that policy analysis--rand technology assessment is being viewed here as
I	 t
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a particular type of policy analysis--can reach "conclusive determinations
of correct policy." But the fact that analysis is not determinative does not
mean that it is not influential. Rather, "policy analysis is incorporated...
into the play of power, changing the character of analysis as a result."1B
Charels Schultze suggests that
The purpose of the advocacy process and political
bargaining is to reach decisions about specific
programs in the context of conflicting and vaguely
known values. Systematic analysis makes a major,
and essential, contribution to this process by
forging links between ge ral values and precific
program characteristics.
Certainly, this is what happened in the Cayuga Lake and Storm King cases,
and perhaps, in all the cases studied. By focusing attention on the
total range of impacts of a technological applications, assessments
tended to force policy-makers to consider alternate means for the
achievement of objectives agreed upon by a limited elite.*
B. Stages of the Assessment-Acceptance-Implementation Process
In addition to the preceding discussion of the overall process of
assessment-acceptance-implementation, it is possible to make some specific
comments about each of the stages in that process.
* The tendency for technology assessments to force explicit consideration
of alternative goals and values as well as of alternative means was
frequently mentioned in the seminar discussions in Part I. See, for example,
the discussion on pp. 155-156.
i
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Initiation. In all of the cases studied, assessments were
performed without any formal or legal requirement that they take place.
^f
	
Institutionalized initiations of technology assessments, such as by
Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, did not
influence directly the decision to perform assessments in these five
C
cases. In most of the cases, assessments were performed either as a
result of or in anticipation of generalized public pressure which
demanded some form of assurance that a proposed or existing activity
would not threaten important values held by the public. This pressure was
particularly strong when the effects of the technology application
were highly visible to the general public, as in the jet noise and Jamaica Bay
cases. When the potential effects were important but not readily apparent,
those perceiving the issue organized public interest groups to create the
pressure required to include technology assessment as a part of the
policymaking process. Only in the radiation standards case was an assess-
ment initiated without any explicit pressure from the public for its conduct.
Thus in none of the cases studied was there a structured means for public
involvement in the decision that an assessment was required or in the decision
regarding what to assess. Yet these were critical decisions, and much of
the "messiness" of the performance stage, especially in the Cayuga Lake and
Storm King cases, was a result of public demands for the broadening of
previously narrowly-defined assessment to include a wider range of considerations.
By contrast, the Jamaica Bay study was broadly conceived at the initiation
stage, and public participation in the performance stage was both orderly
and constructive.
r
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Policymakers seem to prefer not to have assessments performed at all,
and if they are performed, to have them designed to examine only a narrow
range of issues. The pressure to initiate broad technology assessments,
J^
	T
	
or to transform narrow ones into broad ones, comes either from analysts
acting as public interest representatives or from the public itself. Because
	1`	 there was, at the time Gofman and Tamplin conducted their study of radiation
Wx.
effects, no public pressure for careful attention to this problem, the
f
Atomic Energy Commission was able to claim that there was no need for the
!j
	
-^	 Gorman and Tamplin study or for any further AEC analysis. By contrast,
1= there was enough public attention being paid to the jet noise issue to
	
t	 force both the PONYA and the Johnson administration to initiate assessments
	
i	 related to that issue.
In the absence of institutionalized means of initiating technology
	 a
assessments,,such analyses are likely to be begun only in response to
pressures for their existence. But the presence of such pressures increases
1
the likelihood that the performance of the assessment will be to some
is
degree politicized, since those demanding an assessment are likely to also
demand an active role in carrying it out. Perhaps the development of
i
assessment as a routine activitiy to be performed prior to discussions
f
related to the application of a technology will increase the likelihood
that assessments can be carried out in a less politicized environment.*
2. Performance. The case studies provide clear contrasts with
respect to the performance stage of the process. In three cases, the
i;
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assessments were performed by analysts functioning more or l ess in
isolation from outside pressures. In the other two cases, the performance
stage was characterized by the involvement of a wide range of participants
and by the assessments themselves explicitly being part of an adversary
	 N
process preceding a policy decision. Yet, no clear pattern emerges as to
which mode of assessment is more likely to produce the enlightenment
policymakers require in order to improve the quality of their decisions.
Mayo suggests that neither what he calls the "scientific method" of tech-
nology assessment nor what he calls the "adversarial system" will result
by itself in an adequate assessment. He argues that uncertainty during the
performance of an assessment both as to facts and as to value preferences
among affected populations will inevitably lead to the use of some form of
an adversarial mode of inquiry as part of the process of technology assess-
,20
ment.	 This seems to have been the situation in four of the case studies.
In the one assessment which had the least impact--the jet noise study--
f
s
F	 '
there was little controversy over assessment findings either during the
performance stage or thereafter. In the other cases, conflicting views
were considered as a structured part of the assessmfnt process (Jamaica
Bay), were an integral element of the process (Cayuga lake and Storm King),
or were generated by the initial assessment (rad4 ation standards). Folk
* Affecting the initiation of assessments, acc.Vrding to Green, is the
likelihood that, in early stages of a technological development, there
is a greater perception of potential benefits than of potential costs
of further development. This means the pressure for an assessment
(in anticipation of future problems) is not likely to be great unless
there is general agreement that assessments should be undertaken or
there is an institutional mechanism for initiating assessments.
See p.153 ff above for a further discussion of this point.
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suggests that "criticise and debate is sic an essential part of the
democratic process. It is only through adversary proceedings that that
part of a policy assessment which is stelid may be identified, and that
part which is insupportable may be shown up for what it is." 27 The case
studies suggest that this will be more likely if the adversary proceedings
(or, at least, the expression of conflicting views and interests) are
somehow incorporated into the performance of the assessment itself.
One of act of an adversary element in the performance of assessments
and illustrated by the case studies is the potential for extending the
performance stage itself for an indefinite time, as adversaries continue
to disagree, or until some authoritative policymaker takes an action which
effectively terminates the performance stage. Also, if the assessment
becomes a continuing process and not a specific time-defined analysis,
there is a tendency for assessments to become increasingly partisan and to
be used as an advocate's tool, with the qualificiations and limitations
of assessment findings given less and less prominence as the process
continues. This suggests the need for some balanced means of obtaining
diverse views and for challenging emerging conclusions during the assessment
process while at the same time providing for terminating the assessment
and presenting its findings on a timely basis.
3. Presentation. One generalization that emerges from the case
studies is that, if an assessment is to be implemented through the actions
of governmental authorities, then the findings of that assessment must
be presented in such a manner as to generate pressure on government for such
action. This means that there is a need formaking the assessment conclusions
accessible and understandable to a non-specialist audience, probably
through media coverage. The importance of making impact analyses intel-
ligible to laymen was emphasized in a recent court decision concerning a
river basin development project in Texas. Although that decision deals
A2 7 5
with environmental impact statements rather than with complete technological
E
assessments, the point made by Judge Bue of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas is easily generalizable:
All features of an impact statement must be "written in
language that is understandable to non-technical minds
and yet contain enough scientific reasoning to alert
specialists to particular problems within the field of
their expertise." [Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers of t e U.S. Army-, 348 F. Supp 916,
933 (N. D. Miss,, 972	 he reason for this standard
is that impact statements must assist in rational,
thoroughly informed decision making by officials
higher up in the agency chain of command, including
the Congress, the Executive and the general public,
some of whom may not possess the technical expertise
of those who evaluate the impact and prepare environ-
mental statements. . . . Additionally, when technical
procedures are discussed, such as with the benefit-cost
analysis issues, the applicable law and methods
employed should be adeauntely explained so that all
may understand them.22
This did not happen to any great extent in the jet noise case, since
}	
the assessment findings were contained in a report prepared for
the Executive branch and not given wide distribution. Gofman and
Tamplin faced this problem in publicizing the results of their analysis,
f-
and, in the attempt to make their conclusions dramatic enough to gain wide
general support, seem to have so departed from "acceptable" modes of pre-
sentation that they alienated many of their peers in the nuclear energy
community. The choice of a target to receive assessment findings may be an
imporLant element in increasing the likelihood of their acceptance and
implementation. In neither the jet noise nor the radiation standards case
did the performers of the assessment attempt directly to convince the technology
users- -the AEC and power utilities in one case; the FAA and the airlines in
the other---to accept their findings. Rather, they attempted to present
those findings in ways that would create outside pressure which could then
6
^r
be used to force such acceptance. This seems to have been a less successful
strategy than the one followed in other cases in which assessment findings
were presented both directly to those with the authority to accept and
implement them and to a broader audience whose pressure could force the
authorities to consider the assessment. This is related to earlier dis-
cussion of the fact that assessments change the "resistance pattern"
decision-makers face when they feel the necessity to act. It would be
desirable to understand more fully the relationshi p between how the
findinos of an assessment are presented and the de4ree of influence that
the assessment has.
4. Decision to Act. Most of the generalizations which might be made
regarding this stage in the assessment-acceptance-implementation process
have already been analyzed in earlier portions of this chapter. Our
central conclusion is that the decision -making process cannot be made
totally rational through the performance of technology assessments, since
those assessments cannot provide a conclusive "correct" analysis in any
meaningful situat ion. This is so primarily because decision-making with
respect to the application of technology involves not only the choice of
appropriate means but also selection among conflicting values. Dror notes
that "rational elements play an important, though limited, role in
specifying and ordering of values. . . . Final values and their order of
priority can only be determined by value judgments, not by rational
processes."23
The method for making such collective value judgments for a society
is the political process. Technology assessments link specific proposed
activities with their value implications in a way which permits the
2/ 7
bargaining, negotiation, and power play of the political process to produce
a meaningful translation of social values into specific decisions."24
i
	
t	 Technology assessments appear to affect the decision to act in two
ways. One is by making more clear the consequences of various alternative
r
actions. The other is by assessments themselves being instruments of
ev
power which directly act on the decision-makers; this power is exercised
through the persuasion of "partisan analysis." Lindblom observes that
"officials are not on the whole pushed around 	 .[TIo be effective interest
groups do indeed have to persuade--and with better instruments than mis-
representation. 25
 The case studies illustrate both effects. In the
} Jamaica Bay and jet noise cases, the assessments served primarily to high-
light the Iink between particular actions and their social impact. In the
other cases, the assessments served both this function, and perhaps to a
greater degree, the function of instruments of direct influence on the
decision to act.
	
'	 5. Planning of Action. In the five cases studied, only two, the jet
9
noise and Storm King cases, included this stage. Both demonstrated the
difficulty of developing an integrated and coherent plan of action in the
context of a pluralistic political and administrative system, one with
many interests represented at many points. Lowi's complaint seems
relevant here: "Liberal government cannot plan. Planning requires the
authoritative use of authority. Planning requires law, choice, priorities,
moralities. Liberalism replaces planning with bargaining. 
26 
This
somewhat extreme view might be tempered by modifying it to suggest that,
in our go%arnmental system, "law choice, priorities, moralities" are most
often the result of a political process rather than any more "rational"
f
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mode of activity. Thus planning (as well as decision-making) takes place
t '	 in the context of conflicting interests, usually guided by some general
policies which set limits to acceptable plans. But often, those involved
in such planning activities are able to modify the intent of a general`"
r sY+
policy to suit their particular interests. Gergen notes that "although
an idea may be effectively initiated, it may function as any empty 	 f
'campagin promise' until specific plans have been laid out be qualitied
persons. The leverage of such persons is often far greater than would
meet the public eye." 33 The case studies suggest that there is considerable
leverage held by administrators and regulators, often in cooperation with
users or developers, is considerable when it comes to developing specific
plans for the implementation of assessments, even after the findings of
'	 those assessments have been accepted by policymakers.
6. Other Stages. The discussion of the approval of plan, implementation
of plan, and monitoring and evaluation stages in Chapters 10-14 essentially
exhausts what might be said about these stages on the basis of the five
case studies. The last two of these stages are found only in the jet noise 4
case.
5
C. IMPLEMENTING TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS
The analysis in this chapter, and indeed the whole report, suggests that the
crucial time to insure that the findings of an assessment are accepted and imple-
mented is in the early stages of the assessment-acceptance-implementation process,
f	 particularly during assessment initiation and performance. Once an assessment is
completed and the decision to act towards which the assessment was directed is
i'
made, the process of implementation, at least as shown by the case studies,
does not appear to differ very much from the process of implementing any
other policy decision. This suggests that the influence of technology
assessments is likely to be higher on the policy formulation process than on
the policy execution process. Yet the findings of assessments appear also to
have had at least some indirect effects on policy execution in addition to
those effects flowing from policy decisions influenced by assessment findings.
The modification of low-level radiation standards by the AEC, even after the
rejection of the Gofman/Tamplin analysis, is one example of this. Another is
the redesign of the Storm King plant by Con Ed even though the Federal power
Commission did not require such action.
In general, however, the problem of implementing technology assess-
ments seems to be similar to the problem of assuring that laws and other
policy decisions are carried out by administrators and regulators in a
manner consistent with both their letter and their spirit. The relation-
ship between policymaker and bureaucrat in contemporary government is one
of the most important ones in determining whose interests are served by
government. The existence of technology assessments can (but not neces-
sarily will) assure that policymakers, and the public that they represent,	 t
have a powerful tool in the effort to make government policy serve the
public interest (as determined through the political process) and not only
limited interests with access to the non-representative elements of
government structure.
:j
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s and Value Conflict
rnost important impacts of technology assessment
t and bargaining from means to ends. This shift
of course, makes it more difficult for those who
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n-making to assemble the agreement required to
ties are carried out. Ctzioni notes that
	
r
tical elite is to construct a whole from societal
this function." 28
 One conclusion that emerges from the case studies is
that the performance of a technology assessment as part of the policy-making
process modifies that process in terms of how general values are translated
into specific policies.* Dror suggests that "organizational decisionmaking
tends to follow the line of least resistance." 21
 The performance of tech-
nology assessments can be viewed as changing the "resistance pattern"
which forms the context of decisionmakin
	 The question, the, is the^
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i	 nature of this change and its implications for effective and responsive
is	 social policymaking.
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* This point was made by Representative George Brown, arguing
that "the process of assessment in itself creates a wider perception
which is the essential ingredient in the ultimate program of
implementation.	 ." (p. 108)
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By exacerbating the value conflicts that the political process attempts
to reconcile, technology assessments can produce one of two general types
of result: A first passibility is that technology assessments are more
effective as instruments of "technology harassment" than as instruments of
balanced decisionmaking. By highlighting the conflicting value implications
of particular proposals, an assessment may make it impossible to reach a
consensus on an acceptable course of action, and thus nothing is done even
in situations when most of those involved in the policy process agree that
some activity is desirable. This perhaps was the case in the Cayuga Lake
situation. aror notes that "sometimes specifying values can be dangerous
to the very existence of the system" designed to select policy by
reconciling conflict. 30 Gawthorp notes that:
The zone of viable negotiation, which can be con-
trolled exclusively by the professionals as long
as conflict can be narrowly contained, diminishes
substantially when the bargaining arena is forced
to absorb a high influx of amateur advocates.
When the nonprofessional enters into a conflict
situation, he introduces many of the elements that
the profesaionai is committed to ignore .... As a
consequence, system instability dramatically increases
while the prospects of a compromise solution
achieved by professionals within a collegial
a ab:^csphere visibly evaporates.31
A second — ossible result of technology assessments is that they increase the
quality of social poiic_ making by forcing policymakers to give attention to
i
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ends as well as means, while at the same time providing a way of minimizing the
social and political conflict such attention can produce. This is probably
most likely if assessments include as meaningful performers those likely to
be involved in accepting and implementing their findings. Such involvement,
however, is likely to change the assessment process itself. Dror says that
"the need to form a coalition sets some limits on how explicit goals can
be, and determine some structural characteristics of optimal policymaking in
that the groups which are most likely to be in the coalition ofter, should be
involved very early in the policymaking activity itself."32
What is implied here is the conclusion that in order to have a
" roductive" im act, assessments must be desi gned and executed in the overall
context of political decision-making. This does not mean necessarily that
assessments, to have influence, must themselves be advocate's tools. it does
mean that the design of the assessment and the choice of those involved in its
performance should be made with a sensitivity toward the political feasibility
of getting the assessment findings acted upon. This suggests that the design of
mechanisms for public participation in at least setting the value context within
which assessments take place, if not in the actual performance of the assessment
itself, should be a central element in the assessment process. The requirement
for meaningful participation increases the need for and difficulty of what
Dror calls "metapolicymaking," i.e., concern with the impact of the structure
and operation of the policymaking system on the substance of policy. 
33 
To design
a means for increasing public participation in the early stages of the policy-
making process (beyond providing the generalized demand for action that
stimulates the policymaking system into operation) is a "metapolicymaking"
task of the first order. Technology assessments represent an opportunity
to provide such a means, if they can avoid being either mere symbolic manifestita-
ti^r•" of public participation or convenient instruments for the opponents of
technology-based change.
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TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY:
t	 THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
INTRODUCTION
	
y a
Technology assessment is the systematic identification,
o".
	
	 analysis, and evaluation of the real and potential impacts of
technology on social, economic, environmental, and political
systems and processes. It is concerned particularly with the
second and third order impacts of technological developments; and
with the unplanned or unintended consequences, whether beneficial
or detrimental, which may result from the introduction of new
technologies or from changes in the utilization of existing tech-
nologies. Technology assessment seeks to identify societal
options and clarify the trade--offs which must be made; this
y
	
	
approach is designed to provide an objective and neutral input
to public decisionmaking and policy formulation with regard to
science and technology. The analytical techniques of technology
assessment may be integrated into the on-going process of plan-
ning, designing, and evaluating technological projects and programs,
and may also provide an external review and evaluation of such
projects and programs ac any point in time.
In a highly induCtrialized society such as the United States,
the interaction between technology and public policy is continual
Y
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and complex. Federal executive agencies perform and fund research
and development; they foster, subsidize, use, and regulate 
i
technological applications. Political theorists of the nineteenth:
and twentieth centuries have grappled with the problem of the
t<.
capacity of democratic systems to control and direct technological 	 ?^
forces to serve societal needs and to protect public interests.
The relationship between the State, the corporation, interest
groups, and the individual is a central concern of modern political 	 'S
thought. on a more immediate level of concern, the interaction
of social goals such as rising standards of living, equitable
distribution of material goods, and maintenance of the physical
environment has brought into question the viability of existing
governmental institutions and their capability to deal with complex
problems arising from socio-technological change.
Technology assessment has been advanced as a way of enabling
decisionmakers to better understand and anticipate the societal
impacts of technological developments. If technology assessment
techniques can be developed and routinely integrated into legisla-
tive and administrative decisionmaking and public policy formulation,
more rational choices care be made among alternative policies and
actions. Anticipating problems and detrimental side--effects which
result from any public action will permit their moderation or
reduction.
In 1966, Representative Emilio Daddario, as chairman of the
Subcomriittee on Science, Research, and Development of the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics, introduced the concept of
^i
3
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i
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technology assessment, in proposing the establishment of an
Office of Technology Assessment to serve the Congress. This
occurred at a time of rising public alarm over alleged hazards
to life and health resulting from contamination of the environment
by the byproducts of chemical and industrial processes. Moreover,
large public projects such as highway and airport development
had occasioned numbers of public protests, demonstrations, and
legal actions resulting in cosliy delays to many such projects.
Growing hostility to technological programs aroused political
pressures which intensified congressional suspicion of the process
of planning and programming in executive agencies, and congression-
al resentment of the failure of executive agencies to provide
Congress with adequate .information about the impacts of govern-
mental programs.
In this atmosphere the concept of technology assessment
gained acceptance both among legislators and among professionals
and academic specialists in science policy research. In the five
years since Mr. Daddario first used the term "technology assess-
ment," many academic and professional conferences and seminars
have explored the concept of technology assessment, numerous
papers have been presented at meetings of scientific societies,
and scholarly journals and publications have carried treatments of
the subject. The Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop-
ment, chaired by Mr. Daddario and later by Representative John
Davis, held several series of hearings and commissioned four
reports on technology assessment, by the Library of Congress
's
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and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Public
;.	 Administration.
'
	
	 An underlying assumption in all of the discussion during this
five years was that the existing process for planning and eval-
!I	
uating technological projects and programs within federal execu-
tive agencies is fragmented, diffuse, and inadequate in scope and
depth. The purpose of the research reported in the present report
was to carry out an empirical investigation of this assumption, 	 e
and to provide a descriptive and analytical overview of the process
of technology assessment as practiced in federal executive agen-
cies in 1970 - 1971,
The objectives of this research were:
To identify the loci at which technology and
technological programs are assessed by federal
executive agencies,
- To describe the process of technology assessment
used by federal executive agencies,
-- To identify the loci at which the same or similar
technologies are assessed, and to determine where
and how such overlapping assessments are or could
be compared, weighed, or integrated,
-- To identify gaps in the existing technology
assessment process and to determine where and
how such gaps might appropriately be filled,
To describe typical technology assessments in terms
of their initiation, purpose, methodology, research
teams, costs, and results, and
To provide a base of information for use in
improving technology assessment in federal agencies
and in constructing new assessment mechanisms if
these are needed.
Pot
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Departments and agencies of the Executive Branch were
surveyed. Military and national security agencies and departments
were excluded to limit the scope of the study. One hundred and
forty offices within the civilian agencies were contacted, and
their statutory charters, statements of responsibility, organiza-
tion charts, publications, and research programs analyzed. on
this basis, 86 offices were identified as having technological
projects and programs.	 r
One hundred and ten interviews were held with officials in
the 86 offices. A series of questicns, tested and refined through
a preliminary set of ten interviews, were used to structure the
interviews; however, the interviews were kept informal and ques-
tions worked into the conversation as unobstrusively as possible.
(Viese questions appear in Appendix D of the full report.) The
interviews lasted from one to two hours and were designed to
elicit detailed description of the way in which projects and pro-
grams are selected, planned, and evaluated, and of the resources,
g	 personnel, and methodologies used in this process.
S
In the course of interviews, 97 examples of technology
assessment and closely related studies were identified, and a
further set of questions was used to develop .information about	 =
f
their initiation, costs, research techniques, dissemination, and
,f
	 utilization. This analysis was an important final phase of the
isi
research.
is
The remainder of this summary volume presents the conclusions
drawn from the research, with a series of recommendations for the
I
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agencies. It addresses the following points:
- Who is doing technology assessment?
- The organization of technology assessments.
- Disciplines and techniques used in technology
assessment.
- Analysis of a sample of technology assessment studies:
initiation, disciplines, techniques, costs, scope,
purpose, and utilization.
Gaps and overlaps in governmental assessment of nine
major technologies.
Prerequisites for further improvement of technology
assessment.
Recommendations.
The full report of which this volume is a summary will appear
in two parts -- the report itself, and a volume of appendices
designed to serve as a reference volume for full substantiation
of the report. The appendices include detailed descriptions of
the offices studied, data on each of the 97 exemplary studies,
a list of officials interviewed, and the questions used to struc-
ture the interviews.
The process through which decisions are made within bureau-
cratic structures is complex, highly convoluted, and poorly
understood. It is anticipated that the information provided by
this study will usefully contribute to attempts to understand,
rationalize, and improve the decisionmaking process in the federal
government.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Federal executive agencies have, within the last five to ten
years, improved and broadened the process through which they
plan and evaluate technological Arolects and programs. Whereas
economic considerations, especially cost/benefit analysis of
immediate planned effects, have been the mainstay of planning
and programming, agencies are now taking into account a somewhat
wider range of possible consequences of governmental actions
and the exercise of federal responsibilities. Most are trying
to take account of potential impacts which are derivative of the
basic actions or programs, difficult to quantify, and not always
satisfactorily translatable into monetary-terms. The lack of
generally accepted methods for integrating such considerations
into administrative decisionmaking, and into the justification
of agency programs, and the lack of sustained impetus and
encouragement from the highest levels of the Executive Branch,
cause this improvement to be slow and not uniform across agencies.
But in many executive agencies, these new considerations --
encompassed in the concept of technology assessment -- are
gaining general acceptance and systematic technology assessment
processes and techniques are developing.
Congress is demanding from public administrators more soundly
7
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rounded information about the possible consequences of govern-
mental actions. The movement in the 1960's for increased public
participation in decisionmak,ing, widespread alarms over alleged
environmental hazards, and public protests over many public
works projects created political pressures to which Congress
reacted. Controversies culminating in court actions against
highway, airport, and water resource projects caused costly
delays in many projects and created new political obstacles to
governmental obj, ,tives. Congressional concern crystallized in
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which has been
the single most important factor in moving executive agencies
to accept the idea of technology assessment. The proposed
legislation to create an office of Technology Assessment to
serve the Congress (passed by the House in February 1972) under-
lines the continuing congressional dissatisfaction, with Executive
Branch methods of assessment and their demand for an independent
accounting,
Who Is Doing Technology Assessment?
Eighty-six offices in federal executive agencies were identi-
fied as chiefly responsible for projects and programs of a
technological nature. These offices were located in seven
cabinet-level Departments, nine indepL.-ndent agencies, eight
commissions, and four components of the Executive office of the
President. (Defense and security agencies were excluded.) In
these 86 offices, extensive interviews showed that 24 percent
j
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Were concerned only with primary performance characteristics of
technological systems and their direct dollar costs. Sixty-
three percent perform or sponsor some technology assessments; the
bulk of these are partial or narrow assessments which take into
account some of the secondary consequences of technological
applications, most often the secondary economic impacts or
environmental. impacts. The remaining 13 percent of the offices
consistently perform or sponsor technology assessments and
regard technology assessment as their major responsibility_.
In the offices where it is performed or sponsored, technology
assessment is viewed as support for agency planning and program-
ming or as ancillary to substantive basic and applied research
programs. It is most often found in offices bearing the title
"Policy, Programs, and Evaluation" or an equivalent designation
(25 percent) or offices solely responsible for research.
Thirty-five percent of offices sponsoring technology assess-
ment reported that most or all such work was done in-house; the
remainder preferred contract studies or a mix of in-house and
contractor assessments. On 97 exemplary studies collected, 38
percent were performed in-house, 42 percent by contractors (15
percent by university researchers and 27 percent by other organi-
zations), 9 percent by agency and contractors together, 4 percent
by interagency groups, and the remaining 6 percent by panels of
non-government experts convened by the agencies. Contractors
performed or participated in all categories of studies but were
e
sE	 most heavily used for partial or narrow technology assessments
l^	
(70 percent) .
11	 The organization of Technology Assessments
Al
	
	
The advantages of in-house assessment, which was preferred
by 35 percent of the offices, were reported to be:
.}	 -- they had greater credibility for agency management,
''	 -- they showed greater likelihood of producing institu-
tional change in the agency,
-- individual assessors were protected from constituency
pressure by their bureaucratic anonymity,
!1
	
	
-- the data base remains available to the agency,
-- in-house expertise is developed and maintained,
the assessment activity can be flexibly scheduled in
terms of time, resources, and workload.
The corresponding disadvantages of in-house assessments were
perceived as:
-- the lack of a multidisciplinary staff in most offices,
'	 a relative lack of external credibility,
E.
'"	 -- the possibility of institutional bias,
the ease of suppression of assessments by administrators
displeased by the findings or implications.
Most offices divide assessment activity between in-house staff
and contractors depending on the size of the study, the availabil-
ity of expertise, and the pressure of time and workload. A few
officials preferred as a policy to have technology assessments
performed by contractors rather than staff.
V.
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The advantages of technology assessments performed by contrac-
tors were reported as:
-- there is less institutional bias and greater objectivity,
-- they have greater external credibility,
-w more disciplines can be used than are present in most
agency offices,
	 u~
-- the regular work of the staff can proceed without
interference.
In order to further enhance the opportunity for multidisciplinary
assessment, there is a growing trend toward the use of consortia
of research organizations.
Difficulties and disadvantages of having assessments done by
contractors were reported:
-- there are severe difficulties of coordination and
management when agency and contractor are geographically
separated,
-- contractors tend to tell agencies what the agency wants
to hear (as the contractor perceives it),
-- contractor reports can also be ignored or suppressed
by agency management.
Officials showed a tendency to prefer independent research
organizations over university-based groups, which were reported
to have difficulty in organizing a management structure for large
interdisciplinary research projects. When only one discipline
or one or two researchers were to be involved, some officials pre-
ferred university research on the grounds of greater objectivity
or greater prestige. Some university researchers who were con-
r
tacted alleged that their findings were suppressed or misused by
a
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agencies. University groups were also unable in some cases to
compete for research contracts because of the rules of their
institutions. Analysis of collected studies showed that costs
per professional man-year were considerably lower for university
groups than for independent organizations.
The advantages of using interagency mechanisms for performing
assessments were reported to be:
-- they may have high level visibility and influence,
depending on the level of personnel assigned to them,
they provide the opportunity for continuing monitoring
and assessment,
-- they provide the opportunity to coordinate and rational-
ize policies of several agencies.
The off-setting disadvantages of interagency assessments are:
-- they are difficult to initiate because of the lack
of a sponsoring authority,
-- they are avoided because of conflicting agency missions,
responsibilities, and interests,
--- agency viewpoints and interests are seldom overridden,
especially if the tasks of analysis are divided among
the participating agencies.
"Blue--ribbon panels" of experts from outside of the government,
especially from industry and universities, are sometimes convened
to conduct assessments, especially those focused on societal
problems related to technology. The advantages of using ex2ert
panels are:
-- they allow mobilization of expertise from many sources
at low cost,
-- they tend to have high visibility, prestige, and influence,
i
r
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-- they offer the possibility of co-opting powerful segments
of society for support of policies or decisions emerg-
ing from the assessment,
--- they allow representation of affected interests.
Expert panels also involve disadvantages:
-- there may be bias, or alleged bias, from institutional
and occupational affiliations of the members,	 r
-- they show a tendency toward conservatism in approach
to problems,
-- the analysis may lack continuity, diligence, and con-
sistency.
It is likel that maximum independence and com rehensiveness
is gained when
-- the assessment is sponsored by a source not directly
responsible for the program or project being assessed,
such as the National Science Foundation or the Execu-
tive Office of the President, and
--- the assessment is performed by an independent research
group or university group which values its reputation
for objectivity as a chief stock-in-trade.
But unless the agency responsible for the program or project
under assessment is fully prepared to accept the assessment and
integrate the results into its own planning and programming
process there will be little gain in terms of responsible deci-
sionmaking.
Disciplines and Techniques Used
in Technology Assessment
Engineers, economists, and physical scientists make up the
bulk of the staff of offices which perform and sponsor technology
assessments. Fifty-four percent of these offices had one or
I	 ;
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more engineers engaged in technology assessment activity, 46
	 }
percent had economists, aid 33 percent had physical scientists,
while only 19 percent had one or more social scientists working
on technology assessment. In most such offices, social scien-
tists when present constituted only a small percentage of the
staff. Analysis of specific studies, however, indicated that
	 i ^
social scientists were somewhat more likely to be used in assess-
ment studies than the above figures would indicate, because only
38 per.•ent of the studies were done by agency staff; contractors
more often included social scientists on their teams. On these
research teams, however, the number of social scientists was
again usually small compared to the number of team members
claiming other disciplines.
Type of	 Percentage of research teams on which disciplines
Assessment*
	 were represented by one or more team members:
Econ. Engineer Phy.Sci. Biol.Sci. Soc. Sci.
Wide-scope
Assessments(9)
	 55%	 33%	 66%	 33%	 55%
Partial T.A.(40) 41
	 25	 25	 16	 44
Problem--
oriented T.A.(14) 30
	 20	 40	 10	 10
Futures
Research(17)
	 50	 63	 13	 13	 13
Most technology assessments rely heavily on the collation and
judgmental analysis of existing information, along with field
studies in the case of planned projects. Techniques from
*See definitions on page 18.
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established disciplines and academic areas, such as cost/benefit
analysis, surveys and interviews, and input-output tables, are
often augmented by sophisticated techniques of systems analysis,
operations research, and modeling and simulation. Wide-spread
government acceptance of and use of these tools for analyzing
complex problems is helping to persuade administrators that the
r	 ^
complexities of social impact analysis are not beyond reach.
Innovative techniques borrowed from futures research, such as
Delphi, cross-support matrices, and decision trees were reported
to have been used by a small number of offices. Researchers
reported that the use of these new techniques occasioned scepti-
cism and res-,stance In higher echelons of management. Officials
also reported with some consistency that the regulatory process
in particular has suffered from the fact that civilian agencies
(in contrast to DoD) have lagged behind industry in developing
a capability for technological forecasting.
The effect of bias from institutional and occupational
affiliations of members of expert panels conducting technology
assessments is an area in which behavioral research L3 needed.
Such panels are sometimes used, especially for problem-oriented
assessments focusing on societal problems (such as pollution,
deviant behavior, or regional development) to which technology
is either a contributing cause, a possible solution, or both.
The use of a panel allows for representation of affected interests,
and thus tends to increase awareness of political and institutional
4 ^
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feasibility and constraints; but it introduces a problem of
bias and weighting ire what is intended to be an objective and
neutral evaluative proces:a.
The appropriate role for public participation in assessment
also needs further research and innovation. Conventional
techniques such as public hearings necessarily occur at an
advanced stage of planning or development and tend to crystallize
opposition without significantly adding to the base of available
information, without generating alternatives to the proposed
action, and without providing for representation of the entire
range of interests affected. Representation of interests implies
the desirability of weighing interests in terms of numbers of
people affected (and usually their political or economic power).
Technology assessment aims at evaluating impacts in terms of
desirable changes for society as a whole. These concerns may
or may not be coincident in any particular case for any particu-
lar time period.
No innovative methods of incorporating public participations
were discovered in this study. NASA has experimented with
ut.ilizati.on conferences in planning space station programs, and
FAA with consultative planning conferences. Both allow the
expression of interests of potential users of systems, but do
nc'' provide input from other potentially affected parties, nor
do these techniques seek out and identify unplanned consequences
of agency actions.
1
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	t	 Technology assessment "methodologies" advanced by a number
of analysts are basically similar; they can be reduced to a
structured analytical process involving several simple steps or
i'
E' tasks:
	
r!+	
-- Definition of the subject of inquir y ; description of
the subject technology and its parameters; development
of data bass.
-- Description of alternative, supporting, and competitive
technologies.
-1
Development of state-of-society assumptions, for
present and future time periods.
-- identification of potential impacts.
--^ Analysis of and evaluation of impacts in terms of
(a) affected parties, systems, and processes,
	
'	 (b) probability of occurrence, direction, magni-
tude, and duration of induced changes.
	
'`	 --- Identification of possible action options.
-- Assessment and comparison of alternative aCLiOn
options.
On the basis of evidence from this study, it appears that
technology _assessment is most adequately performed by inter-
disciplinary teams using a variety of analytical techniques to
a.ccom lliish the above tasks, augmented by on-site investigations
of specific projects, and with the option of commissioning
additional research if needed.
Analysis if a Sample
of Technology Assessment Studies
Eighty-six officer in federal executive agencies provided a
total of 97 examples o,' technology assessment and related studies
.a
y
which were in progress in 1970-1971 or recently completed by the
agency and its contractors. Since these studies were provided
by agency officials they constitute neithar a random sample nor
an exhaustive list, but substantial evidence suggests that they
made up the bulk of relevant research underway at that time.
	 J4
For purposes of analysis they were divided into six categories:
Wide-scope - nine - Criteria: open-ended consideration
Assessments studies of possible impacts in several
categories; multidisciplinary teams;
the intention to support and in-
fluence public decisionmaking; a
level of funding sufficient for
in-depth examination.
Partial - forty - Criteria: Consideration of pre-
Assessments studies selected secondary consequences in
one or more categories.
Problem- - fourteen Criteria: Focus on a societal
Oriented studies problem to which technology is a
Assessments contributor or a possible solution.
Environmental - fou~:teen - Criteria: Required by the National
Impact studies Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
Statements and offered by an agency as an
example of technology assessment.
These are treated separately from
other partial assessments.
Futures - seventeen - Criteria: Dealt with trends affect-
Studies studies ing uture utilization and develop-
ment of technology -- supply/demand
studies, technological forecasts,
long range planning studies.
Miscellaneous - three	 -- Criteria: Two technology assessment 	 =
studies methodologies, one survey of tech-
nology assessments.
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(a) Wide-Scope Technology Assessments
Initiation of broad policy research by an agency appears
rare; the wade--scope technology assessments were almost all
initiated by Congress or at a higher level of the Executive
Office.
lResearch teams had an average of 4.5 disciplines per team. t _
Physical scientists, economists, and social scientists were most
frequently included. The study efforts took the farm of intex-
disciplinary interaction of the team, using a variety of analyti-
cal techniques, and included field or on-site investigation in
the case of specific projects. one study relied heavily on
modeling and simulation, three provided for input from affected
publics by hearings or surveys and one included a large program
of origional research.
The average cost of these studies was $381,000. The mean
cost was $149,000, there being a wide range of costs. Average
elapsed time* was 16 months. This was somewhat shorter than the
average elapsed time for partial assessments (wide-scope tech-
nology assessments generally constituted the entire workload of
the research team during the time of the assignment, which was
often not the case with partial assessments). The contention of
manv agencv officials that wide-sco pe technoloav assessment was
impractical because it would add greatly to the decisionmakina
time, was not supported by the evidence of these studies.
There appeared to be a significant learning period in the
*From initiation of research to final report.
r
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performance of wide-scope assessments, ex perience in performingj^	 	 P	 xP	 P	 g
wade-scope technology assessment would very likely shorten the
i !	 average elapsed time for studies conducted by experienced teams
or team members.
l The most significant aspect of the wide-scope technology
i`
t	 assessments was ai ;
	
	
greatly broadened or restructured analysis
compared to that originally proposed for the study. This was a
i.
consequence of new information emerging in the course of 'the
study. unexpected potential impacts suggested new policy issues
or alternative technological approaches for exploration.
Four kinds of recommendations were produced by these assess-
ments:
-- New or altered research priorities,
-- Specific policy formulations,
-- Modification of accepted practices or projects,
-- Termination'of projects.
Administrative changes or legislative actions appear to have
resulted from all wide-scope assessments which had been available
to decisionmakers for a period of months prior to this analysis.
They ranged from "informal changes in practices" and "definite
influence on the ordering of research priorities" to outright
termination of two large projects.
(b) Narrow or Partial Technology Assessments
Partial technology assessments had usually been initiated by
an agency, often as a result of unsolicited proposals. They were
r
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performed or funded as part of the on-going substantive research
effort or for purposes of agency programming and evaluation.
Therefore they were less likely than wide-scope assessments to
be directed toward a particular instance of decisionmaking or
policy formulation.
Seventy--eight percent dealt with either one or two categories 	 ,
of impacts, most often economic impacts or environmental impacts.
(Environmental impact statements required under the National
Environmental Policy Act are treated separately below.) Usually
the impacts to be investigated were selected before the study
began, i.e., the investigation was not open-ended. Economic
impacts were analyzed in 55 percent of the partial assessments
and environmental impacts in 38 percent. When social impacts
were investigated, it was most often in terms of socio-economic
changes such as migration of farm workers or "quality of life"
(treated qualitatively).
The most frequently used mode of procedure was _collection and
analysis of existing data. Twenty-two percent of the studies
included some input from affected pablics, usually through
questionnaires or interviews.
The research teams included an average of two disciplines per i
team. The most frequently used were economics and social sciences.
'ii
The average cost of__partial assessments by university research
groups was $85,000; the average for assessments by independent
a
organizations was $139,000. No figures were available for those
22
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performed in-house. University studies had an average cost per
professional man/year expended which was little more than half
of that for independent research groups, probably because
graduate students were used in a professional capacity at low 	
! 
v.
remuneration. No measure for comparison of quality was attempted	
r
in this study.
The average elapsed time for vartial or narrow technoloav
assessments was 18.5 months. For university efforts, average
elapsed time was 13.5 months, for independent research organiza-
tion studies it was 22.2 months.
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(c) Problem-oriented Assessments
Three broad themes were found in this aroun of 14 studies:
environmental and health problems, inadequate public services,
and the probable need for federal regulation in new areas.
Problem-oriented assessments were initiated from outside the
agency in nearly all cases, either by unsolicited proposals or
as a result of requests from Congress, the Executive Office, or
public or professional groups. This suggests that federal
agencies rarely initiate exploratory investigation of societal
problems.
Less than a third of the problem-oriented assessments appear
to have resulted in traceable administrative or legislative
action. These assessments began by conceptualizing a societal
problem in which te4hno,^9y is a factor; to some extent they
open up new areas and represent a preliminary evaluation of the
i
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magnitude of a problem. Thus their influence may be slow to
mature.
The average cost of the problem-oriented studies was
$678,000. This is nearly twice the cost of wide-scope technology
a(
	
	 assessment. The relatively high cost is not fully explainable
and may be spurious since cost figures were available for a
I
	
	
relatively small number of studies. The average elapsed time
was about the same as for partial assessments but teams were
i.
e larger.
' These studies were more multi-disciplinaKy than wide -scope
assessments, with an average of 6.3 disciplines per team.
f
E^ Physical scientists, engineers, and economists were most often
d
included.	 There were social -scientists on only ten percent of
the teams, although they were dealing with societal problems.
f. One-third of problem-oriented assessments utilized panels of
i,
experts from outside the government, more than any other category
of studies.
(d)	 Environmental Impact Statements
Environmental impact statements offered by agencies as
examples of their assessment activity ranged from brief and
cursory documents to elaborate research reports. 	 All were clas-
sified as partial assessments since they dealt primarily with
the physical environment but in some cases other impacts were
discussed, such as effects on ethnic groups and communities.
One-half of the statements were the subject of considerable
24
public controversy. Two, and possibly a third, have been or will
be the subject of law suits. Five of the fourteen were the
subjects of public hearings. Thus these statements were far
more likely than other partial assessments to enter the arena
of public discussion.
Environmental impact statements probably cost less than other
partial_assessments. Since they were prepared within agencies,
no cost figures were available. Officials estimated the costs
as generally in the neighborhood of $15,000 to $50,000, on the
basis of professional staff time. If the average level of effort
is much lower, for example $14,000 or approximately 3 man/months,
the annual cost (at a rate of 200 per month) is $24,000,000 or
600 man/years. This is probably a low figure, and moreover
does not include the cost of multiple agency review.
Environmental impact statements are effective in forcing
agencies to collect information necessary for technology assess-
ment, in providing experience in multidisciplinary consideration
of secondary consequences of actions and pro3ects, and in pro-
viding a mechanism for public review of executive decisionmaking.
The National Environmental Policy Act thus created and maintains
a strong stimulus to the development of the technology assessment
process in federal executive agencies.
(e) Futures Studies
Technology assessment necessitates and benefits from the
further development of capability in futures research. Technology
..
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assessments for governmental projects and programs must deal
with potential or anticipated impacts. They must therefore
consider the trends in technological invention and innovation,
t	 ^^
r
	
	 the possible changes in application and levels of utilization
of technologies, and the possible social environments of the
's
'	 future within which the technology may be utilized.	 r
.- t	
Seventeen examples of the 97 collected were concerned pri-
marily with trends influencing the future levels of utilization
. i
	
	 of technologies: they were supply/demand projections and extrap-
olations, technological forecasts, and long range planning
studies looking to government-wide or agency programming needs.
Only one study attempted systematically to lay out alternative
i
j	 socio-political scenarios for the future. This study was concerned
primarily not with the social utility of a technology but with
planning agency strategy to insure acceptance of its programs;
it was therefore promotional rather than assessment-oriented in
its intent.
The three technological forecasts were initiated by agencies
to help with planning research programs or future regulatory
trends; they were performed by contractors. As has been noted,
j	 civilian agencies tend to lack capability in technological fore-
'	 casting. These three studies cost an average of $140,000.
Supply and demand studies and long-range planning studies
were intended to explore the need for new federal policies, or
to support agency planning and programming. Three were requested
2
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by Congress or the Executive Office, eleven were initiated by
agency personnel.	 About half were performed in-house and half
by contractors.
	 Estimates of cost are difficult since so many
`	 were performed in-house.
	 Four supply and demand studies for
which estimates are available had an average estimated cost of ;e
$743,000, higher than that for any other category, but because
of the small number this figure should be treated with caution.
:y
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	A variety of analytical techniques was used in futures studies,
including modeling and simulation, trend projection and extrapo-
lation, surveys, Delphi techniques, economic analysis, and
reliance on consensus of experts. 	 A majority of studies relied
on one or two of these methods, mathematical modeling and con-
sensus of experts being the most frequently used. 	 Only one study
combined as many as four techniques.
Futures studies were not strongly multi-disciplinary; an
average of 2.1 disciplines was used, engineering and economics
being the most frequent.	 Most of the studies concentrated on one
`r
trend or subject area such as materials supply and demand, econ-
omic projections, or a pattern of technological, development.
-	 3
(f)	 Miscellaneous Studies
Two studies, one by the Water Resources Council and one by a
contractor for OST, were attempts to formulate methodologies for
assessment.
	
Both codified approaches which are already in use
and neither produced innovative techniques qualitatively different
from present assessment procedures.
	 Their usefulness lies in
,
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providing systematic elucidation of the steps in analysis for
1
;s
researchers who have not had experience in technology assessment.
}	 The Water Resources study also includ,-d testing by a number of
1
assessment teams of the proposed procedures, allowing for some
i!	 experimentation in applying such procedures in a field situation.
The variations which resulted suggest that the proposed assess-
ment procedures will give results which are not strictly repro-
ducible but which are comparable, useful, and defensible for
A^	 decisionmakers.
The final study was a survey of current technological activity
in the federal, state, local, institutional, and industrial
sectors. These findings have not yet been released.
Gaps and overlaps
in Federal Technology Assessment
Technology assessment in federal executive agencies (in the
civilian sector) is chiefly concerned with:
-- technology related to basic human needs: food and
fibre technology, housing technology, biomedical
technology, water resource technology;
technology critical to an industrial society: power
technology, mineral resource technology, transporta-
tion and communications technology;
-- technologies over which the federal government
exercises a unique degree of control., largely because
of astronomically high costs of research and develop-
ment and their derivation from early military appli-
cations: space and nuclear power technology.
All of these technology assessment areas were covered by the
present study with the exception of communications technology;
i
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i because of a series of reorganizations and institutional changes
F
which were going on during the period of this study, communica-
tions was not well covered, except for the activity of the U.S.
Postal Service.
	
This area of federal technology assessment n-ads
further attention and description.
In space and nuclear technology, NASA and AEC are in a unique
position to control the development of technology from basic
research to final application and utilization. 	 Theses agencies
therefore have a unique responsibility for, and opportunity for,
•;: technology assessment.	 Both have in the past largely ignored
this responsibility and opportunity. 	 Both agencies interpreted
their mandate as chiefly promotional. 	 AEC's statutory charter
for regulatory activities was written narrowly; the narrow
regulatory power was carried over to the development activities
as a justification for non-attention to potential detrimental
impacts of technological development. 	 Under the pressure of
judicial interpretation of the Nat i-onal Environmental Policy
Act in the Calvert Cliffs case, AEC iias publicly signified its
intention of reconstituting its planning and evaluation pro-
cedures.
NASA has not only failed to develop a capability for technology
assessment but has consistently taken an aggressively promotional
stance toward the technology which after all provides its raison
d'etre. Even the "benefits studies" which NASA sponsors or
performs to display the spin-off of benefits from space activity
6 a,^
R
1
25
11
to the civilian sector, have taken second place to the glamour
f.
	
4 '`
	
of manned space flight in NASA justification of its programs,
	
t	 and secondary benefits and costs have not been thoroughl assessed 	 x
from the stand pint of determining the appxopriate poEtion of
space programs in national priorities.
Food and fibre technology assessment is centered in the
Department of Agriculture. The Department produces a large
volume of partial or narrow assessments of high quality, usually
concerned with economic, and more recently environmental, impacts.
It tends to avoid, ignore, or suppress assessments dealing with
controversial or sensitive social changes. In other areas of
technology, the lack of a single agency with clear responsibility
for planning and evaluating technological developments over a
wide area of concern contributes to a paucity of wide-scope
assessment. In agriculture, however, the chief `actors are fear
of constituency pressure and congressional reaction, stemming
from the incompatibility of two primary Departmental mandates:
service to industrialized agriculture and rotection of the small
farmer.
Successive waves of agricultural technology development have
generated serious social problems as well as world-wide benefits:
the mechanization of farming, the development of chemical fertil-
izers and pesticides, and the change in ownership and management
farming. These changes, and trends such as production of
synthetic fibres, integration of chicken and livestock farming,
r1
and the advent of frozen foods, occurred without comprehensive
anticipatory assessment which might have allowed alleviation of
resulting dislocations.
New developments for which assessment is urgently needed are
biological pesticides, fabrication of struc.^ared proteins, inte-
gration of pork farming, automated underground irrigation, and
controlled envixvnment farming.
Housinq technolocry is i.3rhans the least adeauatel y assessed
of major technologies. Federal involvement in this area was
relatively late. The housing industry is highly fragmented,
reflecting the fragmentation of the market and the lack of
industrialization of the industry. Federal policies such as
post-World spar II veterans' mortgages have had a tremendous
impact on urban--suburban development without bsnefit of antici-
patory assessment. The Department of Dousing and Urban Develop-
ment views provision of additional housing and stabilization of
costs as an urgent and critical problem and therefore puts
emphaAs on action programs rather than evaluative research.
Continuation of current trends and preferences is assumed un-
critically; there is little attention to new developments such
as the movement toward communal living, delayed marriage, or
smaller families. Some assessment of new materials and building
procedures and industrialized housing is performed, but most
evaluation is limited to performance characteristics. The view
of housing needs as an impending crisis impedes the development
of technology assessment in DUD.
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i Biomedical technolo Z assessment is located in several federal
agencies such as NIH, NIW..:, and FDA. They all take a narrow 	 i
view of technology assessment, concerning themselves almost
ff	 ^
r	 entirely with the safety and efficacy to the individual recip-
F
ient of drugs and medical devices, and to a lesser extent with
costs of delivery and impact on medical training and practice.
;t
Consequences of biomedical technology to the public or society
at large and consideration of wider public issues are not found
to a great extent. In large part the explanation for lack of
comprehensive assessment of biomedical technology is the pre-
vailing
	
view of the private and privileged relationship_
between doctor and patient, which is rigorously defended by the
medical profession against interference by public authorities.
Recent advances in biomedical technology such as new contra-
ceptives, behavior modifying drugs and techniques, organ
transplants, genetic manipulation acid laboratory conception,
have ethical and public policy implications which make broader
technology an urgent need. The National Science Foundation
through its RANN Program (Research Applied to National Needs),
has iritiated some assessments in this area. NIH and NIMH have
sponsored some wide scope technology assessments, usually by
scientific advisory committees, but these tend to avoid defining
options or addressing policy issues.
FDA, like other regulatory agencies, has a statutory charter
which gives it little discretionary authority in evaluating new
,s
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drugs and medical devices. Within this context FDA interprets
its authority as narrowly as possible and tends to resist
extensions of its responsibility.
Assessment of water resource projects and technology is highly
important for a number of reasons:
-- Water resource projects constructed with federal funds
may affect many communities in several states or impact
on an entire region,
-- Water resource projects create both public and private
goods,
-- They require large capital investments,
-- They need long lead-times for planning and construction,
and
-- They make large--scale, permanent changes in the physical
environment.
There is a long history of federal involvement in water resource
projects and at least six federal agencies have major responsi-
bilities.
The major constraints on assessment of water resource programs
and projects are institutional (the need to maintain and expand
agency programs and funding) and political (the actions of
congressmen in seeking new projects for their districts, and in
responding to constituency pressures in favor of maintaining the
status quo).
In water resource technology_assessment, however, the process
has been broadened and improved over the last five years, largely
to meet the demands posed by the environmental movement and the
passage of the National Environmental Policy Act. There is also
r:
i
'E 33
- reason to suppose that the improvement will continue.	 in 1965
fi
the Congress created the Water Resources Council which provides
.. a mechanism for integrating technology assessments performed in
federal agencies.
	 This interagency organization has developed
and tested new standards and criteria for water resource projects
planning and evaluation, to be used by all agencies.	 While
r
,.` these by no means guarantee wide-impact assessment, they take
into some account not only environmental concerns but social and
community impacts, and must realistically be appraised as a long
step forward over previous criteria.
In 1968 Congress also established the National Water Commission
to provide an independent assessment of alternative national
water policies (including interbasin transfers, which the Water
Resources Council was statutorially forbidden to consider)and
their economic, social, environmental, and aesthetic consequences.
Thus there is now both a mechanism for integrating agency tech-
nology assessments and a mechanism for providing an independent,
non-agency, assessment of federal water resource projects, pro-
grams, and policies.
Power generation and transmission technology assessment is
important for reasons similar to those operating in the field of
water resource technologyi a long history of federal involvement,
multi--state or regional impacts, large capital investment,
creation of public and private sector goods, significant changes
imposed on the natural environment, and the existence of federal
t
1
i
a w^^
ym1h .
34
l	 regulatory responsibility. The private sector power industry
is large and fragmented, and makes relatively little investment
in research. Demand for sower is rapidly rising, while at the
3
	 same time it is becoming difficult to find acceptable sites for 	
i
v
new power plants because of competitive demands for land near
large bodies of water and because of the opposition of environ- 	 r
mentalists. Application of nuclear technology to power genera-
tion and two problems associated with this innovation (thermal
s
	 pollution and alleged radiation hazards) have contributed a new
factor to severe problems of public acceptance.
A comprehensive technology assessment which considers all of
•.	 the implications of a power--intensive society is urgently needed.
Although technology assessments of power projects are performed
by a number of agencies, and power generation is a factor in
virtually all assessments of water resource projects, no one
agency appears to have the motivation, resources, comprehensive-
ness, and responsibility to perform an overall assessment of this
kind. Such an effort might well be sponsored by the Office of
Emergency Preparedness, the Office of Science and Technology, or
the National Science Foundation; this will probably require
initiation by a mandate from the President or at the request of
Congress.
more research is also needed to identify new sources of energy
and to assess these alternatives. While the National Science
3 5
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program areas, most attention has been given to hardware research
i
and very little so far to assessment.
Mineral resource technology is also an area where federal
f i	 responsibility is fragmented. Several offices within the Depart-
ment of Interior are concerned with mineral resource: located in
the public domain (about one-third of the U.S. land area). The
Bureau of Mines is responsible for mineral conservation, environ-
mental problems, technological development, and health and safety
regulation. Interior also has ecological and conservation
responsibilities, and this dual mission creates internal pressures
on departmental assessors. The petroleum and coal-mining indus-
tries are reported by some observers to be able to successfully
r
bring pressure to bear on technology assessors; substantiation
of this charge is beyond the scope of this study.
The amount of federal technology assessment activity in the
area of mineral resource extraction is very low. This may
reflect the relative importance of the states in this area, and
the influence and power of the minerals industry vis-a-vis its
regulators. In view of the size and economic power of these
industries, the critical importance of mineral resources to the
nation, and the environmental damage associated with many kinds
of minerals extraction, more assessment is badly needed. This
is particularly true of strip mining, off-shore drilling for
petroleum and transmission of petroleum by sea and pipeline.
No single agency has cognizance over a single mineral or source
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or over mineral extraction technctiogy. An in^- :^grating mechani.,_,
for performing comprehensive technology assessment in the minerals
extraction area is badly needed.
Transportation is a critical technology in the United States
because of the very Large land area, a geographically dispersed
population, and a highly integrated industrialized economy.
Although state and local policies have strong influence on trans-
portation, the Interstate Commerce Clause has given the federal
government a dominant role in transportation planning when it
chooses to exercise that role. Highway, rail, air, water and
urban mass transportation systems are affected differently by a
welter of federal, state, and local policies and actions, such
as taxes, user charges, safety regulation, capital charges, and
planning activity. The result is a serious imbalance between
anodes, with nonproductive competition and uneconomic duplication
of facilities and routes in some areas and a lack of any service
in others.
Until 1966 federal planning, promotion, and regulation of
transportation was also on a modal basis and dispersed between
a number of agencies and commissions. In 1966 most promotional
and safety regulation responsibilities wera given to the newly
created Department of Transportation. To a greater extent than
is typical of other federal agencies, DOT officials profess to
have responsibility for, interest in, and enthusiasm for the
development of technology assessment capability. Th,: establishment
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of DOT is beginning to pay off in a strong effort to develop a 	 +
planning, analysis, and evaluation process directed toward the
creation of a national transportation system.
There are great obstacles to this development both internally
and externally. Internally, the obstacles are a scarcity of	 -
funds for intermodal technology assessment, but even more impor-
tantly, the lack of coordination and cooperation between the
constituent modal administrations and between the modal admin-
istrations and departmental planners. Externally, the obstacles
are legislation which freezes inflexible relationships and
competition, and the Highway Trust Fund which stabilizes past
inequities.
The record of the Federal Aviation Administration in technology
assessment is _poor. Although it cooperated in a recent . DOT-NASA
civil aviation policy study which recommended greater attention
to social science analysis in research, including social impact
analysis, FAA continues to adopt a promotional stance toward new
air systems and airports. FAA officials claim no responsibility
for or interest in broadening their assessment process. A few
FAA officials expect this attitude to change rapidly under pres- 	 ,
sure from DOT and Congress. The change is not yet apparent.
The Federal Hiqhwav Administration (FHWA) is displaying new
interest in social and environmental impact studies, although i
is not vet clear to what extent these will be inte grated into
decisionmaking. Highway transportation enjoys the benefits of
i4
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the Highway Trust Fund and the political protection of an
allegedly powerful highway lobby. Assessment in FHWA has suf-
fered from this political pressure and that which arises from
State Highway Departments. But public controversy over urban
segments of the Interstate and Defense Highway System begun in
1956 caused costly delays and forced some improvement in the
planning process. The first congressional response, a require-
ment for comprehensive metropolitan planning written into the
1962 Highway Act, helped to rationalize regional highway planning
but also created a gap between regional highway planners and
local decisionmakers in which social impacts of highway location
was largely ignored.
Public reaction to community disruption and massive relocation
built up, and concern for the natural environment provided
additional pressure. Congress added, in successive highway
legislation during the 1960's, requirements for consideration
of environmental and social impacts, new restrictions on reloca-
tion, and a requirement for consultation with other agencies.
Under these pressures the FHWA which had sponsored some environ-
mental and social impact studies (and collected large numbers of
those done by states and universities) over a period of two
decades, has greatly expanded this activity and provided addi-
tional guidelines for state and local planners.
The Federal Railroad Administration has begun preparations
for several large wide impact technology assessments. Until 1971
i;
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-	 s	 FRA had little or no money for social impact research.. With
American railroads approaching a state of crisis, Congress has
is
provided more funds and expanded FRA responsibilities in the
+f
	
	 areas of safety, efficiency, and environmental considerations.
FRA is now planning technology assessments of relocation of rail
facilities in rail-locked communities, of alternative safety
i^
devices for rail crossings, and of extension of the Alaska
^--
	
	
Railway. Plans for these studies are couched in technology
assessment terminology and indicate a comprehensive study plan
'	 but serious constraints of timing and funding.
Urban mass transit, until recently the step-child of federal
transportation planning and funding, is now given "highest
priority" by DOT. Until recently, the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration regarded its primary mission as that of subsi-
dizing local transit system development. While capital grants
is still the primary thrust, there is now a policy that local
projects should provide test cases for development of innovative
approaches which have general applicability in other urban areas.
UMTA displays something of the same crisis mentality shown by HUD
in housing; since urban transit is an urgent need, emphasis is
put on action programs, rather than on evaluation of social
impacts of alternative solutions.
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Prerequisites for Further Improvement of
Governmental Technology Assessment
Futures Research must be u2graded and emphasized to allow
improved forecasting of technological innovation and application,
improved anticipation of possible impacts, and improved under-
standing of the alternative social contexts in which these trends
may be experienced.
Current practices reinforce shortsightedness. When cumulative
detrimental impacts reach serious proportions, or when the need
for new technology or for technological solutions to societal
problems is perceived as critical or urgent, action programs are.
emphasized. The evaluation of the potential social impacts of
alternative solutions is downplayed or avoided lest it delay or
interfere with immediate solutions. Urgent priorities and the
demand for fast solutions constrain time, money, and personnel
for foresight. More reliable and comprehensive forecasting
techniques may help avoid such situations by anticipating prob-
lems before they become urgent and encourage alternative techno-
logical plans in advance of immediate needs. However, it
appears that agencies will allocate sufficient funds and
expertise to long-range n las.ning and forecasting only if they
receive a strong directive to do so from the Administration or
from Congress.
Further major developments in technology assessment methodology
will come from experience and experimentation to performing
41
technology assessment: the sponsoring of comprehensive technol-
ogy assessments should not be contingent upon the general
acce tance of systematic or elegant scientific methodologies.
The development of an exhaustive and universally accepted list
of social indicators, and the working o»t of quantifiable
relationships between technological applications, impacts, and
processes of social change is desirable. Development of tech-
nology assessment as an integral part of planning and evaluation
of technological projects and programs can proceed without
standardization of procedures if there is a strong and continu-
ing demand from Congress or from the President through the Office
of Management and Budget.
The demand for technology assessment from the agencies should
be substantive rather than procedural. Institutionalization of
technology assessment on the model of the filing of environmental
impact statements is not desirable. It is likely that formal
procedures such as the filing of technology assessment state-
ments would quickly degenerate into a procedural requirement to
be satisfi.ed,at the lowest possible level of effort, and by
adding greatly to the workload of the agencies would absorb
resources and time better spent on high priority projects and
anticipatory, long-range assessments.
In some areas, particularly housing, biomedical, s ace, mass
transportation, and mineral resource extraction technologies,
immediate and significant increase in volume, as well as the
r
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z; quality, of technology assessments is necessary.
	
The pressing
need for more housing and more urban mass transportation, the
rapid development of biomedical science, and the uncritical
attitudes and policies of NASA and of agencies promoting mineral 	
. x
resource development, have resulted in serious gaps in govern-
;.
i mental technology assessment. 	 These gaps can be corrected if
^S
Congress and the Office of Management and Budget provide both
the requirement and the resources for improvement of the planning
and evaluation process within existing agencies.
In other areas, interagency organizations are needed to
collect, compare, weigh, and integrate technology assessments for
the use of decisionmakers.	 For technologies such as power and
chemicals (pesticides, fertilizers, and food additives), where
a number of agencies share responsibilities, each agency has a
narrow mission or a specialized constituency.
	 Partial assess-
ments are conducted by various agencies but none is balanced
and comprehensive.
The report of the National Academy of Public Administration
(A Technology Assessment System for the Executive Branch, 1970)
recommended that the Council on Environmental Quality become the
center for policy, monitoring, and review of technology assess--
meat for the Executive Branch.
	
This recommendation now appears
ill--advised.	 The Council on Environmental Quality is within the
Executive Office of the President. 	 To expand its function to the
extent necessary to monitor assessments from all agencies and to
a
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improve the process substantively, would require resources and
multidisciplinary personnel far in excess of what is appropriate
for an office in that locus. As it presently operates within a	 j
narrower range of responsibility, the Council's work is largely
1
	
	 r'
procedural. Broadening of the substantive responsibility of
F	 agencies as a result of the National Environmental Policy Act
has come, and probably will continue to come, not because of
pressure from the Council so much as from public pressure
acting through Congress and the courts.
A better alternative is the creation of a small staff for
each ma j or area of technology, following the model of the Water
Resources Council. A professional staff not under the direction
of any single agency could collect, compare, and evaluate tech-
nology assessments performed by all agencies impinging on the
technology, and from other assessment entities in the private
sector, and could also suggest and sponsor other assessments
which are needed.
Finally, a source of independent assessments is needed. In
all areas of federal involvement with technology, performance of
objective comprehensive technology assessments is constrained by
the demands of institutional protection. Agency performance is
judged in terns of the volume of successful projects and programs
and in terms of giowth of appropriations and personnel. The
success of programs and projects is generally judged in terms
of planned or intentional performance rather than in terms of
44
second or third order effects which show up later and are some-
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times difficult to relate to specific decisions or programs.
' These factors make inevitable some agency bias. 	 Therefore a
j' source of independent assessments should also be prcvided.
This function is best served by an organization which has no
responsibility either for the projects and programs being
assessed, or for avoiding or correcting their possible.conse-
quences.
	
An agency which funds research but which has no line
responsibility is in the most appropriate situation to sponsor
independent technology assessments and to make these available
to the Executive, the Legislature, and the public. 	 Technol-
ogy assessments sponsored in this way can cut across agency
missions and can be consucted at any stage of development,
including the critical anticipatory stage. 	 They can potentially
be given maximum exposure for all elements of the public decision-
s:
making process.
In order to achieve these two advantages fully, however,
three things are necessary. 	 The first is a system of publication
and dissemination of assessment results so they reach the public
and decisionmakers quickly, and in a readable and usable form.
Most research-funding agencies have not yet developed such
dissemination systems.	 The second necessity is for congressional
funding which is both ample and sustained.	 The third requisite
is that the management of the sponsoring agency adopt and maintain
an attitude toward assessment needs which is fiercely indepen-
dent, daring, and Farsighted.
r
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RECOMMENDATIONS
More attention to anticipatory assessment and long-range
planning must be demanded from all igencies. Congress and
the Executive office (especially OMB) should provide addi-
tional resources and strong directives for expanded futures
research, including technological forecasting, technology
assessment, and social forecasting.
Emphasis on performance of technology assessment should
not wait upon the development and acceptance of systematic
methodology. Federal executive agencies are now in a
position to perform and use technology assessment, and
further methodological development should and will come
from experience and experimentation in conducting technology
assessment.
III. Strong and continuing pressure from Congress and from the
Office of Management and Budget will be necessary to over-
come built-in institutional inertia and ensure that federal
agencies continue to improve and broaden the planning and
evaluative procedures for technological projects. OMB
should take steps to provide this pressure.
IV. The demands made by the Office of Management and Budget
and the Congress should be substantive but not procedural.
Formal requirements for technology assessment statements
I.
II.
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on the modal of environmental impact statements are not
desirable.
V. Pressure for a greatly expanded volume of technology
assessment is especially needed in housing technology,
biomedical technology, space technology, mass transporta- 	 i^
tion technology, and mineral resource extraction technology.
r
VI. New organizations with small professional staffs should
be provided for certain major areas of technology where
many federal agencies have partial, overlapping, or conflict-
ing responsibilities, such as power generation, chemicals,
and biomedical technology. "he function of these offices,
	 }
following the model of the Water Resources Council, would
be to collect, compare, weigh, and integrate technology
assessments from the public and private sectors.
VII. A source of independent technology assessments should be
provided. Maximum objectivity and usefulness to public
decisionmakers can be achieved if assessments are sponsored
by a federal entity having no responsibility for the project
1
or program to be assessed, and are conducted by independent
research organizations or university research groups.
E
r.
VIII. An agency which funds research but which has no line
responsibility can best provide this source of independent
assessments. Such agency must develop a system for
Y
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publication and dissemination of assessment results to
decisionmakers and to the public in a speedy and usable
form.	 Funding for this agency must be ample and sustained.
IX.	 An immediate research effort should be undertaken to
identify possible future innovations and inventions which
need assessment.
	 The National Science Foundation should
sponsor a national survey of industry, research centers and
^i
government sources, aimed at identifying technology assess-
ments which should be undertaken at once (some of which have
been pinpointed through the present study).
	 These would
include recent and imminent developments in the experimental
sciences, and also areas in which dramatic changes in level
of application or utilization of existing technology are
occurring or are likely to occur.
	 The study should also
include a large-scale effort in technological forecasting
to anticipate developmental trends which have not yet become
apparent.	 The fruitful approach to societal problems arising
from technology is not alleviation but anticipation and
avoidance.
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4. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
The National Science Foundation requested die Pro-
gram of Policy Studies in Science and Technology of the
George Washington University to provide a list of can-
didates for technology assessment as proposed by high-
level Federal executives. The purpose of the list would
be to assist NSF in its role of supporting planning and
assessment activities in and out of government.
The task was to result in four items:
• A list of subjects which survey participants sug-
gested needed technology assessment together with an
indication of the frequency of each subject mentioned;
• Suggested criteria for categorization of subjects
for assessment;
• A preliminary evaluation of the urgency and of
the significance of each candidate based on responses
obtained by the survey; and
• Levels of government and agency location for
recommended technology assessments.
Discussion
The study is an informational instrument and an edu-
cational tool. Used as a conventional data-gathering de-
vice, there are specific questions to be posed and an-
swered. Less obvious but no less significant, a survey has
a corollary aim of conveying knowledge about the sub-
ject on which opinions are sought. The study was based
on mail questionnaires and face to face interviews. These
two modes served the dual purpose of seeking necessary
information and of educating the participants on tech-
nology assessment.
The survey offered the participants an opportunity to
reflect on technological developments that warranted
technology assessment, and provided a framework in
which they should be considered. Which of these devel-
opments are in limited use? When would others achieve
general or widespread use? What would be the social
benefits or costs and what would be the sL^ape in world-
wide, national, regional, State, and local terms? On
which groups, professional, industrial, geographical
would fire teciinoiogical developments impact? By way
of summing up, which agencies would have residual re-
sponsibility for technology assessments, and under what
heading, research, regulation, enforcement, or funding
would this accountability be exercised?
Methodology
The methodology consisted of a mailout of 206
questionnaires to officials in 24 Federal agencies and 54
interviews held in nine, It was necessary to identify a
participant population, to design the questionnaire, to
classify the technologies, and to analyze the data re-
ceived quantitatively and qualitatively.
Classification of the nominees for technology assess-
ment produced a three-by-three matrix with one dimen-
sion consisting of physical, biological, and social rows,
and the other problem, technology, and project i-1-
umns. Nominated technologies were assigned to one of
the nine cells of that matrix.
Conclusions
In general, it can be concluded that social impacts are
less fully understood than their physical counterparts for
at least two reasons. One, social impac ts are less suscepti-
ble to detection and to quantification, nor are there pre-
cise legislative requirements to report them. Two, there
are fewer social scientists as compared to physical scien-
tists in most Federal agencies. Despite these conditions,
it is encouraging to note that anticipation of social im.
pacts occurred as often as indicated. More specifically:
1. Some subject areas for technology assessment
were proposed 20 or more times:
• transportation,
• energy,
• management,
• automation and computers,
• communications,
• resource use,
• health care,
• policy,
• education.
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2. Respondents indicated that 78.7 percent of the
technological
	 developments proposed	 for assessment
{ were already in limited use, 17.2 percent in general use,
'- and 4.1 percent in widespread use.
'	 `	 E 3. The periods of time in which proposed techno-
logical developments were anticipated to achieve general
use were:
a. Ten percent in one to two years;
b. Less than 23 percent in two to four years;
c. Nearly 28 percent in four to eight years;
't d. The remainder in over eight years.
-
The periods of time for technological developments
E to attain widespread usage were:
j a. More than eight years, the majority (60 per-
cent); r	 4
b. Four to eight years (20 percent);
c. Four years( 14 percent); and
d. The period 1973-75, less than six percent.
4. Most important impact areas to assess:
Environmental impacts received double the
number of entries as those noted for social impacts.
5. The scope of impacts attributed to technologi-
cal developments rated "most important," "next most
important," and "third most important," was:
a. Worldwide effect (42.8 percent)
b. National impact (41.2 percent)
c. Regional impacts (6 percent) (State and lo-
cal)
6. Groups impacted:
Respondents tended to use general inclusive terms
such as "all," "many," "society," or "the general pub-
lic." More limited groups (e,g., agriculture, taxpayers,
scientists or specific industrial groups) were also cited at
times but it was noted that affected groups were often
thought of as institutions (banks, the schools and univer-
sities) or occupations (scientists, retailers, farm workers)
rather than in socioeconomic or physical terms (poor,
the undereducated, the handicapped, the aged).
7. Type of impact:
The technologies rated as "harmful" or "very harm-
ful" showed no pattern of concentration, and in fact
were often the same technological developments rated
by others as beneficial or very beneficial. Virtually with-
out exception, developments rated "harmful" were al-
ready in use. Either widespread faith in progress, or a
lack of discrimination appears indicated in that individ•
uals depicted their nominees as "very beneficial" in over-
all impact in 38 percent of citations.
8. Preliminary evaluation of the urgency and the
significance of selected subjects for technology assess-
ment:
Because of the low number of entries in the category
that could be taken to be an urgent and significant cate-
gory for technology assessment, that is, the very harmful
category, and the cluster of entries in the very beneficial
and in the beneficial categories, it is difficult to draw
definite conclusions regarding the urgency and signifi-
cance of selected subjects for Technology Assessment.
(See Tables 4 and 5.)
9. Levels of government and agency location for
technological responsibilities:
Survey participants most often indicated Federal
agencies as having primary concern for technology devel-
opments with State governments second. Within the
Federal framework, the Environmental Protection
Agency was most often cited as the agency which should
have responsibility. Research, in contrast to enforcement
or regulation, was most often given as the area of re-
sponsibility.
10. In general technologies should be assessed by
more than one institution, Federal agencies were recom-
mended 153 times, the Congress 91 times, State govern-
ment 50 times, local government 40 times, industry 19
times, international organizations seven times, and uni-
versities eight times. Numerous other groups were men•
tioned.
2
The Purposes of Technology Assessment
1 Technology, it can be said, is the imposition of
change on a product, process, institution or relationship,
usually for the purpose of improvement and progress,
and also usually with some real or imagined rational jus-
tification.
Postindustrial (or technological) man has Ieamed that
changing a single element of a complex and poorly un-
derstood system usually produces unexpected, and often
highly undesirable results in addition to the intended
improvement. Because of this, he has devised yet an-
other technology, that of examining changes to ascertain
as best he can all of the substantial effects. To ascertain
all the substantial effects of a change, past, current, fu-
ture, is the purpose of technology assessment.
By examining past changes, technology assessment
can learn how seemingly wholly desirable technological
impositions have resulted in unintended, unexpected and
undesirable impacts. This is instructive, both as to how
indirect and downstream impacts occur, and how they
can be anticipated by technology assessment.
By examining changes which are still underway, tech-
nology assessment can discover undetected or hidden im-
pacts. With this information, attempts can be made to
avoid, to modify or to enhance, as appropriate, the pre-
viously hidden impacts, or to modify the basic change
itself based on a careful consideration of all of the signif-
icant impacts involved, rather than on the one that in-
spired the change in the first place.
By examining possible future changes, technology
assessment attempts to provide policy makers with
better data and analyses for making policy decisions. As
with most forecasting exercises, the results will seldom
achieve perfection, but the effort will result in a more
rational and effective policy decision process.
The Significance of Technology Assessment
Technology assessment is significant for at least three
equally important reasons.
II. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSESSMENT
First, technology assessment is the use of systematic
methods to examine applications of science and technol-
ogy.
Second, when man's ability to alter his environment
was puny and his alterations were small and temporary,
it was worth little to foretell all of the effects of those
changes because both changes and effects soon passed.
Now, however, changes are large, impacts are massive,
and moreover may be irrevocably disastrous.
Third, in a modern democratic society, accurate, dis-
interested, and complete knowledge is essential for via-
ble operation. Not to provide that information subverts
the intent of democracy. Lacking such knowledge,
power moves from the people to those special interests
which, seeking their own narrow goals, are not likely to
search for reasons to oppose them. The interests of
those who may be adversely affected are thereby usually
ignored until too late. Technology assessment is, there-
fore, significant in at least three principal ways: scien-
tific, democratic, and human survival.
Technology assessment is significant in still another
way, social justice. For example, why should all the
downstream users of a stream suffer loss of that use to
provide a free sewer for an upstream user? Not all tech-
nological changes are so clear cut, yet there are always
beneficiaries and "disbeneficiaries." In the realm of con-
flicting values, an ethical society is interested in equity.
Technology assessment is a means of deciding the rela-
tive costs and benefits to each of those affected by a
technological change. In that way the equity of the pro-
posed change can be determined. Certainly technology
assessment itself does not determine the equity, nor
should it try. But it does provide an essential ingredient
for such a determination.
If scientific data and analysis is not used in making
equity decisions, such decisions become guesses, blind
chance, or responses to hidden biases and pressures.
Table i shows the complete list of 457 technologies
nominated by participants in the study. Since many
were nominated more than once, 382 candidates for
technology assessment result from the questionnaires
y
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and from the interviews. Nominees are organized accord-
ing to the source of interest -- a technology, a problem,
! or a project, and by the land of technology — physical,
biological, or social (See Figure 1). The cells are designa-
ted by letters for convenience in presenting the materiel
in Table 1, i e., the contents of each cell,
	
^.	 A more detailed discussion of this taxonomy will be
fr	 .;t
^	 r'
FIGURE 1 -- Classification of Technology Assessments
Origin
Technologies	 Problem
	
Technology	 Project
Subcategories
1. Transportation	 ..................................
2.Management	 ....................................
3. Energy .........................................
4. Communications .................................
5, Computers/Automation ...........................
6. Resource Use	 ...................................
7- Health Care .....................................
8. Policy	 .........................................
9.Education	 ..........................
10.Pollution	 .......................................
11. Community Development ..........................
12.Economics ......................................
13. Public S.^fety ....................................
14.Politics .........................................
15. Weather Modification .............................
16. Nuclear Technology ...............................
17.Space/Satellites ..................................
18.Agriculture	 .....................................
19.Water ..........................................
20. Mental Health	 ...................................
21. Resource Conservation ............................
22.Sociology	 ......................................
23. Electronics	 ....................................
24.Biology	 ........................................
25.Birth Control	 ...................................
26.Nutrition .......................................
27. Consumer Behavior ...............................
28. Disaster Planning .................................
29. Construction	 ...................................
30. Industrial Production	 ............ I ..... I ..........
31. Cartography	 ....................................
TOTAL ........................................
	
Thirty-one subcategories were used to group all T.A.
	
category, but not all subcategories were represented in
	
candidates. All candidates were assigned to a sub-
	
each cell of the matrix.
FIGURE 2 — Nominees by Subcategories
Matrix Cells
A,1 A,2 A,3 8,1 8,2 8,3 C,1 C,2 C,3 Total
10 47 11 2 71
1 1 1 15 11 6 35
13 19 1 33
2 12 13 1 28
1 9 4 1 5 5 3 28
4 9 4 6 1 3 27
2 2 5 6 2 3 6 25
10 4 7 21
7 10 3 20
6 9 2 17
2 10 2 2 16
5 5 5 15
4 4 5 13
6 3 3 12
8 4 12
1 8 1 110
1 5 4 10
1 1 3 1 2 8
3 4 1 8
6 1 7
3 1 3 7
1 6 7
6 6
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 1 1 3
2 1 3
1 1 2
1 1 2
1 1
58 136 51 8 15 6 80 51 52 457
i^
t
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Matrix Cali Codes
I'	 A,I Physical-Problem(11) 	 B,2 Biological-Technology (22)
A,2 Physical-Technology(12)	 8,3 Biological-Project(23)
A,3 Physical-Project (13)	 C,1 Social-Problem (31)
B,I Biological-Problem (21)	 C,2 Social-Technology (52)
C,3 Social-Project (33)
1
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III. ANALYSIS
The proposal set forth four main objectives for the
study:
1. To suggest criteria for categorization of sub-
jects proposed for technology assessment;
2. To develop a list of technological developments
for which Federal officials believe technology assessment
is needed;
3. To provide some preliminary evaluation of the
urgency and the significance of the selected topics; and
4. To suggest levels of government and agency lo-
cation for recommended technology assessments.
Possible Criteria for Categorization of
Subjects for Technology Assessment
The majority of the nominees, 60 percent, were
placed in the category of requiring more than eight years
to achieve widespread usage, e.g., dietary changes for
prevention of arteriosclerosis (see ;able 7, p. 35). Some-
what less than 20 percent were considered as taking four
to eight years, e.g., breeder reactors (see Table 7, p. 37).
Nearly 14 percent were thought to require four years,
e.g., improved resolution for Earth Resources Technol-
ogy Survey (ERTS) (see Table 7, p. 37), while fewer
than six percent were expected to realize widespread use
in the period 1973-75, e.g., the Marine Mammal Act (see
Table 7, p. 30). Most respondents, it appears, took very
seriously the anticipatory nature of technology assess-
ment.
1. Time Span for the Technological Development
The survey approached the question of when assess-
ment of a suggested invention, innovation, or application
should be undertaken by asking two questions: whether
the technology is in limited, general, or widespread use,
and the period of time which the technological develop-
ment would take to achieve general widespread use (see
items 5 and 6 of the questionnaire, Appendix B). To
provide the reader with an overview of the relative ur-
gency of suggested assessments from the standpoint of
judgments related to these two criteria, Tables 2 and 3
list these candidates in each developmental category.
Respondents indicated that 78.7 percent of the tech-
nological developments were already in limited use. Only
17.2 percent were reported as being in general use, and
4.1 percent in widespread use.
Of those T.A. candidates not now in use, barely 10
percent of the nominees were seen as achieving general
use within one or two years, and slightly less than 23
percent in two or four years. Nearly 28 percent of the
nominees were anticipated within four to eight years,
and the remainder, 39 percent, in over eight years. In
this category, some nominees were seen as requiring as
much as about 20 years to achieve general usage,e.g.,
liquid sodium nuclear enactor (see Table 7, p. 26).*
2. Nature, Scope, and Significance of Potential Impacts
The heart of the survey is to be found in the respon-
dents' anticipation of potential impacts. Three of the
eight criteria for categorization of subjects for technol-
ogy assessment dealt with impacts. The survey handled
references to impacts under five direct or corollary items
of the questionnaire.
(a) Most Important Impact Areas To Assess
(Questionnaire items 7a, 8a, 9a).
Sixty respondents indicated the impacts related to
the environment as a necessary area for assessment, al-
most double the number of 35 that put forth social or
sociological impacts for assessment (e.g., the displace-
ment of people as a result of farm mechanization). Eco-
nomic benefits-costs received 25 citations, and the cost-
effectiveness of systems was mentioned 23 times.
Federal officials thus reflected recent public concern
over environmental degradations and hazards to health
and to safety. Many of the respondents have been in-
volved in preparation or review of Environmental Impact
Statements required under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, which has undoubtedly sensitized
them to possible impacts on the physical environment.
*Table 7 is a summary of the raw data for the study.
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Social impacts are more poorly understood, and at pres-
ent less susceptible to detection and to quantification.
Nor is there a systematic legislative requirement for their
reporting. There are also relatively few social scientists,
as compared to physical scientists, economists, and en-
gineers in most Federal agencies.* Given these condi-
tions, it is encouraging that anticipation of social im-
pacts occurred as often as indicated.
(b) Scope (Scale) of Impacts (Questionnaire items
7b, 8b, 9b).
Eighty-four percent of the impacts identified as
"most important," next most important, and third most
important were depicted as having a worldwide effect
(42.8 percent), or a national impact (41.2 percent).
[Nearly I1 percent were estimated to have regional im-
pacts, and less than six percent to have consequences
primarily for State and local areas (see 'fable 3). This
may indicate that technology assessment will continue
to be concentrated at the Federal government; but it
should be noted that respondents in this survey were all
Federal officials. They were also thinking primarily of
technological developments at a fairly high level of ab-
straction, Increased funding for development of innova-
tive energy technology, or national policy concerning
water resources, for example, might best be assessed at a
national level, while assessment of a particular power
plant or dam might be an appropriate subject for local or
regional level assessment.
(c) Groups Impacted	 (Questionnaire items
7c, 8c(i), 9c(I).
Respondents gave 807 responses identifying groups
who would be affected by the potential technological
developments. One hundred and five responses singled
out "all," "many," or specific industrial groups as being
affected by the technological development. Almost the
same number ( 102) entries) pointed out "society" as
being affected, and another 72 responses named the
"general public," a subset of society. More limited
groups (e,g., agriculture, taxpayers, scientists) were fre-
quently mentioned, but it is noticeable that affected
groups were more often thought of as institutions
(banks, educational institutions) or occupations (scien-
*In 86 Federal offices it was reported that social scientists
(anthropologists, historians, political scientists, psychologists,
and soeiologi , ts) make up 19 percent of the professional staffs.
By contrast, engineers (54 percent). economists (46 percent),
physical scientists (33 percent), biological and medical scientists
(28 percent), and operations research analysts (21 percent)
showed the disparity in emphasis. See Vary T. Coates, Technol-
ogy and Public Policy, The Process of Technology Assessment in
the Federal Government, 1, p. 2-13,
tists, retailers, agricultural workers) than in socio-
economic or physical terms (the poor, the under-
educated, the handicapped, the aged).
(d) Type of Impact (Questionnaire items
7c, 8c(1), 9c(1).
A total of 753 different entries indicated the nature
of an impact on specific groups (professional, industrial,
geographical, and social). Forty-three impacts were spec-
ified as very harmful, and 170 as harmful A much larger
proportion, about one-third of the impacts, or 255, were
depicted as beneficial, and nearly 38 percent, or 285, as
very beneficiaL (See Tables 4 and 7).
The technologies which individuals rated as harmful
or very harmful showed no pattern of concentration,
and in fact were often the same technological develop-
ments rated by others as beneficial or very beneficial
(e.g., changes in work scheduling or retirement, air pollu-
tion controls on automobiles). Almost without excep-
tion, the developments rated harmful were either already
in use (e.g,, existing decision processes and criteria for
land use, concentration of farming) or were expected to
be in widespread use within the next four to ten years.
Either widespread faith in progress, or a lack of dis-
crimination seems indicated by the fact that individuals
rated their nominees as very beneficial in overall impact
in 38 percent of the cases. Nominees called very bene-
ficial covered a wide range, but were especially con-
centrated in telecommunications and information
technology, transportation, energy generation and re-
sources, environmental enhancement measures, and
building materials and techniques. However, in nearly
three out of four cases a technological development
rated as very beneficial was also judged by the same
individual to have significant disadvantages. Most often
the disadvantages were problems of transition (obsoles-
cence of existing technologies, need for new institu-
tions), costs (either development and investment costs,
or increased costs of a service to users), detriments to
those with a vested interest in existing technologies
which would be replaced, or possible environmental
degradation. Concerning improved telecommunications
and information technology, a threat to privacy was
often cited as a significant disadvantage. As for innova-
tive transportation, effects on urban land use and popu-
lation distribution were often cited.
(e) Principal Benefits (Planned and Unplanned)
And Principal Disadvantages (Questionnaire items
10(a)(b)(c).
Table 5 shows a selected listing of benefits and dis-
advantages that were associated with particular techno-
logical developments. (Table 7 gives the full display of
r r	 ^^
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ibenefits and disadvantages). Eighteen respondents cited
improvement or enhancement of the enviroment as the
principal planner
 benefit of individual technological
developmen ts.
Thirteen respondents identified environment im-
provement as the principal unplanned benefit resulting
from their nominees for technology assessment; 15
respondents pointed to environmental damage as the
major disadvantage of technological. developments. Four-
t^"' s  c rwudenis referred to imptovenient in transporta-
tion systems, and 13 to the quality of life as the princi-
pal planned benefits.
3. Preliminary Evaluation of the Urgency and the Signif-
icance of Each Candidate
The survey used the distribution of the potential
overall impacts and the order of subcategories of techno-
logical developments as a basis for determining a prelim-
inary evaluation of the urgency and the significance of
selected top*.'.s. The distribution of data, however, makes
it difficult to draw definite conclusions,
It would appear logical to indicate a very harmful
technological development would suggest categorization
for preliminary evaluation and urgency. Yet only two
nominees fell under this heading, the breeder reactor
program and the present decision-making process and
criteria for land use. Interestingly, one respondent re-
ported this technological development as favorable. out
of 189 entries this amounted to only 1 percent. The
harmful category, e.g., development of a hydrogen
energy transport system, mobile homes as a way of life,
and regulating use of farm chemicals to reduce pollution
of streams and Iakes furnished 17 entries, or 9 percent of
the total.
By contrast, a cluster of entries appeared in the very
beneficial and beneficial categories. In the first, e.g., vid-
eophone or televised closed-circuit conferences, remote-
controlled railroad freight cars, ocean offshore break-
waters and islands, raining -nd processing shale for oil,
individuals rated 80 of their nominees in this group (42
percent). In the second, e.g., improved resolutions of
Earth Resources Technology Survey (ERTS) Cameras,
environmental controls, impact of computer technology
on the Federal bureaucracy, and technology for utiliza-
tion of renewable energy resources, individuals scored 58
of their nominees (30 percent) fell with this group. On
tale basis of these contrasting potential overall impacts, it
is difficult to be definitive about the urgency and signifi-
cance of topics.
Not is it less difficult to order technological develop-
ments according to subcategories. Candidates were
grouped according to innovation or invention, and not
by problem or impact. Yet it is possible to conclude that
transportation within both dimensions of the matrix had
a clear Lead over the next subcategory, management (see
Figure 2). More definitely established were agencies con-
cerned and their types of responsibility.
4. Levels of Government and Agency Location for
Responsibiity over the Technology
With regard to technologies proposed for assessment,
responsibility for research, enforcement, regulation, and
other activities is seen as resting principally in Federal
agencies. State governments were the second most fre-
quent locus for those responsibilities (responses to ques-
tion 3).
Within the Feederal framework, the Environmental
Protection Agency most often was cited as the place for
these responsibilities (see Table 6).
Of 409 answers, 50 percent cited research as a prime
responsibility. Twenty-eight percent cited regulation as
the prime responsibility. The remainder were split be-
tween enforcement (13 percent) and "others" (10 per-
cen t).
5. Where Technology Assessment Should Be Conducted.
In response to question 12, 417 suggestions were
made for where technology assessments should be con-
ducted. There were as follows:
(5 specific agencies were cited 6 times)
Federal Agencies ................ 153
Congress ..................... 91
State Governments .............. 50
Local Governments .............. 40
Industry ..................... 19
Universities ...................
	
8
International Groups .............
	 7
Others ...................... 49
Others included non-profit groups, the National
Acadernies, blue-ribbon commissions, and neighborhood
and environmental groups.
Federal agencies and the Congress were frequently
cited simultaneously, as were State and local government
frequently cited along with the Federal government and
the Congress.
The general impression is that more than one agency
or institution should be assessing the candidates pro-
posed.
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logies ........... 11) 2
(2) Communication —
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13) Broadband Com-
munications..... 	 (1) 2
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12) The Transistor.. 1
13) Microwave ..... 1
f.	 Energy............ (13)	 14	 (5)	 5	 (15) 19
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Energy Source .. 1	 1
(2) Coal Gasification (1)	 2
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(6) D.C. Electric
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(3) Invasion of Pri-
vacy by Intercon-
nected Date Banks 7
141 Cost -benefit Anal-
ysis for ADP .... 1
g. Health Care........ 11)	 1 (1)	 1 (2) 2
(1) Drug Abuse De-
tection Techni-
ques .......... 1
(2) Disposable Sup-
plies for Hospi-
tale........... 1
h. Industrial Production ( 1)	 1 11) 1
(1) Metal Forgin g . !
High Energy.... 1
_
i. Management ....... {71
	
1 11) 1
(1) Work at Home
Through Communi
nication Hookup. 1
1. Nuclear Technology. , (1)	 1 (1) 1
(1) Breeder Reactor . 1
k.	 Pollution	 ......... (1)	 1 (1)	 1 121 2
11) Removal of Stack
Gases of Coal-
fired Power Sta-
tions	 ......... 1
12) Limiting Horse-
power as a Means
of Controlling
Internal Combus-
tion Pollution . , 1
ii
REPRODUCIBILITY OF TUL^
ORIGINAL PAGE IS POOR
ti
.	 I I. Resource Use .........(4) 4	 (4)	 4
(1) Recovery of Alum-
ina for Domestic
Raw Materials ..... 1
(2) Use of Sewage &
Industrial Wastes 1
(3) Use of Waste Wood
for Structural Mate-
rials
	
.... - ...... 1
(4) Advanced Logging
Systems......... 1
m. Space/Satellites. ... . (2) 4	 (2)	 4
(11 Earth Observation
Satellites ....... 11) 3
(2) Improved Reso-
lution of ERTS
Cameras ....... 1
n. Transportation ...... (6) 8	 (3)	 3	 (B) 11
11)	 Electric Cars .... 1
12) Remote Control
for Railroad Freight
Cars........... 1
(3) Transport Wood
Chips by Hydraulic
Pipeline ........ 1
(4) Rapid Transit
(Bus).......... 01 3	 1
(5) Magnetically Levi-
tated Trains ..... 1
161 increased Use of
1
c.	 Health Care ........ (2) 3 (2} 2 (4) 5
(1)	 General	 ....... 1
{2) New Equipment i y
for Medical Care. 1
(3) Cancer Cure , , , , (1) 2
(4) Zero Aging ..... 1
d. Nutrition, , .	 ...... {II 1 (1) i	 r
(1) Chemical Feast.. ]
Subtotal (2) 3 (5) 5 (7) 8
2. Project 2.1%
a.	 Agriculture ........ (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2
(1) Minimum Tillage
System ........ 1 1
b. Health Care........ (1) 1 (1) 1 (2) 2
11)	 Artificial Heart.. 1
(2) Drug immunizing 1
c. Management ....... {1) 1 {11 1
(1) Centralized Redi-
ation Level Re-
card Keeping .. , 1 9
d, Resource Conserva-
tion .............. (1} 1 (11 1	 ('
(1) Marine Mammal
Protection Act .. 1
Subtotal (4) 4 12) 2	 (6) 6
TOTAL (18)19 (10110 (28)29
w	 ji	 f
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Nominee Count
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Nominee
	 (Candidate Count) 	
Nominee
	 (Candidate Count)
Ques-
Lion-	 Inter-
	
tion-	 Inter-
mire	 view	 Total	 mire	 view	 Total
Mass Transit .
(7) Dulles Proposal to C. Social 9,0%
Permit Access from 1. Problem
Reston ......... 1 a. Communications. 	 - . 111	 ]	 (11	 1
(S) Alaskan Pipeline 1 (1)	 Improving Infer-
a.	 Water ....... . .....	 111	 ] (i I	 1 mation Flow
L
.
11) Underwater Sturalle Patterns ....... 1 i
& Transport of Wa- b- Community Develop- '"y	 I
ter In Low-Cost ment .............	 (4)	 4 (6)	 6	 (10) 10 3
i Storage Plastic (1) Community
P ipes	 ..........	 1 Building Techno-
logy	..........	 ]
Subtotal (25)32 116 ) 19 (41)51 (2) Urban Publicr
i Safety .........	 1- -
TOTAL {98!126 (84)119 (1$2)245 (3) The Causes and i
Stimulation of the
! H. Biological 1.6% Willingness and
1. Problem Ability to Change 1
a.	 General	 .... - ...... 11!	 1 (11	 1 (4) Social Innava-
" (1) Biomed. Advance . 1 tion	 .......... 1 ^';
b. Birth Control . , ..... (3)	 1 (i!	 1 15) Cultural Lag -
(1 I Zero Population the Resistance of
Growth ..... - .. ] Societies to
Change.. 1
I
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TABLE 1 — List of Nominees and Candidates by Matrix Rows and Columns — Continued
Quits-
Von- Inter-
nalre view	 ratal
M) Transferring In•
telloctuat and
Managerial Con-
structs - Particu• i
Early to Prosidan-
Val Advisors .... 1	 r
f.	 Energy	 .......	 ...	 t1) 1 (91	 1
(1) Power Plant Loca-
tion Methodology 1
fl. Management .......	 (2) 2 (12)	 13	 113)	 15
11) Private Minority
Hiring improve.
mast......	 .. 1 1
(2) Employee Motiva-
tion	 .......... 1
131	 Responsibility of
Organizations to
Employees - Job
Skills or Total Do-
volopment...... 1
14) Second Careers as
an I nereasi ng and
Desirable Life Pat-
tern	 .......... 1
15) Business Shift from
Competition Against
Other Firms to Col-
luslon Against Can-
Sumer......... 1
16) Need for Manager-
ial Science Olffu-
$ion........... 1
(7) improving People
Utilization	 , , ... 1
(8) Attitude Shift on
Work/Risk Taking/
Welfare.... 111
	
2
(9) Manpower Utiliza-
tion of Older Tech-
nicians ........ 1
(10) Personal Technalo-
gical Obsolescence 1
111) Common indexing
System
for Science and
Technology... 	 . 1
(12) Relationship of
Various Federal
Functions ...... 1
031 TechniallProfes-
slonal) Manpower
Planning Structure
and Process..... 1
Quer
don. Inter-
ire view Tots/
(6) Population Growth 1 I
(7) Form Mechaniza-
tion - People Dis-
placement
	
...... 1
18) Using Technology
to Salvo Saeio-
Political Problems 1
(9) Public Toleration
Limits for Social
Planning........ 1
(10) Root Causes of
Alienation, Slums,
Crime and Vio-
lence.....	 ...... 1
c. Computers/Automa-
tion ...............	 (2) 2 (3) 3 (5)	 5
(1) Technical Informa-
tion.........
	 .. 1
(2) Softwaro Lag (Lack
of Programming
Capability....... 1
(3) Computer Organi-
zation Analysis, .. 1
14) Computer Applics-
lications to Overall
Problem of Produc-
tivity ........... 1
(5) Computor-assisted
Brain Extension .. 1
d. Economics ......... (4) 5 (4)	 5
I	 11) Decline of Defense
Spending in Real
Terms........,. 1
4	 (2) Economy Shift from
(	 Product to Service . 1
13) The Impending
Japanese World
Economic Doml-
nanco.......... (1) 2
141 Government Sub-
sidles of All Kinds. 1
a.	 Education ..........	 fit 1 (5) 8 (5)	 7
!	 11) Assessment of Edu-
cation .......... 1 (1) 2
(2) Practitioner Creden-
dals . Compotenco
j	 vs. Degrees ...... 1
(3) The Military's Edu-
cational Role In the
Society ......... 1
14) Academic Ability to
Respond to Change
I
1
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i	 Nominee Count	 Nominee Count
Nominee
	
(Candidate Count)
	 Nominee
	
Candidate Count)
i
Nominee Count(Candidate Count)
Ques•
Lion-	 Inter-
nalre	 view	 Total
Nominee
(6) Increasing Fad-
eral Executive
Power (OMB, i
Impounding
Funds)
	
........ f
k. Public Safety ...... (11	 1 (3) 3 14)	 4
(1)
	
Crime......... 1
(2) Application of
r
clence to Foren-
sics........... 1
(3) Low Reform ... 1
14) Psychological
Standards for Law
Enforcement Of-
ficers
	 .......	 . 1
1. Resource Conservation (3) 3 13)	 3
(1) Natural Area Pre-
servation ....... 1
(2) Historical Area
Preservation .... 1
(31 Recreation Area
Preservation	 .... 1
m. Resource Use	 ..... (2)
	
3 (2) 3 (3) .	 6
(1) Land Use, Selec-
tive and Multi-
purpose ....... (1)
	
2 (1) 2
(2) Control of Sur• i
plus Agricultural
Capacity .. , ... f
(3) Shift of Alloca-
tion of !Resources "
from Military .. 1
n,	 Sociology ......... 11} 1 {11	 1
(1) Democratization of
the Military Ser-
vices.......... 1
Subtotal (16)17 (57)63 (73)80
9.0%
2, Technology 7.4%
a. Community Develop-
ment ............. (2) 2 (2)	 2
(1) Centralized (State
& Federal} Planning
for State Programs 1
(2) Patterns of Cuf-
turaf Breakthrough
Potential (Japan &
China vs. Latin
America & India) 1
15
t 	 ;
-	 1	 .
1
k
Nominee Count(Candidate Count)
Nominee
Ques•
fion-	 Inter
aaire	 view	 Total
It. Mental Health....... (6)	 6	 (6)	 6
(1) TheLoserSyn- 
drome - Re-Inspir-
ing the Dropout 1
(2) Overcoming Risk
Avoidance Person.
alities ......... 1
(3) The Sodal h. Acts
of Chauvinism,
Xenophobia and
Paranoia	 ....... 1
14) The Causes and the
Means of Counter-
ing Dysfunctional
Myths.......... 1
(5) The Causes and
Stimulation of Am-
bition and Upward
Mobility	 ....... i
161 Chemical Impact on
Human Behavior.. 1
I.	 Policy	 .............	 (3) 3	 151
	
7	 (8) 10
{1) U.S. World Leader-
ship............ 1
12} Extrapolation Ef-
fects In Analysis . 1
(3) Legislative Impacts
on "technology. , .. 1
(4) Federalization of All
Sciences	 ........ 1
(5) National Science
Policy .......... 1
(6)	 Foreign Policy.... 1
(7) Providing Visibility
for Hidden Subsid-
ies and Other Spocial
Privilege by Law .. 1
(8) Technology Trans-
fer ............. (1)	 3
j.	 Politics ............. (6)
	
6	 (6)	 6
(1) The Trend Toward
More Political Con-
trol of Business and
Society ......... 1
(2) Redrawing Political
Boundaries ...... 1
(3) The Effect of Elec-
tion Cycles on Cul.
tural Progress .... 1
(4) Patterns of Demago-
guery	 .......... 1
(5) Rule by the Techno-
logical Elite...... 1
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tion- Inter- Lion-	 later-
nafro view	 Total naive	 view	 Total
b. ComputerslAutoma- f.	 Health Care ........ (3)
	
3	 (3)	 3
tion ................(4) 4 {1)	 f	 15)	 5 (1) Technological
(1) Increased Demand Standardization
. for Information on for the Handicap-
Transfer of Bonds ped ........... 1
& Funds......... 1 (2) Diversionary Pro-
(2) User-oriented Pro- grams for Drug
gramming Lan- Users & Alcohol- r
nguages	 .........
p	 131 Computer-driven
1 ics	 ..	 ........
13) Bio-feedback Im-
1
I	 Urban Information plications ...... 1
Systems ........ 1 g. Management .......	 12)	 2	 (8)	 9	 (9) 11
T
14) ADP in Criminal (1) The Temporary
Justice ......... 1 Organization ... 1
"	 15) Voice-Computer (2) Optimal Organize.
Linkage ........ 1 tion Size	 ...... 1
c. Consumer Behavior...	 (1) 1 (1)	 1 (3) Techniques of Re-
(1) Mass Tourism .... 1 structuring Organ-
d, Economics .........	 (1) 1 (3)
	
3	 (4)	 5 izations and Insti-
(1) Revenue Sharing . 	 (1) 2 tutions ........ i
12) Reprivatization of (4) Vested Interest
Governmental Ac- as a Deterrent toi
tivities	 ... , . , . , . 1 Good Management f
(3) Cost as an Engi- (5) Manpower Plan-
?	 neering Considers- ning Requirements 1
tion	 ........... 1 161 The Rapid Advance
{	 141 Problem of Gover- of Managerial Tech-
vernment Procure- nology ........ 1
ment
	 .......... 1 (7) Flexible Work
e.	 Education..........	 (3) 3 (7)	 7	 (s)
	
10 Schedules	 ..... 1	 (1)	 2
III Educational Tech- (B) Early Retirement 1
nology, ......... 1 1 (9) Technology for
(2) Automated Instruc- Decision-monitoring
tion	 ........... 1 and Evaluation ... 1
(3) Use of Domestic h. Mental Health	 ...... 11)
	
1	 11)	 1
Satellites for Educa- (1) Technology of
tion	 ........... 1 Mental Health Serv-
(4) The "Less Than ices (General).... 1
Baccalaureate De- i.	 Policy	 ......... . ... (4)
	
4	 (4)
	 4
gree ......... ... 1 11) Government Man-
(5) Lifelong Continuing power Policy and
Education	 ...... 7 Planning . , , , .... 1
(6) Academic Govern- (2) Exporting Zero Popu- 3
ante .	 ......... i lation Growth to a
(7) Evaluating the Developing Cultures 1
Educational Pro- (3) Government Plan-
duct	 ......	 ... 1 ning and Management
(8) Inducing Ambition of Industry ..... 1
and Effort to Im. (4) Return on Invest-
prove ... , .. , ... 1 ment as Applied 10
(9) Impulse and Rasisl- Developing Nation's
anceto Technical Resource Alloca-
and Cultural Change 1 tion........... 1 i
16
Nominee
Inter-
Waw Total
j. Politics
	 ............	
13)	 3	 (3)
	
3
(1) Present Legal
Structure Response
to New Ideas ....
	
1
(2) Legislative Lobby-
ing.......	 1
(3) Bigotry as a Political
Toot.
	 .........	 1
k. Public Safety........ 	 (4)
	
4	 (4)	 4
(1) Penal Reform ... 	 1
(2) Cable TV Utiliza-
tion by Law Enforce-
ment Community	 1
131 Low-cost Burglar
Alarm	 .........	 1
14) Cashless Society to
Fight Crime .....
	
i
I.	 Resource Use	 .......	 (1)
	
1	 (1)	 1
11) State-tvide Zoning
and Control of Land
Use............
	
1
m. Transportation	 .....	 (1)	 1	 (1)	 1
11) Automated Freight
Documentation
System ........
	 1
Subtotal (12)14	 (36)37	 (48)51
3. Projects 6A%
a. Community Develop-
ment	 ............. (2)	 2	 (2)	 2
(1) Census Data ?or
Local and Regional
Community Plan-
ning........... 1
(2) Attacking Utility
(Sewage at al.) Cost
to Building Permit
Fee	 ........... 1
b. Computers/Automa-
tion	 ..............	 12) 2	 (1)	 1	 t3)	 3
(1) Computerized/Cash-
free Accounting
Systems ........ 1
(2) Centralized Parsonal
Data Banks ..... 1
(3) Direct Man•Computer
Linkage ........ 1
c. Consumer Behavior... 11) 1	 (1)	 1
11) MobileHomesasa
Lif	 S	 1 1
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(4) work as Pay for
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2	 (1)	 1	 (3)
	
3	 t
(1) Computer Aid to
Instruction ..... 	 1
(2) Special Preparation
of Teachers for Non-
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gram	 .........	 i
(3) "Free" Schools.. 	 1
f. Health Care ........	 (1)
	
1	 (5)	 5	 16)	 6
(1) Community Mental
Health Center Pro-
gram	 .........	 1
(2) Automated Physical
Exams, , ..... . .	 1
(3) Automated Sick Call
Screening ...... 	 1
14) Mission Oriented
Hospitals.......	 1
(5) National Health
Insurance ......	 i
16)	 Escalating Health
Care Costs .....	 1
g. Management .......	 161
	
6	 (6)
	
6
(1) Guaranteed Mini-
mum Wage .....
	
1
12) Corporate Conglom-
erates .........
	
1
131 Multinational
Corps.........	 1
141 Value Engineering	 1
(5) "Incentivizing"
Cost Reduction	 1
(6) Production Line
Absenteeism ...
	 1
h.	 Policy ............
	
(3)	 4	 13)	 3	 (6)	 7
11) Environmental
Controls (Legisla-
tive)..........	 (1)
	
2
(2) Environmental Im-
pact Statements.	 1
(3) Technology Assess-
ment	 1
Nominee Count
(Candidate County
l.4.=
d. Economics .........	 11)	 1	 141	 4	 (4)	 6
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troversy as a Pat-
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Assessment......
_
I6) The Supersonic
jBoomTests as a
Social Pattern in
Technology Assess-
...	 - sent
	 ..........
I.	 Politics .............
-
11) Separation of Pow-
i ars in the Federal
Government .....
(2) The Present and
Future Illusory
Democracy ......
3= (3) Shifting OST Funs
bons to NSF .....{
j. Public Safety ........
(1) Capital Punishment-
Pros and Cons ...
(2) De-institutilization
(Putting a Man In a
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Crime Commission of
1967...... ....
(4) Life Tenure for
judges..........
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1
1
1
(3) 3	 (3) 3
1
1
1
(5) 5	 (5) 5
1
i
t
i
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don-	 Inter-
noire	 view	 Total
15) Idemnify Schools
for damage with
Parents Under-
writing Costs..... 1
k, Resource Use ....... 	 (1)	 1 12) 2	 (3)	 3
(1) Decisorion-making
Criteria in Land
Uso ............	 1
(2) Welfare Recipients
as a Work Force .. 1
(3) Defense Budget
Reduction ...... 1
1,	 Sociology........... (5) 6	 (5)
	
6
(1) The Public Morale
of the Thirties as a
social Pattern 	 , 1
(2)	 Forced Integra-
tion........... 1
(3) Communes ... , , 1
(4) Telecommunica-
tions Land on
Social Workers
(5) All Volunteer
Service......... (1) 2
m. Transportation. ...• (2) 2	 (2)	 2
(1) Impact of
Tourism on Air-
port Services. . , 1
(2) Nationalization of
the Railroads... 1
Subtotal 112)12
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i'	 III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
?	 F. Southern Regional Workshop
on Technology Assessment
Vary T. COATES and
John E. MOCK
October 1974, pp. 1-5; 11--12;
22-24
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A three-day conference on technology assessment for State and local officials was held on the campus of
the Georgia Institute of Technology, in Atlanta, May 6 .8, 1974. Participants included scientists, engineers,
planners, economists, and administrators from most of the Southern States and from many of that region's
universities and research centers. The Conference was co-sponsored by the Governor's Science Advisory
Council of Georgia and The George Washington University Program of Policy Studies in Science and Tech-
nology. The objective was to provide information about, and training in, technology assessment for those
who must formulate policy and make critical decisions about technological programs and projects at the
State and community levels, where the impacts of technological development are most directly felt. The
Southern Regional Conference on Technology Assessment was supported by the National Science Founda-
tion, Office of intergovernmental Science and Research Utilization.
Technology assessment is applied, problem-oriented, multidisciplinary researe!) which aims at anticipating
and evaluating the consequences of a technological development in terms of its impact on the economy, the
environment, the institutions, and the quality of life of a community or a society. Technology assessment is
intended to inform and improve decisionmaking in the public and the private sectors, by broadening the
considerations that go into that decisionmaking, giving it a longer-range perspective, and taking account of
secondary, unintended consequences as well as immediate, direct costs and benefits.
Since Congressman Emilio Daddario first introduced the term "technology assessment" in proposing the
establishment of a Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 1966, the Federal Govemment has
taken the lead in developing and using technology assessment. The National Science Foundation, over the
last two or three years, has provided more than eight million dollars for comprehensive technology assess-
ments in a wide range of technological and problem areas. An Office of Technology Assessment was estab-
lished in 1972 (P.L. 92-484, October 13, 1972) to serve the U.S. Congress. But State and local governments
also must grapple with the complex issues raised by science and technology as they impact on people's lives.
Power plant siting, highway and airport construction, development of natural resources, cable T.V., and
health care delivery systems—these and many other technological programs and projects require decision at
the State and community level and raise complicated problems of equity and conflicting interests.
In 1971 a Working Conference on Technology Assessment was sponsored by the National Science
Foundation and convened by the National Academy of Public Administration. From this Working Confer-
ence grew the State Technology Assessment Panel, which in 1972 produced a report which said:
Technology assessment is a legitimate and necessary State function. To be most effective the tech-
nology assessment process must be applied where the principal authority to act is located.
The Panel therefore recommended that:
The National Science Foundation should undertake a series of projects to develop better information
about how successful technology assessment has been accomplished in States and to stimulate interest
among key State officials in technology assessment.
The Southern Regional Conference on Technology Assessment is one product of the National Science
Foundation's effort to carry forward that recommendation. As Co-Chairmen of the Conference, we wish to
express our appreciation for the full cooperation and great effort of the sponsoring organizations; of Mr.
Edward T. K01y, the National Science Foundation Program Manager; of the host institution; and of the many
Spcakers and participants in the Conference. We hope that this may be the first of a number of similar
conferences in other regions of the United States; we also hope that this Conference has been of value to the
dedicated State and local decisionmakers and administrators who daily struggle with the complex problems
of our highly technological society.
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THE PROGRAM
FIRST SESSION. WHAT IS TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT? Dr. John E. Mork, Chairman
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Mr. Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Director, Office of Technology Assessment, j .S. Congress
r
SURVEY OF RECENT FEDERAL ACTIVITY IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT.
Dr. Vary T. Coates, Associate Director, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The George
Washington University 	
f { 7
LUNCHEON SPEAKER: The Honorable Dean Rusk, Professor of Law, University of Georgia
SECOND SESSION. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AT STATE AND LOCAL LEVELS. Dr. Vary T.	 j
Coates, Chairman
OVERVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT.
Mr, Edward T. Kelly, Program Manager, Office of Intergovernmental Science and Research Utilization,
National Science Foundation
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS DESIRED BY THE STATES
Dr. John E. Mack, Science Advisor to the Governor of Georgia
THIRD SESSION. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, METHODOL-
OGY. Dr. John E. Mock, Chairman
HOW TO DO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
Mr. Joseph F. Coates, Program Manager, Office of Exploratory Research and Problem Assessment, Na-
tional Science Foundation
HOW TO ORGANIZE A COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT.
Dr. Staven Ebbin, Program of Policy Studies in Science and "Technology, The George Washington
U'nwersEty
COUNTER-INTUITIVE THINKING AND ITS PLACE IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT.
Dr. Marvin Cetron, President, Forecasting l,nternational, Ltd.
HOW TO DO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS FOR LESS THAN $5000.
Dr. Andre Delbecq, Chairman, Department of Management, University of Wisconsin, Madison
HOW TO WRITE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT.
Professor Gene Willeke, Environmental Research Center, Georgia Institute of Technology
LUNCHEON SPEAKER: Pr-)fessor Melvin Kranzberg, Georgia Institute of Technology
FOURTH SESSION: WORKSHOPS.
Dem,.)nstration workshops conducted by Mr. Coates, Dr. Ebbin, and Dr. Delbecq
i
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FIFTH SESSION: THREE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS. Dr. Vary T. Coates, Chairman
} !	 PLOWSHARE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT.
Mr. Wyatt Rogers, Associate Director, Western Interstate Nuclear Board
^r
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL:
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CONFERENCE
The Southern Regional Conference on Technology Assessment pulled together and gave visibility to ex-
perience which States and communities have recently gained in Technology Assessment. Each assessment is
unique, yet the problems encountered, the alternative solutions tried, and the lessons learned can often be
helpful to others who must struggle with the complex issues of a highly technologized society. It will there•
fore be useful to highlight themes which emerged in the discussions and salient insights offered by speakers
at the Conference.
1. The Need
There can be little doubt that Technology Assessment—or as many prefer to say, social Impact analysis—
	 r
is not only appropriate but necessary in planning and decisionmakina at all levels of government. This is
now widely recognized by State and local officials. Flow to institute Improvements in established procedures,
and where to find the resources and capability to do Technology Assessment, are more difficult questions.
It is in communities and small regions—where people live and work—that the real impacts of technological
development are felt. However "quality of life" may be defined (and definitions are legion), it is surely
manifested in the everyday conditions under which individuals and families live, work, and spend their
leisure. Housing, transportation, energy, utilities, social and health services, education, public services--these
are the problems with which State and local governments continually grapple, under intense pressures of
scarce dollars, unavailable information, conflicting political demands, and uncertain outcomes. Federal pro-
grams can help, but may disappear at the end of a fiscal year. Federal policies may change not only with a
change of Administrations, but overnight, Research and information coming from the National level may
not be applicable to local situations. But State and local problems continue, and decisions made today may
lock a community into a unforeseen chain of consequences or limit options for years to come.
Areas smaller then use nation are moreover particularly vulnerable to converging trends: for example,
underdevelopment and unemployment, rising demands for resource extraction, and increasing pressure for
environmental protection. Many decisions involve irreversible and large scale changes in the physical en-
vironment and in land use, or commitment of funds and nonrenewable resources over long periods of time.
Caught in a visa of conflicting and converging needs, responsible officials must of necessity make decisions,
usually without sufficient information to identify all possible alternatives and fully evaluate necessary
tradeoffs.
Public policy related to technology, often thought of as a "national" concern, is therefore directly and
intimately a part of local and State decisionmaking, and all techniques which hold promise for improving
and broadening the process of formulating and implementing wise public policy are increasingly of interest
in all levels of government. Technology Assessment, which aims to provide decisionmakers with better in-
formation about the possible consequences of their actions and to help them boner manage uncertainty, is
such a technique.
2. The Experience
Two States have already established an institutional base for Technology Assessment: The Georgia Center
for Technology Forecasting and Technology Assessment in 1970 and th , Hawaii State Center for Science
Policy and Technology Assessment in 1971. Other States are investigating or experimenting with assessment
through their Governor's science advisors, through legislative councils, or through other mechanisms. Re-
1
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gional cooperation is another device used, for example in the assessment of Operation Plowshare, reported
at the Conference. Most States, however, although paying increased attention to environmental concerns
and gradually broadening the scope of planning, have not attempted comprehensive Technology Assess-
ments. As one speaker at the Southern Regional Conference summed up the situation, assessment at the
State level has been "problem-oriented rather than technology-focused, reactive rather than anticipatory,
and limited to the three E's—energy, economics, and environment." Newly emerging technologies and social
technologies, with few exceptions, have been neglected.
Such assessments as have been made have generally been intended to serve the needs of the Executive
branch of State governments. Little or no Technology Assessment—in the States or in the Federal Govern-
ment—has been done for or by regulatory agencies, although regulation and rate-setting are among the most
effective methods of directing and controlling technological development. State legislatures, usually poorly
supplied with informational and staff services, have not yet followed the lead of the U.S. Congress in
establishing an Office of Technology Assessment, although policy making is preeminently a legislative
function.
3. The Obstacles
Money, time, and trained people are in short supply in State and local governments. Staff people with
experience and capability in interdisciplinary, policy-oriented, applied research are particularly scarce.
Agency administrators (and State legislators) tend to be suspicious and intolerant of proposals for "more
study" rather than immediate action.
Political pressures and interest group demands are immediate and intense. In each of the three Assess-
ments presented at the Conference the study teams had encountered problems related to political sensitivi-
ties—interjurisdictional rivalries, the suspicion and fear of a "threatened" industry, the affiliation of legis-
lators with interest groups affected by the technology.
Technology Assessments, by their nature, usually deal with controversial subjects. A Conference partici-
pant noted thatwhile assessors at the Federal level may argue about the value of public participation or how
to achieve it, "the closer you get to the grass roots, the more public participation you will get"—whether or
not you invite it. Potential detrimental impacts may appear more dramatic and galvanize opinion more ef-
fectively than social benefits (which may be more important but more generalized). Because of this intense
public interest, there is more danger of Technology Assessment becoming "technology arrestment" at the
local than the national or societal level.
State agencies are of course subject to the same barriers that Federal agencies find in attempting to
broaden planning and evaluation procedures. Bureaucratic inertia, institutional and personal biases, special
constituencies, and the necessity for self-preservation do not contribute to an ability to ask hard questions
about downstream consequences. Fragmented responsibilities and narrow organizational charters are not
conducive to comprehensive analysis of social impacts. For State as well as Federal decisionmakers, the pres-
sures push toward short-term optimization rather than anticipatory, even-handed judgment.
4. The Strengths
As compared to national or societal assessments, subfederal Technology Assessment can deal with smaller
geographical areas, less heterogeneous populations, and more easily identifiable parties at interest. Data is
likely to be less aggregated. Direct access can be had to potentially affected segments of the population. A
"home-grown" Assessment team, attuned to the mores and idiom of the locality, has a subtle advantage
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which can best be appreciated by researchers who have had the experience of being regarded suspiciously as
"outsiders."
Some areas of technology are at present extremely resistant to assessment because so little data is avail-
able. This is particularly true of very innovative physical and social technologies —for example, the guaran•
teed annual income, or at one time, the contraceptive pill. It may not be possible to predict public ac-
ceptability of the technology, or the ways in which people will use, misuse, and abuse it. In such ca-;es,
"social experimentation," or a monitored trial in a limited area, can provide a firmer base for Technology
Assessment, Local communities provide the ideal site for many such social experiments.
In some cases such social experiments will occur naturally —for example, when one or two communities
in a state adopt cable television, a 'technology Assessment by the State of the impacts In these communities
can assist other local governments to make wise decisions about cable television franchising.
5. Priorities
In a survey conducted for the National Science Foundation, State officials indicated the following as
pricrity areas for Technology Assessment:
—Natural resources and environmental management: coastal zone and wetlands management, solid
waste management systems;
—Energy systems: power plants, off-shore oil wells or supertanker facilities, solar and Wthermal
energy;
—Human resource programs: manpower training and educational equalization programs, educational
technology, health care delivery systems;
i —Transportation: special bus lanes, parking restrictions, mass transit systems, airports, highways;
—Government functions: integrated information systems, "little city halls," mobile police units;
—Economic development: industrial parks, shopping centers, new factories;
—Communication systems: cable television franchises;
—Community development: golf courses, other recreation facilities, high rise or scattered site public
housing, annexation.
Although local governments have been engaged in such services and functions for a very long time, there
is still no reliable way of anticipating how much benefit will result for the community from a new project,
or of judging the comparative benefits of competing demands for scarce resources.
& Ways and Moans
Comprehensive Technology Assessments are expensive: experience gleaned at the Federal level indicates
a minimum of $ 100,000 to $200,000 for broad -scale assessments. State and local governments, especially
the poorer or less populous, do not hava such resources to command for applied research. But comprehensive
Technology Assessments have been done at the regional level, through:
—industry and government cooperation;
—pooling of regional resources;
—Federal funding.
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A stuffy of solid waste management systems for the State of Connecticut (reported at the Conference)
i was done by a corporation which also made a substantial contribution to meeting the cost of the study. The
assessment of Operation Plowshare, also reported at the Conference, was a cooperative effort of four states.
The Port of Now York Authority, established by interstate compact, funded a comprehensive assessment of
proposed extension of Kennedy Airport runways into Jamaica Bay. A Technology Assessment of the irate-
!.	 i gration of pig farming, of interest to several regions of the country, is being sponsored by the National Sci-
once Foundation, and it is worth noting that several State universities are now performing Technology
Assessments of interest to their areas with NSF funding.
Georgia and Hawaii have had much success in carrying out Technology Assessments using blue-ribbon
panels made up of leaders of industry, academic experts, government officials, and civic leaders. These as-
E ' sossments are usually exploratory rather than comprehensive, but tend to carry substantial impact with
w^	 ! State Govemors and legislators, r
s "Mini-assessments" (that Is, short exercises designed to draw out information and expert opinion,
k' identify areas of consensus (and disagreement), and develop recommendations for policymakers) can be
i used where there are not funds or time for comprehensive Technology Assessment. The Hawaii State Center
.;: for Science Policy and Technology Assessment has successfully adapted the Nominal Group Technique
(demonstrated at the Conference by Professor Andre Delbecq) for use in two- or three-day sessions to
assess the potential impacts and policy considerations related to mariculture and other technologies. other
i;
techniques for structuring small group interactions can also be used for this purpose.
Every State has un•utilized resourcesfor Technology Assessment, State universities may contain a nucleus
of people familiar with Technology Assessment, experienced in interdisciplinary research, and having a
I ' commitment toward public service (and in some cases, with available research funds). Depending on the
university, interdisciplinary science policy programs, Departments of R&D Management, or broadly-based
Engineering Schools are possible routes of ingress to such people. Corporate management, State academies
of science, and professional societies are other sources of expertise. The Intergovernmental Personnel Act of l
1970 can sometimes be utilized to borrow talent from the National Government agencies. State and local
r agencies themselves can be tapped for people who are dissatisfied with conventional modus of evaluation
and not afraid to ask hard questions.
Public interest and environment groups often include members with training and experience in physical
and social sciences who are under -utilized because they awe presently homemakers or retired. Many citizen
groups are experienced in organizing people with diverse backgrounds into study groups to gather informs•
tion and explore issues. They are also able to disseminate and build community support for implementing
theresultsoftheAssassment. Organizing Assessment efforts, managing interdisciplinary groups, and reducing
representational bias, on the other hand, call for a trained and experienced Project Leader.
7. Implementation
Experienced Technology Assessors at the Conference warned that the quality of an assessment is no
guarantee that its conclusions or recommendations will be implemented. Many factors and considerations,
other than reliable information about long-range consequences, are necessarily involved in making a decision.
Even if a Technology Assessment directly leads or contributes to a wise decision, it will saidom be given the
credit, since the political .eaders will instead point to their o.vn discernment and wisdom,
It is seldom, however, that a Technology Assessment will produce definitive and clear-cut recommenda-
tions. More often, if successfully done an assessment will lay out a range of alternative policy strategies,
each involving uncomfortable trade-offs which must be made. Technology Assessment Is an input to and an
a
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SUMMARY OF THE SESSIONS
WHAT IS TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT?
Dr. John E. (Ted) Mock, Co- 	 Technology assessment, said Ted Mock In opening the Conference,
Chairman of the Conference, is 	 "may be the answer to Murphy's Law." (Murphy's Law, In its classical
the Science Advisor to the Gov- 	 formulation, states that "whatever can go wrong, will go wrong.")
ernor of Georgia Technology assessment, he explained, is "the systematic study of the
effects on society that may occur when a technology is introduced,
extended, or modified, with special emphasis on impacts which were
unintended or delayed."
During the 1960's, he reminded the audience, many Americans
became concerned with the Impact of technology on their environ-
ment, on their safety, and on the quality of their life style. Long
accustomed to think of science and technology as harbingers of
progress and a better way of life, Americans—faced with smog, pol-
luted rivers, congested cities, and disastrous side-effects of drugs such
as thalidomide—woke up to the idea that the most promising of
technologies may also have unanticipated, unwanted consequences. In
their alarm and dismay, Mock pointed out, some have veered toward
anti-scientism and even anti-intellectualism.
Emilio Daddario was then Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on
Science, Research and Develop-
ment of the Committee on Sci-
ence and Astronautics, U.S.
House of Represantativas
Public Law 92-484 (Oct. 13,
1972). A complete legislative
history, and a listing of members
of the Technology Assessment
Board and Advisory Council, may
be found in ANNUAL REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS by the
Office of Technology Assess-
ment, March 16, 1974
It was in this context that Congressman Emilio Daddario in 1966
first proposed to the U.S. Congress that it establish an Office of
Technology Assessment.
Mr. Daddario and his Subcommittee began systematically to explore
the feasibility of a better system for anticipating the effects of
technological development and for supplying Congress, other deci-
sionmakers, and the American public with the information needed to
formulate wise policy. Six years later, the Office of Technology
Assessment was established, and former Congressman Daddario, who
earlier had resigned from Congress, was appointed as its first Director.
The Deputy Director of OTA, Mr. Daniel V, De Simone, was
present to give the keynote address for the Southern Regional
Conference.
THE CONGRESSIONAL OF-	 "it is impassible to go back," said Dan De Simone. The sense of
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY AS-	 progress and optimism once natural to an Increasingly affluent society
SESSMENT	 gave way In the 1960's to a questioning of the inevitability of progress.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
	
	
That unguarded optimism, he said, cannot be restored, but neither can
the development of technology be reversed, nor would we wish It to
Mr. Daniel V. De Simone, Dep- 	 be. Instead, society must learn to handle technology more wisely, "but
uty Director, OTA
	
	 we must assess Its real benefits and costs before we can handle it
wisely."
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AT STATE AND
LOCAL LEVELS
Ed Kelly began the second session of the Conference by observing-
"Technology Assessment is too important to be left to the Federal
Government." The State and local levels are where f=ederal technology
is implemented, the impacts felt, and services delivered. Moreover,
State and local governments themselves Initiate and implement tech-
nological decisions and programs. But at this level the description of
T.A. is vague and its organization undefined. T.A., Kelly said, may be
defined operationally, at the State levels as "whatever the states say
T.A. is," just as planners often have defined urban development as
"whatever we are doing now,"
Kelly characterized present State and local technology assessments
as follows: they tend to be problem-driven rather than technology-
driven, reactive rather than anticipatory, and focused largely on the
three E's—environment, energy, and economics. Social technology,
though of great importance, is all too likely to be ignored currently as
as a subject for assessment. The States have one great advantage, that
of flexibility; if a technology (or a technology assessment) does not
work in one State, it still can be tried in others—States and local com-
munities offer laboratories for societal experiments. Technology as-
sessments at the subnational levels of government can deal with tech-
nologies and problems common to many States or specific to their
own area. But they must, Kelly warned, be particularly sensitive
to the "convergence of events," the coming together of divergent
trends, changes, and pressures to pose unexpected problems-and
opportunities.
iI
1I
	
OVERVIEW OF STATE AND
LOCAL TECHNOLOGY AS-
'I
	 SESSMENT
Edward T. Kelly, Program Man-
ager,Officoof Intergovernmental
Science and Research Utilization,
National Science Foundation
r	 -
Public participation is a "given" in State and local assessments,
Kelly noted: "the closer to the grass roots you are, the more public
participation you will get--whether it is wanted or not." By the same
token, there Is more danger of "technology arrestment" as a result of
assessment, because the pressures are more immediate and more effec-
tive at the grass roots level.
Technology assessment is needed for both the legislature and the
executive In State governments. (And, Kelly said, it is particularly
lacking in State regulatory agencies, as It is at the Federal level,) The
policy formulation process Is basically a legislative function, he re•
minded his listeners, but State legislatures have very little informational
and analytical support end assistance. In general, the lack of in-depth
capability for evaluative research In the State governments lad Kelly
to call for strong links between universities and their State govern.
manta. The universities con provide the resources and the opportunity
that will allow the States to carry their rightful share of technology
assessment.
11
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CANDIDATES AND PRIORI- Early in 1973 Mack carried out a survey of State officials to
TIES FOR TECHNOLOGY AS- identify candidates and priorities for technology assessment, The
SESSMENT: A SURVEY OF survey,	 commissioned	 by the	 National Science Foundation, was
STATE	 by John
OfficeMack for
r
 rho
e Office 
of E:xplar
a-
addressed to Governors' Science Advisors, Directors of State planning
tory Research and Problem As- agencies, Directors of State departments of natural resources, and
sessment, Research Applications Directors of economic development. The respondents (34% of the 200
Directorate,	 National	 Science officials) identified approximately 250 different candidates for T.A.
Foundation, August 1973. This Areas of major concern were natural resources and environmental
is Volume III of a series entitled
CANDIDATES AND PRIORI- management (land use, power plant siting, coastal zone management,
TIES FOR TECHNOLOGY AS- desalinization, pollution control); energy (coal gasification, geothermal
SESSMENTS. The other volumes energy, strip mining, nuclear power plants); and human resources
are: Volume I, SUMMARY OF (health care delivery systems, educational technology). A number of
FOUR STUDIES OF CANDI- officials identified as especially important those areas where there is
DATES AND PRIORITIES FOR
TECHNOLOGY	 ASSESS- pressure from converging trends; energy shortages and environmental
MENTS; Volume 11, A SURVEY enhancement, increased automation in industry and lengthened life
OF	 FEDERAL	 EXECUTIVE spans. As predicted	 earlier by Ed	 Kelly,	 Mock noted that State
AGENCY	 PROFESSIONALS; officials framed their candidates in terms of problems rather than in
Volume IV, AN APPROACH TO terms of a specific technology.
PRIORITIES; and Volume V, A
SURVEY	 OF	 CANDIDATE
TECHNOLOGIES Mock advised the participants that not all of their assessments will
show immediate results—if measured by direct Implementation of
findings or recommendations. Decisionmaking is still the province of
the Governor and the Legislature—it is a political process and reflects
other considerations and	 imperatives besides those informational
inputs from the assessment. And, he also noted, even when assessments
have a direct and positive influence on the decision, it is likely that
the influence will not be acknowledged or spotlighted, since political
leaders will themselves take the credit for the wisdom of their deci-
sions. Nevertheless, the T .A. will provide a more rational and far-
sighted base for decisions than States and communities In the pest have
had available.
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS	 " f=rom urban blight to rural flight," said Ted Mock, "it is the States
DESIREE] BY THE STATES	 which must face the most difficult problems requiring technology as-
Dr. John E. Mock, Science Ad-	 sessment, yet they lack the tradition of doing such anticipatory evalu-
visor to the Governor of Georgia ation." They also lack the expertise, the money, and the institutional
framework for T.A. Yet some States, notably Hawaii, New York,
California, and Georgia, have established an institutional base for T.A.
and are rapidly acquiring the experience, the capability, and the tradi-
tion. The State of Georgia, for example, under the aegis of the
Governor's Science Advisory Council, has done assessments of health
delivery, cable T.V., natural gas supply, geothermal energy potential,
an information service center, development of new cities, remote
sensing ( ERTS) , metrication , and the impact of the energy crisis. These
studies were useful and influential, Mock asserted, and they could be
done at fairly low cost to the State because of services donated and
capability supplied by industry, local communities, and State agencies.
1pro forma fo;hion; and, above ail, Willeke concluded, one must be
	
a
prepared to revise and modify, as only through a reiterative process
can an environmental impact statement, or a technology assessment,
be performed adequately.	 i
1 k''
iI
i^
j^
..	 it
I
E.^
I
i;
ii
THREE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS
Three recent ongoing technology assessments of interest to State
officials were described at the Conference: an assessment of Operation
Plowshare (the use of nuclear explosives to produce oil and gas in
Western States), an assessment of solid waste management technology
for the State of Connecticut, and a technology assessment of integra-
tion of hog farming, sponsored by the National Science Foundation.
Although only one of these appeared to the Conference participants
to fit the definition of comprehensive technology assessment, all of the
presentations provided valuable insights into the organization and
management of complex, multidisciplinary, policy-oriented applied
research —a problem with which all State officials find themselves in-
creasingly forced to grapple.
OPERATION PLOWSHARE The assessment of Operation Plowshare, for example, as reported
by Wyatt Rogers, demonstrated that it is feasible for States to cooper-
Mr. Wyatt Rogers, Associate Di- ate in assessing developments of mutual concern and that through
rector, Western	 Interstate Nu-
clear Board this technique States can have an impact on Federal programs. The
assessment, funded jointly by the National Science Foundation and a
compact of twelve States, grew out of a serious concern by western
States about a proposed, large -scale commercial program which would
utilize nuclear explosives for oil and gas stimulation. The proposed
development was viewed by many as an unacceptable assault on the
environment, safety, and resources of one region in order to produce
presumed benefits for the nation as a whole. The Western Interstate
Nuclear Board and researchers from five Universities in the Rocky
Mountain region conducted fourteen separate studies over a fourteen•
month period	 (with an additional six months of integrating and
"recycling" the results of these studies). Major emphasis was on four
areas of concern: impacts on the environment, impacts on utilization
of the region 's other natural resources, jurisdictional and legal implica-
tions for State and commercial Plowshare technology, and methods of
PLOWSHARE TECHNOLOGY encouraging public participation in related decisionmaking. The final
ASSESSMENT: IMPLICATIONS results of the study were published by WINS in early 1 974. Fallowing
TO STATE GOVERNMENTS. the study, representatives of the affected States met to discuss possible
Glenn A. Whan, Project Director faint policy actions to regulate Plowshare projects.
A TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-	 The technology assessment of solid waste management technology,
MENT OF SOLID WASTE MAN-	 reported by Jules Mirabal, was thought by most Conference partici-
AGEMENT	 pants to represent more nearly a technical feasibility study than a
Dr. Jules Mirabal, General Elec-	 technology assessment. But as a highly sophisticated example of
tric Research and Development 	 multidisciplinary applied research in a complex and politically sensitive
Center area, it was nonetheless of great interest to the audience, particularly
since it demonstrated a successful cooperation between Industry and
State government. (The industry—General Electric Research and
Development Center--specifically removed itself from subsequent
competition to dEvelop the solid waste management centers which
ware recommended by the study.) The assessment grew out of legisla-
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Lion calling for a State -wide masterplan to solve solid waste problems
in 169 cities and towns in Connecticut. The master plan was required
by the legislation to identify and implement solid waste technology v
which was"environmentally sound, economically feasible, and socially
acceptable." On the basis of competition, G.E. was awarded a one-
year contract for $450,000, with G.I., contributions bringing the total
cost of the study up to $1.15 million. The study was organized around
five major tasks: market analysis, transportation aspects, public in-
formation, business impacts, and capital acquisition. Mirabal mentioned
in passing that because of "political realities" in the State of Connecti-
cut, the area of solid waste collection was omitted from the study, the
audience was quick to note the inference and comment on the politi-
cal pitfalls that await technology assessors in dealing with public
service functions in the State and local arena.
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Ivan Smith reported on a comprehensive technology assessment of
OF INTEGRATION OF HOG the integration of hog farming underway at the Midwest Research
.	 FARMING Institute and funded by the National Science Foundation. The assess-
"	 Dr.	 Ivan Smith, Midwest Re- ment team was instructed to look at the broad societal and regional
{	 search Institute implications of the possible movement to vertical integration of the
I! pork industry (from production of piglets through feeding to butcher-
ing) following the model offered by the beef and chicken industries,
The study is to include impacts on the family farmer, the consumer
s (e.g., food pricesand quality of product), labor and management needs,
{ financial	 institutions, energy utilization, world food needs, and a
variety of other affected parties and institutions. Ultimately, and
unexpectedly, Smith said, the team find themselves forced to address
1 such broad moral issues as whether the U.S. is justified in making red
meat the staple of our diet, given the fact that it takes ten pounds of
grain to produce one pound of beef.
The scope of the assessment, Smith pointed out, is reflected in the
composition of the research team, with its consultants, which include
agricultural experts, management experts, swine nutritionists and vet• !
ennarians, engineers, geologists, economists, political scientists, tech-
nology forecasters, transportation specialists, regional developers, land
use lawyers, social psychologists, and marketing experts. An Oversight
Committee further adds to the viewpoints and disciplines represented.
Describing the ongoing T.A. in detail, Smith drew some lessons
which the team is learning and some goals which they are pursuing,
which he feels should be a part of every assessment. A basic need, he
said, is to analyze the driving forces which are bringing about a new
technology {or a significant change in the way we perceive or use a
technology}. This includes a thorough understanding of the boundaries
and the current state-of -the-art of the technology under study.
Secondly, Smith went on, method ,*fogies must be found and improved
which are fitted to the special problems being investigated. Here
Smith advised the group, "Watch out for the development of still
more jargon—it is important to use the user's language," that is, to be
23
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able to communicate directly with those who will need the informa-
tion which the assessmen. will produce. Finally, the assessment report,
Fmith believes, should be organized by impact areas, and elements of
the report directed at and written especially for the various segments
of the population who xiil need ;o use it. He described for the group
how the outline of the hag farming Y . A. was developed early in the
study to be used as a framework for the analysis as it developed. Sepa-
rate sections of the report, aimed at categories of users, will be sep-
arable from the entire report for fuller and more targeted distribution.
1	 6i,
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COMMON THEMES Several insights emerged from the presentations of ongoing assess-
ments and the vigorous discussions which followed. In each of these
studies, non -scientific political and bureaucratic individuals and sci-
entists had managed to cooperate productively in spite of pronounced
difficulties in communication anddifferences of viewpoint, values, and
objectives. In each of the studies there were, or there may be in the
future, political sensitivities and cross -currents which may limit or
pose serious problems for the assessment as well as for its implementa.
tion: jurisdictional ambiguities in Operation Plowshare, control of
solid waste collection by a powerful organization with alleged under-
world ties, conflicts of interest between small farmers and agribusiness
in the hog farming area. There is also the problem of scarce resources
and limited capability when States most grapple with big science and
high technology and the complex issues they pose—a theme constantly
replayed during the Conference. This problem is most acute for the
smaller or poorer States. Three possible means of dealing with the
problem were illustrated by the theee studies presented: regional
pooling of resources by a number of States, cooperation between
State governments and industry, and the seeking of funding from a
Federal agency, in this case the National Science Foundati s„ through
its Research Applied to National Needs Program.
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EMERGING TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Vary T. Coates, Ph.D.
--
	
	 Associate Director and
Head, Technology Assessment Group
Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology
April 1974
This paper reviews recent and emerging trends and problems in
^i
{
Technology Assessment.
	
In 1971 I conducted an extensive survey of T.A.
-; activities . I	 Today I will update that study by describing what has been
i occurrir.g in the last two or three years, as T have been able to olsserve
it, ani highlight some of the problems and issues which I see determining
i^
^i the future of Technology Assessment.
The bill establishing the Congressional Office of Technology
EAssessment was passed in October 1972. 	 I begin with that Office, because
I believe that what happens in and to that Office will be the critical
1. factor in the future of T.A.	 The Technology Assessment Board, which is the
policy-making organ, was appointed in February 1973. 	 As most of you know,
t: the Board consists of six Senators, three from each party, and six Represen-
tatives, again three from each party, and the Director, who is a non-voting
member.	 (This is, I believe, the first time in more than thirty years that
what is essentially a Congressional Committee has been established on the
i
F'I;
basis of party parity.)	 Senator Edward Kennedy is the first chairman, and
f:
will hold office throughout the 93rd Congress.
	
The law provides that the
r:
next chairman shall be a Member of the House.
The Technology Assessment Advisory Council has also bein appointed
and consists of ten public members, whose names and affiliations appear on
the atta .ied list, along with the comptroller-General and the Director of
the Library of Congress.
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Mr. Emilio Daddario, who introduced the first bill to establish
the Office in 1966 while a Representative from Connecticut, and thereby
initiated the technology assessment movement, was appointed as the Director
of the Office. The Associate Director is Daniel De Simone. Mr. De Simone
had not been closely associated with technology assessment hitherto by those
who had closely followed the developing movement. However, he had been the
director of the large study, "A Metric America," while at the National Bureau
of Standards, and had since moved to the National Science Foundation's
Science and Technology Policy Office.
The Metric America study was in fact an assessment of social impacts
of conversion to the metric system, relying in large part on public hearings
and representation of interests--although the study was not called a techno-
logy assessment. Dan De Simone appears to have done his homework well and
to have a good working understanding of technology assessment and what possi-
bilities and pitfalls await the new Office.
Those pitfalls are, I believe, real and threatening. When the new OTA
was first conceived by Mr. Daddario, he envisioned something like a much
smaller GAO or Library of Congress; that is, an entity which would serve
the Congress by supplying it with hard, reliable information, but which would	 j
be more or less independent of the internal politics of Congress. The new
Office, unfortunately, much more closely resembles a ,joint committee, and
thus faces the difficulties of accomplishing its work without appearing to
violate the territory and .jurisdictions staked out by other committees, of
which it must at the same time attempt to serve the needs. A further diffi-
culty and danger is that the present chairman of the T.A. Board is widely
_	 .,..
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^ viewed as a potential presidential aspirant. 	 Without alleging in'any way -
E
that Mr. Kennedy would attempt to, or would wish to, or would deliberately
lend himself to, exploitation of the issues with which the Office must
j
` struggle in order to further his own political image, I fear that this
potentiality will be another complication as the Office attempts to establish
. its initial tale and retard.	 The organization of the Office will lend itself
to this suspicion.	 The T.A. Board has interpreted the establishing law in
such a way that the Board has a small staff of its own, that is, a staff
which serves the Board rather than the Director; Senator Kennedy ' s Science
Advisor is the Executive Secretary of that staff.
As with any Congressional Committee, DTA will be subjected to
pressure as it begins staffing. 	 Mr. Daddario's strategy has been to delay
appointment of program managers until after initial program areas and
major topics were selected. 	 Whether he will be able to select people with
both knowledge of the technological subject areas and in-depth familiarity
r' with technology assessment concepts and methodology, or whether his choices
E:
will be constrained by political considerations, we can only wait to see.
Those observers who had for months been predicting the first few appointments
have so far been surprised every time.	 Public hearings were scheduled to
have been held in January or February to hear testimony from the heads of
Executive agencies about their technology assessment programs and plans,
'd
but those Hearings did not occur, for reasons which are not clear; they
may be held later this spring.
When the bill was passed last fall it was not highly controversial,
a
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but neither did it evoke great interest in Congress. 	 The bill provides that i
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the assessment activities of the OTA may be initiated "upon the request of"
the chairman of any Congressional committee, acting for himself, for the
ranking minority member, or for a majority of the members of the committee;
or may be initiated by the T.A. Board or by the Director in consultation
with the Board. The fact is that most committee chairmen have little or no
understanding of what technology assessment is, or what the Office could do.
Their temptation will be either to try to use the OTA as a quick response
information service to augment their own staff, or to play secrecy games
and resent any "intrusion" of OTA into their territory. Mr. Daddario has
been diligently calling on committee chairmen to educate them and to solicit
their views in an attempt to ward off these dangers.
The "Energy Crisis" has generated in some quarters new cynicism about
the ability of the government to manage complex technological issues or to
prepare for problems which it has been possible to foresee for some time.
At the same time, again in some quarters, the energy crisis has fueled a
reaction against the environmental movement, or pushed environmental con-
terns into lower priority. This kind of facile cynicism, however, appears
to be less important and will probably be less long-lasting than a much
more important effect, a widespread realization that those who raise hard 	
t
questions about national priorities, conservation of resources, and the
necessity of exerting some public control and direction over economic and
technological development can no longer be safely ignored or brushed away.
This change in attitude may in the long-run cause the OTA to be treated
with more seriousness than would otherwise have been the case, and if OTA
can, in its first year or two, produce studies of demonstrable excellence,
e_'	 g	 ^	 4c,fl^	
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?	 insight, and value it will establish a credibility and influence that can
js
make it a major innovation in the American governmental system. Certainly,
although the Office itself lacks the usual levers of power hitherto con-
sidered absolutely necessary in Congress, it has leadership of great integrity,
1	 -
knowledge, and influence in its Board and in the Directorships and it is,
above all, in the right place, at the right time in history. 	 r
The first task the Office has accomplished is to select six areas
of emphasis for their first year ( $2 million is to be committed before
July 1, 1974). Obviously the OTA had some obvious criteria- -they presumably
I
wanted to fund technology assessments in areas which were important in terms
I,
of potential impacts, areas in which Congress must in the near future make
decisions (but areas in which the major decisions for the next five to ten
q;
years have not already been made, or will not have been made before an
assessment could be completed). One would also suppose that OTA would wish
to choose areas in which its assessments might have a strong influence and
the Office thereby establish prestige and credibility. OTA did make use of
four NSF-funded studies of T.A. priorities,
The six areas chosen for technology assessments are: technologies
related to food, a;5ergy, materials resources, oceans, bioequivelence of
drugs, and international trade. Now Mr. Daddario, Mr. De Simnno, and their
(so far very small) staff will begin the task of probl , nn and program
definition within those six general subject areas.
There are a number of ways OTA may go, and a s-irnber of obvious m};-
takes they may make. If they tie themselves too closely tr) . mmediate
needs of the other Congressional committees, they may ask for assessments
only of technologies which are already widely used but controversial---
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such as off-shore oil drilling, pesticides, or strip-mining. It is true
that in many such subjects comprehensive assessments are lacking and
urgently needed. But too much emphasis on relevance to already obvious
decision-making needs may lead them to ignore the decision needs which
will arise in the future--that is, to overlook the more speculative and
uncertain technological options and possibilities which will then c.tch
us unprepared at some future time. OTA will then be trapped in the
behavior Congress has always exhibited-
-reacting to today's crisis, solving
yesterday's problems, and backing rumpfirst into the future.
OTA also runs the risk of concentrating too much on areas which,
however .important, are chosen because they are now a matter of public
concern and thus already are generating action programs. It is unfortunate
when action programs are initiated, and continue, without both a prior and
an on-going assessment of their impacts. Nevertheless, to have a strong
effect on decision-making, it is too late to begin a comprehensive
assessment after a "crisis" is evident and action programs become the
order of the day. By then directions have already been chosen--or dictated,
political and economic capital has been committed, bureaucracies have been
generated, and interests have been mobilized. If only very limited
resources can be allocated to assessments , they should be more, not less,
anticipatory--to maximize the opportunity to lay a grounding of objective,
authoritative information before the subject becomes controversial.
The Congressional Office and what happens to it appears to be
critical because Executive agencies will take their direction accordingly.
To fully appreciate that, it is necessary to recall how the concept of
i
1A
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I!	 technology assessment originated. The 1960's were a time when the
cumulative effects of technological advance burst into public conscious-
ness in the form of alarms over alleged hazards to health and safety from
i
f
industrial byproducts or unexpected physiological effects of chemicals
such as thalidomide. Rapid economic growth and a national program of
`A
highway and airport building suddenly intruded into the suburban sanctuary
I
of the affluent middle class, bringing pollution, noise, and competition
for residential land. In the cities Black and ethnic communities, newly
politicized, began to resist disruption of settled neighborhoods. Court
battles resulting in costly delays to projects, and aroused constituent
pressure, brought response from Congress---new requirements for planning,
community participation, agency coordination, and, above all, demands
that Congress be furnished with more comprehensive information. The
development of technology assessment as an interdisciplinary, policy-
oriented class of studies was one result. A closely related result
was the National Environmental Policy Act and the requirement for
environmental impact studies. I found in the survey which I mentioned
that executive agencies--reacting to these demands--in the ensuing five-
year period began significantly to broaden the processes by which they
plan, program, and evaluate technological projects, although the extent
and pace of improvement varied considerably from agency to agency. This
improvement is clearly a defensive reaction to Congressional, and ultimately
to public, pressure. There has been little or no pressure for better
management from the top echelons of the Executive branch and there is not
likely to be. hence the agencies--the only possible source of sustained
funding for T.A.--will take their lead from the Congressional OTA and tape
j
},
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8its activities as a model or a challenge.
Rumors are circulating widely, and I believe they are well-founded,
that the Office of Management and Budget has directed Executive agencies
to minimize the direct support they give to OTA. Presumably this is a
direct effect of the political problem I have already mentioned, i.e.,
	 ^+
the Presidential potentiality of the Chairman of the T.A. Board, although
I believe the reason given is that OTA might "raid the research budget"
	 f
of the agencies. If these rumors are true, the effect may nevertheless
j	 be minimal, because the agencies have not only to defend their budgets
I
and programs to OMB but to Congress. In the present situation in
Washington, the Executive Office is not able to keep as strong a hand on
the bureaucracy as iz could a short time ago.
`	 In the last two years there have been small but significant signs that
I
some agency officials believed Congressional pressure would continue. From
time to time RFP's appear in the Commerce Business Daily with the words
"Technology Assessment" in the description and solicitations for evaluative
studies commonly use the phrase "including social impacts." The AEC now
has at least one employee with the job title "Technology Assessment
i
Specialist." The Federal Highway Administration uses the acronym "SEES"
or "social, environmental, economic impact studies." The Department of
Commerce has a "Technology Assessment Office" (in fact a misnomer),
i
and most of the agencies have had conferences, seminars, or requested
briefings on technology assessment for their staff. This protective
reaction, it seems to me, comes almost entirely from the middle management
I
echelons where program justification and defense must be prepared, and
i
is resisted or ignored by the upper echelons and the lower operational
echelons respectively. In a number of other agencies, there are on-going
9studies which constitute technology assessments. To mention only a few
examples: There is the major study proceeding in DDT, Climatic Impacts
of Atmospheric Pollution, which has a broader scope and greater depth
than its title might suggest. DOT is also studying the impact of
alternatives to the internal combustion engine, and the impacts of rail- 	 ;^?
j"
road electrification. The Environmental Protection Agency is studying
the potential impacts of electric automobiles on the Los Angeles area.
The National Science Foundation, chiefly through the Office of Exploratory
Research and Problem Assessment within MIN, is still the only source
of sustained funding for comprehensive technology assessment :within the
Federal government. This is in fact probably the best site for this
	 -
activity. One of the recommendations which emerged from my study of
Federal T . A. was that, while all agencies should be pressed to incorporate
T.A. concepts and techniques in their day -to-day planning and evaluative
procedures, comprehensive and credible T.A.'s were best sponsored by a
source which had no operational responsibility for the programs and
projects being assessed, in order to provide a broad scope for potential
assessments, reduce institutional bias and :maxirsize public access to
the results.
	
NSF had $2 . 1 million for T.A. in ai ' 74 and expects to
have $2 . 7 million for FY ' 75. The range of topics in which NSF has
funded technology assessments is broad...
- alternatives to the internal combustion engine
- solar energy
- geothermal energy
- off-shore oil and gas exploitation
energy conservation measures
^:w
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- weather modification (sn(n-Tack augmentation)
- integrated hog farming
- biopesticides
- conversion to the metric system
- alternative work schedules
- remote sensing
I
- videophone
	
-^^	 - cable television
- electronic banking
NSF has also funded some supporting work in T.A.; the survey
	
N	 ^
which l conducted in Federal agencies, the comparative study which Martin
Jones has described 2 another survey of technology assessment activity
x
including the state and local and private sector, four studies of priorities
for T.A., and several workshops and conferences on technology assessment.
There are several additional points to be made here.
NSA' has apparently decided not to fund further studies of a
strictly methodological nature, but to encourage experimentation with
a variety of techniques and methods appropriate to the technology being
assessed---in other words, to let the configuration of the technology drive
	 j
the research design.
The techniques of technology assessment are considered to be equally
appropriate to social technology as well as physical and biological tech-
nology; note that alternative work schedules is a social technology, and
that several of the other subjects (the metric system, integration of hog
	
s
farming) have important elements of both physical and social technology.
s
.	 While none of the areas picked by OTA foe, its first year is purely
	 j
a social technology, Mr. Daddario and Mr. De Simone have stated that they
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expect to choose such areas in the future.
Nearly every technology assessment which has been done reached
a similar conclusion either explicitly or implicitly namely, that
Institutional obsolescence, maladjustment, or inadequacy is critical
in problems arising from or foreseen for technological development;
or that new institutional arrangements must be invented in order to
direct or control the direction of development or minimize undesirable
	 r
side-effects.
Even when sponsors of assessments have explicitly directed the
performers not to make policy recommendations, such findings seem
inexorably to emerge. Some organizations and researchers have refused
or resisted the opportunity to carry out the logical final steps in
technology assessment considered as support for policy making—that is,
to lay out policy and action alternatives and assess their comparative
impacts. It is often claimed that such tasks intrude the "values" of the
a	 or into the decision-makin process. But technology assessment isssess	 $
A
intended to support and inform the decision-making process, and the public
cannot be expected to understand, nor the decision-makers to have the time,
to penetrate a dense technical report and work out the implications for
alternative policies and actions in order to make a wise choice. Either
the assessors themselves must draw out and elucidate these alternatives
(without intervening in the final decision) or some other entity
such as OTA must provide tba translation. NSF has recently
a
required that a substantial portion of the funding be allocated to
providing a popular version of the technical report which is both accurate
and easily readable by the layman, and to providing a plan for popular
dissemination of results through publications, filmstrips, broadcast
rI	
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jmedia, and open conferences. This is a substantial and significant
departure for NSF, which in basic research grants can rely on scholarly
publications and peer group interest to get research results to users.
An interesting trend has developed in would-be contractors and
grantees responding to NSF program announcements and to some e2ttent to
competitive solicitations for assessments by other agencies: the formation
of consortia of universities, or of universities, non-profit and profit-
C
oriented research organizations, and industry research and development
units. Most organizations cannot within themselves meet the requirements
that more and more become apparent as experience with technology assess-
ment accumulates.
It is interesting that industry, which has not rushed to perform
or sponsor technology assessments of technological developments which it
may be pushing, should respond to Federal initiatives, Those companies
which have done so usually have a potential interest in the potential
technology being assessed, and evidently saw this as an opportunity to
perform an assessment and gain valuable information which the corporate
structure would not be willing to pay for (and even make a slight
profit to sweeten the deal),but also saw it as an opportunity to learn a
skill which it may be necessary to possess in the future. In many cases
the industry group chose a University research team as subcontractor or
,point participant. 	 In all likelihood the sponsoring agency will get
full and valuable return on this investment by tapping into expertise
and experience (in the technology) which industry has in abundance. The
University teams; on the other hand have a queasy foreboding that--having
absorbed the knowledge and experience the University group has developed
in assessment--industry will go it alone the second time around and
`s
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attract the lion ' s share of future T.A. funding.
Technology assessments should (a) be widely interdisciplinary,
(b) include or have access to both data from advanced basic research and
experiencedapplied, problem-oriented researchers, (c) be free of the taint
of or suspicion of institutional bias, (d) be protected from pressure by
client, constituents, political activists, (e) be well-managed and coor-
dinated, and (f) be sensitive to the real needs of the ultimate user (who
often does not know his needs). To have the desired impact (that is,
to be in a position to support and inform decision-making) technology
assessments should also have credibility, visibility, and a means of
communicating the findings to the public.
Interdisciplinary research is and has always been a problem for
universities except in extraordinary circumstances. The chief difficulties,
as Jack White has pointed out,3
 are the reward structure and the inability
of experts in one field to communicate information and insights to experts
in other fields, especially where the disciplines differ widely in
assumptions, theories, methodology, terminology, and acceptable degree of
uncertainty. The reward structure for interdisciplinary studies of the
T.A. type is slowly improving. In part this is a result of the emphasis
on relevancy during the past decade, but its practical manifestations are
the emergence of interdisciplinary journals (offering the opportunity for
publication), the development of interdisciplinary degree-granting programs
(;Job-opportunities, promotion&, and prestige), a growing opportunity for
consultantships for social scientists, experienced "generalists," and applied
methodology experts. When, as has been the case with the University of
Oklahoma ' s off-shore oil and gas assessmurx, the study receives wide
attention from Federal agencies and Congress, a new (for academics) reward
14
structure comes into play. It is noteworthy that large independent
research organizations appear to have their own difficulties with
interdisciplinary studies, a point not often recognized. Internal
organization of any information-oriented bureaucracy (as good a definition
of both universities and research organizations as can be found) seems to
 have an irresistible tendency to harken along disciplinary lines. This
probably results from the fact that advanced knowledge and training becomes
ever more specialized. There is probably no way to overcame this tendency
except by interdisciplinary training, or, more likely, interdisciplinary
experience on the part of more scientists. Social scientists are usually
{	 poorly educated in natural sciences,even in an understanding of the physical
laws of the world they live in ; physical scientists seem to have two
parallel deficiencies: an inability to deal intelligently with uncertainty
i
and low probability, and an inadequate understanding of hoar people react
with, and use and misuse, technology.
Universities have an even more serious problem. Theoretically they
can draw on a wide range of disciplines, and have an advantage over
independent research organizations in that they do not become constricted
to those areas well supported by long-term clients, but they almost in-
variably lack management capability. Management of a university inter-
disciplinary research team should not be located within one of the
participating departments, but should be outside of the academic structure
and supported by a core staff which is not tied to the vagaries of the
university teaching calendar; even so, by the nature of the beast, to the
extent that it utilizes faculty and students (and is not simply a think-tank
„_:-i;,ed onto the university) authority and discipline, to impose coherence
and deadlines, will still be difficult. The University, on the other hand,
has some additional advantages for technology assessments--it can provide
ready access to basic research at the developing edge of a science or
technology; it generally enjoys both the substance and the reputation for
objectivity and neutrality; it can exploit trained personnel (graduate
students) at outrageously low costs with good conscience since it is
offering them a valuable commodity in return, real world experience and	 r
a chance to build a track record.
The role which public participation should or can play in technology
c.
	 assessment is not yet resolved. (Here I am not raising a question as to
.	 the role of public participation in decision-making; that it must and can
t
	 play such a role is indisputable.) But technology assessment is not
decision-making--its function is to provide an objective base of informa-{
tion for decision-makers--as nearly complete and neutral as human capability
can aspire to. Some argue that public participation is also vital in that
step, to ensure that all affected parties and all potential impacts are
detected and evaluated. Others would argue against that proposition on
the grounds that
"the public " by definition can add nothing to, and lacks
i
	
	
the specialized knowledge to evaluate, the scientific and
technical knowledge that must be brought to bear durin g
the analysis;
- public participation converts the analytical process into
an adversarial process (or political process) which con-
sists of balancing or weighting obvious interests rather
than detecting and tracing unsuspected impacts;
the interests represented w'.11 be only short-term and
narrow interests; since no one speaks for the community
or society as a whole or for the long-term future, such
concerns will be outweighed and downgraded;
r
I¢
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- public participation generates and solidifies opposition
(or support) too early in the evaluative process, before
sufficient data is available; later information tends not
to overcome the political and psychological "investments" 	 a
already made (i.e., minds are difficult to change);
- some segments of society can rarely or never be involved
in "public" participation; also, assessors may make
biased choices of the "public" who are to participate,
or may co-opt their support for later ir•nlementation.
°	 The development of technology assessment, iu xvhich the U.S. has 	 r
led the way, is not a national but a multi-national development. Several
international conferences have been held, bringing together those inter-
..	 -;
k- ested in technology assessment in both industrial and developing countries.
Groups of government, industrial, and academic representatives from western
and eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and .japan frequently visit the U.S. to
e:
	
	 discuss technology assessment. The International Society for Technology
Assessment, which held a major conference in The Netherlands last spring,
is now planning a more specialized conference in Tokyo in conjunction with
the Japan Techno-Economic Society. OECD has an international group
actively studying technology assessment. 	 One of the most promising
trends to be noted is the way in which assessors and planners in many
countries with different forms of government, legal, systems, ideologies,
and economies are experimenting with the same techniques and methodologies
and grappling with the same problems--such as how to communicate and make
the results of assessment more useful to decision--makers, how to develop
scenarios of the future in which technological impacts will be manifested,
and how to deal with and manage the inevitable uncertainties of assessment.
What is emerging here is a kind of cooperative effort which transcends
language, politics, and ideology in an effort to come to grips with common
	 1
practical problems.
7
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I have said that what happens to the U.S. Congressional Office
of Technology Assessment is a critical factor in the behavior of Executive
Agencies, but I do not mean that it will be the determining factor in the
1
further development of technology assessment. That development, as a 	 J
practical and useful, albeit only a first and uncertain, approach to
i
dealing with the problems of increasingly complex society, is not only
an idea whose time has come," but an idea which is logically inevitable.
i
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
November 29, 1973
RESOLUTION ON APPOINTMENT OF
TEN PUBLIC MEMBERS TO ADVISORY COUNTIL
The Chairman is hereby authorized to effect the appointment of
the following ten public members to the Technology Assessment Advisory
Council;
Harold Brown	 President
t
	 California Institute of Technology
i
	
J. Fred Bucy	 Executive Vice President
Texas Instruments, Inc.
Hazel Henderson	 Author and lecturer on environmental
and social issues
J. M. (Levi) Leathers	 Executive Vice President
DOW Chemical Corporation
John McAlister, Jr. 	 Associate Professor
Department of Engineering-Economic Systems
Stanford University
Eugene P. Odum	 Director
Institute of Ecology
University of Georgia
Frederick C. Robbins
	
Dean
Case Western Reserve University
School of Medicine (Nobel Laureate)
Edward Wank, Jr.	 Professor of Engineering and Public Affairs
University of Washington
Gilbert F. White
	
Director
Institute of Behavioral Science
University of Colorado
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within which the assessment process could proceed effectively -- provided
that the .essential element of citizen participation is forthcoming to
the extent necessary for assessment to reflect the underlying needs and
demands of the society. Technology is interwoven throughout the fabric
of our society; yet as widespread as is its role today, its potential
range of ramifications is likely to be even more extensive tomorrow.
As war is said to be too important to be left to the generals, so
technology assessment is far too crucial to the shape of our future to
be left to the professional assessors and the special interest groups
involved, regardless of how excellent their qualifications or how
altruistic their objectives may be.
The world of tomorrow will be increasingly a technological
society. Technology assessment -- regardless of how recondite its details
may be -- must become an integral aspect of the nation's total social,
political, economic decision-making processes, in which all citizens have
the opportunity to participate. Otherwise, in a technology-permeated
society, it will become increasingly difficult -- if not Impossible --
to maintain, much less enhance, the democratic character of our society
and the quality of freedom in our lives.
Hence, citizen participation must be an absolutely essential
aspect of the assessment process. There are innumerable impediments,
however, which stand in the way of citizens' taking effective assessment
action. These impediments fall in three interrelated areas: (1) finance,
10
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"The judgment then converts what the economists call a
"social" cost into what the economists call an "enterprise"
cost. It internalizes the so-called external cost. In a
similar way the legal system can maintain the incidence of
a cost by declining to recognize a cause of action in tort
against the company.
"Through tort law, the legal system operates directly upon
the incidence of costs. Through the law of contract, the
legal system may operate indirectly upon the incidence of
costs. Contract law may enable the persons involved to
adjust or modify the incidence of a cost by giving effect
to agreements among them designed to effect such an adjustment.
On the other hand, contract law may frustrate efforts of
the persons involved to modify the incidence of costs by
declining to give effect to agreements among them designed for
such a purpose.
"In the long history of the common law in America, changes
have occurred from time to time affecting the incidence
of costs. Changes have also been made by legislation,
such as industrial safety and accident legislation and
workmen's compensation laws. Comparable changes may
occur in the future in the continuing evolution of the
law in response to the changing realities of American life.
"Let me take a moment to hammer the point home. When is
it a good business proposition to put something on the
market? From the point of view of the business enterprise,
it is a sound step if the product to be marketed will make
money. I want to emphasize first, that the enterprise's
own estimate of anticipated income and expense takes for
granted the existing provisions of the legal system; second,
that the existing provisions of the legal system at any
time are the result of a long evolution; and third, that
the legal system in America continues to evolve. Any
changes which you gentlemen may make through new legislation
will become part of this continuing evolution. You would
not be altering the basic structure of the legal system nor
of the business system. You would be altering the incidence
of costs whose incidence has been altered before in the
evolution of the business and legal systems."
H -- The final element in the nation's assessment system is the
essential role of citizen participation, the topic to which the remainder
of this paper is devoted.
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(2) organization and motivation, and (3) information. Each is treated
in turn below.
1
(1) Finance. With rare exceptions, individual citizens do not
have the financial resources to enter deeply into the assessment process
as individuals. Those who are professional experts in a particular
area can often express their assessment views in the open literature,
in Congressional testimony, or as expert consultants. But apart from
this group (which is generally quite small relative to any particular
issue), and from the even smaller group of extremely wealthy individuals 	 F
who make a practice of espousing causes, individuals as such cannot play
a significant role in the assessment process, except through exercising
their power of choice in the operation of the market or political system.
By joining together in groups, citizens can, of course, exert
a much greater influence, depending on the size of the group, its
}	 financial resources, and its cohesiveness with respect to the issues
under contention. We are all familiar with the divers conservation,
r
	 environment, and consumer groups which have been proliferating in recent
F
years, not to mention the various political action groups which have been
emerging recently in response to issues such as Viet Nam, civil rights, etc.
One problem common to almost all such groups is inadequate financing;
fund raising is usually a persistent problem, and much of these groups'
energy and effort is generally devoted to replenishing their depleted
coffers. This lack of money imposes severe limitations on the influence
such groups can exert, especially vis-a-vis well- financed special interest
groups with which they may be contending, either for broad public support
..fit
Effective citizen participation in the assessment process requires
i
	
new financial mechanisms whereby s°.,ch groups can obtain the necessary funds,
on a continuing basis, to compete on an even-footing with the well--heeled
special interests. Part IV of this paper, below, presents a specific
proposal for meeting this financial problem.
(2) Organization and Motivation_. The problems of launching such
groups, of organizing them for effective action, and of motivating
e
citizens to join them and to support their efforts are intimately
intertwined with one another, and are all dependent on meeting the essential
financial prerequisites. For example, consider the problem of motivation.
This problem does not apply to the initial formation of the group, by
a small number of highly motivated individuals, but rather to the difficulties
involved in motivating large numbers of members to join and actively
support the group's programs. Assuming that the group addresses a real
need in our society and has some inherent appeal for some segment of the
2	 public, then the problem becomes one of proper promotion of the group's
1	
objectives and programs and the values associated with membership. This
in turn resolves into a financial problem: if sufficient seed money is
available, then an effective promotional campaign can be mounted and
additional members obtained, who in turn generate additional funds.
The problem of organization is similarly dependent on financial
considerations. Many such groups are reported to be relatively inept at
developing a strong internal organization and at structuring their external
relationships with executive agencies, the Congress, the public-at-large,
or other specific groups they may wish to influence. But I suspect that
whatever ineptness there may be, in fact, is probably due far more to
12
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efforts supported with meagre financial resources.(Ralph Nader, of
course, started out by himself; and even today I doubt whether the powerful
1 Y
'machine' he leads is exactly affluent, especially vis-a-vis the interests
he and his adherents are opposing.) Bu y: the fundamental point, I think,
remains valid: that given a group with inherent appeal to some segment
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of the public, the problems of motivation and organization are largely
idependent on the financial resources which can be obtained.
	 )
=1
(3) Information. While the problem of obtaining and utilizing
information effectively is also dependent in large part on the availability
of adequate financial resources, there are also research problems and
time delays involved here which are of crucial importance. For example,
one may know that the dumping of industrial wastes into bodies of water
has deleterious consequences, without knowing the nature and extent of
those consequences, or the relative damage contributed by particular
components of the overall mix of industrial wastes. Answers to such
questions, however, are frequently extremely important to the design and
implementation of practicable anti-pollution programs. Yet obtaining
valid answers often requires extensive research, and the research in turn
entails time and money.
The difficulty of obtaining adequate information is further complicated
by the fact that many of the consequences of technology, beneficial as
well as adverse, do not occur -- at least sufficiently so that they can
be identified -- until considerable time has elapsed, and vast resources
have already been irretrievably committed to particular courses of action.
13
Once such resources have been so committed, powerful special interest groups
are generated with the objective of maintaining and enhancing their stake
in the technology under cenr'ideration.
In view of this situation, the performance of adequate technology
assessment: entails the incorporation of an 'early warning' capability
which can identi-'y such problems well before they arise, and before the
related patterns of resource allocation have been cement ed in place. The
development of such an 'early warning' capability requires a great deal
of additional research and experimentation in such areas as technological
forecasting, social indicators, and the application of systems analysis
to social and behavioral problems. Society still has a long way to go
in devising appropriate 'early warning' techniques.
In addition, there is a corollary capability which must be
developed if 'early warning' efforts are to prove of any avail. This is
the capability to take appropriate action, after society has been duly
i
forewarned. In certain limited areas, there are some existing mechanisms
directed at this objective. For example, if a food additive is shown to
induce cancer in a test animal, its use is prohibited. Similarly, if tests
of new drugs show them up as ineffective, or as yielding adverse consequences
which outweigh their positive effects, the drugs can be prohibited. Thus
in a few areas, there are mechanisms, however imperfect they may be, for
implementing the results of 'early warning' research. In the vast majority
of instances, however, in which technology can impinge on society and human
life, there are no adequate mechanisms for acting upon 'early warning'
results. Thus, for example, if a new type of container material were
developed today which research indicated would come to constitute a serious
14
fi
S
a
i
if( ;
}
i
A	 a ^{
i
q
environmental pollutant two decades from now -- after certain quantities
1
had accur,ilated and certain chemical changes had occurred -- there would
be no way of halting production, short of new legislation specifically
aimed at that product.
Another approach to the problem would be general legislation
calling for a vast expansion in government regulatory control over industrial
operations and products. This would be bound to have an inhibiting
	
i
effect on the rate of technological innovation and would probably dampen
the overall vigor of the economy. At the same time it would go a long
way toward radically altering the balance of power in the country between
the Federal Government and private enterprise. In any event, it is not
an approach likely to achieve widespread support and enactment in the
foreseeable future.
The fundamental problem remains, however, for technology assessment
to prove effective, society must have the research capability to perform
the 'early warning' Pinction, as well as the implementation mechanisms
whereby such warnings can be acted upon before it is too late.
We can surmarize the requirements for effective citizen action in the
assessment process as follows: Society must afford existing and prospective
citizens groups the opportunity to obtain adequate financing on a
continuing basis. With such financing, citizens groups can motivate their
potential membership to join and participate, and can organize themselves
for effective action. They can also use the financial resources to obtain
the necessary base of informati: to further their causes, supporting the
performance of research when necessary. Furthermore, as the 'early warning'
capability is perfecl^d, they can assess the future consequences of current
15
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and projected technologies. Finally, as mechanisms are developed whereby
society can take prompt action i . n response to the results of 'early
warning' research, citizens groups can come to exert the extensive
f
influence they deserve to wield in shaping the course of the future.
IV - CITIZENS ASSESSMENT ASSOCIATIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION
A -- General
The following proposal has been designed to meet the objectives
outlined above. It does not purport to be a finished end product,
but is put forth as a preliminary proposal solely to serve as the basis
for further thought and discusEion along these lines.
The proposal calls for the establishment of Citizens Assessment
Associations whose functioning would be fostered and regulated by a
new Federal agency, the Citizens Assessment Administration. Through the
financial mechanisms described below, the CAA's would be enabled to obtain
adequate funding on a continuing basis, which would provide them with
the essential financial resources required to assert significant influence
in the assessment process. With this financial base, they would be able
to promote their objectives and activities, motivate sufficient numbers of
their potential membership group, and organize themselves for the effective
exercise of influence on the assessment process. To cope with the
important information requirements for effective assessment action, they
would be empowered to assemble, process, and analyze information relevant
to their assessment topics; and whenever necessary to conduct or commission
necessary research relevant to their assessment areas.
16
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When CAA's had accumulated and analyzed relevant information
needed to perform the desired assessments, they would be empowered to
disseminate the results of their assessments to the public-at-large,
as well as to appropriate decision-making organizations within the
r
society (Congressional Committees, Executive Agencies, etc.). They
would thereby perform a public information function, as well as be in
a position to lobby for legislation or executive regulations in keeping 	 t
'	 with their findings.
In addition, however, they would have the extremely important
power to institute legal, class action proceedings against any organization
i
	
or individual within the society (including agencies of Federal, state,
and local government), which were making use -- or planning to make use
of technologies whose assessments indicated detrimental consequences to
the persons or interests of certain segments of the public. These functions
of the CAA's, along with their facilitating mechanisms, are discussed
in turn below.
B -- Citizens Assessment Administration
This would be an independent government agency with its Administrator
reporting directly to the President. The Administrator would formulate
and carry out the policies of the agency within broad guidelines laid
down by a Citizens Assessment Board, whose members would be appointed by
the President, and who would represent a wide spectrum of interests in
American society.
The CAA would be responsible for developing criteria for, and
regulating the establishment and functioning of, Citizens Assessment
Associations. In addition, the CAA would administer various financial
17
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Imeasures (described in the section on Financing below), which would be
designed to protect the viability of Citizens Assessment Associations.
(Although there are many substantial differences, the relationship of the
Small Business Administration to small business firms can be thought of
as somewhat analogous to what is intended here.)
C -- Establishment and Organization of CAA's
Any group of citizens, meeting the criteria set forth by the
CAA, could establish a new Citizens Assessment Association. In addition,
existing non-profit organizations could be converted into CAA's, if they
meet the necessary criteria. The purposes for which a particular CAA
if formed could be as broad as 'protection of the environment' or as
narrow as 'assessment of consumer products containing asbestos.' The
specific purposes would be spelled out in the CAA's incorporation charter
within quidelines established by the CAA. The initial financial support
for CAA's could come partly through individual donations and membership
dues and partly through foundation grants or government grants and
contracts. In addition to these currently available sources of funds, CAA's
would also have the new mechanism available of issuing Citizens Assessment
Bonds (described below). These bonds would provide CAA's with the continuing
financial stability essential to making a real impact on the assessment
process. Once established, the new CAA would be empowered to use a portion
of its funds for promotional purposes to sell more Citizens Assessment
Bonds and to increase its membership.
	
There could be different classes
of membership and voting rights depending on whether an individual or
affiliated organization made a contribution, paid dues, or purchased a CA
Bond. {The CAA agency would have to regulate these matters carefully to
r
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preclude the seizure of control of a CAA by contending economic interests,
e.g., the purchase of a controlling amount of bonds in a CAA oriented
against oil spill pollution by the oil industry.)
D -- f=unctioning of CAA's
The primary purpose of each CAA would be to perform technology
assessments in its areas of interest, or to draw upon assessment results
obtained by others; and to utilize those results to affect the decision
processes regulating society's use of the technology or technology-
based system under consideration.
To accomplish that purpose, each CAA would have inhouse, or
available to draw upon, a capability for arriving at assessment judgments.
Thus the CAA could have its own staff and/or advisory council of assessment
authorities who would form the assessment judgment upon which the CAA
would act. Or the CAA could draw upon available results of assessments
by groups such as the National Academies of Science and Engineering; or
contract with universities or research institutes, to carry out specific
assessment assignments. When further research was required before an
assessment judgment could be formed, the CAA could similarly carry out such
research inhouse, or contract with others for its performance.
Regardless of which of these patterns was followed, the CAA would
arrive at an assessment judgment upon which it wished to act. (Since the
essence of the CAA concept is citizen participation, there should be provision
in the agency rules regulating CAA's that such assessment decisions must
be duly ratified by the CAA's membership before they can be accepted and
acted upon.	 This would help preclude the CAA's from being subverted into
elitist, expert-dominated organizations.)
s
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Upon acceptance of an assessment, the CAA could follow one or more
of a number of possible courses of action.
(1) The CAA could disseminate its results publicly and attempt
to influence overall public opinion, or the views of selected segments
of the public.
(2) The CAA could lobby directly (or indirectly through other lobby
organizations) with Congress, state legislators, government agencies at,
Federal, state, and local level, the White douse, governors, influential
private organizations and individuals, etc. The purpose of such lobbying
would, of course, be to induce the target group to accept the assessment
results and take appropriate action on them.
(3) The CAA could institute class action, legal proceedings on
behalf of its membership and other potentially affected parties. These
legal proceedings could be directed at any organization or individual in
society (including agencies of Federal, state, and local government when
appropriate), which were making use -- or planning to make use -- of
technologies whose assessments indicated detrimental consequences to the
persons or interests of certain segments of the public.
This power to intiate litigation includes several important components:
(a) The suits would be class action suits that would apply
to whole classes of affected parties.
(b) The detrimental consequences could be either to the
'persons' or the 'interests' of certain segments of the public. Thus if it
could be shown in court that it was to the interest of a certain segment of
the public to maintain the beauty of a national park intact and uncontaminated,
then action which would injure that park would be detrimental to the interests
F9
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(c) The technologies with the detrimental consequences need
not be functioning already for the litigation to commence. The planned use
of technologies with detrimental consequences would also be subject to
appropriate litigation.
What kinds of results would ensue from such litigation? In the
case of technologies which were already in operation, with attendant
detrimental consequences, the courts could award damages to the CAA and
associated affected parties. (In addition, appropriate criminal action
could be initiated when criminal violations hc,l occurred.)
In determining damage awards, the CAA Act establishing the agency
and the associations would extend the concept of damages and associated
costs to include not only real and purative damages when applicable, and
the litigation costs borne by the CAA, but also that portion of the CAA's
operating costs which enabled it to prosecute the suit successfully. Thus
the CAR would be entitled to be reimbursed for: (a) its own operating costs
relative to the preparation for and prosecution of the suit; (b) the costs
of relevant research contracts and consulting fees; and (c) an appropriately
prorated portion of the interest on the CAA's Citizens Assessment Bonds.
This statutory extension in the concept of damages and associated costs
would go a long way toward assuring the financial viability of CAA's.
In the case of technologies whose detrimental consequences had not
yet occurred, the following kinds of results would be possible. This would
include technologies which were planned but not yet in being, as well as
technologies in existence, whose detrimental consequences had not yet occurred,
but could be scientifically forecast with some degree of confidence.
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In such cases, the CAA could seek a permanent Injunction to
prohibit further implementation of the particular technology, as well as
appropriate dismantling of what was already in being. If such an
injunction were awarded (and sustained of course), the organization on
whom the injunction were placed would be liable to reimburse the CAA for 	 ^.
its litigation costs, and also for the associated costs necessary to
prepare the case (as outlined above). Again this would greatly aid
the CAA's in maintaining financial viability.
E -- Financing of CAA's
As noted above, CAA's would be permitted to accept charitable
donations, membership dues, and grants and contracts from private and
government organizations. But the primary source of their funds, and the
foundation of their financial stability would be the Citizens Assessment
Bonds they would be empowered to issue.
The interest rate on these bonds would be regulated by the CAA
agency. The rate would be set at a higher leval than that permitted on
savings bank accounts, and probably somewhat higher than that permitted on
bank certificates of deposit or savings and loan association rates.
Bonds would be issued for ten year periods, and interest on them
would be guaranteed by the CAR agency in case of default on the part of
a particular CAA.
Other sources of funds availabie to CAA's, besides the bonds, donations,
dues, grants, and contracts, would be reimbursement for operating costs 	 i
(as broadly defined above) arising from successful litigation. CAA's would
redeem outstanding bonds at the end of ten year periods through these sources
of funds, as well as through additional bond issues.
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With these ground rules, some CAA's would undoubtedly become
financially insolvent. In such cases, the remaining assets of the CAA
I
would be distributed to the bond holders on a pro rata basis. Thus there
would be some element of risk in these bonds; and it is for this reason
that their interest rate would be set somewhat higher than bank savings
certificates, for example.
F i The interest rates would not be set too high, however, because
ti
the purpose of these bonds is not to provide a desirable form of investment
in general. Its purpose is instead to enable citizens who care about
particular assessment issues, like water pollution or noise due to the
r	 SST, to contribute to society's resolution of the issue, at minimal risk
to their normal savings.
i
To those who would doubt the appeal of such bonds, I would merely
f
point out how voluntary citizens organizations have managed to survive
financially without this reimbursement mechanism. With it, I think they
will flourish, and citizen participation will rightly become a powerful
factor in the assessment process.
F -- Balanced Approach of CAA's
Although much of the preceding discussion on the CAA has been couched
in terms of the negative consequences of technology, there is nothing
inherent in the. CAA concept to exclude the promotion by CAA's of particular
technologies with expected positive consequences. For example, a CAA could
be formed to promote the development and use of electric cars, or certain
systems of public transportation, or solar energy systems, etc. The purpose
of the CAA concept is not to facilitate citizens' attacks on technology,
but rather to enable citizens to achieve full domocratic participation in the
23
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process of technology assessment. Without such participation, the whole
character and quality of our democracy would ultimately be vitiated.
V	 IMPLICATIONS OF CITIZEN ASSESSMENT ACTION
The Citizens Assessment Association concept as presented represents
an institutional innovation which could prove significant. Accordingly,
it is worth exploring some of its major implications.
If the CAA concept were implemented, there would probably be
extensive use of class action suits. At the same time the proposed
legislation would foster an extremely broad interpretation of the interests
of certain segments of the public. Recent lawsuits filed in the environmental
area have been filed partially on behalf of future generations. While
this Is perhaps an extreme case of a broad interpretation of 'interests',
it is nonetheless the general direction toward which the CAA concept would
move litigation.
The broad interpretation of associated costs of litigation -- to
include the operating and research costs of the CAA necessary to establish
the assessment case -- appears to be of some legal significance. Whatever
its significance, however, I believe this interpretation is absolutely
essential to enable the judicial system to play the crucial role with respect
to society's utilization of technology that it has played in other areas
of society's evolution. For the complexities of technology are so great and
the future consequences of present technological activity are so difficult
to determine, that relevant research must be seen as an essential aspect of
litigation on these matters.
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Finally, there are the implications of using present scientific
research as evidence to assert that it is reasonable to conclude that
certain consequences are probable to occur in the future. For example,
scientific research could well conclude that the use of a certain chemical
in small doses over a period of time would cumulatively constitute a
future hazard to a statistically significant segment of the population.
On such grounds under the CAA proposal, an injunction could be obtained
against the promoter of the chemical, with his incurring a financial
liability to the CAA which successfully sought the injunction. This seems
to me again to pose some legal issues of apparent significance. But I
am convinced that the legal system must find a way of taking account of
such considerations, if the system is to fulfill its role in a technology-
centered, highly interdependent society. put in other terms, I believe
the legal system must find a way of making present determinations of
fact on the basis of scientific evidence regarding probabilities of
future occurrence.
As challenging as some of these problems may be to the legal
community, the industrial world will also have its share of adjustments
to make. The concept of imposing costs on an industrial firm on the basis
of some of its planned activities, or on the future consequences of present
activities which are scientifically forecast to prove detrimental, is certainly
something of a radical notion. But again, I am personally convinced
something of that sort is essential for society in order to control the
evolution of technology-based industry in socially desirable directions ---
or at least in directions which are not socially detrimental. One point is
clear in this regard; if such costs were imposed on industry, firms would
25
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consequences of their actions. The `total systems, future-oriented
approach' to technology assessment would undoubtedly gain many adherents
in industry!
A final implication of the CAA concept which may be cited derives
from the Citizens Assessment Bonds. These bonds are predicated on the
assumption that it is proper for citizens to receive a financial return
(even if a modest, limited one) on relatively low-risk investments they
may make, with the objective of enhancing the overall assets of society,
such as environmental quality. It is interesting to ponder where such
a radical notion may eventually lead.
VI - CONCLUSION
In this paper I have made a plea for the importance of citizen
participation in the assessment process, and presented a proposal for
an institutional innovation which would facilitate effective citizen
assessment action. As I stated initially, the proposal is a preliminary
one intended to generate discussion on the myriad of issues involved.
It contains a number of radical concepts and mechanisms which are
undoubtedly open to a number of criticisms. Nevertheless, I believe the
proposal contains the germ of an idea which is worth pursuing. If
recent decades have taught us any lesson, it is that the radical
concepts of one year rapidly become the cliches of the next one. On one
final point, I am absolutely convinced. we have to find a way of assuring
effective citizen action in the assessment process if our society is to
survive as a democracy -- in which the quality of individual life remains
paramount.
f
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groups, both industry and public-oriented, were
urged to attend and to express their views. The ex-
tent to which the media pick up these events and
publications and give them even wider public no-
tice is not clear, but a recent controversy over the
failure (so far) of the National Academy of Sci-
ences to publish an NSF-sponsored assessment of
biomedical technology was reported at length in
The New York Times.
The Congressional OTA also has adopted a pol-
icy of open distribution of assessment results, even
though its primary purpose is to serve the Con-
gress.
Increased public response seen
One must suppose that public reaction to tech-
nology assessment reports may, in the future, par-
allel public response to environmental impact
statements. Early statements were done more or
less perfunctorily and were almost all unsatis-
factory in that they set out the agency justification
for planned projects and programs and were one-
sided, incomplete, and often inaccurate. Improve-
ment has come about not so much because of the
review of other federal agencies or the review of
the Council on Envi ronmental Quality, but be-
cause concerned citizens seized un the statements
and carried them into the courts. The courts have,
in interpreting the National Environmental Policy
Act, steadily broadened and clarified both the pro-
cedural and the substantive requirements of the
law. For example, one court ruled that "govern-
ment agencies are directed to `utilize a systematic,
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences
"TA deals with impacts. Frew social
impacts are spread evenly over
society, some people will reap the
benefits of a -;ew technology, and
some people will be hurl."
and the environmental design arts in planning and
in decision making..."' (Memorandum opinion of
Judge Gasch, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Hardie., 2 ERC 1424, 1 EI,R 20207 (D. D.C.
1971).)
There is, of course, no law requi.ing techndigy
assessment. One may conjecture, however, that
44	 November 1974
data produced in technology assessment may soc a
be carried into court and used to argue damages
inflicted or denial of due process.
Whether used in the courts or not, it seems r,-r
,ain that concerned citizens' action groups will not
miss the opportunity to use ammunition provided
by technology assessment to attack or to defend
government programs in the political forum af-
forded by representai,.ve democracy.
Public information, however, is not the same
thing as public participation. I think there is no
need in this country to defend the case for public
participation in decision making—directly,
through voting, and indirectly, through lobbies, the
agitation of organized groups, and through pres-
sure exerted on elected officials by private citizens.
In recent decades the right of the public to be in-
volved in long range planning or in program evalu-
ation and review has also been incorporated into
many pieces of legislation. Does this mean that
public participation should be incorporated into
technology assessments?
The case for public paareicipat ila a
There are two points of view on this matter that
warrant discussion. Bear in mind that technology
assessment is not decision making, nor is it in-
tended to usurp the duties and prerogatives of
decision makers. TA is intended to provide an in-
formational input into decision making, to identify
potential problems, to provide data for the rational
evaluation of trade-offs, to specify areas of uncer-
tainty, and to l ay out alternatives. Those who ar-
gue for public participation make the following
points:
• The Way in which problems are defined and
alternatives identified controls the range of
possible decisions. If the public is not in-
volved early in the process it has lost the
most significant opportunity to influence de.
cision making.
• The most effective way of identifying the "af-
fected oarties"—those who will benefit or
suffer—and to measure their stakes in the
outcome, is to seek them out and ask them.
The technological elite and the academicians
are all too apt to overlook or misjudge the
interests and the wishes of the ordinary
citizen, especially the poor and disadv.,,n-
taged_
m Technology assessors neceEsari! l, , bring their
own values to bear in carrying out an assess-
ment. Public participation will bring to bear
a wider range of values--- aince there is no
such thing as "scientific neutrality," and cer-
tainly not in applied, problem-oriented social
research—different sets of values must be
brought into consideration.
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", . , it seems certain that concerned citizens' action groups will not miss the
opportunity to use ammunition provided by TA to attack or to defend govern-
ment programs in the political forum..."
o Since technology assessment includes, though
it is not limited to, analysis of economic
benefits and costs, the viewpoints and inter-
ests of industrial and financial organizations
will be considered. These "interest groups"
will in some way participate in the assess-
ment-, "public interest" or citizens groups
should also participate,
© Assessments made by government agencies
by industry, or by research groups ..Bich
regularly serve these clients wi:] always be
biased toward the Establishment or the sta-
tus quo.
The on-going assessment of solar energy by Ar-
thur D. Little is the most thorough attempt to date
to incorporate public participation in technology
assessment. A Public Interest Group Advisory
Panel (somewhat unpleasantly known as PIGAP)
was established to review and criticize the assess-
ment throughout its course, and to submit n sepa-
rate report of its own. Preliminary repot;. .. that
in a number of instances PIGAP has turned up sig-
nificant data overlooked by the technical team,
and that in other instances it contributed to rede-
fining the problems or to directing the investiga-
tion along lines the experts would have ignored or
been insensitive to -for example, the feasibility of
adapting solar heating to public housing needs.
The neutral, scientific approach
Now let's look at the arguments on the other
side. Whose who conceive of technology assessment
as more nearly an objective, neutral, scientific ac-
tivity make these points:
® T.A. is critical in just those areas, inherent
in a high technology society, where issues are
highly complex, data is technical and beyond
the grasp of the untrained layman, and conse-
quences may be delayed, subtle, a-id uncer-
tain. The decision maker is already exposed
to the conflicting interests and view-points
of the public in the political process, but
he badly needs expert guidance in evalu-
ating those conflicting viewpoints and trans-
lating them into sound technuingically feasible
options.
o Public participation prematurely converts the
investigative process into an adversary pro-
ceeding. Opinions tend to crystallize and be
politicized too early, before all the facts are
known and all alternatives have had fair con-
sideration.
o Public participation is necessarily "political"
in nature, that is, it tenrl to the weigh and
balance of special intere , rather than to seek
out unanticipated and hitherto unidentified
consequences.
® There is no "public" but rather many pub-
lics, each of which will tend to speak for im-
mediate, short term, and already identified
interests. Long range and uncertain im-
pacts which will affect future generations,
or benefits and costs which are generalized
over society, may haveno organized or even
latent groups to spear for them, and hence
tend to be overlooked or downgraded in the
assessment.
o There is a constituency problem with pub-
lic interest groups—neither the assessment
team nor the public interest group can ver-
ify that the group in fact speaks for its self-
proclaimed constituency, on a particular
pint or in general. On the other hand,
there is alRo the possibility that public
interest representatives may be co-opted by
their involvement in an assessment.
Summarizing the debate
On the one hand, political decisionmakers, al-
ready buffeted by conflicting demands and values,
need information and guidance from scientists in
highly complex subject areas where they them-
selves are laymen. On the other hand, in the ab-
sence of public participation, the values of a tech-
nical elite, of economic power groups, and of the
Establishment may come to dominate and deter-
mine public decisions before they emerge into tl.e
political arena. In either case, the abil i ty of a
democratic society to guide technological develop-
ment toward its own best interest is threatened.
Self-constituted, non-responsible interest groups,
whether elitist or populist, may interpose an im-
penetrable barrier between the individual and his
elected representative. This is, I believe, why rea-
soned, dispassionate consideration of science and
public information is very much needed.
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PART Ii - FRAMEWORK OF EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Criteria for Assessment of Pro posed Public Actions
i
	 We are becoming more acutely aware of the necessity for increasing our
is
	 capability to control the direction and rate of social change. This requires
a future-oriented policy analysis function, whatever it may be called (Tech-
nology Assessment, Anticipatory Assessment, Social Impact Evaluations, etc.).
For purposes of simplification, the remainder of the discussion herein will
be in terms of Technology_Assessment (TA). The purpose of TA is to clarify
policy and project optio,is in terms of their full social implications in
order that intelligent choices can be made by responsible public and private
sector decision-makers.
The concern with technology assessment is not simply academic. Attention
is invited to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 and its
requirements for environmental impact statements on all major Federal actions;
the policy analysis and technology assessment programs of the National Science
Foundation over the past few years; and the establishment of the Office of
Technology Assessment for the Congress. These actions are initial manifes-
tations of the beginning of the institutionalization of the Technology
Assessment Function. An editorial in Policy Sciences (1974), states in part:
There are stirrings afoot that appear to indicate
that the policy sciences may be some twenty-three years
after the program's framework was laid out by Lerner,
Lasswell, and others, emerging as an identifiable,
respectable, even desirable professional activity. The
creation of numerous training centers in universities
and institutes throughout the world, the production of
Ph.D.'s with degrees in policy analysis, the proliferation
of journals with a decided policy-orientation, and the
willingness of public and private funding sources to
support and encourage these and other related act . vities are
all propitious signs of professional development.
i
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The various entities (public and private) which have been involved in
TA over the past few years have been free to exercise the widest discretion
in the development of various methodological approaches. This has resulted
	
r
	 in innumerable approaches although all have certain basic common components
and operations by virtue of the requirements of the task. Such experimentation
has been productive, and continuing refinement of existing methodological
concepts as well as new approaches should be encouraged. However, it is
 essential fo, the social problem assessment function to become "profession-
alized," at least to the extent that the performance of assessment efforts
	
•	 can be evaluated for their adequacy, if this function is to have an appreciable
impact on the public decision process. Basic to this task is the development
of standards (criteria) which can be applied to measure the adequacy of
performance. The TA function entails certain assumptions which are the basic
characteristics for any assessment entity; that it adopt an independent,
impartial stance toward the policy, concept, program, or project being assessed
(as distinguished from having a stake in or a partisan interest in a particu-
lar outcome); and that it take into account, insofar as conditions permit,
the full range of social consequences which will flow from the introduction
of the project configuration or other action into the evolving social environ-
ment throughout the initiation, implementation and operational stages.
There are, of course, somewhat different attitudes toward the TA function.
Some analysts tend to favor the "enlightment" value (the clarification of
policy options) while others tend to give greater emphasis to the actual
influence of the assessment on the follow-on decision. However, such
differences are all the more reason why serious thinking is now required on
the matter of establishing standards by which the adequacy of the performance
of particular assessments can be made. Further, some of those involved
with the TA function may object to this effort toward developing criteria of
performance for reason that it may tend to inhibit continuing experimentation
in methodological approaches. This concern is overstated. It is now time
i
that those involved in the TA function submit their performances to evaluation
as to their adequacy. Only in this way can the TA function achieve a position
of respect and influence in the public decision process. We must be completely
open as to our organizational and methodological approaches. We must be willing
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to accept criticism and we must strive to improve our capabilities and assess-
ment efforts in response to justified criticism. This continuous striving to
achieve consensus as to the quality of analytical performance (even if often
unachievable as to the relative weights to be given affected social values)
is common to our scientific tradition of submitting experiemental/research
findings to peer review. To a lesser but important degree, it is also the
method of most recognized professions to establish criteria of performance
(including codes of ethics) by which performances by particular practitioners
are to be judged.
It would seem apparent that any public interest-obligated decision
maker or decisional entity would desire to have an understandable presentation,
an analysis utilizing recognized techniques and performed in a professionally
i.
competent manner, and as clear an appraisal as practicable of the differences
in the reasonably anticipated social benefit/cost ratio ;and benefit/cost
k
distributions) of one or more of the policy options under consideration.
The general approach to the evaluation of the adequacy of a TA effort
adopted herein has considerable support from other sources. A Report from
a
the Urban Institute concludes that "many useless evaluations of Fed.,.--al
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programs (are) churned out." 2	Joseph S. Wholey finds that "Results are not
-	 1	 ;
adequately communicated to decision makers." 	 He finds three "particularly
f
serious" defects in federal programs which suggest deficiencies in or at
least appropriate indices of adequacy for judging the performance of a TA
Effort.
	 These are:
	
1) Lack of definition ("The problem being addressed,
the kinds of program activities intended, and the anticipated immediate and
f.
long-range impacts are not spelled out in measurable terms."); 2) Lack of
clear logic (lack of demonstration that "pursuit of action A will produce
impact X."); and 3) Lack of management ("Those in charge of a program do not
have the authority, motivation, or understanding to act on evaluation findings").
Wholey calls for a "preassessment of evaluability" to determine whether a
program satisfies the requisites for useful evaluation:
...that (1) objectives and planned activities have
been defined in measurable terms,	 (2) plausible
assumptions have been made linking expenditures,
program, activities, and expected outcomes, and
(3) -,--!icy makers or program managers are willing
and able to jdentify specific needs for evaluation
information.
It is Wholey's contention that a program or project is "unevaluable" unless
these requisites are met and that evaluation efforts lacking these elements
will simply be "non-productive." 4
Other scholars in the "policy analysis" field have offered suggestions
which have re%,vance to the criteria of TA performance. For example a
recent issue of Policy Sciences contains several useful suggestions. The
Editorial by Garry D. Brewer recognizes the significance of considering the
a
"sequence of decision" including 1) Invention/initiation; 2) Estimation;
3) Selection; 4) Implementation; 5) Evaluation; and 6) Termination 5 James
G. Abert applies a "roles and missions" approach to the "Policy-Makingp ,	 ,'
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Function in Government" E' and defines five key functions: Planning, Analysis,
Research, Demonstration, and Evaluation. With respect to Evaluation he states:
Evaluation is the seeking out of information from
an independent viewpoint not only with respect to
demonstrations, but more importantly, on ongoing operating
programs and activities not funded by the organization in
question. The latter is a "sleeper." It can cause many
problems of a political nature. It is also often difficult
to achieve cooperation in cases such as this, since there
is no leverage. Yet, unless such programs are included,
the scope of evaluation in many areas will be far too nar-
row, since federal expenditures may be only a small portion
of national outlays in the area in question. Examples of
this are health, education, and transportation, where
federal spending is relatively small in comparison to the
total national expenditure. Evaluation Management implies
insuring that there are sufficient resources to do evalua-
tion; that administrative regulations and guidelines require
evaluation; that there is planning for the expenditure of
the available resources; that evaluation produces documenta-
tion in forms suitable for the various users of evaluation
information; and that there i s accountability for the
effective use of evaluation resources.
3
In his summary statement Abert emphasizes that "more attention needs to be
paid to defining who does what to whom and when it is done."D
In their article on "The Scholar as Artisan" 9 Robert T. Holt and John E.
Turner focus on a "producer-consumer relationship." They refer to the pro-
tection that consumers have under modern commercial codes for ordinary products
and suggest that sponsors of studies should have a similar protection when they
"purchase" the products of social scientists. 10
 They state:
Implied warranty provisions establish another principle:
"Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason
to know any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or ,judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. 	 ."
he warrants that the goods are fit for that purpose."
With respect to the enforcement of "accountability" of the scholar they say:
By taking this side-trip to look at the guild system,
we are obviously suggesting that the primary responsibility
11-6
for enforcing appropriate warranties on works of utili-
tarian scholarship rests with the scholarly community
itself. . . In other words, the scholarly community
as a collective entity should be responsible for the
quality of the data, the use of tools of analysis, and
the appropriateness of the design of the product.12
They note the difficulties in "Policy-Oriented Research" and state in part:
The s pecification of the system of variables
appropriate to an applied analysis must include any
variable with a social value attached that is affected
by changes in the manipulated factors--a theoretical
task that presents considerable difficulty. Moreover,
to warrant a product as fit for a particular purpose
carries with it the need to demonstrate that, in meeting
the purpose, the product is not harmful in other ways.
A pill, for example, could not be considered as fit for
curing a common cold if it also precipitated heart
attacks in a sizeable proportion of
ea'spto	
it$ users. Caveat
r is not an acceptable rationale.
The "nature of the warranty" is treated in the following terms:
In li qht of the serious obstacles confrontinq the
social science scholar who mines the veins of utilitarian
knowledge, the question arises as to what the nature of
his warranty to the consumer of the product should be.
Given the underdeveloped state of the methodology that
is to be applied to policy problems and the assumed lack
of skill on the part of potential users, it may be advisable
for the analyst to be explicit about the limitations of
his research for policy purposes, just as the pill manu-
facturer labels the bottle "Not to be taken by people who
have high blood pressure." The bill of particulars might
include:
(1) The assumptions made in the analysis.
(2, A discussion of the limitations of the method.
(3) A listing of the important variables that
are amenable to policy manipulation and
those that are not.
(4) A listing of the variables that may be important
from a policy point of view, even though they
may not loom prominently in the statistical
analysis.
(5) An indication of what the study does not consider
in terms of such factors as "political climate,"
cost-benefit analysis, etc., including the
contingent conditions under which the analyzed
variables operate.14
y !
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Erich Jantsch in his article on "Education For Design" focuses on the
is concept of "total human experience." 15 He is concerned with a "systems
IG
approach to total human experience and purposeful activity,' 	 and states
1	
that "Progress toward an end-state may be called improvement, or increased
dynamic stability, depending on the type of evolutionary metaphor applied."17
Jantsch utilizes the more prominent "systems" concepts:
A holistic measure of improvement for human activity
may then be the effectiveness of design in integrating
human systems towards an overall performance 'ideal'
of eco-systemic stability, i.e., the effectiveness of
both enquiry and creation to that end, with specific
indices such as flexibility and modifiability of design,
propensity for self-organization and engagement of
the members of the human systems, together with active
motivation, openness to genuine leadership, i.e.,
proposals for redesign, etc. Obviously, education for
design has to be geared to such measures of improvement. l8
Jantsch views "planning" as "inherently design," stating:
But planning in a broad connotation is inherently design.
By its very nature it is dynamic, systemic in scope and
based on the feedback interaction between appreciation
and creative, exploratory and normative approaches. In
dealing with knowledge, it is also inter- and trans-
disciplinary, focusir.g on the organization of knowledge
for the task of building human systems.
Yehezkel Drer in his article on "Models For Policy Analysis And Design
In Complex Systems" 20
 provides a far less esoteric approach than does Jantsch
and a far more relevant treatment of tFe evaluative function for present
purposes. In brief, Dror submits "tern interdependent components of an inte-
grated methodology" which he summarizes:
As already indicated, this paper presents an
initial meta-model for policy studies, in the form of
ten interdependent components of an integrated metho-
dology: (1) shared descriptive-explanatory and
prescriptive concept packF—Ies; (2) "preferization"
as the major criterion of policy studies' acceptability;
f
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(3) value analysis; (4) benefit-cost-risk as framework;
f	 (b) search for novel alternatives; (6) prediction and
uncertainty handling; (7) multiple assumptions, models
and techniques; (8) innovative methods; (9) communicability
j	 to clients; and (10) methodological self-awareness. These
components are designed to serve as a guide for engffing in
policy studies and as criteria for evaluating them.
In the elaboration of these ten components Dror touches upon almost every
notion of the evaluation of policy analysis efforts previously noted. A
few points of primary interest include:
Preferizatior, as a primary criterion of acceptability.
This criterion poses the question as to whether a given
study has improved the "policy-results" for the responsible
client. He also states that "responsible acceptance
criteria" provide "a safeguard against essentially political
and personal recommendations being presented as 'science-
based'."22
• Clarification of the fullest meanings of the values involved
in an assessment, having reference to the utility of such
clarification to "legitimate value judges."23
• Necessity of comparing policy options in terms of "benefit-
cost-risk" criteria even though "no quantification or
even commensurability of difference benefit-cost-risk
dimensions is necessarily assumed."24
The development of "novel alternatives" or policy options
when the study task-objective is amenable to such efforts. 25
The "adjustment of policy alternatives to irreducible risk
and uncertainty throl-ih appropriate uncertainty-absorbing
methods" and the "explica`ion of relevant value judgments,
such as risk preferences" and "limitation on the domain of
the study's validity and explicatiowith respect to
unconsidered future contingencies."P6
• The necessity to make "positive redundancy essential as a
basic methodology: "Simultaneous use of multiple and
diverse assumptions, models, languages, and technique is
necessary in all descriptive--explanatory research...
• Emphasis on communicability: "Attention to the communi-
cation problem and recognition of its importance throughout
a study are ther^ore basic elements of the meta-model for
policy studies."28
EI^
i.:
The conclusion that: "A standard requirement for all
policy studies should be that their methodological bases
are explicated, justified and hedged." 29
B. Basic PPSJGWU Evaluative Criteria
Members of the Program of Policy Studies Staff have drawn upon the
foregoing scholars and numerous other sources to construct an evaluative
framework which will be applied in this evaluation of the ORNL MIUS Technology
Assessment. Three basic assessment performance criteria may be posited:
1) Interpretability (presentation of the assessment outcome or report in such
form as to be understandable to the relevant decisional entity or entities
and those participants who will likely affect or in some manner be affected
by the introduction of a given project configuration into the evolving social
environment); 2) Warrantability (authenticity of assessment methodology,
logical consistency, comprehensiveness, factual confirmation of outcomes of
analytical operations, etc.); 3) and Serviceability or utility of assessment
outcome to the relevant decisional entity or entities and others affected
(explicitness of assessment outcome, degree to which the project configura-
tion appears to satisfy the criteria of alignment viability, utility for
making comparative evaluations with alternative project configurations, etc.).
Serviceability of the TA effort will usually increase with its Interpretability
and Warrantability. However, in situations where the assessment entity has
no control over the design of the technological systems models or of the
particular project configuration (or alternative configurations) to be assessed,
these being assigned or specified by the client agency, then the Warrantability
of the effort may be high while the serviceability may be severely limited if,
for example, the project configuration assigned for ?sssssment turns out to
be a totally inappropriate means to the specified social end. Of course, an
assessment effort which better defines the problem confronting an agency is of
1	 5	 i
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some serviceability. As subsequently emphasized, specificity as to the
project configuration (technological system and implementing apparatus) and 	
/
the relevant assessment context will normally contribute to serviceability.
And serviceability will increase to the extent that an assessment clarifies
"project alignment viability" with respect to the project configuration (or
configurations) considered. The Adequacy of an assessment effort performance,
i.e., the extent to which policy options have been clarified, can be measured
by evaluating each of the conceptual/analytical/communicative operations of
assessment methodology with respect to the three aforementioned basic criteria
(and derivative detailed indices of adequacy as needed).
T 
nstructions by the National Bureau of Standards to PPS/GWU in connection
with the evaluation of the ORNL Report entitled "Technology Assessment of
Modular Integrated Utility Systems (MIUS)" pursuant to Contract No. 5--35851
provide that:
Major emphasis in the review should be evaluation
using the basic criteria of Interpretability and
Serviceability with minor attention given to Warranta-
bility Criteria.
C. Alternative Technology Assessment Approaches
Technology Assessments may be performed in accord with any of a variety
of particular methodological approaches, but most such approaches will probably
assume similar basic assessment tasks: the identification of the significant
effects which will result from the introduction of a given (or of alternative)
project configurations (technological system and implementing institutional
apparatus)into one or more projected future social environments and the evalu-
ation of the social impacts of such effects on participants and social value-
institutional processes in accord with specified concepts of social justice,
i.e., schemes of social value weight and distribution. Certain characteristics
I 
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of technology assessment are normally accepted. This function is future-
oriented; it is inclusive in its consideration of effects; and it is explicit
with respect to the postulates, assumptions, and methodological techniques
employed. These characteristics are consistent with the ORNL Report which
states: "Contrary to the implication of the title of the report, the evalua-
tion does not focus on technology but rather on the consequences of its
application." (	 ) Some practitioners also place great emphasis on the
assessment function as a means of providing an "early warning" device for
undesirable effects, particularly the "higher order" or remote and indirect
consequences of a particular technological project. Stress is here placed on
the point that technology assessment seeks the clarification of policy options
confronting the responsible decisional entity.
Numerous approaches to technology assessment have been developed and
utilized with varying degrees of adequacy. The Task-Object ve of the proposed
r a"i
!r
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assessment whether given by the sponsoring entity or posited by the assessing
a
entity has a great deal to do with the technical assessment approach adorced.
The basic concepts and analytical operations noted above are common with most
assessment methodologies although the terminology may differ somewhat. Frequently,
in assessment situations where the task-objective is focused on the general 	
j
i
applications of a new technology the assessing entity will identify and define
3
k
one or more "systems" using the technology for purposes of showing how it might
be applied to various tasks or perform under different contextual conditions.
Such dimensions of the assessment methodology as social environment, relevant
participants including authoritative decisional entities, legal/institutional
processes for implementation and operation, funding arrangements, administrative
structures, and other essenttial implementing components will be analyzed in
terms of available options without any necessary relationship to any particular
rII-12
technological system proposed to serve a carefully defined social environment.
Hence, the effects emerging from the application of this technology and the
k! social impact evaluations of such effects will alto be discussed, perhaps
	
,.I	 comprehensively, in categories of possible effects rather than the effects
.1
	
!	 to be anticipated from a particular application in a precise social setting.
The responsible mission agency then will have available data from which it can
design numerous combinations of specific project configurations for promotion
and implementation. (See Part III-D re Section 3 of the ORNL Report for a vari-
ation of this approach.)
The second approach to assessment may be employed in those situations
where the task-objective is focused on the assessment of well-defined project
configuration (a specific technological system and the necessary implementing
apparatus required to place the system in operation to perform a specified
task in a precisely defined social environment). In such instances, all
components of the project configuration are linked or combined so that the
full scope of effects which will flow from its introduction can be rather
precisely identified, measured as to probability and magnitude, and evaluated
by one or more relevant social justice (social value weight and distribution)
schemes. Put otherwise, a particular option has been selected with respect to
each of the essential and controllable design components of the project con-
figuration. Assessments of this type can normally be performed in a manner
which will be highly serviceable to the interested implementing agency, at
least with respect to the likely total social benefits and costs (and the
distribution of benefits and costs) which will be associated with the authori-
zation, implementation, and operation of the project configuration.
Frequent references will be made in the PPS/GWgJEvaluation to this distinction
between an "open options" approach and the more precise project configuration
0.
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assessment task. It is obvious that the technical assessment methodology
wili vary to some extent with these two approaches reflecting the generality/
specificity of assessment concepts and analytical techniques employed.
The ORNL Report is specific as to the basic methodology selected for
its conceptualization and analysis of the MIUS technology. This "procedure"
is set forth as follows in §2.2:
Step 1 - Define the Assessment Task
Establish scope (breadth and depth) of inquiry
Develop project ground rules
Step 2 - Describe Relevant_ Technologies
Describe major technology being assessed
Describe technologies competitive to the major
and supporting technologies
Step 3 - Develop State-of-Society Assumptions
Identify and describe major factors influencing
the application of the relevant technologies
Step 4 - Identify Impact Areas
Step 5 - Make Preliminary Impact Anal ys is
Step 6 - Identify Possible Action Options
Develop and analyze various programs for obtaining
maximum public advantage from the assessed technologies
Step 7 - Complete Impact Analysis
Analyze the degree to which each action option would
alter the specific societal impacts of the assessed
technology discussed in Step 5.
In the Introduction to the ORNL Report (Section 1) it is stated that
a number of questions need to be addressed in this assessment of the comparative
^ R I 
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social benefits and costs of substituting MIUS installations for conventional
utilities in certain developmental situations:
1) What technologies are currently available for use in MIUS?
2) What technologies are likely to be available in the next two
decades for use in MIUS?
3) How is MIUS likely to be applied and what type systems is it
likely to replace?
4) What would be the likely primary consequences of application
of MIUS, such as reliability of service, cost, and environmental
impact?
a) What are likely higher order impacts - economic, psychological,
social?
6) What community or interest groups are most likely to be affected
by the anticipated impacts of MIUS and are most likely to take
action to influence these impacts?
7) What are the most likely institutional problems and solutions to
those problems?
8) What benefits and costs are likely to accrue from government
efforts to alter either the application of MIUS or its subsequent
consequences?
PPS/GWL1 conducted its Part III, Preliminary Evaluation of ORNL Responsiveness
to HUD, against the above "procedure" and the specific questions the ORNL assess-
ment undertook to address as noted in 62.2. The following basic questions were
considered of relevance in this connection with respect to each major section
of the ORNL Report:
1) What did ORNL propose to do in terms of the concepts, questions
and tasks it undertook explicitly to perform?
2) How well did ORNL perform the proposed tasks with reference to the
assessment methodology selected and the questions and tasks posited
to be addressed?
3) What were the more obvious areas of adequate performance and what
were the more obvious deficiencies in the execution of the ques-
tions and tasks posited to be addressed?
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4) How adequately does each major section of the ORNL Report
serve to relate to or support other major sections of the
Report?
5) How adequately does the ORNL Report, overall, contribute
to the clarification of MIUS model options for the purposes
of HUD policy/decision-making in terms of Interpretability,
Warrantability, and Serviceability?
Part IV of the PPS/GWU review relates to the Analysis and Evaluation
of the Adequacy of Particular Aspects of the ORNL Technology Assessment of MIUS.
This part of the PPS/GWU Evaluation goes to the "normative specification for an
adequate assessment of MIUS" and hence does not adopt the ORNL methodological
approach as the sole measure for an evaluation of the adequacy of the ORNL
assessment effort. The Part IV review draws upon other study reports assessing
the MIUS as well as alternative approaches to technology assessment as evaluative
standards by which to measure the performance of particular aspects of the ORNL
effort.
By broadening the range of assessment performance evaluative criteria for
the Part IV PPS/GWU review beyond the limited scope of Part III, experience
can be drawn upon and insights gained which should enhance the utility of the PPS/
GWU review to all interested parties. Contract No. 5-35851 requires that the three
aforementioned basic criteria of evaluation be employed in this review and then states:
Interpretability criteria shall be utilized to determine
whether the document's format and content allows an intended
user to properly interpret the operation of the Technology
Assessment effort, the relative attainment of the task objec-
tive and the assumptions, social problem context, limiting
constraints and areas of uncertainty encountered in the effort.
Warrantability criteria shall be utilized in this effort
primarily to establish the appropriateness of the Assessment
Metholoiogy used and to determine the acceptability of social
value schemes utilized. Secondarily, the warrantability cri-
teria should be used within the bounds of personnel expertise
to the extent agreed upon by the contractor and NBS to determine
the extent to which factually established input/output data have
been utilized and the completeness of technical aspects of the
Assessment operation.
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Serviceability criteria shall be employed to establish the level
of utility of the document as input to HUD decision making. To
this end, the review should establish whether the assessment is
defensible, whether the actual policy choi,,es and action options
available to HUD have been dealt with, whether the assessment has
considered the alignment between HUD, other institutions and
external factors to determine what extent implementation can occur.
With respect to Task II %ssigned PPS/GWU, this review was to be carried
out as represented by the PPS Performance Evaluative Matrix.
It was also provided that the final evaluation report:
,.,shall detail the specific and general areas of the document
requiring revision prior to publication, those areas of the
document where the technology assessment methodology is defic-
ient and those viewpoints, impact areas, action options, social
environments, and areas of uncertainty not fully considered or
identified in the document.
It is evident from the foregoing that questions such as those posed below were
useful guiding techniques for the PPS/GWU review of Part IV selected aspects of the
ORNL Report:
1) What was the explicitly stated or implicit purpose of each particular
section in the scheme of the assessment task-objective assumed by ORNL?
2) What are the critical questions which one would have expected the
particular section to address?
3) ghat methodological concepts and analytical techniques were applied to
the examination of these questions?
4) What assumptions and/or qualifications were made in the course of
analyzing these questions?
5) What alternative concepts, analytical techniques, and modes of reductionism
might have been usefully considered by ORNL?
6) Was the treatment of the questions posed or task proposed in accord with
recognized technology assessment methodology? Or was it primarily in form
of a general information inquiry? Or was it primarily in form of an
implementation strategy for MIUS installations?
j a
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7) How were questions and/or tasks handled for which satisfactory data or
basic analyses were not available, that is, situations of uncertainty?
$) How does the particular section of the ORNL Report logically relate to and
support other sections of the Report so as to provide a systematic and
coherent development of the MIUS technology assessment?
g) To what extent does each particular section tend consciously to deal with
the assessment task in terms of explicating the analysis and social impact
findings so as to be of greatest Serviceability to HUD; other relevant
decision makers in the authorization, implementation, and operational phases;
and all other participants in some manner affecting or likely to be affected
by the implementation of the MIUS technology?
10) What specific rearrangements of format, or revisions in content, or suggestions
for re-examination/re-assessment are appropriate for the purpose of rendering
the ORNL Report a publishable document?
In addition to utilizing other MIUS studies, assessment methodologies, and
the foregoing questions, the following brief exposition of an assessment meth;. ,uol-
ogy is given for the purpose of presenting certain concepts which have utility in
the evaluation of particular aspects of the ORNL MIUS assessment effort. This
assessment approach focuses on relatively well-specified project configurations
in contrast to the more or less "open-ended" or "scoping out of possibilities"
approach which is characteristic of task-objectives directed to the assessment
of configurations specified only in terms of "technological systems" such as MIUS.
This PPS/GWU approach is incorporated into the assessment Performance Evaluation
Matrix along with additional technology assessment notions for the purpose of
providing a graphic illustration of evaluation of an assessment effort against the
basic criteria of Interpretability, Warrantability and Serviceability. The
Principal concepts of this particular technology assessment approach are:
r	 f._
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1) A well-specified Project Configuration (technological system
with implementing and operational apparatus is to be introduced
into:
2) The Relevant Evolving Social Environment defined as the full
social context anticipated to interact with the project config-
uration and including:
. time period projected
. relevant geographical area
. jurisdictional dimensions - authoritative
(formal) and private sector
• participants likely affected by or in some
manner affecting the implementation and
operations of the project configuration
relevant conditioning factors and trends
organized in terms of social value—institutional
processes (public decision process; process of
technological innovation; economic resource
allocation; knowledge and skill capabilities
and institutional processes; urban and regional
development processes; societal behavioral
patterns; processes of exercising options
pertaining to individual well-being; processes
affectingthe quality of the natural environ-
ment, etc.)
A critical aspect of the evolving social environment is:
3) The System of Technology Assessment/Implementation participants
which deals explicitly and systematically with all those public
and private sector entities, public officials, and private organ-
izations and individuals likely affecting or affected by the
assessment/implementation procedures. Such participants having
differing perspectives, claims and resources which will be used
to develop strategies, based upon their resources and influential
social conditions and trends, which can be applied in relevant
public/private decisional arenas to achieve outcomes which will
satisfy the claims of such participants. Such claims (through
^fur^
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4) The Policy Formulation and Program Implementation PF/PI Process
which i ncludes the phases of:
• Perception of the "problem" or "task" or "action"
proposed
• Formulation of the "problem context" and problem
definition
• Assembly of relevant information
• Invention of alternative means or courses of action
• Assessment/Evaluation/Recommendation of the selected
course of action (Project Configuration)
• Formal prescription of law or authorization of new
program based on the selected course of action
• Application of new statutory scheme in appropriate
decisional contexts and/or implementation of the
prescribed program, i.e., course of action
• Appraisal of the Effects of the application of the
statutory scheme or of the operation of the program
. Modification of the statutory scheme or of the program
based upon continuing monitoring and appraisal
The PF/PI Process provides for the clear identification of the loci of
the numerous interactions (decision points) WHICH will FlKely occur
between the System of Participants in the assessment, authorization,
implementation, and operation of the proposed project / program, i.e.,
successive phases of the assessment effort. Each phase of the PF/PI
Process will involve a somewhat different pattern of participants and
produce a different set of interactions, decisions and follow-on actions.
Hence, different effects with respect to type, magnitude, and participants
will be produced which the assessment should recognize at each of the
foregoing phases. This approach has the advantage of assisting in the
-	 E
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k	 5) The Relevant Assessment Context which varies with the Project
Configuration, the Evolving Social Environment, the System of
F 	 a
Participants, the relevant Authorizing and Implementing Public/
Private Decisional Entities, and the Phases of the PF /PI Process.
r
In brief, the Relevant Assessment Context is the "zone of inter-
-	 ?Y,
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actions" which are anticipated to occur at the intersection of
the System of Participants with the Public/Private Decisional
f	 Entities at each phase of the PF/PI Process. From each of these
t:
interactions, decisions, or follow -on actions, effects will result.
^. The notion of the Relevant Assessment Context is a means by which
effects can be comprehensively, explicitly, and systematically
identified. Explicitness as to the Relevant Assessment Context
contributes to the specificity with which effects can be identified
and measured.
The concept of Project Configuration is basic to the assessment approach
outlined above. Furthermore, it serves as a highly useful evaluative standard
for the ORNL assessment. Project Configuration refers to the means by which a
specified public goal is to be achieved in an evolving social environment. This
requires that project design must be inclusive of the total implementing resources
necessary to place the instrumentality into operation. Unless this inclusive
approach is taken, the full range of planned and derivative effects cannot be
identified nor can a confident evaluation be made of the probable social benefits
and costs and their distribution.
A crucial feature of assessment performance evaluation is its usefulness in
determining whether the project configuration is a suitable means for achieving
the specified social goal in the evolving social context into which it is to be
i0
II-21
introduced. This is one way of stating the notion of Project Alignment Viability.
Such "viability" will be achieved to the extent that the project configuration
assessed will attain the desired goal in the social environment projected.
If a project configuration having a major technological component is to be
employed to achieve a specified objective (the satisfaction of certain transporta-
tion, housing, or energy needs), the inclusive project configuration would then
need to specify such elements as the following:
The precise technological component or system to be employed, its readiness
or future availability.
. The institutional-processes through which the proposed project must move for
purposes of authorization, funding, implementation, operations, etc.
The formal authority (legal prescriptions, statutory schemes) required for
implementation and operations, and the authoritative decisional entities
involved in the ongoing prescribing, invoking, applying, and appraisal
functions.
The financing/funding arrangements and the other resource requirements
such as informational needs, professional skills, etc., for imple-
mentation and operations, including proposed allocations of responsi-
bilities and distribution of attendant costs.
Fi
	
Special institutional-processes designed for utilization in the
implementation and operational stages having the primary purpose of
soliciting viewpoints of those community participants who will be or
may be affected by the proposed action (formal hearings, arrangements
f
	 for review of environmental impact statements by interested parties,
etc.)
f'
The management/administrative arrangements which must be provided in
both the public and private sectors for implementation, operation,
and continuing appraisal.
.I
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. The scheduling of the stages of authorization, implementation, and
operations.
An estimate of the costs of the planned configuration elements
including "hardware," costs of the efforts required in personnel,
time, professional skills, and other requisite resources throughout
the authorizing, implementing, and operational stages. (Costs of
condemnation of properties, relocation of residents and businesses,
and the provision for new facilities and services incident to such
a relocation may constitute a major cost item in many projects.)
Enumeration of the legal (or other) requirements, constraints, and
limiting conditions imposed upon the project design such as Public
Health and Welfare standards, safety factor specifications, cost
limitations, time for completion constraints, etc.
After precise specification of the project configuration and the relevant
future social environment, it can be determined with greater accuracy whether
the specified alignment of technology, formal authority, institutional
structure, financial arrangements, administrative/management operation, the
scheduling of events, and the attendant social costs present an effective,
efficient and acceptable means of gaining the social objective sought. The
is
viability test will impose the greatest diligence upon the assessing entity
in making its social benefit/cost ratio determination and in sorting out the
approximate distribution of such benefits and costs. Failure to test the
alignment of the project configuration with socio-political conditions and
anticipated results can be a serious impairment of both the reliability and
the utility of an assessment effort for the responsible mission agency.
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The crucial point to note about the notions of Project Configuration and
Project Alignment Viability is that they represent more closely the realities
of the social situation than do more generalized assessment approaches. Put
otherwise, they go to the question of whether a specified project configura-
tion when introduced into a relatively well defined evolving social environ-
ment will produce the desired results for which it is intended. Viability
goes to the Goals-Conditions-Means-Results test. This approach is specific
in that it undertakes to identify precisely what will occur if a given action
is taken with respect to a particular social context. This approach is to
be contrasted with an assessment approach which presents a task-objective
positing a generic system (technological or otherwise) for assessment, one
which is thus inevitably "open ended" as to possibilities since numerous
combinations of project configurations are under assessment rather than one
or more well-specified actions. The "open ended" approach leads inevitably
to the analysis of the various options open for each component of the
project configuration as opposed to selecting out a particular option for
each component and linking such components into a coherent identifiable
project configuration.
The develo`ment of this section on a framework of evaluation has served
several purposes: 1) emphasized the importance of evaluating proposed public
programs or other actions; 2) stressed the need to be precise as to the
functions which a particular evaluation/assessment is to serve; 3) restated
the task-objective of the MIUS assessment as perceived by ORNL and the
explicit methodological approach adopted by ORNL; 4) suggested alternative
assessment approaches (including that of posing questions relevant to the
assessment task) by which the ORNL MIUS technology assessment might be
j
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legitimately analyzed and evaluated); and 5) presented an Assessment Performance
Evaluative Matrix (Assessment Process Operations vs. Basic Criteria of Performance)
as a graphic illustration of the evaluative tasks undertaken by PPS/GWU pursuant
to Commerce Contract 5-35851. As in the instance of the ORNL Report, Assessment
Process Operations can sometimes be replaced with relevant sections of the Report
evaluated.
The outcome of this Evaluation is presented in abstract form for ourposes
	
r
of providing a succinct statement of the operational significance for ORNL and
HUD of the conclusions of this Evaluation. The Abstract (Part I) is a condensa-
tion of Part V (Conclusions and Recommendations) and is directed to:
1) the specific sections of the ORNL Report which, as they
presently stand, should be useful to H1 15 and other affected
policy/decison-makers, as measured by the basic criteria of
Interpretability, Warrantability, and Serviceability (with
emphasis on Serviceability).
2) Three Options suggested to ORNL as guidance for revision of
the present ORNL Report for the purpose of assuring its
'nterpretability, Warrantability, and Serviceability as a
published document.
j
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III. Adversarial System
Expressions such as "adversarial system," "adversary process," and
"advocacy" tend to convey an image of an argument or a contest. Advocacy
is often defined as "pleading for" a person or position . 18 Some undoubtedly	 rte.
a
equate advocacy with rhetoric or "the art of influencing the thought or con-
duct of onus hearers. ilg In his article on "Concealed Rhetoric in Scien-
tistic Sociology" Richard M. Weaver states:
Rhetoric is anciently and properly defined as the art
of persuasion. We may deduce from this that it is
essentially concerned with producing movement, which
may take the form of a change of attitude or the
adoption of a course of action, or both.20
In this brief statement there is little to suggest that advocacy or the
adversarial system is or might be a method of inquiry as well as a tech-
nique of influencing a decision outcome,
There is a great deal more to the adversarial system than rhetoric,
however. In a recent treatise on the former, William A. Blaser commences
his analysis with a discussion of the adjudicatory model of the adversarial
system. Clearly, the assumption is entertained that, from the presentation
of rival claims prepared independently by the interested parties, the
"true" facts will emerge and that the "correct" rule will be applied. 21
18The American College Dictionary.
Ibid. i
20 Essayin Scientism and Values (Schoeck and Wiggins, Eds., 1960),
pp. 83-84. "This means that rhetoric, consciously employed, is never inno-
cent of intention, but always has as its object the exerting of some kind
of compulsion." Ibid.
21Blaser, Fretrail Discovery and the Adversary System (1968), p. 4.
is
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He makes the following points:
The adversary system's method of investigating the facts
of a case is conditioned by the system's ultimate aim of
exploring disputes thoroughly, enabling all parties to
present their claims in their own words, and settling the
disputes decisively without violence.22
The adversary system distinguishes between the roles of
advocate and judge because it is assumed, one inhibits
performance of the orher.21
The adversary system assumes that public respect for the
courts is necessary and depends on Judicial neutrality.24
Additional assumptions relative to the adjudicatory model of the adversarial
system pertain more directly to the development of relevant information:
The adversary system places the burden on the parties and
competitive relationship motivates each to find all the law
and facts.25
The adversary system gives each party the full responsibilityy
and opportunity to reveal defects in the rivals arguments.2b
By separating the partisan advocate from the judge of the law
and facts, the adversary system tries to ensure that the
decision-maker suspends judgment until all the arguments and
proofs have been presented.27
Blaser advances a further proposition concerning cases of first impression
for which there is no settled precedent that "the adversaries do not merely
urge the court to adopt whatever well-defined but competing legal principles
221bid., p. 13.
23lbid., p. 4.
24Ibid., p. 5.
25Ibid.
26
Ibid., p. 4.
27
Ibid.
f 4''
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can apply to the facts most advantageously to themselves, but their argu-
ments and mutual criticisms help the court develop new and more clear
1 ,
	 principles of law for that class of cases.1128
1
	
	
The assumptions made about the advantages of the adversarial system
as a technique of inquiry are somewhat blunted by actual practices. As
Blaser says, "Since the parties in a fight seek victory rather than truth
for its own sake, their presentations may confuse rather than help the
court."24 For example, expert testimony is often shaped to partisan ends.
Further, "While the trier of facts wishes to know everything that is
pertinent, a partisan who discovers harmful information is suotivated to
30
conceal it from the adversary and from the court." While the practice of
concealment is to some extent considered to be in accord with the "rules
of the game" in an adversary decisional arena, such as a court or a regulatory
agency adjudication where the primary objective of the advocate participant
is to prevail, such practice could seriously hamper the assessment process
where the objective is to assemble complete information on a given applica-
tion.31
28Ibid., p. 13.
F
29Ibid., p. 6.
i
301b id. p. i.
31
See generally on the adversarial system, E. Barrett Prettyman,
"Some Observations Concerning Appellate Advocacy," 39 Va. L.R. 285 (1953)
wherein Judge Prettyman discusses both brief writing and oral argument and
i '	 quotes John W. Davis on oral argument techniques, at 299, as follows:
"'The statement of the facts is not merely a part of the
argument, it is more often than not the argument itself. 	 .'
Always "go for the jugular vein".' By that is meant that
upon oral argument the lawyer should pick the nub of the case
and go for it. '.	 .(T)he quintessence of the advocate 's art'
I	
.
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In an authoritative decisional arena, advocacy has as its objective 	 j
the presentation of claims or demands that the decision or outcome allo-
	
cates values, i.e., rights and duties, benefits and costs, in designated 	 }
ways. But advocacy in the sense of attempting to influence outcomes is
;:?1
I	 also employed as a strategy in assessment forums. While the assessment
process culminates in an informational outcome as contrasted with a
binding value allocation, it nevertheless involves a decision or determin-
ation as to the outcome which distinguishes such processes from a mere
"bull session." Advocacy in the assessment forum is directed toward
a	 gaining recognition for certain types of effects of a technological ap-
plication and toward persuading the assessment entity to apply evaluative
criteria to such effects (socially desirable or undesirable and the
magnitude thereof) so as to reflect the participant's preferences.
Mr. Davis cah^.the ability to pick one single point and drive
it home as the oni^hy topic in the case. If you are
superbly courageous, you can concede impossible and even dubious
points."
Arthur S. Miller, in "Drawing the Indictment," Saturday Review, Aug. 3,
1968, pp. 39-40, summarizes the adversary system thus:
"The adversary system, in sum, is based on two premises: first,
that the lawyers and judges are competent in the matters dealt with,
and second, that the system can provide enough of the right type of
data to make viable decisions."
Professor Miller believes that both assumptions are incorrect with regard
to courts as they are presently constituted. See infra p. 81 of this paper.
See also, on the adversarial system, Milton Katz, The Relevance of
International Adjudication, (1968) chap. 2.
ri
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}	 IV. Similarities-and Differences
We can probably agree that scientific method is aimed primarily
toward enlightenment, i.e., the production of knowledge, while an adver-
sarial system is directed primarily toward power, i.e., the assertion of
claims and the influencing of decision outcomes. 32 But the adversarial
system clearly includes an enlightenment component. The adversarial
system not only attempts to shape the outcome directly (as with mere
i
rhetoric), but is supported to some degree by the organization of relevant
information including both factual events and appropriate rules or criteria
of decision. For example, when applied in the ultimate political decision
arena where the issue involves a technological application, the adversar-
ial system subsumes the assessment function.
32
To draw on a social science example rather than a technological
application, consider the following observation in the review by David M.
Schneider of Rainwater & Yancy, "The Moynihan Report and the Politics of
Controversy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1968, pp. 20-21:
"But the major problem remains, this time fairly and well
put by the authors: 'The central issue raised by the Moynihan
Report for the government social science relationship is that
of the political use of social science findings.' That is, the
Moynihan Report is not basically a research report or a technical
document; it is a polemic which makes use of social science tech-
niques and findings to convince others. It was designed as a
persuasive document because Moynihan felt that the social science
data he could bring to bear would have a persuasive effect.
'. . .the rhetoric of persuasion is generally considerably sim-
pler than the rhetoric of scholarly or research discourse. The
suitable criteria for evaluating a persuasive document are not
that all its is are dotted and all its is are crossed but that
it selects some crucial issues and presents them in such a way
as not to belie a fuller and more balanced intellectual dis-
cussion of them. it is our view that the Moynihan Report does
not violate this standard although tae recognize that some other
social scientists would disagree."'
..
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This close interaction between enlightenment and power has prompted
some interesting analyses of the differences and similarities between
scientific method and legal process including the adversarial system.
However, the identification of scientific method with verifiable or
patre4r1—al1a° verif-fnable empiri cal relationships, that is, with accurate
description of phenomena and the prediction of events under given condi-
tions, has convinced some observers that a sharp distinction should be
drawn vis-a-vis legal process: That scientific method represents a dis-
passionate search for the It whereas adversarial, system reflects a
passionate "urge-to--sin"--to impose a position, to achieve a preferred
afa11
i
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value or resource distribution . 33 Consider, for example, the informational
limitations of advocacy as illustrated in Professor Mason ' s description of
one of Chief Justice Marshall's opinions:
33 RaymondM. Wilmotte in "Engineering Truth in Competitive En-
vironments," IEEE Spectrum, May 1970, p. 45, advances the thesis that
"the success of decisions in both public affairs and industry depends
today on the correct assessment of technical uncertainties" and that in
"an atmosphere of adversary confrontation, the efforts to hide them can
prove the source of much harm." He states further:
"The mental attitude of the individual who sees that there is
a gap in the truth when uncertainties are not expressed is
altogether different from the attitude attending the process
of finding the truth by the legal process of adversary con-
frontation, for that method in effect eliminates the voluntary
disclosure of uncertainties. Scientists are inherently un-
sympathetic with this legal process, at least on technical
{	 matters." Ibid., p. 46.
Wilmotte seems to be saying that the adversary process tends to add con-
fusion to factual determinations, particularly where the "uncertainties"
as to facts are significant. His references are to the factual /effects
phase rather than to the value or social preference phases of the assess-
ment-decision process. He feels that areas of uncertainty can and should
be reduced in order to enlighten and clarify rather than to confuse. He
asserts that "No scientific or engineering study should be considered
complete without an 'uncertainty analysis'. No system or component is
really understood by its designer until he has carried out such an analysis."
Ibid., p. 47. He finds the "adversary confrontation" designed not to "reach
a
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By minimizing the complexity of the question he had
gratuitously set for himself, the Chief Justice ruled
out the technical agglutinative approach. L'e chose to
fuse the ingredients Judge Cardozo singled out as neces-
sary for a persuasive opinion--overtones of sincerity and
fire, the mnemonic power of alliteration and anthesis, the
terseness and tang of the proverb and the maxim. "Neglect
f	 the help of these allies," Cardozo warns, "and it (the
JJ
	 opinion) may never win its way." Such qualities make for
an Opidiuu at once both 'magisterial` and *imperative.'
Such an opinion 'eschews ornament.' It is meager in illus-
tration and analogy. If it argues, it does so with the
downward rush and overwhelming conviction of the syllogism,
seldom with tentative gropings toward the inductive apprehen-
sion of a truth imperfectly discerned.34
Contrast the foregoing technique of persuasion with the following descrip-
tion of the scientific mode of presentation:
The natural scientists have won an enviable reputation for
modesty in this respect: they seldom allow their desire
for results to carry them beyond a statement of what is
known or seriously probable. This often calls for a great
deal of qualification, so that cautious qualification has
become the hallmark of the scientific method.35
A striking if somewhat crude contrast of adversarial system and the
scientific approach is that offered by the late Judge Jerome frank in his
book Courts on Trial (1949):
Our mode of trials is commonly known as "contentious" or
"adversary." It is based on what I would call the "fight"
a conclusion, but to prove one." He adds, "One can generalize from the
example of the ABM that whenever the purpose of a technical presentation
is to 'sell' rather than to communicate something, and competition exists,
the foundation for a process of adversary confrontation is established."
Ibid.
34Mason, The Supreme Court: Palladium of Freedom (1962), p. 86.
i'
t
35
Weaver, supra, n. 20, p. 91.
r
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theory, a theory which derives from the origin of trials
as substitutes for private out-of-court brawls.35
In short, the lawyer aims at victory, at winning in the
fight, not at aiding the court to discover the facts. He
does not want the trial court to reach a sound educated
guess, if it is likely to be contrary to his client's	 i
interest. Our present trial method is thus the equivalent
of throwing pepper in the eyes of a surgeon when he is
performing an operation.37
Judge Frank characterizes the "fight theory" of justice as "a sort of legal
laissez-faire," that whereas classical economic theory postulated "economic
man," the adversary system postulates "litiguous man. 08 Several statements
in the Report on Technical Information for Congress also attempt to draw a
sharp distinction between scientific and legal-political processes, as for
example.
Scientific truth is established by objective demonstration
and confirmed by replication; political truth is established
by consensual agreement, usually after an "adversary contest."39
John Dewey's specific attention to the process of problem solving as re-
flected in the adversarial system and its relationship to scientific method
is illustrated by the following passages:
As a matter of fact, men do not begin thinking with premises.
They begin with some complicated and confused case, apparently
admitting of alternative modes of treatment and solution.
Premises only gradually emerge from analysis of the total
36Frank, Courts on Trial (1949), p. 80.
37 Ibid., p. 85.
38Ibid., p. 92.
39 TechnicalInformation for Congress (1969), supra, n. 15, p. 5.
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situation. The problem is not to draw a conclusion from
given premises; that can best be done by a piece of inanimate
machinery by fingering a keyboard. The problem is to find
statements, of general principle and of particular fact,
which are worthy to serve as premises. As a matter of actual
fact, we generally begin with some vague anticipation of a
conclusion (or at least of alternative conclusions), and
then: we look around for principles and data which will sub-
stantiate it or which will enable us to choose intelligently
_ -ns	 o tin J er ever thought out thebetween rival cnn4.i.uai^u^. N:^	 _
case of a client in terms of the syllogism. He begins with
a conclusion which he intends to reach, favorable to his
client of course, and then analyzes the facts of the situa-
tion to find material out of which to construct a favorable
statement of facts, to form a minor premise.40
40 Dewey, "Logical Method and Law," 10 Cornell L.Q. 17, 22-23 (1924);
reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readin s in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy
(1951), pp. 553-554.
Making a determination and then searching for the "authority" to
support the conclusion as is reflected in the story about Chief Justice
Marshall: "Judgment for the plaintiff; Mr. Justice Story will furnish the
authorities," would seem the antithesis of the scientific method. But the
pronouncement of Marshall does not necessarily represent his process of
reasoning. Chancellor. Kent, in explaining how he arrived at a judicial de-
cision, noted that he first made himself "master of the facts" and then:
"I saw where justice lay, and the moral sense decided the
court half the time. I then sat down to search the authorities
.I might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule,
but I almost always found principles suited to my view of the
case."	 [Extracts taken from Jerome Frank, "What Courts Do In
Fact," 26 111. L.R. 645 (1932), reprinted in Cohen and Cohen,
Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (1951), pp. 474-
476.1
Dewey's attitude toward the lawyer's approach to information gathering and
organization would seem to be shared with Gordon Tullock in The Organization
of Inquiry (1966), pp. 58-59:
"So far, I have discussed science and inquiry as though they were
the same thing. In one of the general uses of inquiry, this is
true, but in other meanings of this term they are different.
Investigations may be started which are not motivated by either
curiosity about reality or the desire to make practical use of
knowledge of the real world, but by some other motive. A lawyer
building up a brief for his client, for example, may be much more
intelligent, more learned, and more ingenious in his research methods
than most scientists, but his investigation is not scientific be-
cause he is not searching for the truth. He looks for an argument,
based on factual information to be sure, which he thinks will persuade.
In fact, in the Anglo-adversary type of legal proceedings, he is
prohibited from expressing his personal opinion on this point to the
court."
'i
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I do not for a moment set up this procedure as a model of
scientific method; it is too precommitted is the establish-
ment of a particular and partisan conclusion to serve as such
a model.41
f'
41Ibid. But does the focus oa a predisposed, partisan conclusion
necessarily preclude characterization of such techniques of data collection
and organization as utilized in the famous "Brandeis Brief" in support of
the normative standard of "reasonable" in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1907), as scientific?
"In the fall of 1907 the owner of the Grand Laundry in Port-
f land, Oregon, Curt Muller, decided to appeal a ruling against him by
the Oregon Supreme Court. Some months previously Muller had been
convicted by a lower court of having forced a Mrs. Elmci Gotcher,
one of his employees, to work longer than the ten hours a day per-
mitted by the Oregon law governing women workers in factories and
laundries. He was fined $10 for the offense. The Portland laundry
incident might have had little importance, except that since the
1905 ruling by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Lochner v. New York, which struck down a ten-hour limit for men
working in bakeries, employers had been encouraged to challenge
every law restricting hours of work. The Portland laundry owners,
employers of women, warted a clear test.
"From his study of the Lochner decision of 1905 and others in-
volving the clash between Fourteenth Amendment liberty of the
property-owner and state legislation designed to protect the weak,
Brandeis recognized the kernel of his task: to convince the Supreme
Court that the Oregon legislature had acted reasonably in passing its
ten-hour statute. The Court had made it ,:lear that it would tolerate
protective laws that curbed the employer in the free enjoyment of
his property only if such laws were reasonably calculated to pro-
mote the social good. The words reasonable and reasonably ran like
a thread through one Court decision after another.
"Brandeis immediately put Josephine Goldmark to work pulling
together evidence to prove the reasonableness of a law designed to
curb the physical and social evils to women attendant upon exces-
sive hours of toil. This evidence was to be from physicians,
m	 health inspectors, social workers., and industrial experts rather
than from legalists. Medical libraries were combed for documenta-
tion; when this was assembled and edited, Brandeis submitted 101
pages of citations from experts in a dozen countries, all bearing
on the physical requirements of women for a decent amount to (sic)
rest if they were both to work and to fulfill their functions as
nothers. Some of his testimony dated back fifty years, and much of
it revealed greater official concern with working women's health
in the Old World than in America. Brandeis' brief showed that every
reliable nonjuridicial authority in Western Europe and North America
knew that excessively long hours of work are harder on women than
on men; and further, that because women bear children, the physical
well-being of humanity requires that their working hours be limited.
One citation after another proved that long hours of work led to
- 26 -
Despite the fact that many efforts have been made to distinguish
scientific method and legal process, similarities can also be found. All
decisional subsystems within society and especially those which are
closely related to a recognized discipline or profession, are necessarily
concerned with particular subject matter, thought processes, and institu-
tionalized or customary decisional procedures. While given professional
groups tend to specialize in certain types of subject matter, thought
processes, analytical frameworks, and customary modes of reaching out-
comes, such elements are not necessarily the exclusive province of such
professions. Science is the subject matter of politicians as well as
scientists. Inductive, deductive, trend, alternative, and goal--value
thinking are engaged in by all professional groups to some degree. Further,
all such groups are exposed to some extent to the various institutionalized
or customary modes of outcome determination. One should not be surprised,
breakdowns in women's health and morals-- tn illness, to alcoholism
and to prostitution." 	 [A. L. Todd, Justice on Trial (1964), pp.
57-58.]
"But Brandeis' triumph in Muller v. Oregon consisted of much
more than success in arguing a case on the basis of actual condi-
tions of industrial life. One reason the case is considered to
be a landmark in constitutional adjudication is that the Supreme
Court accepted the brief filed by Brandeis as an entirely appro-
priate means for buttressing the Legal argument in behalf of what
would be called today welfare legislation. 'The Muller case is
epoch-making,' Felix Frankfurter wrote in 1916, 'not because of
its decision, but because of the authoritative recognition by
the Supreme Court that the way in which Mr. Brandeis presented
the case. . .laid down a new technique for counsel charged with
the responsibility of arguing such constitutional questions and
an obligation upon courts to insist upon such method of argument
before deciding the issue."	 [Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes and
Brandeis (1956) , pp. 88-89.]
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therefore, that many thinkers have found a degree of correspondence between
scientific method and legal process, including the adversarial system.42
42The philosophical movement of "analytical or logical positivism,"
	 i;r
including its jurisprudential aspects, grew out of the application of the
	 a
methods used in the natural sciences to the study of social and legal pro-
cess. See Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence (1962), p. 89.
F. S. Cohen, in "Field Theory and Judicial Logic," 59 Yale L.J. 238
(1950), reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in
- Jurisprudence and Legal
Philosophy (1951), p. 580, quotes from Einstein and Infeld, The Evolution of
Ph aics (1938), p. 259-
"A new concept aprPars in physics, the most important invention
since Newton's time: tna field. It needed great scientific
imagination to realize that it is not the charges nor the particles
but the field in the space between the charges and the particles
which is essential for the description of physical phenomena."
In the discussion which follows Felix Cohen states:
1
-Must we not say that the truth of any assertion is a matter of
degree, that from certain angles the sentence may give light and
that at other angles it may obscure more light than it gives? The
angle or perspective and the context are part of the meaning of
any proposition, and therefore a part of whatever it is that is
true or f `se.
"The location of words in a context is essential to their mean-
ing and truth. The fallacy of simple location in physical space-
time has finally been superseded in physics. We now realize that
the Copernican view that the earth moves around the sun and the
older Ptolemaic view that the sun moves around the earth can both
be true, and that for practical though not aesthetic or religious
purposes the Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomics may be used inter-
changeably. We realize that Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries
can both be true. What is a straight line in one system may be
an ellipse in another system, just as a penny may be round in one
perspective, oval in a second, and rectangular in a third.
"A prosecuting attorney who assumes that policemen are accurate
and impartial observers of traffic speeds will arrive at one
estimate of the speed of a defendant charged with reckless driving.
The defendant's attorney, if he assumes that his client is an honest
man and that policemen on the witness stand generally exaggerate in
order to build up an impressive record of convictions, will arrive
at another estimate. If each honestly gives his views the court
will have the benefit of synoptic vision. Appreciation of the im-
portance of such synoptic vision is a dist_nguishing mark of liberal
civilization. To the anthropologist, the tolerance that is institu-
tionalized in a judicial system geared to hear two sides in every
case represents a major step in man's liberation from the tyranny
of word-magic. If we do not feel that we have to annihilate those
who say things we do not believe or, what is generally more irritating,
a
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Morris Cohen, for example, in his writings strongly supported the
"hypothetico--deductive" method, asserting that, like science, law is based
upon a relatively few primary principles from which particularized legal
rules are derived. 43 The resemblance found by Morris Cohen would certainly
be rejected by others who might select a different aspect of legal process
to examine or who might start from assumptions or conclusions about legal
process which differ radically from those of Cohen. Holmes at times seemed
scornful of the application of a formal logical approach to legal process
i
i
r	 r
say things we do believe but say them in strange ways or in
unfamiliar accents, we are able to conserve our energy for more
useful purposes. Energy so conserved may produce science, art,
baseball, and various other substitutes for indiscriminate
individualistic slaughter.
"The ancient wisdom of our common law recognized that men are
bound to differ in their views of fact and law, not because some
are honest and others dishonest, but because each of us operates
in a value-charged field which gives shape and color to whatever
we see. The proposition that no man should be a judge of his
own cause embodies the ancient wisdom that only a many perspectived
view of the world can relieve us of the endless anarchy of one-
eyed vision."	 Ibid., pp. 583--584.
43
See M.R. Cohen, "Law and Scientific Method," in Law and the Social
order (1933), pp. 192-197; reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in
Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (1951). Citations are to pages in Cohen
and Cohen. Representative comments include:
"The method of beginning with hypotheses and deducing
conclusions, and then comparing these conclusions with the
factual world, seems to be still the essence of sound scientific
method."	 p. 563.
"A deductive system that enables us to derive many legal
rules from a few principles makes the law more certain, so that
people can better know their rights." p. 564.
"A suggestive parallel can be drawn between the functions
of the law and of natural science. Both facilitate transactions
by increasing our reliance on the future." p. 542.
"(S)cientific jurisprudence endeavors to analyze all laws as
combinations of a few recurrent simple elements." p. 549.
--29-
as when he stated that "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience." 44
 While this assertion would seem sharply at odds with
Cohen's, Holmes might be said to have moved very close to the scientific
spirit of inquiry by emphasizing the empirical approach and the predictive
r^
function: "The prophecies of what the court will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 45
 Clearly, "science," 	 f
"legal process," or even "science of law" can be defined, interpreted, and
analyzed in a multiplicity of ways, and whether similarities or differences
are found depends largely upon the aspect of the concept or process ex-
amined.46
44 Holmes, The Common Law (1881); reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readings
in Jurisprudence and„ Le&al. Pha.losophy (1951), p. 530.
45 Holmes, The Path of the Law from Collected Legal Papers (1920);
reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosoph y
(1951), pp. 416-417.
46
See the interesting introduction to the article by Barbara J.
Shapiro, "Law and Science in Seventeenth-Century England," 21 Stan. L. R.
727 (1969):
"It is a remarkable trick of the English language, and of
the historical development of legal thought, that the phrase
'law and science' stands in such sharp contradistinction to the
phrase 'legal science.' Nineteenth and early 20th-century
lawyers, seeking to carve out an intellectually legitimate and
autonomous discipline of law, used the term legal science not to
suggest that the law was part of modern scientific culture, but
precisely the opposite. They meant that law was a science just
as chemistry was a science, and was thus entitled to independent
existence. This reasoning rested on an obsolete definition of
a science as any systematically organized body of knowledge and
on a failure to acknowledge that what made chemistry or physics
a science was not its autonomously organized knowledge but the
fact that it shared with other sciences a particular method of
investigation and a particular mode of stating results.
And consider the statement of Frederick K. Beutel in Experimental Juris-
i
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Many observers who have given careful attention to the interacting
roles of scientific method and the adversarial system in the making of
' socio-political decisions usually attempt to assign different tasks to these
prudence
	 (1957), pp. 18-19, on the "Essence of Experimental Jurispru-
dence":
"A science of law based on a rigorous application of the
scientific method should be devoted to the study of the phenomenon
of law--making, the effect of law upon society and the efficiency
of laws in accomplishing the purposes for which they came into
existence.	 It is immaterial whether or not all of political
science, part of each of sociology, economics, philosophy and
many of the other social sciences are included within its ken.
The line between the 'sciences,' like the definition of law, is
little more than a quibble which can be left to the pundits,
bureaucrats and administrators; to the scientist, the nature of
its subject matter, the methods which it uses and the results
which it achieves, rather than its definition, are fundamental."
Suggestions that an approach to problem solving which involves
•	 Specification of goals,
•	 Description of contextual conditions and influential trends,
`	 Invention of alternative courses of action to achieve such goals,
Appraisal of the outcomes and consequences of alternative
courses of action, and
•	 Cost-benefit evaluations of the consequences of such outcomes
in terms of specified goal-objectives, d
is a "scientific approach," seems to push the scientific label a bit too
far.	 This is certainly a rational approach to problem analysis if we
consider rational to be the application of relevant facts and analyses to
specific standards of judgment or consider rational problem-solving to be
the selection of satisfactory means to achieve specific objectives. But the
types of thinking represented by the components of this decisional model
certainly existed long before the Western Scientific Tradition got its
momentum.	 There is nothing distinctively scientific in this approach.
	 It
represents alternative thinking which has always been reflected in legis-
lative and policy processes.	 See Mayo & Jones, "Legal-Policy Decision
Process:	 Alternative Thinking and the Predictive Function," 33 Geo.Wash. L.R.
318 (1964).
	
Nevertheless, modern science has contributed to the more effec-
tive utilization of this decisional process. 	 Its empirical, inductive pro-
cedures have provided more comprehensive data on the real world and have
assisted in better defining the gap between what exists and our aspirations.
It has improved our techniques of trend thinking and prediction.
	 It has
provided improved means of measuring impacts of given policies, projects,
practices and applications and has therefore given us a better grasp of how
to move from where we are to where we want to be.
	 The approach to problem
analysis noted above, however, obviously involves both "factual" and
"evaluative" components so interrelated as to provide a systematic or
r' rational model for social problem solving. 	 Such intellectual tasks as goal
f'.
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two methods of inquiry or to suggest limits on the applicability of scien-
tific method or of legal process. Judge Lee Loevinger in "Law and Science
	
I	 as Rival Systems" comments as follows:
The fundamental point that lawyers, as well as scien-
tists, must understand is that both the dialectic method
of law and the empiric method of science are merely means
of gathering and helping to organize data, and that data
may answer some simple specific questions, but they do not
	
•-•}!	 provide answers to problems, particularly of the kind with
which law and government deal.47
The dialectic method of law is essentially clinical in the
sense that it is best adapted to investigation and determina-
tion of the "facts" of individual cases and it is not well
adapted to the investigation of mass or social problems.
Legal procedures tend to break down under the influx of large
numbers of cases. . .and simply have no means of coping with
large populations or broad social investigations.48
What science has to offer law in this generation, and prob-
ably in several succeeding ones, is knowledge of how to
gather, analyze, and test data. . .
Loevinger offers as a summary statement:
The difference in the legal and scientific modes of securing
data is, as has often been observed, at least partially a
clarification, model construction of factor-variable interrelationships,
and alternative invention, are involved. It is not surprising, therefore,
that similar approaches have been suggested as means by which both science
and scientists can effectively relate to the social-political process.
See, e.g., Robert S. Morison, "Science and Social Attitudes," Science,
July 11, 1969, pp. 150 and 165; Don K. Price, "Purists and Politicians,"
Science, January 3, 1969, pp. 25 and 31; and Gordon F. White, "Broader
Bases for Choice: The Next Key Move," in H. Jarreted, Pera ectives on
Conservation: Essays on America's Natural Resources (1958), pp. 206, 216-225.
47
Lee Loevinger, "Law and Science as Rival Systems," 19 U. of Fla. L.R.
530, 541-542 (1967).
48Ibid.
49
Ibid., p. 544.
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function of the different tasks performed by law and science.
While science seeks to analyze and predict phenomena, law
seeks to classify and control conduct. in the most simple
and elementary terms it may be said that the function of
science is descriptive and law is prescriptive. The essential
legal function of prescribing norms is not and cannot be scien-
tific in any sense which the contemporary scientific community
would recognize as scientific.50
5o
!bid., P. 535. A professor of rhetoric puts the matter simply:
"The difference is that science is a partial universe of discourse,
which is concerned only with facts and the relationships among
them. Rhetoric is concerned with a wider realm, since it must
include both the scientific occurrence and the axiological order-
ing of these facts. For the rhetorician the tendency of the state-
ment is the primary thing, because it indicates his position or
point of view in his universe of discourse. Rhetorical presenta-
tion always carries perspective. The scientific inquirer, on the
other hand, is merely noting things as they exist in empirical
conjunction. He is not passing judgment on them because his
presentment, as long as it remains scientific, is not supposed
to be anything more than classificatory." Weaver, supra, n. 20,
p. 85.
Distinctions between "law" and "science" become somewhat less clear when
one shifts from the physical sciences to the behavioral sciences. Con-
sider the following extract from Gordon & Temerlin, "Forensic Psychology:
The Judge and the Jury," 52 ,judicature, No. 8, March 1969, p. 333:
"Psychology and the Law often stand juxtaposed. The Law is
basically rational and deductive; Psychology is basically ex-
perimental and inductive. The Law assumes a volunteeristic source
of man's actions and couches its concepts in such absolute terms
as guilty or innocent, defendant or plaintiff, sane or insane.
Psychology assumes a deterministic basis for man's actions and
shrouds its concepts in relativistic and probabilistic terms.
The Law, for the must part, seeks answers in legal theory and
precedent; Psychology seeks to solve its problems by future
research. Yet, one overriding commonality emerges. Both
Psychology and the Law are concerned with human behavior: one
to study it and aid in its actualization, the other to codify
rules for the protection of men and to guide men ' s behavior toward
one another."
For an interesting comparative professional analysis see June L. Tapp,
"Psychology and the Law: The Dilemma," American Bar Foundation, 1969,
No. 2, Reprinted from Psychology Today, February 1969.
r
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IX. Applicability of Adversarial System to Technology__Assessment
As a general proposition it can be stated that any methodology, pro-
cedure or technique which increases the adequacy of the identification of
effects (scope, intensity, and persistence) of a technological application
and which clarifies the social norms against which the desirability or
i
undesirability of such effects can be measured has a legitimate function in
the technology assessment process. 129 The utility of any mode of inquiry
can therefore be measured by the degree to which it contributes to the
execution of the operations encompassed in the concept of Adequacy.
Scientific method is indispensable as one means of producing relevant
data; but as a method of inquiry it clearly does not satisfy all of the
data requirements for the technology assessment process as defined herein.
While the operations of scientific method are essential in establishing
cause and effect or probability relationships and in projecting trends,
even in contributing to the data required in comparing alternative projects,
i it has relatively little direct contribution to goal clarification. One
3
must not dismiss, however, the contribution that scientific operations do
129The following statement of Dean Don K. Price in The Scientific
Estate (1965) p. 272f would seem of relevance in this connection:
"Though science has given mankind greater certainty of
€	
knowledge, it has gained that certainty by renouncing the
concern for purpose that must remain at the heart of
politics and administration---in both practice and their
theory. . .
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .
The case for the mutual independence of the several disci-
plines does not depend mainly on the objective validity of
the ways by which they acquire and verify knowledge. It
depends even more on the political value of maintaining free
competition and free mutual criticism in the search for truth."
i►
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make in the appraisal of impacts of existing applications. Such data is
relevant to goal clarification in the sense that it forces reexamination
of posited goals to determine if the means employed are in fact achieving
the goals sought or if goals supposedly sought are the objectives actually
desired after the implications of such objectives are made explicit by
scientific investigation of effects, thus, in effect, contributing to the
selection, as well as clarification of goals. 130
As scientific method reaches its limits of utility, some variation
^ Y'
r
of the adversarial system will usually be introduced. But the Formal
Adjudicatory Model of adversarial system is not a wholly satisfactory
model of the technology assessment process either, even though it com-
bines both factual determination and normative resolution. 131 Yet there
130Consider this statement of Emmanuel G. Mesthene, supra, n. 1,
P. 101:
"We used to scorn the mind of the military man as rigid, yet
he has proved remarkably flexible. In less than twenty years,'he
has learned that science, which began by giving him new means
to his old ends, has ended by giving him a new set of ends. Science
has changed his old business from soldiering to a much broader con-
cern with national security affairs.
. . To turn to science as a means is to take the first step
toward changing one's ends. The question is not whether the ends
will change, but when and how, and the ,: .tanager's principal atten-
tion--whether he is managing a business, a government, or an
international negotiation--must be on the first signs of change
in the ends he thought he was heading for when he began."
131 Seewith reference to the general point, Harold L. Korn, "Law,
Fact and Science in the Courts," 66 Columbia L.R. 1080 (1966):
"CONCLUSION
"Adjudication faces an institutional setting for 'fact-
determination' that seems on its face at war with the kind of
aspirations that science can entertain in pursuit of the truth.
Built into the system is an extreme tolerance for low-accuracy
resul "s. A mere ' preponderance' of the eviderce- -probability
greater than fifty percent- -normally suffices to establish a fact
as true for the purpose of the litigation, and latitude exists to
d ike§ ,
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are characteristics of the adversarial system such as the motivation en-
gendered in the participants to present the full data to support a position
and to carefully scrutinize the positions of other participants which
definitely can contribute to the satisfaction of the various operations
set forth in the Adequacy Performance Model suggested. Hence, the ob-
jective must be to utilize scientific method, the adversarial system and
other modes of inquiry to the greatest degree possible in order to optimize
the criteria of adequacy.
That adversarial system in some form will probably be introduced into
the assessment process is evident. 132 However, the inevitability of ad-
versarial practices in certain assessment forums is not necessarily conclusive
sustain jury verdicts that are erroneous in the eyes of the court
even under this broadly permissive criterion. Much pertinent
data is excluded because of policies that the law deems para-
mount to ascertainment of the truth in adjudication, or under
rules designed to screen uneducated nineteenth century juries
from evidence that they might overvalue. The evidence that is
admissible is gathered and presented in an adversary setting under
the result-oriented aegis of the parties; and the tribunal is
supposed to base its decision (apart from matters which may be
'Judicially noticed') solely on the evidence so produced by the
parties of its own."
"It is an important question to what extent this institu-
tional setting properly imposes limits on the goals that may
meaningfully be pursued in seeking improved technical decision-
making. To some extent the justifications for so structuring the
traditional trial process may be unconvincing as applied to scien-
tific and technical issues." ( Ibid., p. 1115.)
"However they are viewed, it is clear that inherent limitations
of the judicial process require that the major stresses of scien-
tific and technological advance be borne by legislative and ad-
ministrative innovation." 	 ILbid., p. 1116.)
132A strong impression of the "inevitability" of the assertion of
partisan claims in various technology assessment forums is provided by
i
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of the desirability of such.practices, at least in the manner in which
the adversarial system is sometimes employed by-particular participants.
With respect to the technology assessment process, adversarial system
must be appraised in terms of its utility as a made of inquiry which
contributes to the operations of the Adequacy Performance Model. Profes-
sor Arthur S. Miller advances a cogent criticism of the adversary system
as it operates in the judicial system:
That deficiency of "ad hocer "--former Bureau of the Budget
Director Charles Schultze's term--may be seen quite clearly
in the lawyers' desire to judicialize human affairs. They not
only view the adversary system of litigation (which deliberately
casts witnesses in partisan roles and expects them to be par-
tial in their testimony) as a proper method of settling dis-
putes, but tend to look on it as the sine q ua non of any
situation. But litigation does not suffice when the problems,
in Aristotle's classification, concern distributive justice
rather than corrective justice. As government moves ever
more into a system of planning, the adversary system simply
will not cope with the needs.
There is, furthermore, nothing in the intellectual equip-
ment of the usual judge to make him knowledgeable about
many of the problems now brought before courts and those
"quasi-courts," the administrative agencies. The same may
be said for the average lawyer. (Administrators, on the other
hand, are supposed by definition to be endowed with technical
expertise, a, notion that has been badly oversold in this
country.) As a consequence, judges cannot base wise decisions
on the information brought to them by contending litigants.
Accordingly in the past they have tended to abdicate deci-
sional responsibility to administrators--just as legislators
have.
The adversary system, in sum, is based on two premises: first,
that the lawyers and judges are competent in the matters dealt
Wollan, The Process of Settin& Safety Standards in the Courts, Congress,
and Administrative Agencies, Part III-Summary and Conclusions, (Program of
Policy Studies Staff Discussion Paper 204, 1968). Conversely, the proba-
bility of attaining "rigorous objectivity" in the assessment function is
minimized.
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with, and second, that the system can provide enough of the
right type of data to make viable decisions. Neither idea is
valid.133
It is clear that adversarial system is discouraged in certain assess-
went forums or by particular assessment entities. In other words, ad-
versarial system is not viewed as a positive mode of inquiry for the
purposes of certain assessment entities. This seems to be the case with
the National 'Transportation Safety Board. This Board is an unusual type
of assessment entity, the Department of Transportation Act specifically
stating that in the exercise of its function the Board is charged with a
continuing review of the safety situation with respect to all modes of
133 ArthurS. Miller, supra, n. 31, p. 40. These criticisms focus on
the competency of the advocates and decision-makers to resolve scientific
and technological questions. Dren in regard to traditional courts Miller,
ibid., p. 42, acknowledges that:
"At the very least they could study the problem of making judges
and other legal decision-makers more competent. One way to accom-
plish this would be for panels of experts to be made available to
the jt.dges. This is done in Great Britain, with respect to the
Restrictive Practices Court (a court that deals with Britain's
counterpart of the antitrust laws); there economists are on the
staffs of the judges. Further, judges and administrators dealing
with scientific-technological issues should have available person-
nel who could forecast the impact of projected decisions."
Cf. the statement of Arthur Kantrowitz, supra, n. 126.
More dif£iCult to cope with is the view that people, particularly
educated people such as scientists and engineers, should be able to cooper-
ate to their mutual benefit in achieving common goals rather than competing
for individual benefit and individual goals.
Perhaps this is a consequence of the affluence of science over the
past 30 years. But as Representative Emilio Q. Daddario (D--Cann.) pointed
out in "Congress faces Space Policy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
May 1967, p. 11, at 15, in reference to DOD and NPSA cooperation in
space ". . if the budget equeeze became tight enough, some individuals
normally willing to recognize complementary spheres might become More
partisan."
a
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transportation. 134 The Act further states that the Board, in the exercise
of its functions, powers, and duties, shall be ". . .independent of the
Secretary and other offices and officers of the Department." Section 5(b)
of the Act prescribes that the Board shall have responsibility for de-
termining cause or probable cause and reporting the facts, conditions, and
circumstances of accidents investigated under authority transferred to the
Secretary of Transportation. 135 Reports and recommendations of the Board,
as well as special studies, must be made public. The Board is concerned
with obtaining the fullest possible information. It is not concerned with
authoritative determinations of placing fault or assessing legal liability.
Its findings are not admissible in court. In order to obtain the most
candid and uninhibited evidence feasible it has discouraged adversarial
procedure. 336
 Nevertheless, the Board does attempt to establish probable
134Public Law 89-670, 89th Cong., H.R. 15963, October 15, 10 , 6, 80
Stat.931, An Act to Establish a Department of Transportation, and for
other purposes. See Section 5: National Transportation Safety Board.
See also Annual. Report to Congress, 1967, of the National Transportation
Safety Board.
135The Board is authorized, for example, to:
"Make recommendations to the Secretary concerning rules,
j	 regulations, and procedures for the conduct of accident in-
vestigations.
{
	
	 "Initiate on its own motion, or conduct rail, highway, or
pipeline accident investigations as the Board deems necessary
or appropriate.
"Conduct special studies on matters pertaining to safety
in transportation and the preventicn of accidents.
"Make recommendations to the Secretary which will, in its
opinion, tend to prevent transportation accidents and promote
transportation safety.
See Annual Report to Congress,1967 of the National Transportation
Safety Board, p. 2.
136This is the impression gained by the writer in discussing investi-
gatory procedures with persons cognizant of the Board's operations. See
n
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cause and this finding is obviously related to fault and liability.
Here the accident has occurred. Liability for certain parties and
remedies for others potentially exists. The Board's recommendations have
been generally accepted; thus, its assessments effectively control official
decisions. Various participants, therefore, have a stake in its findings
s'
or may think they do. This encourages a self interest, partisan approach
`	 which may inhibit full disclosure of fats. But in such circumstances,
why should it be expected that the adversarial system would not creep into
the factual investigations by the Board? One might further ask: Why
shouldn't such procedures be accommodated to some degree at least?
Another assessment context in which an attempt has been made to de-
empha.:ize adversarial procedures is discussed by Professor Harold P. Green
in his article: "Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: A
Critical View." 137 In the author's view the public or affected segments of
Charles Yarborough in the "Crash Inquiry Innovation," Wash. Evening Star,
October 28, 1969, A9, col. 6, wherein it is stated that in the investigation
of the Indianapolis mid-air collision tragedy "the NTSB will not only sit
as a full membership but that another procedural precedent will be de-
parted from: Witnesses, heretofore subject to questioning by batteries of
technical experts, will be interrogated only by Board Members."
137 HaroldP. Green, "Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing:
A Critizat View," 43 Notre Dame Lawyer 633 (1968) (Reprint No. 1, Program
of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George Washington University.)
Perhaps some scientists and engineers would find the following extract
from Felix S. Cohen, op. cit. supra, n. 42, congenial to their temperament.
In addressing the topic of The Paradoxes of Judicial Logic, he asks: Are
Lawyers Liars? and states in part:
"How the edifice of justice can be supported by the efforts of liars
at the bar and ex-liars on the bench is one of the paradoxes of
legal logic which the man in the street.has never solved. The bitter
sketch of 'Two Lawyers' by Daumier still expresses the accepted
public view of the legal profession. So, too, does the oft-told
_ 85 —
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fl	 the public do not have an adequate opportunity to review the considera-
tions that go into the licensing process nor to contest the determinations
made. 138
 One of his more pungent statements for our present analysis re-
fates to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards of three members, two of
3!
whom must be technically qualified members of "recognized caliber and
stature in the nuclear field":139
Clearly, therefore, the boards do not base their determina-
tions solely upon the evidence within the four corners of the
record. The evidence is weigher ead assessed in terms of the
knowledge, experience, and biases of the expert members of the
board. Moreover, the hearing procedures themselves have been
significantly de-judicialized on the theory that "trial-type"
'
	
	
proceedings are not appropriate for the development of scien-
tific and technical information concerning safety and also to
accommodate the procedures to the temperaments of the scientists
and engineers who testify and sit on the boards.140
A major implication of the foregoing is that concerted efforts have
been made to limit adversarial proceedings in nuclear power licensing,
no doubt with the best of intentions since this process is viewed by
nuclear specialists and enthusiasts as essentially a scientific-technical
matter. The Price-Anderson Act of 1957 provided that a mandatory hearing
be held on every application for a license for a nuclear power reactor, 141
story of Satan's refusal to mend the party wall between Heaven
and Hell when it was his turn to do so, of St. Peter's fruitless
protests and threats to bring suit, and of Satan's crushing
comeback: 'Where do you think you will find a lawyer?"'
138	 139
 supra, n. 107, pp. 652-653. 	 139ibid., p. 643.
140Ibid. Social scientists are apparently more willing to accept the
analogy of a trial to critical reviews of their efforts. See, for example,
Carl Stover, "Industry, Technology, and Metropolitan problems," 27 Pub. Adm.
Rev. 112, 114 (1967).
141Green, supra, n. 107, p. 639.
ff
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thereby amending the 1954 Act which required only that a hearing be
granted at the request "of any person whose interest may be affected,"
no hearing being required in the absence of such request. 142 The 1957f	 ;
Amendment was interpreted to require a mandatory hearing at the construc-
tion permit stage, the operating license stage, and on any significant
amendment to the application at either stage. This approach apparently
sled to a multitude of hearings, most of which were uncontested. 143
 Profes-
sor Green states:
In view of the practice of informal discussion and collabora-
tion between the regulatory staff and the applicant, safety
issues were generally resolved before the hearing so that the
role of both parties typically was to build a record supporting
issuance of the construction permit, license, or amendment.
The entire multi.-hearing procedure not only invited interven-
tion, but also was in many respects an exercise in time-
consuming, expensive futility which was particularly irritating
to scientists and engineers, who had little patience for the
lawyer's role and the legalistic aspects of these proceedings.144
It would appear, therefore, that adversarial proceedings such as reflected
in non-essential public hearings can get in the way of adequate as well as
efficient assessments. By a 1962 Amendment to the 1954 Act the requirement
for a mandatory hearing remained but only at the construction permit stage,
"The ABC is, however, required to give thirty days notice of its intent
to issue an operating license or an amendment, and it must grant a hearing
at the request of any intervenor whose interest may be affected.i145
142Ibid., P. 637. 	 143Ibid., p. 639.
144	 145
Tai , pp. 639-640.
	
xbid., p. 640.
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The effort to restrain non-productive adversarial intervention can
I /;
be appreciated. This attitude hardly resolves the complex of issues in-
volved, however, Safety or the criterion of "undue hazard" applied in
nuclear power licensing is not merely a scientific-technical issue;
social risks and benefits are involved in such judgments. A consensus
position on such matters, if potentially attainable, would seem desirable,
but an imposed consensus, whether it pertains to factual interpretations
and predictions or to social objectives, is not only unfair to the affected
public but is an inherently dangerous procedure--bath technologically and
politically. 146 Further, the problem here is not limited simply to de-
termining the best techniques for the promotion of public enlightenment.
It also involves the allocation of professional influence over economic and
political decision-making. Put another way, the greater the universe of
issues that are categorized as scientific-technical, the greater the
decision-making power of the scientist and engineer. The consequent jost-
ling for positions of influence as between professional groups or organized
societal interests would not seem destined for early demise.'
Efforts persist, however, to moderate the public's feelings of dis-
satisfaction with decisions based on highly conflicting assessments, par-
ticularly where serious threats to health are concerned. During the Calvert
Cliffs nuclear power hearings, the Washington Past, noting that all such
hearings have been controversial, suggested that:
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a competent and disinterested public body take a careful look
at all the available facts before the leap is taken. The
location of such plants ought to be a major issue before a
Council on Environmental Quality.147
The obvious abuses of the adversarial system in practice such as con-
cealment of relevant information, introduction of frivolous claims, the
distortion of factual data to suit partisan ends, the exaggeration of
benefits or of potential dangers, the divisive efforts which prevent con-
sensus on matters where potential and legitimate consensus would serve the
public interest, and so forth, should not blind us to the contributions
such a system can make in support of more adequate technology assessments.148
The advantages may be looked at broadly in terms of the pressing need for
public participation in major technological decisions. For example, Profes-
sor H. L. Nieberg states in his article on "The Tech-Fix and the City":
147Wash. Post Editorial, May 8, 1969.
148 See,john Platt, "How Men Can Shape Their Future" in the Bulletin of
the World Future Society, June 1970, p. 9:
"Several features stand out as requirements for satisfactory group
decision-making in the groups and cities and countries of the world
ahead. The first is that all social decisions from now on must be
participatory. Every individual or sub-group must have as large
a share as is practically attainable in the decisions that affect
its destiny.
	 .
Better maps may not only bridge divergent pictures of reality but
may even do something toward bridging divergent self-interests.
If one route can be shown to be clearly more promising than another
in terms of total social costs in reaching a generally agreed--upon
goal, then that total social advantage can be partly used to give
compensating personal advantages to groups whose interests are
damaged by taking that route. Thus, we compensate landowners
displaced by a highway, or wormers displaced by automation. It
is only when the total advantage is uncertain that the disputes
rage on. Much wider use of this principle of preassessment and
compensation would help many of our needed social changes to go
faster and with less disruption."
r
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The problem is not how to control science and technology. The
problem is to recognize which interest groups are exerting
preponderant influence and for what purposes--in order that
we may seek the time-honored correctives of pluralism---namely
visible public accounting and counter--prevailing power. If
there is, as Admiral Rickover frequently asserts, an antithesis
between blind technology and individual libevt y, it is an anti-
thesis between coalitions of narrow grout: interests able to
allocate natural resources toward ends not shared by other
large groups. Our theme, therefore, is the need to assimilate
the gothic mysteries of science and technology to ordinary
political analysis, common-sense political judgment, and plain
English. Obviously, the nation cannot deny itself the aid of
augmented science and technology in facing the serious problems
of the day. But neither can it blindly accept all those claims
made in the name of science and technology as inexorable natural
forces. Scientific and technical change are far from unstoppable
and automatic, but are rather the result of, and responsive to,
public policy. The interested public can gain access and predict
consequences in this, at least as well as in any, area of policy
choice; and all areas are complicated, highly specialized, and
jargonized.149
149H. L. Nieburg, "The Tech-Fix and the City," in the Quality of Urban
Life, Vol. III, Urban Affairs Annual Review, (Sage Publications, 1969)
F pp. 211, 240.
E ,	 On the growing intensity of the general public interest in major tech-
nological projects, see guest editorial of Eugene B. Skolnikoff of MIT,
"Public Challenge of Government Action," in Science, May 2, 1969.
See "Arms and the Scientists: A Long Dialogue Continues," Science,
March 28, 1969, p. 1436.
"The national debate on Sentinel is the first example I know
of a military system being a matter of public debate not confined
to a small group of experts or advocates of a special cause .--Professor
Jack P. Ruina of MIT, a former top Pentagon weapons adviser, at recent
Senate ABM hearings.
"David E. Lilienthal, first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
made this point in a recent CBS public affairs program when he con-
trasted the ABM debate with conditions prevailing two decades ago
when the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb was made. Lilienthal,
who opposed development of the H-bomb, commented on the decision and
its effect on the arms race. 'Well, it's easy,' said Lilienthal,
'to look back and say you were right, but now we're going through
another cycle.
	 .'
Now we're having a public debate about another issue of this kind,
and it's casting a lot of light on public policy. The H-bomb should
have been discussed that way.'
"Certainly there is a new freedom in discussion of weaponry
in comparison with the early postwar period, when the military
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It must be kept in mind that we are not necessarily concerned with
desirable and undesirable social impacts but with which impacts represent
positive social values which should prevail in specific assessment contexts.
We desire both a pest-free agriculture and a pollution-free environment.
How is one to determine what distribution or adjustments are to be made
between two social values at a given point in time or during a projected
period of time? Certain segments of the public stand to gain benefits and
secrecy lid was kept clamped down withh wartime tightness. But
it is unclear to what extent more open discussion has actually
affected key strategic decisions or the process by which they
are made."
The adversarial system would seem to be consistent with the implementation
of the notion of "social justice" as proposed by Kenneth E. Boulding,
"Social Justice in Social Dynamics," in Social Justice (Richard B. Brandt,
ed., 1962):
"T propose to approach the problem of social justice as an
economist and social scientist in a manner somewhat different
from that which is customary among the philosophers. The
philosopher treats the concept of ,justice as essentially a
normative concept. He is concerned with abstract notions of
what is right, good, and ,just. tie is concerned with what ought
to be, not necessarily with what is. These normative discussions
nre important and I would rwt for a moment wish to decry their
value. There 1.6, huwe^, t , r, another point of view from which the
problem of social justice can be examined. This might be called
the p.- . =i_ive or opera: ional point of view in which social ,justice
--nr aL coast she image of social justice as it exists in the
miads of the mrubor:s of society--is an essential variable in de-
termining tits: dyn,,w icy processes and the evolution of that so-
ciety." (p. 73.)
"The perrcption of divergence between the perceived real •:slue
and the ideal value of any important psychological varinhle--that
is, of any variable which is strongly related to utili'.y or gen-
eral satisfaction--may be labeled discontent. In this sense,
discontent cast be ref,,rrded as the prime mover of man to action
provided that his image of cause and effect permits him to believe
himself capable of such action ..s to reduce the dfvr!;	 'etween
the perceived real and the ideal. We may notice a point oi.ee, ;.,r
importance of which will be clearer later. The divergence i?etween
the real and the ideal may be reduced by acting so as to manipulate
the real. But it may also be reduced by adjusting the ideal. This
is the way of renunciation--of wanting what you get, rather than
getting what you want. It is traditionally associated with Eastern
philosophies, and if adopted it is a powerful deterrent to rapid
change." (p. 78.)
i
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E' other segments of the public stand to be deprived of benefits or to bear a
additional social-economic costs as a result of these decisions. 	 The
G^adversarial system offers the indispensable means by which the relevant
values are clarified and the probable benefits and costs are estimated for
the enlightenment of the ultimate decision-maker.
r
No doubt 'some observers and participants view the adversarial. system
as a most serious threat to the achievement of adequate assessment out-
` comes.	 But if one begins with that criterion of the Adequacy Model which
i refers to the comprehensiveness and openness of assessment information,
then the adversarial system as a method of inquiry is to be encouraged
}
qq rather than inhibited. 	 Even the most casual inquiry into the various
f
existing technology assessment systems which have relevance to particular
applications will show a tremendous fragmentation of assessment entities
and their associated processes of assessment.
	
Improved coordinating
mechanisms to serve the purpose of assuring that all such assessment sub-
systems contribute their inputs to support Total Impact Assessments is
perhaps the really crucial need at this particular time. 	 Participation
needs to be encouraged rather than hindered.	 Broadened participation will
in turn, no doubt, contribute to additional, areas of factual disagreement
and to different judgments on the social worth of the application under
consideration.	 This will encourage further resort to adversarial type
proceedings.	 But why not?	 Advocates for potentially affected participants
^s . ► L}} introduce a flow of intelligence respecting the relationship of
the parties they represent to the assessment situation which would not
=.	 d
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judicial tradition to support this proposition but the more contemporary
practices of administrative agencies of sending proposed rules to poten-
tially affected parties for comment often taps an extremely useful source
of data and appraisals.
Some commentators feel that a well-structured and vigorous adversary
system is the crucial technique for technology assessment. 151
 This notion
150 Considerthis statement of Gordon F. White:
"The kind of analysis the natJ9a needs would present estimates
of the consequences of each of the politically practicable lines
of public action. Thereby, the poi.'.tical process of choice would
be sharpened rather than curbed, and governmental intervention
seen in perspective with the alternatives.
. ..	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .
"Agency consolidation, policy formulation, Congressional
reorganization, and interagency co-ordination may, indeed, help
reduce friction and reconcile operating methods. But they are
less basic than an agency or procedure to focus attention upon
the choices and effect of public action. Even with such a
mechanism we could expect continued conflict, divergence, and
pluralism of approach. As Norman Wengert has stated, we should
welcome such indecision and friction so far as they reflect
searching and experimenting with promising lines of action. We
should be dissatisfied only when the choices are not made from
the full range that could be marshalled with our potentially
available stock of knowledge and skills.
.	 ..	 .	 .	 .	 . . . .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .
"Whether or not the federal government recognizes a greatly re-
fined appraisal process as an aid to decision-making, nonfederal
agencies will be needed for that purpose, to double on a small scale
for such action in its absence, or to give it competition in its
functioning." Supra, n. 46, pp. 224-25.
151 Considerthe following extract from Dennis W. Brezina, The Role of
Crusader-Triggered Controversy in Technology Assessment: An Analysis of
the Mass Media Response to Silent Spring and Unsafe at Any Speed, Staff
Discussion Paper 203, (Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology,
The George Washington University, April 1968):
"The process of technology assessment in the case of pesti-
cides and auto safety had previously consisted of an unemotional
and sporadic debate which centered on highly technical issues of
interest primarily to a small circle of experts, and which,
f	 jj
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is based on the assumption that new technologies have a momentum ex-
pressly and energetically promoted by the proponents of specific applica-
tions, that such proposals invariably emphasize, even exaggerate, the
benefits to be derived from such applications and minimize the social
costs. If this situation is assumed as the general context of technology
assessment, then the obvious means for gaining a Total Impact Assessment r
f
therefore, was largely beyond the understanding of the public.
i
	 The appearance of the two crusaders and their upsetting books
signaled a shift in the tempo and the substance of the previously
low-keyed and intermittent debate, for value judgments were
injected and simplifications were made in such a way that the
issues became meaningful to the public. This popularization
phase evoked an emotional response which raised the debate to
a controversial pitch. At this time the political implications
of the issues became apparent to the public and the Congress
and enough interest and pressure was generated to allow Congress
to take action. In this way the books served to move the issues
from the technical plane to the political arena, where the policy
makers could decide on future courses of action before the partial-
ly resolved issues gravitated back to the technical public. This
movement from expert to crusading critic, to public, to policy
maker, and then back to expert, in general describes the pesti-
cide and auto safety controversies.
"In terms of the democratic process, one is persuaded that the
public's involvement was to a great extent due to the efforts of
Rachael Carson and Ralph Nader. Whether public and congressional
interest could have developed without these crusaders is a matter
of conjecture. That the technology assessment process did pro-
ceed in this fashion in these two cases suggests that other con-
troversies over technological programs might occur in the same
fashion in the future. For example, crusader-triggered contro-
versies might enter into the process of assessing the anti-
ballistic missile or the supersonic transport, which are two
technological programs as yet not explained to the public in any
systematic way that points out both their strengths and weaknesses.
In any event it is not clear how public and congressional involve-
ment in the assessment of technology can be assured unless some
controversy develops. If controversy is, therefore, necessary,
then Silent Spring and Unsafe at Any Speed are elements of an
emerging tradition of social criticism evolving in response to the
scientific-technological revolution. This new form of social
criticism has tended to illustrate that public and congressional
involvement, even though episodic, can be a viable and influential
part of the assessment and application of technology." (Italics
added.)
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He further suggested a referee or judge to hear arguments ..nd added:
With opposing briefs, arguments and Lross-questioning many
facets of the problem, many prejudices of the witnesses
would be brought out into the open. The forced opposition
is the important point.157
r d'
157Ibid., pp. 117-118. Apparently, some such procedure was adopted.
C
	 The N.Y. Times Editorial of July 6, 1969, 8E, col. 1, commented, in
connection with Pentagon programs, that "the influence of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. . .has been rising sharply within the Administration" and added:
"The danger in the current trend. . .is the elimination of
checks and balances. The decisions Mr. McNamara made were
partly right and partly wroag: But the adversary process he
employed, which forced the Joint Chiefs to justify their pro-
posals to civilian experts, was eminently sound. Nowhere
else--neither in the Pentagon, nor in the Budget Bureau review,
nor in the Congressional hearings, nor in National Security
Council and White House studies--does such a thoroughly compe-
tent cross-examination occur."
See also Harold Demsetz, "The Technostructure, Forty -six Years Later,"
reviewing Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 77 Yale L. J. 802, 811-812, 	 t
for a concise description of the assessment system within the Pentagon
between weapons systems and between bidders on a particular weapons system.
Because of the requirement for secrecy, an open forum of any real utility
would be rather difficult to obtain.
Congress,of course, does on occasion serve as a more or less open
assessment forum. The B-70 controversy as well as ABM involved searching
examination of the Pentagon's position--whether one agreed with the ultimate
outcome of these controversies or not. See Michael Harrington, "The Social-
Industrial Complex," Harper's Ma&azine, November, 1967, p. 55, for a de-
scription of the adversary nature of such controversies and of new social
programs before Congress, which points up the danger in the present relative
lack of capacity of any group which does not stand to make a profit from a
favorable outcome to challenge such presentations.
"Each element in the defense sector---particular industries, branches
of the service, 'independent' associations for the Army, Air Corps
(sic), Navy, and Marines, and even trade unions---has its own special
interest (profit for the companies, prestige and power for the
officers, jobs for labor). And each one lobbies for strategies
which are determined, not by any objective analysis of the needs of
the nation, but by its own stake in the decision. The debate over
the B-70 bomber during the Kennedy Administration was a classic case
in point. A powerful section of the military-industrial complex, led
by the Air Force and aiming to serve purposes of its own, mounted
a determined campaign against the Administration in favor of proposals
which had been rejected by three Secretaries of Defense under Eisen-
hower and by Secretary McNamara under Kennedy."
I /,:
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Dr. James R. Killiam, Jr., Chairman of the MIT Corporation and the
first White House Science Adviser, proposed in testimony before the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal organization and Disarmament in March 1969, that
the U.S. establish a new policy review group. He proposed a task force
which could channel public debate on weapons issues by making an "inde-
pendent, comprehensive study in depth of our weapons technology and of the
factors which gear upon the decisions the nation must make." His proposal
would seemingly introduce a new, reputable, moderating participant into
such controversies which could contain the vehemence and bring a more
i
effective adversarial procedure into being.
Their special value would be that they would be dependent
conclusions reached by a group of competent citizens who were
free of organizational loyalties. By virtue of this freedom
such a commission could also provide some reassurance to the
growing number of citizens who are concerned about the
"military-industrial complex" and its alleged influence.l$8
"Something like this pattern is beginning to emerge within
the eccial--industrial complex. 'Business,' to quote the Wall
Street Journal once more, 'is turning into an important force for
pushing embattled domestic proposals through Congress.' An
executive of the Department of Housing and Urban Development is
quoted as saying, 'Each agency has gisdually developed a list of
firms interested in its field. . We know how to turn them
on. . .' . . .(A)s the experienos of the military-industrial
complex demonstrates, such procedures lead straight to private
alliances between self--interested executives and ambitious bureau-
craCs. This trend is already quite developed in the cities in-
dustry--where, for instance, real-estate men support rent subsi-
dies as a means of attacking public-housing. . ." (p. 57.)
A ,; ;,ynton Caldwell put it, supra, n. 99, at 128, "American administration
of science and technology is not irresponsible; nevertheless it may be
argued that it is not sufficiently responsible."
158
Quoted in Technology Review, May 1969, p. 72.
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Dr. Killiam added that "it is important for the policy-maker and the public
to have the benefit of listening to contending points of view on complex
technical and strategic proposals such as Sentinel."159
The need for, and opportunity to employ, adversarial system exists
to the extent that scientific method cannot supply the data to satisfy the
operational criteria of adequacy of assessment. But the need for informa-
tion and evaluations through methods of inquiry other than scientific
method does not necessarily mean that adversarial system can be employed or,
if permitted, to what extent. Multiple assessment entities and their associa-
ted forums exist which differ in objectives, degree of specific official
authority, composition of membership, character and scope of subject matter
_reated, capability to assemble and analyze data relevant to its objectives,
!tatutory or customary decisional processes, and reputation, including
'expect status, among participants. These factors plus the general dis-
,osition of the assessment entity will determine the extent to which the
Ldversary system may be applicable. Some assessment entities will or pur-
ort to be non--partisan seekers after the "truth" and stress unbiased,
reclusive claims. At the other extreme, adversarial proceedings will not
only be expected by the assessing entity but be required as in courts or in
regulatory agency and Congressional hearings. The assessing entity may,
through time, indicate clearly what types of information and techniques of
presentation it tends to rely upon.160
lS Ibid.
160Various tyres of communications links between information sources and
the Congress are aioted in Technical Information for Congress (1969), p. 510.
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The following tentative hypothesis is offered for the purpose of pro-
viding a summary statement of the theme developed herein and for the further
purpose of provoking continued critical appraisals of the role of adver-
sarial proceedings in the technology assessment process:
The greater the uncertainty as to relevant data
and effects of technological applications,
The greater the divergence of preferred social values
among the participants,
The greater the perceived stakes in the authoritative
decision to be based, at least in part, on the assess-
ment outcome,
The greater the probable influence of the assessment on
the ultimate authoritative decision,
The greater the acceptability to the assessment entity
of adversarial proceedings,
# The more likelv are the participants to resort to
The contribution of adversarial system to an assessment will, of course, be
measured by the extent to which it satisfies the criteria of adequacy.
There is a very obvious and substantial reason why adversarial techniques
will be imposed upon assessment processes such as the National Transportation
Safety Board hearings and the Atomic Energy Commission licensing proceaure. Sucn
procedures necessarily tend to become adversarial because real interests and
values are at stake. While this will depend upon a number of factors,
161 While the variables noted may tend to be the more influential re-
garding the likely resort to adversarial techniques, a wide range of factors
which may exist in numerous combinations would be relevant to the testing of
the hypothesis. See Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology,
Chart: Process of Technology Assessment/Application, December 1969.
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including the assessment forum and the influence that the assessment out-
come is likely to have on the authoritative decision, one may appropriately
ask: why shouldn't participants having a stake in the ultimate allocation
of benefits and costs employ every legitimate means of protecting and ad-
162
vancing their interests? 	 While "impartial assessment sub-systems" can
usefully provide independent (more or less) standards of judgment by which
partisan claims can be appraised, it is unlikely that our social values and
?.	 x
our assessment-decision procedures can or should preclude partisan partici-
pants. Further, as set forth previously, there would seem to be a potential
•.	 gain from the standpoint of improving the adequacy of the assessment process
by such partisan participation. In other words, an adversarial system tailored
163
to the assessment process not only reinforces a fundamental political principle
j
162
A recent National Academy of Sciences panel report, "Behavioral
Science or Electioneering?" reprinted in part in the Saturday Review,
November 1, 1969, p. 65, states:
"If there is to be any substantial increase in social experi-
mentation, the public must have a voice in what is permitted.
This is a matter not simply of public acceptance of scientific
methods of gaining information, but, more importantly, of public
participation in decisions that affect the utilization of scien-
tific knowledge. This is true for such classic social problems
as poverty and crine; it could be even more important where
the products of science and technology may stimulate fundamental
changes in human affair-i."
163	 s
The late Judge Learned Hand stated in the Associated Press Case,
52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943):
" ffl either exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of
the newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of
the most vital of all ger_ pral interests: the dissemination of news
from as many different sources and with as many facets and colors
as is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is
not the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it
presuppose] that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of authori-
tarian selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but
we have staked upon it our all,"
3
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but also serves as a valuable mode of inquiry.
s:
	
	 Yet it would seem clearly desirable to attempt to identify those
areas of agreement or consensus relevant to the assessment, particularly
t
164This "theme was sounded on April 14 by Dr. Kenneth S. Pitzer, then
	
^s
President of Stanford University, a former research director for the AEC
and a recent chairman of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. 	 r
Urging a testing delaL, in centra? 'Nevada and Alaska until independent scien-
tists could study the possible effects, Pitzer said;
'The problem in this case is not that the risk is completely
ignored; rather, that it has been examined primarily in closed
circles with the effective judgment rendered by officials com-
mitted to the test program. This sort of problem should be con-
sidered by an impartial judge and jury. I believe the risk that
a damaging earthquake might be triggered deserves a much more
substantial public hearing. Then Congressmen, Governors, and
other responsible public officials, as well as the interested
public, can form their own judgment, balancing this and any other
risks against the need for tests or the extra costs of moving to
a (safer) location."'
Gladwyn Hill, "About 355 of 'Those Things' Have Exploded in
Nevada," N.Y. Times Magazine, July 27, 1969, p. 36.
Consider also the following extract from a talk by Representative
Emilio Q. Daddario (D- Conn.) at Washington University in St. Louis on
February 12, 1969, quoted in Science, March 15, 1969, p. 1183:
"Let's take one example---the 200 BEV accelerator proposed
for Weston, Illinois.
"You may be, and probably are, much interested in the 'policy'
machinations which resulted in a decision to go forward with
this highly publicized, highly expensive bit of 'big science.'
I am, too. But I must confess I do not know what they were.
"What rationale is behind the priories given to the accelerator?
(Not that given to the facility itselr.) Who was most responsible?
The National Academy of Sciences? The Congress? The Atomic
Energy Commission? The National Science Foundation? The Office
of Science and Technology and the Federal Council? The Presi-
dent's Science Advisory Committee? Or was it the remnants of the
old World War II MIT-Los Alamos axis whose guiding lights are
sometimes alleged to have been dominating U.S. science ever since?
What logic actually governed the selection of the site? And, in
this case, did an 'in-group' make the recommendation; if so, was
its real advice followed?
"These are questions on which we have all read much and specu-
lated much. Certainly, they are questions of policy. Just as
certainly, very few know the answers, and I sometimes wonder if
anyone knows them all.
"But the point here is to suggest that many of the important
a
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the technical aspects, as early in the assessment process as practicable.
In other words, it would seems highly desirable that to the extent a
potential consensus exists, it should be formulated and stipulated in order
to restrict the areas of uncertainty and difference as x=ch as possible.
This will prevent those aspects of the assessment which are determinable 	 rv:.
and can be agreed to from being distorted by subsequent conflicting asser-
tions, interpretations, and partisan claims. Perhaps in some situations
the most adequate assessments can be made at an early phase of the develo p-
went of a new technological application before interests in the application 	 -
have become consolidated as by investments or by the assignment of program
authority. But this also means that relatively little will be known at
this stage about the impact of the operations. This is another variation
of the eternal dilemma of whether information is to be sought from those
who are essentially unbiased and therefore probably only superficially in-
formed or whether advice is to be sought from those who have studied the
problem in depth and have in the course of this process in some way become
committed or identified with a particular application or interest. 165
There are, however, difficulties with the foregoing hypothesis that
the potential for consensus is greatest at the earliest phases of a pro- ;
posed technological application. Surely, disputes are to be expected on
every conceivable factual and normative issue in the assessment of existing
`a
details of federally assisted scientific endeavor in this
country are decided without being responsible to any policy,
formal, or informal.	 ."
a
165Cf. the statement of Arthur Kantrowitz, supra, n. 126.
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applications where stakes are already consolidated. But even in the
case of developed technologies where an assessment is simply for a new
project resembling many existing applications, the early phases of the 	 f
assessment process may present the best opportunities for resolution of
differences. Put another way, as the assessment process approaches the
final assessment forum and the ultimate authoritative decision, the more
likely that partisan claims of participants will be vigorously pressed. 	 r
But again, reservations arise. The procedural closeness to the ultimate
arena may not identify the most crucial forum, i.e., that assessment
forum which will have the greatest influence on the ultimate allocation
of costs and benefits. For example, the hearing on the initial construc-
tion permit for a nuclear reactor may be a far more critical assessment
point than a subsequent hearing, by request, just prior to the granting of
the final permit. Hence, one can expect, within procedural limitations,
that the adversarial system will be employed with maximum vigor and ex-
pertise in what is perceived to be the critical assessment forum.166
s
a
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166Limitations on adversarial techniques, however, may severely
33^
i
cripple the public's right to participate in decisions which vitally con- k
cern it.	 See for example "Maryland A-Plant: 	 Boon or a Menace?" Wash. Post,
Aug. 26, 1970, p. 1, col. 1, wherein it is stated:
"Dr. Edward P. Radford, professor of environmental medicine
at Johns Hopkins University, is among the scores of people who
have criticized the events in the decision-making process.
"He notes that in May of 1969, the AEC began hearings on
Baltimore Gas and Electric's application for a construction
permit.
"Although opponents regarded this as the key hearing in block-
ing the plant, the AEC pointed out that the lac y governing such pro- .
ceedings prohibited presentation of testimony regarding the choice
i	 of plant location, thermal effects on marine life in the Bay,
power line location and the relationahip between the size of the
plant and the actual power needs of the area to be served.
'	 "Testimony was therefore limited strictly to matters regarding
actual plant construction."
f
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To the extent the above situation does or will pertain, it raises
a most difficult and critical question concerning the role and the efficacy
of existing or proposed "neutral" or "unbiased" or "non--partisan" assess-
ment entities. If, as the tentatively advanced hypothesis suggests, the
most vigorous partisan demands will be made (or attempt to be made) in
the most critical or influential assessment forums, what is the implica-
tion of this assumption for the role of a supposedly impartial assessment
entity? Of course, the answer might differ somewhat with the structure of
the assessment system for different technological applications, with the
stage of the assessment process as the assessment moves from proposal to
recommendation to ultimate authorization, or even with particular opera-
tions of the Adequacy Performance Model. But the crux of the matter is
that partisan claims will be focused on the more influential assessment
forums; 167 and the more influential the assessment outcomes of a given
assessment entity on the final authoritative decision, the greater the
167 ConsiderLynton Caldwell's statement, supra, n. 99, pp. 128-29:
"The locus of responsibility for this kind of policy guidance
is obviously. . .a function of the Congress, the President, and
the Supreme Court. But the knowledge required for policy deci-
sions in the new age of science cannot possibly be developed
at this level. . .(P)ublic policy making must be sought at those
levels in the structure of decision where the knowledge is. . .
(T)he technological bias of our social attitudes and administra-
tive programs make it easy for technical judgments to become
social decisions without adequate appraisal of the implied con-
sequences."
See also M. Harrington, supra,- n. 157.
This is partly compensated for by deliberately structuring institu-
tions around these people to protect them from their own lack of knowledge
--although these institutions are by no means sufficiently knowledgable.
"But even with a President and a Vice-President who are firmly
on record as advocates, the program is not automatically guaran-
teed clear sailing in the executive branch. The Executive Office
of the President is not an open door to budget suppliants in NASA and
r
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effort that will be brought to bear to impose partisan demands on the
assessment process (forum proceedings) of such entity. 168 In the Congres-
sional hearing (assessment forum) certain possibilities seem apparent.
If a given Congressional committee or sub--committee should tend to rely
primarily upon the analysis and recommendations of a particular "impartial"
assessment entity, then interested participants would surely make every
effort to be heard and to influence the assessment outcomes of such 	 N
entity. At the other extreme, the "impartial" assessment entity might be
viewed by the committee or sub-committee as "just another witness," in
which case the entity would enter the Congressional assessment forum as a
partisan participant, although with a different perspective from the usual
interest-oriented witnesses. In the latter situation the adversarial pro-
ceeding would focus at the Congressional hearing level rather than in the
forum of the "impartial" assessment entity. But it is simply a matter of at
what lev61 and to what extent the adversarial system enters the assessment
Defense or other agencies who have space plans to push.
Of course their requests are heard. But these requests are
screened for the President by a variety of institutional safe-
guards whose very purpose is to protect a President from his
own, enthusiasms and from the persuasiveness of a particular
subordinate official. The Bureau of the Budget is a profes-
sional "no" agency; othenaise the limit to federal expenditures
would be almost impossible to fix short of disaster.
". . .The consequence is that it is most difficult to estab-
lish new forward commitments in the executive branch. The
desire is there, perhaps, but the realities of total, national
needs are a strong constraint." Rep. Daddario, supra, n. 133, p. 16.
Of course, Congress cannot rely on such a "no" agency since it doesn't
have one--except itself.
168
The pressures that can be brought to bear upon the ultimate assess-
ment/decision entity is well illustrated in the fluoridation controversy.
See Wollan, "Controlling the Potential Hazards of Government-Sponsored
Technology," 36 Geo. [dash. L.R. 1105, 1125, 1130 (1968) (Reprint No. 2,
Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, July 1968.)
7
will be brought to bear to have them heard. Hence, the "impartial"
assessment entity in all probability cannot escape the adversarial pro-
cedure. 169
 Either its own assessment process will have to provide for
adversarial procedures or it will have to enter the Congressional assess-
ment forum as one of multiple participants in an adversarial assessment
context. It may, nevertheless, be plausibly maintained that while the
conventional partisan inputs to the Congressional assessment forum are
indispensable, there is cle, y further need for one or more "disinter-
ested, public-interest-oriented" assessment entities which can provide
the Congress with a full spectrum of prospective impacts of proposed
technological applications. Yet it would seem most unlikely that in our
political system such an "unbiased" assessment entity could operate as a
169Without positing a particular model of an assessment arrangement
it is not feasible to identify the specific difficulties or issues which
would arise with respect to concept, prescribed functions, organization and
operations. Assuming the possibility of the establishment of a more highly
institutionalized and centralized assessment function than now exists,
surely past experience with official entities such as courts and the regula-
tory agencies would be suggestive in identifying the types of issues which
might arise. In this connection such articles as that of A. Everette
Maclntyre, "The Status of Regulatory Independence," 29 Fed. Bar Sou. 1
(1969), would be useful. And on the further assumption that the new asses-
sors would have objectives similar to those of Federal Trail Examiners
in the technologically oriented regulatory agencies and would be confronted
with conceptual and operational questions with which such examiners have had
to contend, careful attention to John 14. Macy's article, "The APA and the
Hearing Examiner: Products of a Viable Political Society," 27 Fed. Ear
Jou. 351 (1967) would seem warranted.
And in terms of process and the relationship of scientific or technical
"facts" to decisional criteria, the article of Harold L. Korn, "Law, Fact,
and Science in the Courts," 66 Col. L.R. 1080 (1966) is highly relevant.
This article treats in major subheadings: I. Transmitting Technical Informa-
tion; II. Applying the Scientific Knowledge Lo Decision of the Legal Issue;
and III. Scientific Knowledge as Law or Fact.
r
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decisive assessment instrumentality in isolation from partisan claims.
In any event, the shifting interaction in the assessment process between
the inputs of adversarial system on the one hand and the inputs of a sup-
posedly disinterested public interest-oriented assessment entity on the
other, is deserving of continuing careful examination. 171
170Hugh Folk, in a paper entitled The Role of Technology Assessment
in Public Policy, pp. 4-5, 9, 10, delivered at the AAAS Meeting on December
29, 1969, addresses this point in the following fashion:
"No matter how objective an assessment might be, it will become
embroiled in political controversy if the matter is important.
"It would seem to me' wise to accept as a political fact that
any assessment of an interesting problem is likely to be embroiled
t
	
	
in controversy. Those who wish to engage in such exciting activi-
ties should look to their flanks. When they prepare assessments
they should employ 'no men,' devil's advocates, and experts on
'the intentions of the enemy.'
". if tecb ,ology policy is to be forged in the fire of
political controversy, then a responsible technological opposition
must constitute itself. These counter assessors must separate
themselves from the closed, coopted, scientific and technological
elite that pretends to be above or beyond politics and ally with
those political interests and politicians whose objectives are	
3
consonant with survival, prosperity, and liberty as the counter-
3
assessors perceive these goals. They must train themselves in
the skills, the arts, and even the wiles of the assessment process."	 i
171See discussion of the "notion of 'Independence' of the Assessment
Function" in the Statement of Professor Louis H. Mayo, "Some Legal, Juris-
dictional, and Operational Implications of a Congressional. Technology
	
Assessment Component" before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and	 u
Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, December 2,
1969. (Staff Discussion Paper 207, Program of Policy Studies in Science
and Technology, December 1969.)
Experience with agencies established to protect or promote the "public
interest" rather than a special partisan segment of the public, has been
something less than an overwhelming success.
An editorial concerning the resort of citizens to the courts rather
than to the regulatory agencies, "Back to Caveat Emptor," N.Y. Times,
August 24, 1969, E12, Col. 2, states in part---after referring to a study
of the Food and Drug Administration which cautioned chat exaggerated faith
in the FDA "should be dispelled to the greatest extent possible,"---
	
"So it should, and the candor of the study is admirable. But 	 3
where: does it leave the consumer? If he believes the findings--
and there is no slightest reason for him to doubt them--he may well
-	 -
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that std before tom--= wag of ehe wegaLatory aSencles.. . Ize
be gill be ssize of it- For t^ axtilwr documents the aiready
fen l ar thasls that these agencies, set op to }protect the public
against special iatereats, tend.. to .forget the public and ceive to
idenitify themselves with the interests they are suppressed to be
watching.
"It is understandable, then, that say citizens are coucluding
that their beat resource against damage and deception is . the
Morton Hintz, in "A Speech Portends Change of Climate," :lash. Post,
February 7, 1969, A22, col. 5, writes that:
One other day, is a talk warning about the location of -large.
nuclear power plants licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission,
Senator .Edmund Muski.e (D-Maine) recogai.z .ed that 'Government
itself develops vested interests which become more conc erned
with self-perpetuation than with social . rialues. . Sometimes . econ-
omic interests and Government agency`interests . become so inter-
twined that the public cannot distinguish between the two."'
Further, in Hews and Comment, Sci.ence., 29 August, 1969, p. 881, Morton
Mintz states:
"It will be. recalled that the commissioner, Dr. Herber B. fey,
Jr., said the conflict over the combination anti-biotics was
'between commercial and therapeutic goals.' If he is correct,
the Panalba case reaches a great question of our time.t In a
struggle between public interest and special interest in which
the stakes are needless exploitation, injury, and even death to
helpless patients, can American institutions function reliably
to protect the public?"
^ t	
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of computer-advocates.	 The model or models employed will differ; the
values introduced into the computer as social benefits and costs will
differ; thus the outcomes will certainly differ as will the combinations
of consequences flowing from such outcomes. While automatic data processing
and simulation may lead to the establishment of a greater degree of cer-
tainty about some factual situations and relationships, the capability of
the computer to vastly broaden the number of alternatives that can be con-
.	 r
sidered with respect to both the effects phase and the normative phase of
technology assessment may generate an increasingly greater number of dis-
crepancies, areas of uncertainty, and potential points for disagreement.
Advocacy may not yet have reached its hey-day.
Fence, with reference back to de Jouvenel, it seems highly probable
that adversarial system has a most promising future in technology assess-
A
172
That new modes of decision-making, designed to reduce uncertainty
and clarify options, will be employed is clearly indicated by Daniel Bell,
	 t
in "The Balance of Knowledge and Power," Technology Review, June 1969,
pp. 39-40:
"In the post-industrial society, there will be new modes of
decision-making based on 'intellectual technology.' If
technology is defined not just as machines but as a rational-
istic attempt at problem solving, using machines, then the new
intellectual technology--systems analysis, simulation, decision
theory, linear programming, stochastic models--based on the com-
puter will become increasingly important in the analysis of
problems and the laying down of alternative solutions."
For a less optimistic view, see Ida R. Hoos, "Automation, Systems
Engineering, and Public Administration: Observations and Reflections on
the California Experience," 26 Pub. Adm. Rev. 311 (1966).
i{
;i
.u,
meet and other phases of the public decision-making process, whether
the advocacy is performed by the "ascendant technologist" or the
"obsolescent lawyer." 173
s
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mustered in successful opposition to desirable technological applications.
In some instances assessment may inhibit desirable technological innovation.
Assessments are particularly subject to the risk that the difficulties
of coping with unwanted aide effects of technological applications will
be magnified, while possibilities -that solutions.will later be discovered
are ignored or minimized. Assessment systems may also be "captured" by
a special interest. group. 70 Avoidance and minimization of risks such as
these is clearly desirable.
8. Criteria of Internal Operations
Another approach to the problem of adequate criteria of assessment
focuses upon the internal operations of assessment entities. 71 Operations
are conceived as sufficiently discrete to be subsumed under categories
and a flow chart is prepared of steps or sequences of categories of opera-
tions. By way of illustration a modified version of a flow chart of the
technology assessment function of the Congress will be used. See Figure
1 below. 72 1,1hile as originally conceived this flow chart made use of
70
Concerning risks of assessment, see Technology: Processes of
Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2, pp. 84-89.
7.1
Respecting criteria of internal operations, see Vickers, The Art
of Judgment, (1965), pp. 157-169
72
The flow chart is found in statement of Louis H. Mayo in Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee
on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, on S. Res. 78, 91st Cong., lst
Sess., March 4, 5, 6, April 24, and May 7, 1969, at p.120. The tech-
nology assessment capability of the Congress is also discussed in Tech-
nology; Processes of Assessment and Choice, pp. 100-110; Technical
Information For Congress; and A Study of Technology Assessment, pp. 9-21,
all summa, note 2.
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eight categories (initiation, identification ) ,specification, selection,
utilization, determination, evaluation, and modification), it is sufficient
^i
for present purposes to reduce these to six:
	 problem perception, problem
formulation, selection, utilization, determination, and evaluation.	 Pro-
ceeding seriatim criteria will be suggested for the adequacy of each opera-
tion.
.	 t
(a)	 Problem Perception
I
The occasion for an assessment may be triggered by a statutory or
customary obligation of the Congress, or of one of its committees, or by
a social crisis or other stimuli. 	 The important idea of the category is
that somehow the Congress comes to perceive that a technology assessment
problem exists and merits attention.
	 If the Congressional assessment
mechanism adopts a passive stance toward problem perception, waiting for
stimuli to come to it (except where a legal or customary duty requires
it to search for problems), important problems of assessment (at least
until they have reached crisis proportions) and a representative
	
sample
of problems of assessment are not likely to be perceived by the Congress.
To minirn.ize these risks affirmative scanning or search strategies are_
required.	 In other words, the operation of problem perception can be
evaluated to terms of its completeness, representativeness and timeliness.
	 a
Presumably not all problems of assessment perceived by the Congres-
slosiaEl assessment mechanism would be permitted to appear on the Congres-
sional agenda for d?cision making.
	 Hence some screening of perceived
problems is requi e..	 The adequacy of the screening operation might be
7
te.ted by the following criteria:
	 the urgency of the problem; the lack
-5.3-
of assessment efforts respecting the problem by other assessment entities;
f#
the existence or lack of existence of another assessment forum; the
appropriateness of the Congress as an assessment forum (for example, if
it cannot Process theproblem it ought not appear on its agenda); the
relationship of the problem to other concerns of the Congress; and the
ii	 nature of the problem (for example, problems of assessing existing
tj
^E	 technology assessment systems might receive, initially at least, higher
se
agenda priority than problems of assessing past or future technological
if	 applications).73
(b) Problem Formulation
Since a problem is a disparity between existing and preferred con-
ditions, problem formulation requires a statement•of existing conditions
(including trends in such conditions), a statement of preferred conditions,
a statement of criteria for determining preferred conditions, and an esti-
mate of the gap between existing and preferred conditions. 74
Criteria of adequacy of statements of existing conditions are: the
methodological soundness of fact collecting strategies; the accuracy of
73
For other formulations of agenda -criteria, see supra, note 2,
Technical. Information For Congress, p. 474; Technology: Processes of
Assessment and Choice, p. 93; A Study of Technology Assessment, P. 5, 9,
10.
iE	
74
s	 Mayo urges that adequate formulation of a social problem includes
r{	 delineation of the social subsystem encompassing the social interactions
and effects to be assessed. Since by definition a system (or subsystem)
r	 has some capacity for coping with threats to its equilibrium or stability
it is not enough merely to trace impacts of outcomes to a social system.
The critical issue is: did the impact have sufficient "critical mass"
to produce permanent changes in the suctem, or.did the system absorb and
neutralize the impact.
4
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the data the comprehensiveness of the data; and the contextuality (in-
!	 eluding the degree to which relationships with other institutions, programs,
{	 and policy goals. are reflected) of the data. It may sometimes be helpful
ji
to include a classification of the particular technological application
j	 to be assessed .75
Criteria for evaluating statements of preferred conditions (goals)
i	 may come from numerous sources, including the constitution, statutes,
administrative regulations, case-law precedents, and conceptions of
olio goals derived from democratic ideology. Since
s
p cy g	 gy•	 problem formulation
ideally requires operational statements of preferred conditions such
statements also can be evaluated in terms of possibility of achievement,
degree of satisfaction of conceived needs, and, if preferred conditions
	
s
are also instrumental goals, how ultimate goals will be affected.
Criteria for evaluating criteria for determining preferred conditions
would include the criteria set forth above for evaluating statements of
preferred conditions. In addition such criteria might also include the
extent to which criteria for determining preferred conditions functioned
as such (for example, are the criteria sufficiently operational to deter-
mine preferred conditions?). Criteria for evaluating estimates of the
gap between existing and preferred conditions are the suitability of the
methodology and the soundness of its application.
If the problem formulated by the Congressional assessment mechanism
refers not to existing or prospective technological applications but to
75
See the six-fold classification in statement of Louis H. Mayo, supra,
note 72, pp. 114-115; and the ten-fold classification system suggested in
Technical Information For Congress,ess  supra, note 2, pp. 480-482.
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the adequacy of an existing assessment system, meta-criteria (criteria of
criteria) are required. The notion of adequate assessment presented in
this paper proposes a set of meta-criteria.
(c) Selection
Selection refers to the operation of choosing "information sources."
Perhaps a more descriptive reference is "intelligence sources," since more
than mere data or information is required. For example, the political
feasibility of a solution of an assessment problem might depend upon the
Congress permitting interest groups to contribur.e. inputs of intelligence.
Selection involves a definition of the intelligence needed, determinations
of where it can be found and how it can be obtained, its dependability,
comprehensiveness, contextuality, economy, and probable contribution
to the resolution of the problem. Criteria of adequate selection would
therefore test the adequacy of the definition of the intelligence needed,
of identification of its location . and avilability, of methods of obtain-
ing it, and of its characteristics of dependability, comprehensiveness,
contextual:ity, economy, and probable contribution to problem resolution.
(d) Utilization
This operation refers to the decisional procedure used by the assess-
ment mechanism, and, unless they are prescribed, includes choices of the
procedures used. Choice of procedures and application of procedures chosen
may well be governed by different albeit interdependent criteria. Since y
a
choice and application of procedures are instrumental steps for reaching
decisional outcomes, criteria governing them should be causally related
to the qualities (criteria) sought of decisional outcomes. In other words,
r
r	 ^^
4
3
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decisions choosing a decisional procedure, and decisions applying chosen
procedures might be tested by asking whether the procedure as a whole or
some aspect of its application helps or hinders realization of specified
qualities of outcomes. Decisions choosing a decisional procedure and
applying chosen . procedures should also be governed by the nature of the
problc-m formulated (for example; whether assessment of a technological
application, or an assessment of a technology assessment system), and by
the intelligence sources to be used (it may be preferable., for example,
that statistical data from unimpeachable sources be presented in docu-
mentary form). The number of participants as intelligence sources may
also influence choice and application of a decisional procedure.
(e) Determination
This operation refers to the process of arriving at decisional out-
comes and to the outcomes themselves. The process of decision can be evalu-
ated by the criteria of BDM76 or by the following criteria proposed in
Technical Information for Congress: 77 what alternative solutions have been
advanced; what are the probable costs and undesirable side effects of each
alternative; what are the probable values and useful side effects of each
alternative; what are the economic and technical considerations relative
to each alternative; are the various alternatives feasible technically,
economically, politically; are all apparent alternatives politically or
technically unacceptable, thus requiring that additional alternatives
76
See text p. 38 and note 51, supra.
77
Supra, note 2,.p. 475. See also pp. 2-4
should be searched for; what are the implications of each alternative
for the short and long term; what contradictions are contained in the
information as received; what bias and indications of unreliability
prejudice the information; what are the relative weights of the technical
conclusions and the information about political values pertaining to the 	 i c^
various alternatives after bias and unreliability have been screened out;
and what are the relative costs and benefits of adopting the preferred
alternative or of not taking action. 78
Outcomes are the end products of a process of assessment. But these
end products may also constitute inputs to intelligence, promotion, pre-
scription, invocation, application, appraisal, or termination functions
of the Congress. When this is true criteria applicable to the Congress'
performance of these functions would also be appropriate criteria of out-
comes of a process of assessment.
M Evaluation
Since it refers to post--assessment appraisals of the impact of
determination-outcomes, this operation is an appraisal function and
should be evaluated by criteria applicable to the Congress' performance
79
of this function.
78
For additonal criteria see Downs, supra, note 45, pp. 175-176.
79
Criteria of appraisal are presented in the text, supra, pp. 30-31.
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IV. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF ADVOCACY
Evaluations of advocacy commonly postulate the context of an adjudi--
catory arena governed by an adversarial decisional model, assume that all
advocates are lawyers, and focus upon the strategies of advocates.
	 Con-
i sequently, advocacy in non-adjudicatory areans, the role of non-lawyers as
r
advocates, and advocacy as a mode of inquiry supporting intelligence and
other decisional functions remain implicit and obscure.
	 Perhaps such	 i
failures of evaluation are partly attributable to the commitment of some 	 .
disciplines (especially "pure" ones), professions and occupations (for
" example, operations researchers,.systems analysts, and management scientists),
i
' and schools of thought (in the most extreme form, scientism) to inflexible
	 }
notions of "truth," "objectivity," and "neutrality."
	 Explicit recognition
of advocacy as characteristic of all arenas, of advocacy by non-lawyer
i
participants, and of its role as a mode of inquiry would raise questions
about claims to scientific validity, objectivity, and neutrality.
	
And	 ? `
f
the practice of labeling policy problems as "technical" or "scientific"
or "legal" might itself be recognized as a strategy of advocacy aimed at
enhancing the power and prestige of technicists, scientists, and legalists.
Some failures in evaluation of advocacy may also reflect a general
cultural bias (in particular a bias of academics) in favor of hierarchical
and pyramidal, unilateral controls as the preferable modes of coordinating
	
1
community life, and against bargaining-advocacy as a coordinating
	 mechanism.84
Finally, since bargaining-advocacy may be "illegal and much (though not all)
is extra-legal and is commonly condemned as the product of stupidity,
s1
Lindblom, sera, note 12, p. 3
t	 -
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partiality, and avarice.
	
." its contributions tend to go unnoticed. 81
How, then, does advocacy fare, as a mode of inquiry as well as
strategies of claimants, when evaluated by representative sets of criteria
of adequate assessment?
' 	 1. Participant Criteria
Openness of participation as a criterion of adequate technology
assessment could hardly be achieved without some design for advocacy
as a mode of inquiry. Not only does openness look toward affording
opportunity for advocacy, but other participant criteria require in
i
stitutaional arrangements that treat the strategies of claimants, col-
j.' lectively, as part of the intelligence function and as a means of enhancing
the quality of assessments. Who is permitted to participate, the degree to
which participants are representative of the interests at stake, the timing
and form of participation, the contributions expected of participants - these
criteria presuppose an assessment design which institutionalizes advocacy as
a mode of inquiry. Moreover, quality assessments commonly require intel-
ligence which can be supplied only by advocates, as data about past and
future circumstances of participants, the value orientations of participants,
and the feasibility (political, economic, and technical) of recommended
alternatives for dealing with assessment problems.
While participant criteria presuppose a design for advocacy, other modes
of inquiry are not ruled out. Officials and other participants may inform
themselves by other means and may present their offerings in other styles
and forms. The essential point of a design for advocacy, however, is that
however participants inform themselves and whatever form and style of
presentation is used (including claims to speak as "experts" or in the name
of scientific validity), all presentations are open to challenge and attack
on any relevant ground. From this point of view advocacy is not comparable
to other :nodes of inquiry, because it transcends other modes. It does so
not by denying the contributions, but by providing a method for revealing
the strength and shortcomings of other modes, including itself as a mode.
Moreover, in practice other modes . of inquiry, although aimed primarily to-
ward producing knowledge with certain qualities and employing tests such
as colleague consensus and inter-subjectivity, are heavily dependent upon
advocacy as an internal quality control mechanism. Advocacy thus builds
upon other modes of inquiry by providing the conditions under which they may
find most fruitful expression.
2. Perspectives Criteria
Apparently officials cannot be assumed to supply the inclusiveness
of identification required for adequate technology assessment. $2 Nor
is it likely that any discipline, body of experts, professional or
82
"The fundamental premise	 is that bureaucratic officials 	 .
are significantly -- though not solely -- motivated by their own self-
interests,'.' Dr-;.ms, supra, note 45, p. 2.. See also Technology:
Processes of Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2, pp.. 24-28, 57-62.
c	 ^^
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occupational group, 83 or governmental entity will always assert common
rather than merely special interests in technology assessments. It also
seems unlikely that the expectations of participants required for adequate
assessments (expectations, that is, of significant influence upon outcomes,
of decisional integrity, and of adherence to basic procedual rules) can
be created and maintained without employing advocacy as a mode of inquiry.
That claimants-advocates are partisan toward their own interests does 	 r
not necessarily mean that public interests are inadequately represented in
technology assessments. Assessment officials are not confined to the
partisan presentation of a single advocate (including the presentation of
their own staff) as an intelligence source, but may consider all the
intelligence supplied, by whatever means, to their decisional system.
And the cumulative impact of narrowly, partisan presentations sharply
and precisely in opposition to one another often may spotlight the public
83
".	 professional groups, however conscientious, often have uncon-
scious commitments to the technology or technologies with which they are
associated and tend, with few exceptions, to make little difference in the
basic perspectives from which assessments are currently made." Technology:
Processes of Assessment and Choice, p. 25. "The dilemma of intelligence vs.
specialization is twofold: specialization is essential to the efficient
command of knowledge but antithetical to the penetrating interpretation
that bears on high policy; specialization and its concomitant, inter--unit
rivalry, frequently block the sharing of accurate information, but if pro-
blems of upward communication can be solved, rivalry can result in great
gains -- the clarification of clashing alternatives and the presentation
of opposing cases. The primary cost of specialization in intelligence is
paroachialism --- the production of misleading or irrelevant information,
a product of the familiar limitations of the expert. The professionally
biased producer of intelligence remains too distant from the intelligence
user, too ignorant of policy needs, is forced to compete with other pro-
ducers for the support and guidance of the user . . . . The gain from
constructive rivalry is another matter; it depends on administrative styles
and structures that expedite the free flow of rival perspectives and solutions
to the responsible executives and their general advisors." Wilensky, supra,
note 48, pp. 49-50. See also pages 162-164, especially note 60 on page 164
of Wilensky.
interests at stake. Much depends, also, an expectations of claimants
that assessment decisions will be reached in a mechanical and legalistic
way, on the one hand, or will represent a ennscientious effort to arrive
at a formulation of the public interest as seen from the broadest per
f
spectives, on the other hand. Men the latter expectations prevail
advocates realize that persuasive presentations must be related to and
ji	 shown to be consistent with. policy needs.
1
r:a ,
3. Situations Criteria
i
In some settings constitutional or other legal prescriptions require
advocacy as a mode of inquiry in technology assessment. If such require-
..
meats do not exist, however, since assessment usually involves numerous inter-
actions among participants, provision must be made for such matters as
timeliness and sufficiency of notice of proceedings, the scope of matters
to be considered, the decisional standards to be applied, the kinds and
degrees of participation to be permitted, and the degree of support of
the basic decisional functions of the assessment system. These are matters
which make advocacy possible and, because of its long experience in con-
fronting them, advocacy is readily adapted to decisions respecting them.
4. Base Values Criteria
As a strategy of claimants and as a mode of inquiry ad
contribution is conditioned by the effective means availabl
exercise. While this is also true of other modes of irquir
i has a unique capacity for expanding and economizing the res
assessment system. Base values are expanded because partic
values of all types into assessments. In particular, advoc
aid of power to assessment outcomes; enlist the wealth of
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investigation, preparation, presentation, and other expenses); supply
' needed standards of rectitude; contriLute skill and enlightenment; reduce
alienation and increase social cohesion; and promote the health, safety,
! and comfort of all persons participating in an assessment.	 To the extent
that advocacy augments it also economizes the use of the base values of
I i^
assessment systems.
That assessment practices and outcomes are influenced by the base
r
X9,'3
F
values of advocates is not, however, an unmixed blessing. 	 Advocates rarely	 j
't
are equally endowed with such means.	 In consequence some advocates may
be so richly endowed, as compared to others, that practices and outcomes
will be skewed against the public interest. 	 The best possible counter-
balance for this possibility, however, may be to increase the influence
of opposing advocacy.
5.	 Strategies Criteria
As is true of other modes of inquiry advocacy can emphasize either
coercion or persuasion. 	 Relative stress upon persuasion as against coercion,
in short, does not appear to be dependent upon modes of inquiry but upon other
variables, particularly the base values and perspectives of participants.
For example, as political power of advocates decreases greater reliance
E
tends to be placed 	 upon the persuasive use of research findings; $ and
84
"Facts-and-figures men who command technical intelligence obviously
are given more discretion where the problems are technical. 	 Less obviously,
they also carry more weight when the organization is weak in grass-roots
political resources.	 Among Washington lobbyists, for instance, repre-- 	
i
sentatives of small organizations with limited political. resources --- hu-
manitaxian .organizations, specialized trade associations -- accent research
in their lobbying strategy, in contrast to large-member organizations, such
as farm groups, veterans groups, and labor unions, who incline toward grass-
roots compaigns and publicity."	 Wilensky, supra, note 48, p. 19.
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coercive strategies are reduced by creating expectations in participants
that only strategies of persuasion are likely to be influential.
Advocacy has a major contribution to mane to minimum rationality in
assessment. Without it inclusive, balanced outcomes adequately reflecting
both common and minority interests appear impossible to achieve. Advocacy
also can contribute to and often is essential for the orderly development 	 j
of each component of policy judgments in technology assessment. Since
formulations of problems of assessment requires comparisons of present
conditions with criteria of the desirable and with projections of future
eonditionp defined by such criteria, and conceptualization and proposal
of the social subsystem to be assessed, advocacy necessarily is involved.
This is also true of the prescriptive act of specifying goals.
While not so apparent, formulation of causal or probability links be-
tween technological applications and social impacts and between assessment
systems and social impacts inevitably requires advocacy. Suitable scientific
procedures for this component seldom exist. And even when a suitable science
is at hand and requisite controls can be used, discretion (hence advocacy)
is not necessarily eliminated. The most basic theories of scientific
disciplines are sustained (or undermined) by advocacy. 85 If a consensus
85
Kuhn, The Structures of Scientific R^-;rol.uti.ons ( 1962). "In the popu-
lar view, science is a more disinterested and, y therefore, better institu-
tion foi uncovering truth. But major advance;; in scientific theory often
come from men insisting on opposing models of physical or social nature.
They are often polemical; their debate is sometimes carried on in the spirit
of armies at war, as Priestley's holding action against Lavoisier's theory
of chemical elements, Marx's invective about German idealism, and Weber's
insistence on the role of religious ethics in economic life all illustrate.
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exists among scientists respecting a causal or probability relationship,
in an assessment, it is supported by advocacy. 86 Such a consensus will
rarely exist in any event . 87 Claims of scientific validity often amount
to no more than a "dialectic of expertise "88 Moreover, the objects of
an assessment may be advocates with sufficient persuasiv«ress to co-opt
they are oriented more toward truth than power. The judge or the official
must give some weight to political consequences of decisions; the scientist
is ideally oblivious of such considerations. Second, differences in science
are settled by colleagues; scientific truths rest ultimately on the con-
sensus of the competent. It is thus too technical for many administrative
purposes; the capacity to assess scientific truth is well developed only
among those immersed in its traditions and techniques. Finally, because
scientific propositions take a long time to establish, science is not an
ideal procedure for urgent organizational and judicial decisions. In short,
although adversary proceedings do not involve critical experimental tests,
they resemble science in their systematic regulation of the clash of views,
and they have the additional advantage of sensitivity to political interests,
greater availability to non-expert officials and judges, and speed."
Wilensky, supra, note 48, p. 153
86
"The argument is that the existing machinery of scholarly inquiry and
the process of mutual criticism tend to produce, over the course of time,
a collective produce, known as knowledge, which is relatively free of special
bias. No one, obviously, can say that this process even completely achieves
its goal." Frankel, "Being in and Being Out," 17 The Public Interest 44, 58
(Fall, 1969).
87
"The higher in the hierarchy one goes the less do problems correspond
to the specialized structure of knowledge and the less a decision can be
programmed. Only at the lower levels of policy deliberation can the special-
ized expert tackle a specialized problem with a chance of solving it by the
premise met 'iod6 of science. Further, at any level, the role of the expert is
self-changing .-.	 Wilensky, supra, note 48, p. 46.
88
f
	
	 "Facts -and--figures men are preoccupied with rational argument and
criteria; their technical competence compels opposing parties to be more
careful or honest in the use of information to match each other expert for
expert, fact for fact." Wilensky, supra , note 48, p.16.
i
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the assessment itself. 89 Nor are assessment officials always models of
impartial. detachment.90
Advocacy may assist in the invention or discovery of alternatives.
Since means--ends relations often are highly problematical, and since the
discovery of them often is highly creative and subjective, it is desirable
that participants advocate a variety of alternatives. Advocacy can con-
tribute to projections of outcomes. In fact all such projections if
made to influence policy making constitute advocacy. 91 ForecaGts of
consequences of policy alternatives usually outrun consensus-based
bodies of scientific knowledge. Mider such circumstances competing
projections by opposing advocates are to be encouraged. The evaluation
19
. . Budget Bureau examines depend for information on the agency they
are assigned to investigate; the agency often converts the examiner into an
advocate of particular programs by a sensible even flow of information
(discounting the risk of disclosing weakness.)" Wilensky, supra, note 48, p.18.
101, . . there is a kind of inbred tendczmy, in governmental reports,
to support existing policy. We possess an adversary system of government,
and an adversary press, and an international ideological struggle is going
on . Under these circumstances, reports tend to have a self-defensive
function. They accentuate the positive; they give the official what he needs
to defend policies that are under attack." Frankel, supra, note 86, p. 49.
91
"A forecast that a contemplated action will have this or that co pse--
quencE is an argument for or against its adoption." de douvenel, The
Art of Conjecture, (1967), p. 147
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of projected consequences may also be assisted by advocacy. Since the
use of standards of evaluation advocates their suitability for that
purpose (including the claims that consequences identified by them as
relevant merit evaluation and that consequences not identified by them
as relevant do not merit attention), and since competing evaluations
expose each others limitations, advocacy is most useful..
It is true, of course, that when inappropriately channeled advocacy
can distort policy judgments. Incompetency in advocates, concealment
and exaggeration or minimization of relevant facts, the screening of
information through the categories of legal propositions sloughing-off
the "irrelevant, incompetent, and it=aterial," the presentment of frivilous
claims, creation of a "circus atmosphere", 92 exaggeration or minimization
of anticipated social costs and benefits, mutual provocations of parti-
cipants, delayed decisions, and hasty and ill-advised decisions 93 -- each
92
"The deficiencies of adversary procedures are obvious. A circus at-
mosphere may develop as attorneys become preoccupied with press releases
rather than legal briefs, with courtroom histronics rather than reasoned
argument ("when you can't win a case, jaw it.") Wilensky, supra, note 48,
p. 152. Note that Wilensky is referring to advocacy by lawyers at .rial
court levels of judicial arenas, apparently before juries. Nr:vertheless,
because he entertains a broader conception of advocacy he can recognize its
contributions: "But these limitations, not inevitable, are offset by the
overriding advantages of partisan advocacy, including the opportunity to
test the credibility of witnesses through cross-examination. In or out
of court, the adversary process is the best way to assure that assertions
are exposed to systematic scrutiny by men with countervailing interests who
are motivated to press hard." p. 152.
93
".	 bargaining in the wrong place at the wrong time accounts for
some of the worse aspects of American government. (1) It explains why
conflicting interests often result not in agreement but in the paralysis of
public po"Icy, as is illustrated most dramatically by the filibuster. (2)
it also gives disproportionate power to the leaders of strategic minorities.
(3) It sometimes leads to the substitution of irrational agreement through
6 uth 
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of these may cause rationality to suffer. The need,. therefore, is for
technology assessment entities to adopt procedures that enable advocacy
to make its optimum contribution to policy, yet safeguard the procedures
of persuasion and decision from disruptive side -effects. The criterion
of minimum rationality is not likely to he approximated without the use
of advocacy as a mode of inquiry.94
Finally, advocacy can promote the criterion that assessment outcomes
should assist the ultimate decision maker ' s performance of basic decisional
functions. Thus, it can test for qualities of dependability, comprehensive-
ness, and contextuality in intelligence functions; and for the rigor with
log-rolling for agreement upon. some common goal.. (4) It favors the most
highly organized groups." Lindblom, supra, note 12, p. 37. See also
Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2, pp. 25-27
94
Lindblom`s evaluation of advocacy (in particular, bargaining, which is
one form of advocacy) is interesting. He argues that advocacy -bargaining is
superior in many circumstances to any other alternative (in particular, su-
perior to hierarchial control) for ordering social affairs; that it is the
most feasible means for accommodating to the needs of social pluralism; chat
because the bargaining power of an official depends in large part upon the
coincidence of the goals he pursues in bargaining and the public interest
(defined as "the achievement of widely shared goals"), and because bargaining
power is largely determined through alliances with common interests, the
public interest is given operational meaning and promoted; that "the common
values of no significant group will be neglected in the final reconciliation
of values necessary for policy decisions" ( "why the courtroom, the partisan
attornay, and the pursuit of victory instead of the study, the scholar, and
the pursuit of truth? Because, for all the miscarriages of justice in the
courts of lass, we do not believe the researcher can give every man his due
or bring out every fact and value favorable to him." p. 28); that it aids
rationality in organizational contexts by supplying feedback about low level
decisions to top level policy makers; that it "motivates men to search elt-
haustively and ceaselessly for common goals" C. . . bargainers are highly
motivated to look and keep on looking, and to become resourceful in finding
hidden common goals. And, of course, the search for common values, even
where none are found, clarifies goals and reduces pointless conflict stemming
from mistaken self-interests." p. 31); and that it reveals wants and frustra-
tions that would pass unnoticed, thereby permitting adjustments of policy in
the light of them. See also Fuller's evaluation of advocacy in 1958 Proceed-
ings of the American Association of Law Schools, pp. 188-191.
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which scientific method is applied, the contextuality of the method,
and the impartiality of findings and recommendations in appraisal
functions. It can entourage integrated policy and reliance upon strategies
of.persuasion rather than coercion in promotion functions. It can promote
the promptness with which prescriptive functions are initiated, the con-
textuality of its explorations, and its conformity to basic goal values.
Respecting invocation functions advocacy can help achieve a proper balance
between promptness and efficiency in initiation of the process and in
maintenance of proper safeguards against irremediable losses, assure
contextuality of analysis, promote rationality in provisional character-
ization, minimize coercion, and demand immediate initiation of follow--on
application functions. Respecting application functions advocacy may
assist the promptness of initiation, the comprehensiveness and contex-
tuality of exploration, and the choice of decisions conforming to inclusive
community policies and capable of effective and economic enforcement.
Finally, respecting termination functions advocacy can promote the res-
ponsiveness of prescriptions to changes in social processes,.help reduce
the cost of social change, encourage needed social change, assure comprehen-
siveness and contextuality in exploration, encourage cancellation in
conformity with community policies, and promote effectiveness in amelioration.
6. Outcomes Criteria
Assessments may be intended to produce (1) intelligence to assist
resolution of a particular policy problem; (2) appraisals assisting
another decisional entity's appraisal of the impact of a particular
policy; (9) appraisals of existing assessment systems; and (4) appraisals
of total impact:-assessments.
i
i
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	; E	Since previous discussion indicated how advocacy might contribute
	
f	 to each component of a rational policy judgment, 95 (1), above, will not
be discussed. With respect to (2), above, assessments producing appraisals
to assist an ultimate decision maker's appraisal of the impact of a
particular policy should (2) define what is to be appraised; (b) trace 	 $,
	
{^	 f	 1.4:'
(establish cause and effect or probability relations) and describe the
consequences of the policy under evaluation; (c) formulate a conception
	 r
of relevant consequences sufficiently operational to serve as a guide in 	 ^-
tracing and describing effects; (d) posit a set of standards for evaluating
the quality of effects traced and described; and (3) report its "findings".
Advocacy may contribute to each of these standards.
Since definitions of objects of appraisal involve allocations of
scarce base values, influence other tasks of an appraisal, and determine
what is not to be appraised, rival definitions of objects of appraisal
are foreseeable and should be encouraged. We have seen that establish-
ment of cause and effect or probability relations between particular
policies and their consequences seldom can be based on a science of
consequences, and even when so based, because consensus is essential
for scientific validity, advocacy contributes to the establishment
of that consensus and thus to the use of that science. Since conceptions
of relevant consequences are partly normative in nature and partly
intended as instrumental for tracing and describing (and since the
instrumental aspect usually out-runs scientific supports), advocacy
11
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can, does, and should contribute to them. To posit a set of standards
of appraisal is to advocate its appropriateness; alternative sets of
standards should be advocated before a set is posited. Finally, reports
of "findings" advocate their worth as findings; and, to the extent based
on inferences from evidence, advocacy can test the factual support of
.findings.
Assessments producing appraisals of existing assessment systems,
(3), above, should be governed by criteria of appraisal constituting
reliable indicia of the quality of the internal operations and external
relationships of the object of assessment. Advocacy's contributions
to the internal operations of an assessment system will be presented infra. 96
The present analysis, characterizing external relationships and contexts
in terms of participants, perspectives, etc. is intended to indicate
advocacy's contribution in these respects.
In practice total impact assessments must satisfy criteria for
evaluating the outcomes of other assessment systems, for relating out-
comes to a conception of total assessment, for a conception of total
assessment, and for coordinating the efforts of other assessment systems.
Advocacy may help meet these criteria. Its ccntribution to evaluations
of other assessment systems were noted supra. 
97 
It can aid the formulation
of conceptions of total assessment by explicating and critically evaluating
their most basic assumptions; and it can assist in relating outcomes of
96
See text, ins
 fraa, PP - 74-76.
97
See text, su ra, pp. 45-50•
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particular assessment entities to conceptions of total assessment by
.^ explicating and critically evaluating the relational frameworks employed
to achieve syntheses.	 Finally, advocacy can enhance the quality of
`Fw efforts to coordinate the assessments of other systems.	 For example,
" prescriptions of appropriate spheres of autonomy between assessing systems
-.
and systems assessed are more likely to reflect inclusive community
4
perspectives if all perspectives are advocated.
t
E
7.	 Effects Criteria
The reference here is to desirable impacts upon social institutions,
the values of the citizenry; the physical and ecological environment;
basic decisional functions and structures of legal process; and assessment
systems and their participants.	 Advocacy has contributions for each of
these areas.
Advocacy can help preserve and protect social institutions through
forecasts or appraisals of adverse impacts upon them, by insisting that
their uniqueness requires special criteria of evaluation, by insisting
upon an interdisciplinary approach to evaluation of impacts, and by
noting their importance for the production of the values to which they
tend to be specialized. 	 Moreover, advocacy is essential for the invocation
and application of existing prescriptions applicable to social institutions,
and it can be indispensable in critically evaluating current debates about
' roles of social institutions and the contributions of specialists in
the study of particular institutions.
Respecting criteria of impact upon the values of the citizenry advocacy,
``
f
can be indispensable for establishing minimum and maximum shaping and
S
S :.	 51
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sharing criteria, in the invocation and application of existing prescriptions,
a
and in critically evaluating current debates about desirable levels of
shaping and sharing particular values and the contributions of specialists
,i in the .study of particular values.
formulation, invocation, and application of policy respecting impacts
of technological applications and assessment outcomes upon physical and
ecological environments involve policy functions which outrun the con- 
,4
E tributions of scientific methods. 	 How much of the fruits of pest-free
f agriculture are we willing to forego in order to avoid certain effects
•'' of 'DDT?
	
Such questions raise policy issues in the resolution of which
advocacy is both inevitable and essential.
E
Since impacts upon basic deelgional functions and structures of
legal process are impacts upon the policy malting and implementation
process, itself, and since it is inevitable and essential to the process,
advocacy has a role.
With respect to impacts upon assessment systems and their participants,
advocacy and bargaining are essential strategies for creating and maintain-
ing relationships which assure a continuing flow of base values needed by
assessment systems.	 It can help maintain the confidence of all partici-
pants in the competency, detachment, impartiality, and open-mindedness
in assessing systems.	 It can help promote conformity by assessment
systems being assessed with criteria proposed in this paper.	 It can
promote national coordination and control over assessments. 	 And, it
can help systems being assessed to avoid or minimize adverse impacts a
of their assessments.
{
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8. Internal Operations Criteria98
(a) Problem Perception
	
"i	 Advocacy can assist the completeness, representativeness, and
timeliness of problem perception. For example, by serving as a supple-
ment to scanning techniques permitting members of the general public to
call assessment problems to the attention of the Congress, advocacy might 	 r
contribute to completeness, representativeness, and timeliness of problem
perception. It can also contribute to agenda-malting by aiding the for-
	
-;	 mulation of criteria of inclusion and exclusion and the interpretation
and application of such criteria.
(b) Problem Formulation
Statements of existing conditions, statements of preferred conditions,
criteria for determining preferred conditions, estimates of the gap between 	 a
existing and preferred conditions - each of these components of problem
formulation can be aid by advocacy. Respecting statements of existing
conditions it can test the methodological soundness of data collecting
strategies used, the accuracy of the data, and the comprehensiveness and
contextuality of the data. In statements of preferred conditions it 	 R
help establish the authoritativeness of criteria, contribute to estimates
of feasibility, note discrepancies between statements of preferred and
conceived needs, and question whether preferred conditions, if instru-
mental goals, will achieve ultimate goals. The formula ion of criteria
98
See text, supra, pp. 50- 59,
j
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for determining preferred conditions, since it is a prescriptive act,
can be assisted by advocacy, as can be interpretation and application
of such criteria. The suitability of the methodology and the sound-
ness of its application in estimating gaps between existing and pre-
ferred conditions can be tessted by advocacy. Finally, it can aid in
the formulation of meta-criteria for evaluating existing assessment
	
I
systems.	 r
(c) Selection
Advocacy can help test the adequacy of the definition of intel-
ligence needed, in some instances aid in determining the location,
availability, or methods of obtaining that intelligence, and probe
its characteristics of dependability, comprehensiveness, contextuality,
economy, and probable contribution to problem resolution.
(d) Utilization
Decisions choosing procedures of assessment and decisions applying
procedures chosen can be aided by advocacy. If both types of decision
are to be evaluated in terms of their impacts upon assessment outcomes
advocacy is a useful means for establishing such impacts.
(e) Determination
If the process of arriving at decisional outcomes and the outcomes
themselves are to be evaluated by the criteria of BDM or by the set pro-
posed in Technical Information For Congress, 99 or by the criteria applicable
99
See text, supra, p. 56
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to the performance of basic decisional functions of the Congress, advocacy
is a most useful tool for such evaluations.
Advocacy, then, is not only here to stay - its potential is so vast
and largely untapped that its future is quite speculative. We must work
and hope that it will be used to establish a comtiutitty in which the
dignity of man is honored in deed as well as in word.
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f1° When I was asked to give this .talk, it was suggested that my
;i
:f
topic,be "The Law Confronts Expanding Technology."	 This, I thought,
r4.
was an inappropriate topic..	 However true it may be that the law is
E
a static, backwards--looking force in our society, it simply is not true
that the law cnnfronts or in any sense resists technological. advance.
On the contrary, our entire legal system reflects a tolerant,.indeed a
benevolent, attitude towards technological advance.	 This is reflected
in the patent system rooted in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
'j
r^
Constitution to "promote the progress of science and useful arts," in
our tax laws, and in our predisposition for political and economic
f freedom.	 Even our common law system has evidenced a disposition.to
;^	 y
balance pre-existing rights in the status quo against the benefits of
i
technological advance, and generally to sacrifice the former in favor
..	 t of the latter.
It is important to any discussion of this topic that there be a
clear understanding of what "lava" is.	 It is, first of all, . `a body of
rules governing individual activity and relationships among the various
actors in society.	 These rules are found in the vast body of judicial
decisions applying the common :law.' They are also found in statutor;,
enactments and the rules of administrative agencies, as well as iii
judicial and agency decisions interpreting these statutes and rules.
i
The law is also a process of decision-making as lawyers representing
clients with clashing interests seek to have their clients' interests
.. ------- 	 _..
I
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enhanced, protected, or vindicated before the courts, administrative
agencies, and legislative bodies.
When a new technology emerges, it is brought forth into a social
environment which includes pre-existing technology and is not necessarily
applicable to the new technology'or the peculiar social problems which
I ''
jthenew technology may bring.	 For example, when the first automobiles
came into existence, there was no law directly applicable to automobiles.
There were, however, laws applicable to thr use of thoroughfares, to
the rights of pedestrians, and to the rights, duties, and liabilities
i
of persons who used horses or horse-drawn vehicles.	 As the use of the
automobile impinged on existing legally protected interests, it became
necessary for the courts to consider wl.ather, and the extent to which,.
existing law was applicable to the automobile. 	 What were the respec-
tive rights of users of automobiles and users of horse-drawn vehicles?
Were automobiles vehicles within the meaning of statutes wri tten in
t
contemplation :of horse-drawn vehicles 	 bicycles?	 Were the rules
>`.
i of the road applicable to these new-fangled devices? 	 The courts
^i grappled with these problems on a case -by-case basis as lawyers repre- .
sentiug the adversary interests of their clients argued pro and con on
.;i these issues, . and ultimately, through a . process of trial and error, a !
body of law directly applicable to automob iles began to emerge.	 Over
sl
4
,E a period of time the legislatures also began to . take cognizance of ..
;E the automobile, and statutes began to emerge providing for registration
j of motor vehicles, licensing of operators, inspection, traffic control, a
liability, etc...
Development of this new bvly of law directly applicable to auto-
-'	 r
{
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mobiles could have operated as either a deterrent or an incentive
1
to the growth of the automobile technology. We knotT In retrospect
that the incentives, including development of highways, far outweighed
	
'	 the deterrents. Only in recent years, as our legislatures have
addressed themselves to problems of safety and pollution, have there
i
been indications that law may be moving In the direction of deterrence.
Let the now ahem t a eneralized descri Lion of the le al 	 t toP	 g	 P	 g	 sys a	 ;e
as it ennfronts expanding. technology.
The first response of the legal system to a new technology has
	
i
	
characteristically been to deal with the problem entirely as a matter
of private law. Legal problems are dealt with within the framework
	
}
	
of disputes between .
 private interests; The private parties who are-
,i
using the technology versus the private parties who may be injured or
i
threatened by the technology. Government, through its judicial
	
r'
	
^f
	 processes, acts as the impartial umpire for the resolution of these
	
.I
	 disputes. :As. the principles and .
 the Wisdom of the past., found -in
Gcause social disruptions and injury on the theory that the legal system
will provide monetary compensation to persons whose legal rights have
been violated.
There frequently comes a time, however, when society regards the
existence of the disru ptions and injuries .caused by the technology as
3nacceptable, and the focus of law-making then shifts from the courts
to .the legislatures. Whereas the process of law-making by the courts
is piecemeal, random, and highly indirect, legislative action is
positive, deliberate, and direct. The legislative action may be in
the form of new rules redefining the rights and duties of private
person's with respect to the technology, or it may be in the form of
positive regulation of the technology. It should be recognized,
however, that the legislative process usually operates slowly and
uncertainly. It is always characterized by inertia and usually also
by considerable friction which arises from strenuous efforts by the 	 1^
sponsors of the technology to resist legislative action which will
adversely affect their economic interests. As a consequence, the
Einitial legislative action is usually based on political compromise
!?	 and the enactment, viewed in retrospect, is rarely adequate and
I	 remains to be modified in later successive legislative actions asy.
society reaches the conclusion that the disruptions and injuries
remain unacceptable.
By and large the system I have described has worked reasonably
well over most of the History of Anglo-American iaw. This is not to
say that it has not permitted immense injury, which could have been
avoided. Obviously, for example; automobile technology has produced
t
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immense slaughter on our highways which could have been substantially
lessened had our law-making institutions come to grips with the
problem of automobile safety at an earlier date. On the other hand,
?	 there is little question in my mind that, had our current concern with
i.E
f
	
	 automobile safety arisen in the 1920's or 1930 1 s, our technological
progress as measured by the present state Pf the automobile would have
t;
been substantially retarded. When.I say, therefore, that the system	 a r
has worked reasonably well, I am saying that it has provided a frame--
work for enabling technological advance am the assumption that even
!l
:!J considerable disruption and injury is an acceptable price to pay for
^t
this advance.
The present interest in technology assessment reflects the
growing view Ia, our society that such disruption and injury may no
`	 longer be acceptable. This view has come into being largely as a .
consequence of the recognition that the technologies of today and
tomorrow may be . producing disruptions and injuries which go to the
4	 question of survival itself, and that technological advance is
occurring at so rapid a gate that intolerable and irreversible.
levels or injury may be sustained before we are even aware of the
fact that the technology involves a capacity to produce injury.
As a lawyer, I see the function of technology assessment as
being twofold: first, to provide for legislative action designed to
channel technological advance along lines which are regarded as 	 j
^;	 J
optimal from.the standpoint of society's interests . ; and, second, to
encourage and promote legislative action which will deal decisively i
q
J
':
	 with the.potential disruptions and injuries caused by technology at
is
i
6a much earlier stage of the'growth of the technology than is feasible
under the present legal system'.
Implementation of the first of these objectives would involve
the substitution, of governmental decisions for the operation of the
market as a determinarx of the allocation of resources. Government
would presumably discourage less optimum technologies through tax
or restrictive regulatory actions and would encourage more optimum
technologies through benevolent regulation, tax incentives, or subsidy.
Government, as a benevolent big brother, would make a value judgment
on what is good for society, and this decision would have the effect
of limiting the present right of the public to vote with its dollars
in the market place as to what products it wants and voliat negative
consequences it is willing to accept in order to have the benefits
it desires. If; for example, technology assessment should result.in
a legislative decision that cheap but dangerous Lawn mowers are
verboten, lawn movers would become unavailable to a segment of the
public which can afford only cheap lawn mowers and is prepared to
l
i
noted.that the evaluation of both benefits and-risks is based more on
predictive judgments than on experience. Benefits, moreover, are
usually much more obvious.and immediate than risks, which, when con-
sidered on a predictive basis, tend to be remote, specu l ative, and
subject to technological fixes.(hoped for) that will minimize them.
This concept gives me, as.a lawyer, some concern. An explicit legis-
lative judgment that benefits outweigh risks could well have the
effect of impairing or limiting the right of members of the public
to seek legal redress or relief if they regarded the risks as unaccep-
II
I
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table to them. For example, a legislative determination that a certain
level of aircraft noise is acceptable in the light of the social
benefits of aircraft might well have the effect of precluding someone
who is in fact injured by the noise from obtaining redress or relief
in the courts.
In a large sense, there is really nothing unique or novel in
consequences of this kind. Our legislatures have always made decisions
of this nature and these consequences have in fact resulted. Still,
technology assessment adds a new dimension which troubles me. Obviously
no one could seriously question the desirability of our legislatures'
having the maximum possible amount of authoritative information on
benefits, risks and costs on the basis of which decisions may be made.
It is institutionalization of the process of providing such information
to the legislatures which troubles me. Most of the recent discussion
of technology assessment seems to proceed on the assumption that there
exist valid processes through which benefits and risks can be identified
and quantified, and alternatives set forth, by specialized elite groups,
i
aiat,^ .
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and that the legislatures can then make "correct" decisions in the
light of value judgments. Indeed, some spokesmen for technology
assessment go even further and talk as if the assessment exercise
would be a waste of time if the legislatures did not reach the
correct judgment indicated in the assessment. 	 My own view is that
neither benefits nnr risks can be identified, let alone quantified,
.y; and that alternatives cannot be articulated, without some large value 	 r
judgments on the part of the assessors as to what the public would
regard as benefits and risks and the importance attached by the public
to each item of benefit and risk. 	 Thus, my concern is that the insti-
tutionalized technology assessment mechanism will serve to the legis-
latures a predigested body of information rooted in the value judgments
3
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of a small, narrow, elite group and that the result of the assessment
process, if taken seriously by the legislatures, will greatly constrain
the operation of the democratic processes in the ultimate decision-
making exercise.
My concern in this respect is mitigated only by my confidence that
technology.assessments of this kind, no matter how authoritative the
assessment body may be, will not in fact be accepted as conclusive by
members of legislative bodies.	 The assessment will in all liklihood
be just another informational input into the legislative process, and
legislative enactments will still be based on political compromises
i
reflecting the prejudices, interests, and responses by legislators to
+ the interests of their constituencies. .
In short, therefore, ,I believe technology assessment is a highly
useful exercise in maximizing the information available to legislatures,
s
9i but I believe that those who regard it as a panacea, or even as an
...'J
important form of therapy, are taking the concept much too seriously.
A final point I would like to make relates to.the role of the
}1 law itself in technology assessment. 	 Since legislation resulting from
technology assessment will be new law superseding or supplementing 
e,
existing law, it is important that existing law be considered in the
process of assessment. 	 Moreover, since new law always has a disruptive
...effect on expectations and commitments arrived at under old law, it
{ seems to me to be generally desirable that new legislation should make
} i the least possible change in the law consistent with accomplishingI,
the desired objective.	 This means, T think	 that proposed ^	 ^ 	 alternativeP	 P
courses of action set forth in a technology assessment should include
i
i an assessment of the first order and secondary order consequences of
any.suggested changes in the law. 	 In addition, before a technology
assessment flashes a green light for advance . of a technology, considera-
tion should be given to what legal changes may be necessary in the long
run to regulate that technology.	 For example, one can visualize that
4
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some of the emerging biomedical technologies may require regulatory
laws which could have a profound effect . on traditional individual free-
Ez	 dome. The necessity for such laws is obviously a kth--order consequence
of the technology and should be considered in the assessment process.
Thus, the technological capability of predetermining the sex or the
Y physical or mental attributes of a baby could well create social con-
a
ditions necessitating the licensing and regulation of marriage, concep- 	 a
tion, or birth. Possibilities of this kind should be considered in
technology assessments.
3
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In this connection, I throw out a word of caution to those of
you who believe that this a "lawyer-ridden world." Institutionaliza-
Lion of technology assessment could well lead to the massive intrusion
of legalistic processes into the assessment function. There already
is an example of how this could happen. It has been suggested that 	
i
the National Environmental Policy Act involves something closely akin
	
.I
to technology assessment. NEPA became law on January 1, 1970. There 	 i 
r
is no indication that anyone thought it would give rise to a spate of
:Litigation. In its 30 months or so of life to date, there have been
well over 100 court decisions involving NEPA and its procedures dealing
with such questions as when NEPA is applicable; what elements must be
j ^	 considered in NEPA statements; who and what interests must and may
participate in the NEPA process; etc. The same thing can happen to
technology assessment.
Finally, it should he recognized that the process of technology
^r
assessment discussed today is neither the beginning point nor the
ending point in society's assessment of technology. Society has
always had mechanisms for technology assessment. Today, the market
s=
place, the legal system, and the insurance mechanism all play an
important role in technology assessment. If an institutionalized
technology assessment mechanism is created, this will be superimposed
upon and supplement the existing structure. The outputs of this
assessment mechanism, assuming they are reflected in legislative
	 7
a
action . will riot be self -executing. They will merely change the rules
of the game, and the marketplace, the legal system, and the insurance
S
1
i
1	
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mechanism will continue to perform them own assessment functions
under the new rules.
It is interesting, I believe, to note that the legal profession
has shown relatively little interest in technology assessment. This
is perhaps due to the fact that those from other disciplines who
have been immersed in the assessment problem have not adequately
recognized the relevance of legal institutions in technology
assessment and therefore have not called for the lawyers' help. On
the other hand, it may be that from the standpoint of the legal
profession, the old maxim is relevant: "The more things seem to
change, the more they are the same."
o^
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V. CASE STUDIES
A. Early Experiences with the
Hazards of Medical Use of
X-Rays: 1896.1906
Barbara S. MARX
Fall 1968, pp. 58-68
OPERATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
IN FAMY EXPERTENCEq IffTH THP HAZARDS OF MRDTCAL USE OF X-RAYS
4
A period of diffusion typically precedes the assessment of
hazardous effects of.a technological innovation, unless the hazardous
effects have been persuas?-1•e-h c^njec"'U'red or c Xtrapolated. from x
the known hazards of'.similar situations.	 During the initial stage
of the diffusion process the technological innovation is tried`
_I out in a preliminary way, and the. basic questions of What-is-it?. `
_ How does it'work? and Mat can it do?	 are generally answered:.
E'
The initial stage of the diffusion process is then followed
{
f,
by a process embodying some kind of .technology assessment--which may
' be directed toward examining a great number of different
effects, good and bad, resulting from the technological innovation;
or may look mainly at socially detrimental effects;
	
or in a still
'.+ narrower focus, may evaluate hazardous effects.
a
This paper will now consider the characteristics of the techno-
logy assessment process which were manifested in response to the
hazardous effects of early medical uses of X-rays. 	 In the interests j
of better organization of the analytical material, I wish to.propose a model
to describe the eatly stage of the technology assessment process
with respe(.L to medical X-rays.	 The model may be thought of as
consisting of working hypotheses about the process,
k.
l'
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1.	 Tentative Model Describing the Major Phases in the Earl
Stage of the Technology Assessment Process--The major phases o-','
# a technology assessment process 	 directed toward the evaluation
i of hazards .consist of: 	 (1)	 identi .f cation, (2) assessment, and
(3) control.	 These phases may proceed in a relatively orderly or
4 i
disorderly way... may occur quite : continuously or take place in a
s
F
? sporadic interrupted way, and nay follow the identificati on-assess-
meat-control	 sequence in such a way that the phases are relatively ^f
"^
3
	! discrete or, on.the other hand, are relatively overlapping.
Typically the phases overlap and in part cannot be clearly distin-
guished; 	 .nevertheless the categorizing notion of three major
- phases is help:[	 in characterizing the types of assessment acti-
i vities predominating during each phase.
(a)	 Identification Phase--The identification phase of
the early stage of the technology assessment process is com-
3
prised of two sub-phases. 	 The first consists of collecting
preliminary information about the hazards.	 Two main types
of activities may bethought of as : occurring. 	 A body of infor-
mation is gradually accumulated about the imnediate and rela-
tively immediate hazardous effects.of using a particular
technological innovation. 	 In addition the information about
a
the. hazards is winnowed and integrated to resolve the discre-
pancies in a preliminary way. 	 The outcome of the first part
F
!
of the identification phase is to arouse information needs
t
59
P
1 va	 ;:
relating. to the two ganetal questions of What are the causes
of the hazardous effects? Man identification`problem--aud}i
`
^
What should be done about the hazards?--which is 'none. ar
assessment ^roblema
-^ The other sub-chase of tote ' identificat3.on phase is represented
'.1 b	 activities which colledt- . ^reliminar	 information about :they	 p	 Y
z" causes of the hazards and the cause effect "relab3onsii 3ps.
r
` k During this sub-phase the following activities are likely' to...:
occur
	 debate about causes, collection of new ifIormat on,.
j and partial resolving of disaZmement about facts,:.tertris, and
concepts--for
 example, What are . the . severe hazards?
	
What::
d
really happened in the severe cases?	 To.how many persons,
-
or with what frequency? What are the definitions of the terms .
{ being Lased?	 The outcome of the second sub-phase of the identi-
fication phase is to generate information needs relating to
i^
the general assessment question of What are the remedies for
the generally agreed upon causes?,
(b)Assessment Phase -The assessment phase of the early
stage of the technology assessment process consists of acquir .-
ing.information about possible remedies and determining their
	 -
effectiveness.	 Again, the collection of information, debate,
and some form of resolution of the disagreements are a.ctiviti.es ..
that typically occur. 	 The outcome of the assessment phase is
to arouse information needs pertaining to the question of how
60
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M47 the remadies be most effectively applied?	 and What cone.
actions should be taken to implement them?
c) Control Phase 	 The control phase , of the early stage of
the technology assessment process is marked by activities
?	 which focus on means of controlling toe hazards.	 Typically	 z
t-3^ann ari+4tr9f'$cap
 ara:rala	 43 " fin ni!►^_ cone Saith the setting	 -r	
-	 -	 -
of informal..standards. and the establishment of some kind of
E	
monitoring structure.	
i
2.	 Brief Run-Through of the Model, Fitting in the Data.
order to give the reader a general impression of the fit of the model
r	 to the data, we vill run through its major phases and show how
these relate to the activities 'occurring during the early assess-
f ^ .	 went of hazards of medical X-rays ° 	In categorizing the activities	 ^	 6
i ^	 in terms of the phases, it mush be remembered, as previously cau-
4
t.ioned; that the phases and activities comprising them are not neces-
#	 sarily altogether orderly, continuous, discrete, or in the specified
sequence.	 Discrepancies and overlap exist. 	 But on the whole the.
patterns of events fit the formulations of the model.
f`	 (a) The Identification Phase and its Activities--The.medical.
X-ray pioneers began knowing only what the rays could do--i.e.,
snake a: "shadow" picture of certain anatomical structures beneath.
the skin;	 they did not Itnow Mhat X-rays Caere, or the damages
which 'could result. 	 X-rays were a mysterious.. form. of 	 light" .. .r;
that was not accompanied by the sensation of heat.	 Therefore
exposing human tissues to:X--rays seemed as harmless-as exposing.
_ i 61
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it to daylight.
	
Nothing was known about suitable exposure
distances, frequencies; or time-lengths, or about the varying
intensities of : rays :discharged . by various devices then"utili-sed.
But since'X-rays were thought to be perfectly safe,.;these issues
did not-seem Very I	 Ortanti . ro?, this.reason also	 animals
were not used to answer experimental questions about the ;effects
of X-rays..
However, within the. first year of use art awareness bad
already developed of some.af the am adiate adverse effects.
In 1897, a. number of medical: artioles had.described adverse
effects consisting mainly of "burns,	 but also of unhea.ling
sores, , depila.ti.ori, and other injuries. 	 Initially	 it was
thought that just the sUln was affected, and only several
years-later was it realized that underlying anatomical structures
"	 could be injured. 	 A.lthough throughout the decade, infarction
was accumulated about the benefits and hazards of X-rays,
f	 within the first years the immediate	 and many of the relatively
f	 immediate
	
hazards had been described and identified..
j	 The other sub-phase of the identification phase followed,
i	 with. only a very short laC-time between it and.. the first .sub- .
phase in which the nature of-the hazards was identified.
Thus the two sub-phases overlapped for the most part. 	 As r
`	 can be expected, the identification of causes led to much more
.	 debate.	 In 1897 there had been some conjecture about the causes
of X-ray injuries, and this suiftl.y Increased, with active aq
debate continuing until at least 1901:.. The . burns..0ere attributed
52
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To the reader of today, one of the more distressing debases
i
was the semaritic one relating .to the definitJon of a burn.
Up till then it was supposed that burns were caused only when
detectable heat was generated.	 Titus an "X-ray burn" seemed
a Contradiction in terms.	 The argument over whether the common
i
i form of injury should be termed a burn absorbed attention and
E
energy which might have been better spent. 	 Tai retrospect
tltl
:9
she issue seems to have been a: dead-end that delayed the assess-
merit process and contributed to the sources of disagreement
and confusion:.
(b) The Assessment Phase and its Activities --the assess-
ment phase consisted of acquiring information about possible
remedies and examining their effectiveness.	 As early as 1898
some safety precautions were recommended, and . in the next years
the question of how to prevent injuries received more consider-
ation.. It may therefore be seen that the early Part of the
assessment phase overlapped a great deal with the identification
phase.	 however, it. was very rudimentary assessment, and the
. amount of space relegated to precautions in the medical articles
_
a
was very small compar.ecl'with space :devoted to the identification
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of causes.of injury.	 The remedies.suggested- show .how little
was really known then about the causes. 	 The importance of
., distance between. the patient and X-ray tube was- emphasized early,. ^.
` and.it was thought that excessive exposures lasting an hour or !
so could lead to adverse. effects. 	 The.other remedies suggested-- f
' such as using an aluminum screen or silk sheet to protect . the r
patient:--wera later on realized to . have little relevance.	 In
r
` 1897
	
Thompson had observed that heavy lead glass had a shield-
irig .effect,.but the Implications were not recognized until.
much later.	 Discussion about causes of injuries and their
prevention still focused mostly on the patient 	 whereas the
i effects upon the practitioner were little considered.
I
By 1903	 Williams suggested coating the.X-ray tube with
white lead paint and using leaded glass to protect the operator's
r
eyes.	 We see that with medical X-rays, during the early
stage of the technological assessment process, relatively few
^d
activities can be classified as fitting into the assessment s
phase, for during the first decade of use very little infor-
mation about possible remedies had been developed.
c	 The Control Phase and its Activities--Even fewer activities
may be viewed as pertinent to the control phase. 	 There were
some efforts near the end of the decode to apply some fairly
k' generally agreed upon precautions, but not in any systematic
way.	 The control phase, in the initial stage of technology
assessment of medical X-rays, falls mainly outside the time period 3
3
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studied in this paper. It was soon after to be marked by
the. realization, that ways of. measuring the intensity of
,i
X-ray exposures would have to be developed, so that some in-
formal standards could be described and applied.
3 'Possible Characteristics of Subsequent Stages of the Tech-
I nology Assessment Proeess--The :foruiirlatxons about the phases of the
early stage of the technology assessment process have been based
for the most part on analysis of the data presented in Part I of
the paper. If these.formulati.ons are somewhat speculative, those
referring to the possible characteristics of subsequent stages in
j
	
	 the process must be deemed even more speculative. It is, however,
conjectured that the technology assessment process during its 'later
stages recycles through the phases of identification, assessment,
and control but very:Qrobably with a number of notable differences.
One apparent difference is that the early stage's phases are
characterized by relatively informal and rudimentary efforts: to
establish: (1) the nature and causes of the hazards, (2) the most
effective remedies,:.and (3) the type of control actions which
should be taken so the remedies wild. -be
 adequately applied. By
contrast, in the later stages.
 of the technology assessment process
the activities seem to become more formal, or codified, more intensive:
and more sophisticatedo—More subtle .
 concepts of. the hazards and
3
their causative factors'emerge.. At the same time the phases of ideas-
tifica.tioa,.assessmerit, and control::i.nterPenetra.te:much more,
with the result that they are less sequential
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meat process. There appears to be a trend for the stages to move
- 5
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from a simple form of the assessment process to a complex form,
with each stage becoming increasingly more complex. Rarely does
a subsequent stage seem to be simpler than the one preceding it,
in terms of the number of participant structures and information
dissemination structures. Consequently perhaps the dilemma of.the
early stage of technology assessment is that, although the partici-
pant"structures and information-dissemination structures are quite
simple and easy to deal with, little tends to be known about the
hazards and little exists in the way of formal regulatory structures.
Correspondingly, perhaps the dilemma in the later stages of assess-
ment is that while more is known about the hazards and more regula-
tory structures have evolved, the increasingly greater number of
participant and information dissemination structures, and the frag-
mentation of the assessment process they cause, verges on the chaotic.
The result is to overtax the capabilities of whatever overall
decision-making and administrative bodies exist.
This paper has presented data depicting representative early
experiences with the . hazards of medical X-rays during the first
t
F	 l G'
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decade of their use. The reasons for the rapidity, of the initial
s ^
i
-
Some comparisons between X-ray diffusion "then" and "now" were out-
i
lined, with emphasis on changes which have occurred in the amount
of information available and in the medical communication network.
Then, based on analysis of the kinds and sequences of activities
found in the data, a tentative model was proposed describing the
major phases in the early stage of the technology assessment process.
' -	
r
In the concluding section, conjectures were made about what differences
might distinguish the early stage of technology assessment from its
later stages.
Although in this preliminary study no effort has been made
to demonstrate the detailed fit of the model of the technology
i
assessment process to the events set forth in the data, if the reader
i
runs through the phases and sub-phases of the model and systematically
plugs in the data, he will find that the evidence here strongly
. substantiates the model. 	 But the proof of the model is what it
can do.	 if the present formulation looks promising, then to be of
9
value the model will require further development. 	 Further	 work
with the model should be useful in testing and refining it, and
appraising to what extent it can be used as a tool for investiga-
ting and analyzing the process underlying other technology assess-
ment situations.
3
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	 Controlling the Potential Hazards of
Government-Sponsored Technology
i
^4^
MICHAEL WOLLAN'
Introduction
Side effects of science and technology today threaten to overnut our means of
controlling them. Air and water pollution, power blackouts, radiation dam-
age and many other technologically-created hazards have had the sobering
effect of impressing many public officials with the need for wise management
of scientific and technological change. In Congress this concern is being fo-
cused on Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario's Subcommittee on Science, Re-
search and Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics,
which is holding hearings and seminars on methods of "identifying, assessing,
publicizing and dealing with the implications of applied research and tech-
nology."x In the executive branch, the Office of Science and Technology is
discussine, proposals for a Fourth Branch of Government that would antici-
pate and control the medical, social, political and economic ramifications of
applications of science and technology.
Moreover, numerous examples from the recent history of technological
change demonstrate that an essential part of the planning for technology as-
sessment must be the continuation of assessment after government policy with
respect to a scientific or technological innovation has been initially developed.
For instance, fifteen years after atomic weapons tests were performed in
Nevada, health authorities in Washington County, Utah, felt the need to ex-
?
' Research Associate, Program in Low, Science and Technology, National Late Center,
The George Washington University. B.A., University of Chicago; LL.B., Yale University.
s. Technology Assessment, statement issued by Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Science, Research and Development of the Rouse Comm. on Science and Astro-
nautics, Both Cong., sst Sess., at 3 (s967) [hereinafter cited as Daddario State "
 nt].
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amine children for possible effects of fallout from the tests. Many years after
the introduction of the internal combustion engine, we began to appreciate
the seriousness of pollution problems caused by tetraethyl lead in automo-
bile fuels. And after the Navy systematically sprayed an island off the coast of
{
	
	 New Jersey during World War lI to eliminate hoards of flies it disci vered that
the spray, DDT, killed fish.e
The need for re-assessment has been particularly apparent with respect
I 
	
tr
drugs and chemicals that people regularly consume, because medical knowl-
edge of the effects of chemical compounds on people is constantly changing.
The Food and Drug Administration, for instance, requires that all reports of
adverse effects of drugs be submitted to its specialists for study, even after the
drugs have been approved for sale and distribution. A, recent survey of leading
chemists and biologists in . the United States indicates that many scientists
who endorse fluoridation as a public health measure also believe that con-
tinued research on the effects of fluorides on human beings is desirable. The fact
the:t fluoridation involves the regular ingestion of a chemical whose effects
i { were not fully understood or examined at the time it was endorsed by the f-ablic
:. Health Service underscores the need for continuing assessment.
l
Although the concept of Technology Assessment is not new,' the present
patterns of massive federal support of research and development were stim-
ulated by World War 11 and now have led almost every government agency
z into programs that involve applications of science and technology:' Who
assesses the impacts of these programs; for what purposes; through what
E means, mechanisms and procedures; and, with what results? These are ques-
tions this article analyzes by case studies that provide some insight into how
the technology assessment function is currently being performed.
Weather Modification
Since the evolution of the most primitive societies, men have attempted to
control their environment by modifying the weather. 6 In the United States,
Congress, in rSgo, sponsared early scientific efforts to make rain, when the
Department of Agriculture received $g,000 to produce rain by setting off ex-
1 plosives in the clouds." Not until -1R46, though, were controlled laboratory ex-
2. For an Interesting discussion of these and similar problems, see Commoner, Science
and Survival (1956).
3. As early as 1830 our FederoI Government began to assess technology. A series of
boiler explosions on steamboats brought pressure on the Congress to take corrective
action. Lack of infopn6tion on why boilers burst prompted Congress to direct the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to act. In turn, the e.¢ecutive branch, unable to make much head-
way granted research funds to the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia to conduct
experiments to produce the body of data necessary to ]create flaws in design, con-
struction, and theory of steam boilers. Regulatory legislation eventually resulted.
Daddario Statement, supra note 1, at 10.
4. For a descrir.ion of federal support of science and technology, see XVI Nat ' l Science
^-'oundation, Federa: Funds for Research, Development and Other Scientific Activities
(1967),
5. See Halacy, The Weather Changers (x968).
6. Baum, Congressional Action on Weather Modification (paper for Symposium on
Weather Modification, Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, N.Y., Dec. 30, i967).
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Technology Assessment and the Law
THE GEORGE 1VASHINGTON i.AW REVIEW
periments used to demonstrate a method of increasing precipitation by seeding
clouds with' pellets of dry ice. In the 7  years since these experiments were
performed at General Electric, weather research has progressed to such an ex-
tent that scientists are now able to produce significant changes in rainfall, tor-
nadoes, lightning; hcd and fog. "[I]n a sense, weather modification today is a
reality. Man can and does interfere with the atmosphere in a number of differ-
ent ways. His ability to produce deliberate beneficial changes is still very lim-
ited and uncertain, but it is no longer either economically or politically
triVial: 1T
For many years novel legal problems raised by rainmaking have puzzled
the courts. For example; in the late 79th century, when ' a severe drought struck
northern New York, a minister named Duncan McLeod organized a commu-
nity prayer session to ask for rain. Within three hours a tremendous storm
blew over the area, bringing two inches of rain. Lightning destroyed a barn
owned by Phineas Dadd, who had been the only person in the community who
openly objected to the prayer session. Dodd promptly sued Reverend McLeod
for $5oo, arguing that the loss of the barn was a direct result of the prayers he
organized. Defense counsel finally persuaded the court that defendant had only
prayed for rain, and the lightning had been a gratuitous gift of Gods
As the range of controllable weather phenomena expands, more complex
biological, ecological and political problems arise. For instance, suppose we
are able to prevent hurricanes from battering the coast of Florida by redirecting
them into the Atlantic or the Caribbean. How will other countries in the
area be affected? What diplomatic approaches are necessary to work out ar-
rangements which will allow us to protect Florida from hurricane damage
without deliberately inflicting this damage on another country? How will our
ability to control rain and snowfall affect biological communities? Will repro-
ductive cycles be influenced, and if so, how? More important, will weather
modification methods become instruments of warfare? What steps should be
taken to assure that the benefits to society of weather control will be maxi-
mized and the hazards minimized?
Generally, definitions of weather modification encompass both intentional
and inadvertent changes in atmospheric processes, motions or compositions.
Intentional changes include rainmaking and control of lightning, hail and
severe storms, while inadvertent changes usually refer to the consequences of
air pollution.
Major programs of the federal government to modify the weather deliber-
ately t•)egan after World War II, and have gone through three stages: 2) the
period from World War II t02958, 2-1 x958-1.965, 3) Yo66 to the present.
!	 7. I Nat'l Academy of Sciences, Weather and Climate Modification: Problems and
y?y'	 Prospects 3 (19661 thereinafter cited as Nat'l Academy of Sciences].
1}	 8. Partidge, Cuuntry Lawyer ch, 7 (7939).
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Stage Otte: lardy Federal Involvement
Although the Congress supported isolated weather modification experiments
around the turn of the century, long range federal programs of weather control
research did not begin until after World War II, In x947 the armed services
initiated investigations of cloud modifications through Project Cirrus, since
the Air Force was interested in the advantages increased lmowledge of cloud
behavior would provide for fliers. Project Cirrus was followed in x952 by a
Department of Defense five year Artificial CloudNucleation Project.
These early projects were confined primarily to research for military pur-
poses, and were conducted on a small scale compared with the multi-million
dollar activities of commercial rainmakers in the early 795o's. Rainmaking
companies were responsible for most advances in non-military applications of
weather modification in the first decade after the War as droughts in several
sections of the country aroused considerable concern, particularly among far-
mers, and private organ-ations were often hired to try to increase precipita-
tion.
After x9go a number of Congressmen began to think more seriously about
the possibilities of the federal government sponsoring research into civilian
uses of weather modification. Fear that the Soviet Union might develop weath-
er control knowledge that could be used to disrupt American agriculture, cou-
pled with concern about drought in the West, Ied Congress to consider an eval-
uation of the current state of knowledge of the weather. In r9 ,53, Congress
created the Advisory Committee on Weather Control, headed by Retired
Navy Captain Howard Orville, to "make a complete study and evaluation of
public and private experiments in weather control for the purpose of determin-
ing the exec... which the United States should experiment with, engage in, or
regulate activities designed to control weather conditions."'
Although the Orville Committee's primary task was to review existing ca-
pabilities for weather modification, Congress was aware of some possible ad-
verse consequences of experimentation with the weather. The Statement of
Purpose and Policy which Congress adopted for the Committee noted that
weather control "without proper safeguards, sufficient data, and accurate infor-
mation may ... adversely affect the general welfare and common defense.""
The bill setting up the Committee declared it to be the policy of Congress to
prevent the "harmful and indiscriminate exercise" of "experiments and opera-
tions designed to modify and control weather.""
The Committee's final report, issued in December, Y9S7, provided Congress
with the first complete review of weather modification research in this coun-
try. Given the data of the report and its recommendations for vast expansion of
government-sponsored research, Congress was ready to advance to the next
stage in the development of national weather modification programs--selec-
tion of agencies to sponsor research, and appropriation of funds.
9. 99 Cong. Rec. 2o66o (1953)•
xo, Id,
ii. Id. The Committee devoted relatively little attention to these problems.
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Stage Two. The Growth of Federal programs
Public Law 85-5:ro. At the urging of the Orville Committee, Congress in Pub-
lic Law 85-51o, approved July x%, :L958, designated the National Science Foun-
dation to "initiate and support a program of study, research, and evaluation in
the field of weather modification . . . ."12
During the hearings on 85-5%o, two arguments, frequently repeated, were
most influential in persuading Congress of the need for establishment of long-
range national weather modification programs. First, as Senator Francis Case
pointed out,
[E]conomicaffy the possible importance of this bill to the Nation and to the
world is tremendous.... We spend hundreds of millions of dollars to counter-
act and alleviate weather caused disasters, or, I might say, to overcome
situations created by a lack of knowledge about the weather or what is coming.
It is my earnest conviction that what the Congress does to authorizean orderly
experimentation and evaluation program in cloud modification will have last-
ing significance for conditions of drought, floods, hurricanes, had, lightning,
fog, and smog.1n
Second, a number of Senators and Congressmen were greatly concerned
about the possibility that the Soviet Union would progress more rapidly
than the United States in the field of weather control. They were troubled by
the testimony of Dr. Edward Teller, who asked the House Commerce Commit-
tee to "Please imagine a world in which the Russians can control weather on a
big scale, where they can change the rainfall over Russia, and that•and here
I am talking about a very definite situation—that might very well influ-
ence the rainfall in our country in an adverse manner "14
Little attention was paid during the congressional hearings and debates to
possible adverse consequences of weather modification or the likelihood of
detrimental results of experiments.
Under 85-5mo NSF promptly established a program of research, through
grants and contracts, to study further the scientific bases of weather and
climate modification. In the program's first year of operation, $%,24:1 minion
were spent."' Funds for the program continued to be appropriated at the rate
of between one and two million dollars a year, gradually increasing to $3.5
million in :L968. 16
 While NSF has allocated this money to support basic sci-
entific weather research, other agencies, mainly the Departments of Agricul-
ture, Commerce and the Interior, have slowly and independently built their
12. 42 USX- 5 2862 (a)(9) (1964)-13.Hearings on Weather Modiflcation Research Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong, 2d Suss., at 0 (i9j6),
14. Id. at 9,	 1
25 , Nat'l Science Foundation, Ann Rep.: Weather Modification 3 (LqSq).
16. interview with Toter Wyckoff, Program Director for Weather MoMcotibn, Jqat'j
Science Foundation, in Wagh,, D.C.
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own programs to investigate uses of weather control specifically of interest
to them.
Development of Programs in the Other Agencies. The Bureau of Reclamation,
in the Department of the Interior, has financed limited research into snow and
rainfall for over seven years because of its interest in water resources in the
Western states. Until x964 these efforts only received about $-1oo,000 a year in
financial support from Congress, but then Senator Alan Bible of Nevada and
other Senators from the West began to push for huge increases in appropria-
tions for projects designed to augment water resources in the Upper Colorado
River Basin-IT Senator Bible, who was specifically interested in experimenta-
tion with methods of rainmaking, led a fight . that secured an appropriation
of 'approximately $:E million for the Bureau of Reclamation 's weather modifi-
cation research in fiscal year a.965. Since then, funds allocated to Interior's
weather modification research and development programs have risen regular-
ly.. For fiscal year x968 Interior will spend $.5.r mullion to control the weather
—almost fifty per cent more than any other agency, including the National Sil-
ence Foundation.1'
During the same period, the Department of Agriculture has pursued its pro-
grams of lightning suppression, spending the modest amount of one to two
hundred thousand dollars a year.' D The Federal Aviation Agency's research
into fog dispersal has cost even Iess each year, while the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and the Department of Defense have similarly allo-
cated money for a few small-scale weather control projects?°
The Department of Commerce is the only other agency that has made major
efforts to expand its weather and climate control programs since the Orville
Committee submitted its final report and Congress enacted Public Law 85-5Y0.
Until -1966, Commerce support of weather modification never rose above
$2.5o,000 a year due to the skeptical view which its Weather Bureau had to-
ward the future of weather control. In the past three years, however, the De-
partment's Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA) has en-
thusiastically promoted a wide range of weather control projects, including
efforts to modify hurricanes, increaserainfall, divert the energy of tornadoes
and suppress hail. This year ESSA will spend $-1.5 million on weather modifica-
tion, and hopes to triple that amount by 1970-n'
To avoid duplication of weather modification projects, the agencies engaged
in weather research have used an Interdepartmental Committee for Atmospher-
ic Sciences to exchange information and coordinate programs. Annual meet-
s7. Hearings oil progress in Weather Modification Before file Subcomm. Alit Water
and Power Resources of the Senate Comm. an Interior and Insular Affairs, Both Cons.,
ast Sess., at is (:967).
18, Hearings an Weather Modification Before the Subcomm. an
 Communications and
Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign. Commerce, gnth Cong., ast Sess.,
0 42 (x967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings oil
ig. Nat'i Academy of Sciences, supra note r, at IS.
xo. Id. Exact amounts being spent by the Department of Defense are not public since
many of the projects are classified.
2%. Hearings an Weather Modification, supra note 18.
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ings of all officials involved in weather control are arranged by ICAS to en-
courage exchanges of ideas and reports on successes and failures met by each 	 .
y agency. ICAS does not attempt to plan or regulate the Government's weather
i modification lzctivitles. Occasionally, the Committee may recommend that one 	 ^.
agency eliminate a proposed experiment because similar work is being; under-
'	 } taken by another agency, but in general, ICAS serves only as a clearinghouse.
for information on federal weather modification research.
As Interior, Agriculture, the FAA, ESSA and NASA have joined the Nation-
- al Science Foundation in support of weather modification efforts in the past ten
years, theirprograms have focused primarily on establishing the feasibility
of scientific methods for controlling the weather. Interior, because of its mis-
sion-oriented projects in the area of water resources, has sought to find ways 	 !
} of Augmenting; precipitation, Agriculture, because of its responsiblities for the
1 farm economy, has been interested in how weather control can reduce crop
ii damage. The FAA, because of its concern for Air safety, has tried to find meth-
'' ode of removing heavy fogs that hang over airports. In general, all of these
government programs have endeavored to overcome skepticism among many
scientists about man's ability to subject the weather to his control. But almost
I no studies or funds were devoted to investigation of the legal, biological, eco-
logical or social . consequences of weather modification throughout the late
ag3o's and early-19 o's.
I^ Appointment o NSF arid NAS Stud y Groups. B %963,  a number of Adminis-FP	 ^	 J	 P^ YE; tration people and some Congressmen felt that a general reevaluation of the	 -
{ results of weather modification, similar to the study of the Orville Commit-
_` tee, was due, On October 27 NSF 's National Science Board authorized appoint-
ment of a Special Commission on Weather Modification to review the "state
of knowledge on weather and climate modification, make recommendations
concerning future policies and programs and examine the adequacy of the
# Foundation's program."' In November, the National Academy of Sciences also
appointed a Panel on Weather and Climate Modification "to undertake a de-
liberate and thoughtful review" of the status of weather modification and its
potential.
The NSF and NAS study groups were closely connected from their concep-
tion, since NSF provided fifty per cent of the money for the NAS study. ay To
Avoid duplication of their efforts, and to assure that the many complex prob-
lems of weather modification received adequate treatment, the two organiza-
tions agreed that NSF would concentrate on the non-scientific aspects while
the Academy would focus on scientific and technical matters. Together the two
sz. Special Comm'n an Weather Modification, Nat'l Science t'oundmion, Rcpott on
Weather and Climate Modification 6 (%965).
23 . Nat'l Academy of Scmaces, supra note 7, at vii.	 f
s¢. 1d. at ix.
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hoped to provide a comprehensive analysis of What had happened in Weather
modification programs since the Orville Committee report. As the NAS Panel
explained later in the preface to its final report; "The complexion of the held
had changed subtly since the appearance in 1957 of the final report of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's Advisory Committee of Weather Control. It was time for a
new and broader evaluation." 21 The Panel and the Special Commission com-
pleted their Work within a month of each other, The published results ushered
in the next stage in the development of federal weather modification policies,
Stage Three: Emergaiice of Now Dimensions in Federal Policy
The NAS and NSF Reports. In November, x965, the National Academy's Panel
submitted its imai report,"' followed a month later by the conclusions and rec-
ommendations of the NSF Special Commission. 27 In a careful, detailed review
of progress with respect to modification of clouds, cloud systems, climates in
large areas and climates in local and regional areas, the Panel concluded that
scientific means for bringing about limited forms of weather control were
already available, and investment of large sums of federal money promised
even more progress in the immediate future. Given this persuasive evidence
that "weather and climate modification is becoming a reality,"28 the NSF
Special Commission sought to make the public, the scientific community, the
Congress and other government agencies aware of five crucial questions:
x) What may be the biological consequences of weather and climate modifi-
cation activities?
z) What might be the social, human and economic benefits to than?
3) Are there legal, political, and legislative issues to be resolved?
4) How should the plans of the United States in Weather and climate modifi-
cation be communicated to and coordinated with other nations?
S) What are the organizational and funding needs for a national program
I
n weather and climate modification?
None of these questions were thoroughly answered in the report, but the
need to explore them in depth was spelled out explicitly. For instance, com-
menting on biological implications, the report noted that
Anything that has a general and significant effect upon plants and animals,
making some more abundant, others less so, is of primary concern to mankind,
for it strikes at the very basis of human existence. Changes in weather and cli-
mate may be expected to have such effects, It follows that any program of
Weather and climate modification must give serious attention to adverse as
Well as beneficial biological aspects,20
Regarding social effects, the report mentioned that
ap, 14 at vii.
4 1 & 11 Nat'l Academy of Sciences. Weather and Climate Modification; Problems
and Prospects (1966),
27, Report on Weather and Climate Modification, supra note az.
a8. Td. at B.
1d, atz8,
zaxx
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lack of social research about weather modification since
ie Advisory Committee an Weather Control, when uncer-
feasibility of extensive weather modification is large the 	 }
and .to remain unexplored until a major problem erupts.
Is strongly that this should not be the course of events
;encies engaged in weather modification attempts should
don to the social implications as f^
adonal problems, the report concluded that
wire to the time when field experiments with weather or
are expanded in scope and number and involve actual at-
changes in the atmosphere, some form of international
essential in the planning and execution of projects....
en to the types of international organizations that will be
tions they should perform ... pi
,F
)orts urged expansion of federal programs of research
^e level of funding be raised from $9 million a year
V %97o. They also suggested that program direction
;ency, although both qualified this point by stating
d responsibility should be maintained. that will allow
ieir mission requirements for work in this field."aa
ie NAS and NSF reports acted as catalysts, immedi-
me on the non-scientific problems of weather modi-
on of how federal weather research should be strut-
s own recommendations for research into the social
1, NSF established a Task Group on the Human Di-
here, to determine ways in which research on the
eather modification aright be encouraged, and to
requiring most urgent attention. The Task Group's	 s
cations of Weather Modification Activity,
	
1i
In addition, other agencies connected with weather modification programs
have in the last two years undertaken independent studies of various so-
cial, legal and ecolo ilcal effects of weather modification. The Interior, Com-
merce and Agriculture Departments have contracted with several universities
to study such issues as federal liability for damages due to weather modifica-
tion experiments, the effects of experiments on crops, and the effects of in-
creased precipitation on plants and animals in localized areas. These studies
are now in progress.
3o. Id. at zg.
3Y. Id. at 26-27.
IJ	 32.. Nat'l Academy of Sciences, supra note 7, at *s.
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rMoreover, the agencies have begun to think more about how to structure
federal weather modification programs so that the non-scientific consequences
would be regularly taken into account in the planning and execution of proj-
ects. On March 79, 2966, Dr. Donald F. Hornig asked ICAS to prepare a report
on the organization of federal weather control programs. 811 Dr. Horner E. New-
ell of NASA agreed to write the report, and in November he submitted a
"Recommended National Program in Weather Modification." Newell strongly
expressed his feelings that "there must be regulation and control of weather
modification activities... to provide a mechanism for protection against
harmful consequences of weather modification but also to permit valid ex
perimentation."8 't.He added that "the regulatory body must not be one of the
operating agencies participating in the National Weather Modification Pro-
gram. To assign this responsibility to one of these agencies would imnnedi-
ately generate conflicts of interest, sow the seeds of dissension, and doom the 	 r
efforts at regulation and control to endless frustration. "81
Finally, the reports have led Congress to assume a more active role in assess-
ing the economic and social impact of weather modification activities. Senator
Warren Magnuson's interest in weather modification was aroused enough by
the reports that he asked the Legislative Reference Service to prepare an exten-
sive report on "Weather Modification and Control" for the Senate Commerce a	 ,
Committee.86
Thus, the NAS and NSF reports in effect added new dimensions to the
development of weather modification policies by stimulating greater interest
in non-scientific issues and in regulatory structures that would attempt to
further scientific progress in weather control while minimizin g the hazards
such progress might create for the public and the environment.
The Current Status of Weather Madifucat-ion. The surge of interest during the
past two years in assessment of the social consequences of weather modification
has not meant that programs of research or experimentation on methods of
weather control have been curtailed. On the contrary, the programs of NSF, In-
terfor, Commerce and Agriculture continue to expand, as the NSF and NAS re-
ports recommended. For example, Project Stormfury, conducted jointly by
ESSA and the Navy, will attempt this fall to disperse or change the direction
of hurricanes in the Caribbean. ESSA this year will also be trying to reduce the
huge levels of snow which plague the area around Buffalo, New York, and In-
terior has an extensive program for combatting the water shortage problems
in the Southwest by modifying rainfall in the Rocky Mountains. In general,
33. Newell, NASA, Report on a Recommended National Program in Weather Modi-
fication to the interdepartmental Committee for Atmospherl'c Sciences (%966) (Federal
Council for Science and 'technology, Executive Office of the rreryident, Nov, 1966, preface).
34. Id at y.
35• Id. at 36.
36. Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Report in Weather Modifica-
tion and Control (x966)_
i
a	 1x44
'it	
3
t:	 dY
Y.
Technology Assessment and the Lazo
THE GEORGE WASEMIGTON LAW REVIEW
$xo.55 million will be spent on federal weather modification programs in
-1968, compared with only $7 million in 1966. 7
Congress has been prodded by the NSF, NAS and Newell reports (just as it
was prodded ten years ago by the Orville report) to review the structure of fed-
eral programs and to consider the need for new legislation that would broaden
the regulatory authority of the Government and assign direction of federal
programs to a single agency. The bill receiving most attention, H.R. gzxz,
would give primary authority for weather modification research to the De-
partment of Commerce, while allowing other departments to carry out pro-
grams in specified areas. Non-federal weather modification activities would be
regulated by the Secretary of Commerce under authority granted by the bill.
And responsibility for "thorough study and investigation" of social, econom-
ic, biological and ecological effects of weather modification would be dele-
gated to the Secretary of Commerce.
Hearings on H.R. gzxz were held in October and November, -1967, by the
House Commerce Committee, but at the moment the bill is still in committee.
Committee staff members indicate there is little hope for passage this year.
Until new legislation is enacted, weather modification programs will continue
in the various agencies at levels depending on the appropriations each agency
can obtain from Congress. Some of the social consequences will be studied, as
they are now, under grants and contracts issued from each agency. Although
there will be no systematic planning or centralized regulation of federal weath-
er modification projects, WAS will continue to compile information on them
and advise the departments or agencies of possible duplications in their efforts.
Technology Assessment in the Field of Weather Modiftcation-
An Evaluation
Frequently important social implications of a scientific method or invention
are discovered long after extensive use has been made of the particular device.
For instance, when oil from the freighter Torrey Canyon polluted the English
coast, thousands of gallons of detergents were used to restore beaches to their
pre-disaster condition. Now scientists have discovered that the detergents were
more harmful to birds, plants and marine lifer than was the oil.
In the field of weather modification, however, many scientists, Congress-
men, and government officials are already aware of possible adverse conse-
quences. No formal assessment institutions or mechanisms, and no major dis-
asters, were necessary to inform those government officials or scientists who
were responsible for initiating federal weather modification e;.periments of the
10
r
37. Hearings on Weather Modification, supra note 18; Nat'l Science Foundation, Ann.
Rep.: Weather ModiAcadon 91 (x966).
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existence of non-scientific ramifications of weather control. But the level of
concern about the consequences of. weather modification has. changed since
1953, and two groups, the NSF Special Commission and the NAS Panel, were
primarily responsible for shifting interest in these questions from general dis-
cussions to specific, analytical programs of study and research. Prior to :E9'65,
despite the work of the Orville Committee, many people still doubted whether
the future of weather modification was bright enough to justify expediture
.
 of
large. amounts of government funds in research programs or experiments.
The National Academy 's report eliminated almost all of these doubts. The NSF
report, in turn; directed attention to the kinds of legal, ecological and biologi
cal problems which will occur more and more frequently as the number and
range of weather control experiments expand.
For the purposes of understanding what institutions or mechanisms are the
most effective instruments of technology assessment, it is important to note
that the current level of interest in social consequences of weather modifica-
tion was induced by groups which did not operate mission-oriented weather
control programs. Government agencies responded to the reports of the NAS
and NSF, but did little to investigate the non-scientific ramifications of weath-
er control prior to publication of the reports at the end of x965. A possible
explanation for the failure of these other agencies to initiate such studies is
that to Interior, or Agriculture, or the FAA, weather modification devices are
merely tools to be used to accomplish its mission of conserving water resources,
protecting farm crops or promoting air safety. The agency thus is likely to
allocate its limited resources to programs that demonstrate the feasibility and
applicability of weather modification. NSF, however, has broader responsi-
bilities for financing scientific research and development in-general.
As technology assessment institutions, NSF and the Academy panel not
only stimulated greater interest in some of the implications of weather mod-
ification, but they performed this function prior to the launching of weather
control experiments affecting mass populations. Therefore, many questions
about weather modification are now being studied by government agencies in
anticipation of situations in which large numbers of people, plants or animals
mightbe injured by reckless experiments.
Nevertheless, NSF, the NAS Panel and other existing agencies have limita-
tions as assessment institutions that are dramatized by noting some of the
issues in weather modification not being thoroughly treated:
x. Who should decide what region of the country will be the subject of a
weather modification experiment, and how should that decision be made? These
questions are important as long as there is uncertainty about the possible con-
sequences of the experiment, and such uncertainty is present with most weather
experiments today. For instance, some scientists believe it is possible to re-
duce the severity of some hail storms by seeding clouds. However, the seeding
must take place at a critical time and altitude or the severity of the storm
might be increased instead of diminished. Thus, the question of how the deci-
sion. is made to conduct the experiment in state X instead of state Y becomes
;' E k	 significant Should the people in the area be consulted? How much should
^; ^	 xxx6
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they be told about the risks involved in the experiment? The NSF and NAS
reports  dealt with questions of a more general nature, and the agencies cur-
rently engaged in weather modification programs have been reluctant to at-
tempt to lay down guidelines for deciding these questions. Most officials
connected with the programs feel that since they are aware of the possible
serious consequences of experimentation, the public can trust them to conduct
the experiments with a minimum of risk. Probably general regulations gov-
erning choice of sites, timing of experiments and notice to persons likely to
be affected should be drawn up by an agency which would not have a mission-
oriented interest in weather modification programs.
2. The National Academy's Panel, the NSF Special Commission and the
Newell report to ICAS all urged that a federal regulatory structure for weather
modification be established.The NAS recommendation was particularly strong:
We recommend that attention be given immediately to careful monitoring and
regulation of operational programs for weather modification. New legisla-
tion will be required, and this legislation should reflect the economic, political,
social, and scientific implications of the programs. To ensure maximum over-
all benefit and public welfare, legislation should include means of assigning to
a single federal agency, possibly created for this and related purposes, the
responsibility for monitoring and regulating operations and ensuring the pub-
lication of full reports. Such an agency should have powers and resources to
conduct independent evaluations, and may need the authority to adjudicate
among conflicting projects as
No regulatory system has been set up, although legislation authorizing reg-
ulation of non-federal operations has received some attention. H.R. gz-iz,
pending before the House Commerce Committee, would allow the Secretary of
Commerce
after notice and opportunity for a hearing, to issue regulations governing the
weather modification activities of any person or persons not engaging in such
activities pursuant to contract, lease, cooperative agreement, grant, or other
transactirn with agencies of the Federal Government, which conflict with or
impede Ally activities conducted under this Act and to encourage compliance
with such regulations by such business concerns so
There is little likelihood, however, of committee action on the bill this year.
Some limited rules governing weather modification projects have been is-
sued by sponsoring agencies. For instance, in Project Stormfury's experi-
ments with hurricanes, ESSA has informally ruled that "a hurricane in the
southwestern North Atlantic Will be considered eligible for seeding as long as
there is a small probability (%o°Jo or less) of the hurricane center coming within
38. Nat 'l Academy of Sciences, supra note 7, at 23.s	 39. H.R. 92-12, 96th Cong., zst 5ess. § 2o .5(a) (1967).
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5o miles of a populated land area within the ensuing 24 hours. ,"D This regula-
tion reflects ESSRs understanding that its experiments may not produce the
hurricane behavior predicted, and therefore steps must be taken to protect
Feople attd property in the Caribbean or North Atlantic that might be adversely
affected by experiments.
In general though, there has been much reluctance to create a regulatory
agency or to issue broad regulations that would limit weather modification
experiments conducted by the federal governmen0" H.R. 92-12 would apply
only to non-federal activities, and the agencies involved in federal activities
have not attempted to develop detailed regulations for weather control
pmlects•
.. There are two basic reasons why, despite the conclusions of the NAS Panel,
the NSF Special Commission and the Newell report, a federal regulatory struc-
ture for weather modification has not emerged. First, the operating agencies are
hesitant to allow. a.rew agency such as a National Weather Modification Com-
mission to have the power to regulate the manner in which their experi-
ments are selected or conducted, fearing that a Commission might, through
unnecessarily conservative regulation, restrict current rates of progress in the
atmospheric sciences. The agencies are also unwilling to allow an existing de-
partment to be given general regulatory authority because of the possibility
that programs in one agency will then be given priority over those in another.
For example, Interior opposes the provisions in H.R. 9272 that would give
primary responsibility for weather modification research to the Department of
Commerce. Second, because of the pressing problems of the Vietnam War and
of the cities here, no pressure has developed in Congress to act on H.R. 9222
or other legislation dealing with regulation of weather Modification.
The longer Congress waits to enact legislation which would create regulatory
mechanisms in the field of weather modification, however, the more difficult it
becomes to overcome tite resistance of established programs to a central regula-
tory authority. Taus, while the NSF, NAS and Newell reports, as assessment
reports, have succeeded in raising  issues connected with the science of weather
modification and in prompting further studies of the issues raised, their impact
on the organization and regulation of government weather modification pro-
grams has been minor.
Engine Noise from the Supersonic Transport
The federal government's decision to construct a supersonic commercial air-
liner (SST) in conjunction with private industry has been subjected to a con.
40. Environviental Sciences Services Administration, U.S, Dept of Commerce, Project
Stormfury Fact Sheet 3 (Aug. 1967).
,ls. E.g-, 5.373, 9oth Cong., ist 5ess. § 363 (x967), introduced by Senator Magnuson in
January, 1967, would require that an agency obtain prior approval of Congress before
conducting weather madification operational activities. Agencies that submitted their
views on the bill to the Commerce Committee urged deletion of the section.
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tinual evaluation or assessment by a number of writers and members of Con-
gress 42
 Controversy over the SST has centered on three questions:
1) What hazards are presented to the public and to property by the plane's
sonic boom, and what limitations will these hazards place on air routes for
the plane?
z) How much financial support for the projects should come frorn the federal
government, and what return should the government receive on its invest-	 r
ment?	 r
3) To what extent should issues of national prestige determine whether or
not the governmenttmderwrites the design and construction of the plane?
A fourth issue, the amount of noise created by the jet engines of the plane,
has received little attention. Analysis of this issue, however, is of immediate
importance and further illustrates the manner in which the technology assess-
ment function is being performed in the federal government today.
Assessment Prior to the President's Announcement
Speaking to the graduating class of the Air Farce Academy on ]tote 3, 1963,
President Kennedy gave his seal of approval to proposals for joint govern-
ment-industry development of a commercial supersonic transport'' These
proposals had been evolving since the mid-r.g3o's, and had been reviewed for
several years by numerous government officials, private citizens, industry rep-
resentatives and members of Congress. The potential noise level of the plane's
huge engines was among the issues frequently discussed.
At the first congressional hearings on the subject of a supersonic transport,
held by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in May, 196o, tlt,
noise problem was broadly defined. 44 Ira H. Abbott of NASA told the Cout-
mittee that "As far as engine noise is concerned, the situation is not much
different than for existing jet transports, except that more power will be needed
and there will be a corresponding tendency for more noise, i40 Major General
Victor Haugen of the Air Force testified that "engine noise, and its effects, as
evidenced by sonic fatigue in aircraft structure and physiological discomfort
or community annoyance, has been recognized for some time .... The higher
power of the engines on the supersonic transports would snake the problem
more severe."46
 Two industry representatives added that the noise problem
should not be taken lightly. The President of North American Aviation, Inc.
42. See, e.g., Lardner, Supersonic Scandal, The New Republic, Mar. s6, 1968, at 13;
Watkins, SST Faces Drastic Cut in Weight, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Mar. 11,
x968, at 28; 113 Cons. Rec. 5x4446 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1967) (tmarlrs of Senator Proxmire).
43. Kennedy, Public Papers of the President----1963, at 439 (1964).
44. Hearings on Supersonic Air Transports Before the Special Investigating Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 86th Cong., Zd Sesv. (1960).
45• Id. at 5.
46. Id. at 2o.
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commented that "At best, the sound problem is of major consequence,"" and
a manager from General Electric, describing the type of engine capable of
'	 powering the plane, concluded simply: "It will be a noisy engine."'s
E Government officials at the ag6o hearing indicated that they were al-
ready thinking of the possibility of government imposition of noise stan-
dards for the plane. One NASA official involved in SST research programs
said that an SST "must be socially acceptable in the sense that it must not
caun undue noise at or in the vicinity of the airport or over the routes it will
be flown."60
 FAA Administrator General Elwood R. Queseda repeated this
concern: "A major premise which must be kept ii mind from the outset in de-
}. veioping such an aircraft is that any need for increased power should be met
without increased noise. 1110 A year later, when Congress made its first appro-
priation for research on SST feasibility, the FAA discussed more Specifically
the standards it would use to regulate the SST's engine noise, FAA's new ad-
ministrator, Najeeb Halaby, told Congress! "'We would try to see to it that
the noise levels were tolerable to the community, or as tolerable at ' the then
e%iStlttg RirCra f t.„at
To strengthen its understanding of potential problems of the proposed SST,
the FAA solicited special reports on various aspects of an SST program. In July,
ag61, an SST Steering Group comprised of the FAA administrator, the Assis-
tant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development and the NASA
Director of Aeronautical Re search was estabhshed. as In December, -1962, this
Steering Group received a report from its SST Advisory Group, consisting of
ten members drawn from the airlines, airplane manufacturers, financial insti-
tutions and research organizations. The report included a warning that "the
relatior*,ip between take-off performance and the noise generated at take-off
must be such that public annoyance in airport communities is less than it is
i today."" "Approach and landing noise," the report continued, "must be no
greater than that generated by present subsonic jet aircraft."" Other studies
prepared for the FAA between xg6o and -1963 repeated this assessment60
Assessment After the President's Announcement
After the President announced his support of a government-industry project
to develop an SST, the FAA began to take further steps toward establishment
of noise standards for the potential plane, and also explained more carefully
the basis for its expectations regarding the plane's noise levels.
,7. Id. at %o3,
48. Id, at 31.
49. Id. at 4.
5o. Id. at 46.
51. Hearings on Independent Offices Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1962 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 87th Cong., ist Sess., at 627 (1961.).
52. Hearings on Dep't of Transportation Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1968 Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, gath Cong., 1st Scss., at 307 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Dept of Transportation Appropriations].
53• SST Advisory Group, Report to SST Steering Group 1a (Dec. -11, 1962).
54• Id.
$5 . Hearings on Dept of Transportation Appropriations, supra note 52.
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June 5,.%963 to January x, x9.67. Two creeks after his speech at the :Air Force
Academy, President Kennedy submitted to Congress a program for develop-
ment of the SST,110 listing major decision points critical for the success of the
plane and outlining objectives for the plane's design. Objective munber seven
sought "noise resulting from landing and.take-off operations not greater than
that presently created by the current international subsonic jet transports!"
On August %5, xg63, the FAA sent to manufacturers Requests for Proposals
(PM) for development of the SST that essentially incorporated this design ob-
j ective as well as the FAA's previous statements to Congress on the plane's en-
gine noise levels. The REP-informed potential contractors that "noise resulting
from take-off operations shall be less than %=z PNE)B [an arbitrary unit com-
monly used to measure noise levels from airplane engines] at a point on the
ground one statute mile from the departure end of the. runway... 111$8a
level that would compare favorably with commercial jets flying at subsonic
speeds. banding noise, according to the REP, would have to be "less objection-
able than that resulting from operations of current subsonic jets used in inter-
national service," and ground noise at the airport would have to be "reduced
to a level tolerable to the average traveler and airport employee. "aD
The bases of the FAA's design objectives were elaborated by Administrator
Halaby and Deputy Administrator Gordon Bain before the Senate Commerce
Committee in October, %963. Bain explained that although the engines for the
SST will have to be more powerful than engines for subsonic jets, and there-
fore capable of producing much more noise, it is not likely that the aircraft
would have to use its full thrust on takeoff. In addition, because of the plane's
ability to climb at a rapid rate, Its noise level should be equal to or substantial-
ly Iess than current fanjets and we believe it will be less. "DD Halaby's opinion
was that the combination of more powerful engines and more rapid climb
would create "about the same noise" for the community as subsonic jets."'
Both Halaby and Bain admitted there would probably be a noise problem
"on the runway as the pilot applies the power on the takeoff run.- O ' "There is
just no question," said HaIaby, "but what [a subsonic jet with] four engines
generating %S,000 pounds of thrust, for a transatlantic takeoff out of runway
56. Hearings on Independent Offices Appropriations for Fiscal Year x964 Before a
Subeomm. of the Senate Comm. an Appropriations, 88th Cons., 1st Sess., at 1984 (1963).
58
Id. at -1
. FAA, Request for proposals for the Development of a Commercial Supersonic
Transport ao (Aug. %5, -1963).
59• Id.
6o. Hearings an U.S. Commercial Supersonic Aircraft Development Program Before
the Aviation Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. of Commerce, 88th Cons., Ut Sess., ser. 35.
at 73 (1963) [hereinafter dted as Hearings on U.S. Commercial 'Supersonic Aircraft
Development Program].
6%. Id. at x73.
62. Id. at 75.
x%zx
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13-Z at IdlewiId, will make less noise on the runway than [an SST with] four
` engines, developing 4o,000 pounds of thrust. There is just no doubt about
it. Ox Therefore, the FAA, in its RFP, instead of specifying that the noise levels
be less than or equal to those of subsonic jets, called for levels "tolerable to the
average traveler and airport employee.""'
During x963 and 1966 the engine designs were evaluated by the I=AA and
several other groups. One evaluationgroup consisted of z29 representatives of
the Air Force, Navy, Civil Aeronautics Board, NTASA and the FAA. Another
! was the President's Advisory Committee on the Supersonic Transport, chairedji by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Nine United States airlines. conducted
their own investigations of the designs.
This evaluation process did not include a direct comparison of the noise
Ievels potentially produced by the two engiries ° 0 Instead, the various com-
mittees focused on the type of engine required to power a plane with the quali-
ties and dimensions which the Government sought. Of the two frame-design
- companies competing, the Boeing Company submitted the design the Gov-
„ ernment felt was most suitable, and the final decision on the engine was based
primarily on an analysis of which engine was better adapted to the Boeing
plane.00
January x, x967 to the ,Present. On January 1, 1967, contracts were drawn
between GE and the FAA for development of a prototype engine for the SST,
and between Boeing and the FAA for development of a prototype airframe.
Consistent with its earlier statements that it would assure engine noise levels
for the plane that would be "socially acceptable,- the FAA insisted that
noise standards be included in the contracts. Accordingly, the approach and
' airport noise levels specified in the Boeing contract are approximately equal
to levels produced by subsonic jets, while the take-o$ level is lowers'
These standards are production objectives rather than inflexible require-
ments for the prototype planes Boeing has contracted to construct. The FAA
explains that while they expect Boeing to be able to "come close" to these
numbers, neither the Agency nor Boeing guarantees that strict compliance is
possible."" Publicly, Transportation Secretary Alan Boyd is confident that
the standards will be met: In May, 7967, he told Congress that "These engines
have such tremendous power that at subsonic flight they will be able to
operate with less noise than the existing subsonics that are utilizing maximum
power."00 Privately, FAA officials are much more cautious, prefering to abide
by their earlier statements that they expect the SST engine noise levels to be at
least equal to those of subsonic jets. 70
 Some state that "there is a real aggres-
63. Id.
6¢. FAA, Request for Proposals for the Development of a Commercial Supersor^c
" Transport zo (Aug. 15, x963).
with officials of the65. Interviews
	 FAA.
66. id.
67. FAA contract no. FA-SS-67-3, at A-7 (Ian. %, x967).
'i
S. Interviews, supra note 65.
Hearings on Dept of Transporfafion Appropriations, supra note 52, at 37.
j. Interviews, supra note 65.
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sive" noise reduction program at Boeing and G£ which encourages them to
believe that "we can keep the noise to today's levels, although it will be tough,
because the engines have to be bigger."" Others are more sceptical?2
At this stage, the assessment process for the engine problems is carried out
jointly by the contracting companies and the FAA. G£ and Boeing submit
quarterly progress reports to the FAA's Supersonic Transport Project Office.
In addition, the companies and the Agency exchange information informal-
ly, since close contacts between them have developed in the course of the ad-
ministration of the contracts.
The Assessment Process Evaluated
Since the supersonic transport prototype models probably will not be ready
until 197% or '1972, a complete evaluation of the efforts of the Government
"
	
	 and the contractors to predict and control the engine noise levels is not possi-
ble. But some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the assessment pro-
cess that has taken place so &r.
r. The congressional hearings in %96o demonstrated that Congress and the
FAA have been aware of the potential problems of the SST engine noise levels
from the beginning of serious discussions about the federal govenunenes role
in the design and construction of the plane. Other government agencies
which participated in early decisions regarding the SST, such as NASA, the
Department of Defense, and the Office of Science and Technology, have also
shown an understanding of the noise levels likely to be produced by the plane
and of the need to take some steps to reduce these levels. In addition, the air-
'	 line industry has repeatedly made known to the FAA and Congress its recog-
nition of the noise issue. 73
Thus some of the social consequences of using advanced technology to pro-
duce the new, more powerful engines required for a supersonic commercial
airliner were anticipated several years prior to the announcement by President
Kennedy that the Government would support development of the plane. The
institutions and processes which led to this anticipation were both formal and
informal. Congressional hearings, advisory committees and -the regular re-
search of government agencies and industry produced a general recognition
among some members of Congress and presidential advisors of the engine
71- Id.
72. Id, On May x, x968, the New York Times reported that the Boeing Company was
considering switching to a fixed-wing concept in order to overcome difficulties being
encountered in design of the plane. If the fixed-wing design is eventually adopted, it is
likely that the engine noise problems created by the plane will be increased. Hearings on
US. Commercial Supersonic Aircraft Devclopment Program, supra note 6o, at 16z (re-
marks of Gordon Bain, Deputy Administrator, Supersonic Transport Development, FAA).
73 • Hearings an U.S. Commercial Supersonic Aircraft Development Program, supra note
6o, at 4449.
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noise problem. No institutions specifically devoted to technology assessment
were necessary to bring about this awareness.
x. However, as was apparent in the case of weather modification, the
assessment process has had limitations that are primarily a result of the fact
that the major participants in the engine noise Assessment process--the FAA,
the airplane and engine manufacturers, other government agencies such as
NASA and DOU—for over five years have had vested interests in the success-
ful design and construction of the SSV111
While the FAA has consistently raised the question of how to build an
SST that will not significantly increase the amount of jet noise to which com-
munities surrounding airports are now exposed, it has not seriously consfd-
med, in connection with the SST program, a more searching question: How 	 r
much noise from jets should the Government tolerate, and what can be done
to reduce SST jet noise to that level? Approaching the task of setting standards
for engine noise with the primary goal of reducing noise below the level of
public tolerance might have produced contract "Production Airplane Objec-
tives" significantly more stringent than those in the Boeing contract now,
because, according to the FAA, many people living near airports find jet noise
intolerable as soon as the levels approach 8 ,5-go Pndb.76
The major reason why the FAA and other groups involved in assessment of
the engine noise problem have concentrated instead on constructing a plane
which would not generate noise levels above those of subsonic jets is that
they have assumed that certain other characteristics of the SST should not be
altered. As one FAA official explains, "Given a plane with a range of 4,000
miles, a speed of 2.7 mach, a payload of 60,00o pounds, operating off exist-
ing runways, the contract objectives are the lowest possible noise level expec-
tations. If you start by setting noise figures whirl► would eliminate complaints
about noise, you might end up with a very different kind of plane, one that
would not fit our conception of the SST."" Another official describes the pro-
cess of choosing noise standards this way: "Start with the kind of plane you
need, then drive the numbers as low as you can possibly get them," 77 Titus,
because the individuals and institutions assessing the noise problem have
been committed to development of the SST commercial plane with the char-
acteristics described above, the assessment process has been limited. Efforts to
reduce the noise levels have concentrated on comparing engine noise with 	 i
noise from existing subsonic jets rather than on the noise level people living
near airports find tolerable.
Although the FAA and the airplane industry have admitted for several
years that the noise on the runway and at the airport from the SST will prob-
ably be greater than from subsonic jets, no comprehensive studies have been
made of the costs of soundproofing airport buildings or expanding airport
74. See, e.g., 11=1119s on Independent Offices Appropriations for Fiscal Year x95,2
Before a Subcomin, of ilia Senate Comm. on Appropriations. 67dt Cong., rat Sere. (:961).
75• Interviews, supra note 65.
76- Id-
77- Id,
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boundaries. In 1963 E. Thomas Burnard, Executive Director of the Airport
Operators Council, which represents Iocal government bodies that maintain
and operate airports, warned the FAA that the noise levels at the airport might
require such expenditures. Burnard told the Senate Commerce Committee:
Me dan't think that these economic considerations should overlook the pos-
sibdity of buying thousands of acres of prime real estate in major metropoli-
tan areas, should the noise calculations be off, or millions of dollars of con-
crete should the aircraft be incapable of operating off the existing—or cur-
rently planned—runways.... Aircraft that require further soundproofing
of terminal buildings, concourses, fingers, maintenance and operating areas,
and even mobile lounges, will also add to the cost of operation ?s
The FAA says that "not a lot" of money will have to be spent on improved
soundproofing or airport expansion, but does not know "exactly how much
we might have to pay."" Such computations have not been made because
compared with the total cost of the multi-billion dollar SST program, these
sums are likely to be small. Those committed to development of the plane
therefore tend to regard Burnard's warning as relatively insignificant, even
though a thorough assessment of the costs and benefits of the engines for the
SST would require some quantitative estimates of these costs,
In the design competition between GE and Pratt-Whitney, the FAA and the
advisory committees evaluating the competing designs did not make a direct
comparison of the noise levels likely to be produced by the two engines be-
cause their basic aim was to choose an airframe with the qualities and dimen-
sions they sought, and then to pick the engine best suited to the frame. FAA
officials acknowledge that the design competition could have been arranged in
a manner that would have permitted noise level comparisons to be made. But
commitments to a particular kind of plane limited the structure of the
competition.
,Fluoridation
Probably no issue of science and public policy has involved. as much emo-
tional fervor as fluoridation. Over goo referenda on fluoridation have been
t held in the United States since x95o, 80
 and nearly every one has taken place
in an atmosphere filled with irrational charges and counter-charges. Almost
zo years after the major American dental and medical organizations accepted
fluoridation, public health officials in such cities as New York, Detroit, and
Los Angeles are still faced with strong, articulate opposition to it.
3<
78. Hearings on ILS. Commercial Supersonic Aircraft Development Progrant, supra
note 60, at 392.
79. IntcMIM8, supra note 65.f`s	 8a. U.S. Public Health Service, Fluoridation Census 342 (7d ed. 1966).
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tDecay-resisting effects of chemical compounds of fluorides were discovered
in the %93o'9,81 and by x940 some scientists and public health officials were
urging local communities to add fluorides to their drinking water supplies es
But not until the United States Public Health Service endorsed fluoridation
as a safe, effective method of combating tooth decay in %9go did many towns
adopt it.
Early Warnings
In -194 4, the Federal Security Agency held hearingsI 3 to determine what tol-
erances should be set for fluoride residues from spraying agricultural prod-
ucts. In the course of the hearings, the possibility of adding fluorides to
public water supplies was also debated. H. Trendley Dean of the Public Health
Service, who had been in charge of PHS studies of fluorides and dental health
since the early 1930's, testified that he had already begun investigations of
the effects of fluorides occurring naturally in water supplies of many towns
I	 ; in the Southwest to find out what fluoride levels were potentially harmful.
• ` !
-'	 .; Dean told the hearing that water containing 8 parts per million (ppm) fluor-
ide in Bartlett, Texas, produced several minor changes in. bone structure,
nails, pelvis and the lumbar spine, but that these were "a matter of small im-
portance as to public health."84 Dean added that hundreds of thousands of
people had been drinking naturally fluoridated water for many years in this
country and that the PHS had no reports of fluoride poisoning. Thus the PHS
was considering the possibility that arti ftcially fluoridated water, containing
` about % ppm fluoride might be a method of combating tooth decay that would
not result in any ill effects.
Some other scientists testifying at the 1944 hearings were more sceptical
s about the consequences of fluoridating water. A University of Chicago physi-
6logist pointed out that physical harm would often be difficult to detect. "You
have to do tremendous damage, because of compensatory repair; he said,
"before you can get evidence of injury. However, the injury process undoubt-
edly goes on.""' Others testified that statistical epidemiological surveys such
as tine ones the PHS conducted in the Southwest might be misleading, since
-tgipie would react differently to fluorides, just as they would react differently
to any drug:: A third witness warned against analogizing experience with 	 z
natural fluorida tion to artificial fluoridation. He noted that other minerals in 	 i
the naturally flux-dd .zted water could reduce the likelihood of harm by cam-
bining with the fluorides to form compounds that pass through the body in-
stead of being deposited in the bone structure.
PHS Caution anti Pressure from Wisconsin
Despite their general belief that artificial fluoridation at the r ppm level prob-
ably would be complctely safe, PHS officials in the early x940 's were unwilling
8Y. McNeill, The Fight for Fluoridation {%957)•
es. Id.
83. Federal Security Agency, Docket No. EDC-41 (1944)-
84. Id. at 449-34•
sg. Id.
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to recommend that communities began adding fluorides to drinking water. They
felt that within a . few years more conclusive results of research would provide
therm with an even stronger case for fluoridation, and would answer any re-
maining questions about physical ' oar. dental effects. In particular, the VHS
in x945 began two experimental projects in conjunction with state public
health officers in New . York and. Michigan. In .each state two cities were
chosen, one to be fluoridated artificially, and the other to. serve as a control.
The experiments were designed to last ten years; then the PHS would re-
evaluate its position on fluoridation.
Energetic public health officers in Wisconsin, however, were not willing to
wait for this research to be completed. They were actively engaged hi a cam-
paign to bring about an early PHS endorsement of fluoridation. Since x94%
Wisconsin cities had been accepting it, primarily as it result of the persuasive
efforts of the state dental society and two of its members, Dr. Francis A. Bull of
the state Board of Health and Dr. john Frisch, a Madison dentist. After. the
VHS demonstration projects in New York and Michigan were under way,
Frisch and Bull launched a remarkably intense nationwide effort to obtain a
PHS endorsement of fluoridation before the ten year period passed 1 0 They
criss-crossed the country attempting to persuade dentists and community lead-
ers of the benefits of fluoridation sl
By a95o Frisch and Bull were beginning to reap results. Early data from the
Michigan demonstration project were leaking out through the University of
Michigan Dental School, which supervised the project. Figures revealed defi-
nite reductions in the incidence of tooth decay. Frisch publicized these statis-
tics, and argued that now the benefits of artificial fluoridation had been proved.
Any delay in introducing mass fluoridation, he contended, would no longer
be justified. Privately, Frisch and Bull told the Public Health Service that they
had better get on the fluoridation baud wagon if they did not want their
image as leaders in public health to be permanently tarnished.
In addition, by zg5o influential state dental health officers were taking posi-
tions in favor of fluoridation. On May S, David Ast, New York's director of
dental health, sent a memo to his regional health directors offering state aid to
local communities wishing to start fluoridation.""
The Endorsement
The climax of the mounting pressure for fluoridation came in late May, %95o,
at the annual meeting of state and territorial dental health officers in Washing-
86. This campaign has been recorded in the F.S. McKay and john Frisch Papers of the
Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.
87, Herbert Bain, an official of the American Dental Association, came to dread meet
inge "because those guys would show up and never let you off the hook." Interview
with Donald R. McNeill, in Madison, Wisc., Dec. x3, 1966,
68. Memorandum from David Asst, May 8, 793u in McKay Papers, supra note 86.
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ton. Dr. Bull once again buttonholed every major Public Health Service off!
cial attending the conference. In particular, he concentrated on Dr. Bruce For-
syth, assistant surgeon general and chief dental officer for the PHS. Bull drew
Forsyth aside and told him he was "being made a sap out of i80 because be-
fore long the PHS would be the only major health organization refusing to en-
dorse fluoridation. Forsyth agreed to attend a private meeting of four state
dental directors; plus Dr. H. Trendley Dean and Dean's assistant, Dr. Francis
Arnold. The four directors were Bull, David Ast of New York, Edward Taylor
of Texas and Robert Downs of Colorado, who had briefed each other carefully
inpreparation for the encounter withForsyth, Dean andAxnold.
At the meeting Dean argued that since. the New York and Michigan studies
were only half completed, it was still not time for the PHS to take a position
When several days passed without the PHS endorsing fluoridation, Bull as-	 r
slimed that Dean's view had prevailed. Within the PHS, however, the debate
was still going  on. Although Dean stuck to his original position, Forsyth and
Surgeon General Leonard Scheele were becoming convinced that it was time
for the VHS to back fluoridation. Finally, Forsyth and Scheele, as the nation's
. top-ranking public health. officers, either formally overruled Dean or informed
him that they were about to endorse fluoridaton, with or without him: On
June 1, 1950, carne the announcement from the PHS that "Communities de-
siring to fluoridate their communal water supplies. should be strongly encour-
aged to do so.""
The Delaney Hearings
There was a strong feeling in the Public Health Service in 1950 that because of
the prevalence of tooth decay arnong children and adults in the United States,
public health measures should be taken as quickly as possible to reduce the in-
cidence of decay. The PHS believed that the experience with naturally fluori-
dated water supplies, plus the preliminary results of the Michigan and New
York studies, justified its conclusion that fluoridation was a safe, effective an-
swer to the problem. Eighteen months Iater, however, at hearings on chemi-
cals in foods and cosmetics, conducted by the House Select Committee to
.E Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Food Products." evidence was presented
which indicated that a number of questions had not been thoroughly explored
by the PHS before its endorsement of fluoridation. For instance, while physical
examinations were performed on children in the Michigan and New York
projects in order to detect possible adverse effects of artificial fluoridation, no
such examinations were performed on adults in the selected communities.
Other points overlooked by the PHS and brought out at the hearings included.
x. Dr. john Knudson of the PHS admitted that the studies had never spe-
89. Interview with Dr. Francis Bull by Donald R. McNeill, Apr. 25, x955, in McKay
papers, supra note 86.
go. Am. Dental Assn Newsletter, June t, z950.
gs. Hearings on Chemirals in Foods and Cosmetics Before. the House Select Comm. to
Inves0gate the Use of Chemicals in Food products, Bad Cong., id Sess. (1952) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on Chemicalo in Foods and Cosmetics]. 	 i
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cihcally gone into the question of the possible effect of the addition of artificial
fluorides to seater on children who are suffering from malnutrition ° z Yet, the
February, ig5z, issue of the journal of the American Dental Association had
warned that "low levels of fluoride ingestion which are generally considered to
be safe for the general population may not be safe for Mal-nourished infants
' and children, because of disturbances in Calcium metabolism.,'03
z. Dr. Isador Zipkin of the PHS admitted that although they had performed
chronietoxicity studies of the effects of fluoride on rats, a procedure recognized
F by a number of authorities as necessary before any chemicals are inserted in aE food product, such tests were not completed until at least a year .after the
PHS formally endorsed fluoridation.°
1 3. The PHS went ahead with its endorsement although a June, %9.5o, report
I on the New York demonstration project concluded that "a longer period of
^i observation is required before final conclusions can be drawn. The possibility
of demonstrating cumulative effects of fluoride in the final years of the ten
year study cannot be eliminated at this time.i"
4. -The possibility of carcinogenic characteristics of fluorides was not in-
vesdgated by the PHS as
E 5. Congressman A. L. Miller asked a representative of the National Cancer
Institutes if any experiments had been or now were `.'being carried on as to
I 111 effects in pregnant women and in people with chronic diseases, that is the
older people ... ?" The NCI official said he knew of none. Dr. Trendley Dean
of the PHS added: "I don't know of any experiments being conducted along
that line. ,©r
6. No attention was given to Iegal questions which might be raised by t'
fluoridation. The possibility that some individuals might consider fluorida-
tion of water as a violation of their civil liberties, or that some religious groups
might oppose fluoridation as an abridgement of their first amendment rights,
apparently played no role in the PHS decision.
On the basis of this evidence, the Select Committee concluded that
a sufficient number of unanswered questions concerning the safety of this pro-
gram exists as to warrant a conservative attitude. The committee believes that
# if communities are to make a mistake in reaching a decision on whether to
I fluoridate their public drinking water, it is preferable to err on the side of cau-
tion—since there are reasonable alternatives to fluoridating the public
water supply, even if these alternatives are not quite as effective. The topical
application of fluorides to the teeth of children may be more cumbersome, and
is 92. Ill at 2510.
f93.J. Am. Dental Assn, Feb., 1952.
94. Hearings on Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics, supra note 9%, at 1659.
i l
95• Id. at 15aa.
96. ,Id. at x493•
4 97. Idc at 166.8.
Yrz9
-	 i
h
1
}
^ I ^ •	 St
t ^'
perhaps more expensive, than the simple Addition of fluorine to drinking
water. Nevertheless, it is a feasible program, and one which will provide
comparable protection for children's teeth for the P:riod needed to acquire
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that no hazard exists to any portion of
the population by reason of the addition of fluorides to drinking waterYB
The committee strongly urged that research be continued "to determine the
long-range effects upon the aged and chronically ill of the ingestion of water
containing inorganic fluorides. 1111D Thus, the committee in effect said that
the Public Health Service had issued a premature endorsement of fluoridation
as a completely safe public health measure,
Why did the PHS give its unqualified support to fluoridation before several
important medical and legal issues had been thoroughly explored? There are
two. basic reasons. First, the campaign directed by Drs. Frisch and Bull suc-
ceeded in generating signgicant pressure in dental and public health circles
for fluoridation. Because of them general concern about public health issues,
and particularly the problem of tooth decay, the officials responsible for PHS
policy with respect to fluoridation, Surgeon General Scheele, Dr. Bruce For-
syth and Dr. Dean, were receptive to the growing demand for active support
of fluoridation,
Second, the Public Health. Service was not as likely to be as sceptical in its
investigation of the effects of a chemical or drug as an agency such as the Food
and Drug Administration, whose primary mission is to test for safety of chem-
icals and drugs. Since its creation in 2798, the PHS has been entrusted with
the responsibility for introducing new concepts in public health and for
promoting public health measures. Its main emphasis, therefore, has been on
the prospective benefits of scientific research, and this was dearly revealed
in its fluoridation studies of the 194o's. The experimental projects begun in
1945 in New York and Michigan had as their real purpose the investigation of
whether artificial fluoridation would have the same anticariogenic effects ob-
served in naturally fluoridated areas, 10° Thus, while thorough physical and
dental examinations were performed on children in the selected communities,
adults were ignored because the PHS knew from its previous research that the
benefits of fluoridation would only be observed in children. The PHS was
aware of and concerned about possible adverse medical consequences of fluori-
dation, but its primary interest in confirming the,benefits of fluoridation easily
created a situation in which the issues brought out by the Select Committee in
%g5z were not rigorously researched, particularly when the limited studies
undertaken in naturally fluoridated areas had not yielded cases of serious phys-
:-I h
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The dual responsibility to produce a cure for tooth decay and to test its safety
placed the PHS in a very difficult position during the early struggles over
98. Select Comm. to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Food Products, Report on
Investisation of the Use of Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics, 11K Rep. No, 74, 82d
Cong., zd Sess. (%952).	 i
99. Id.
zoo. Hearings on Chemicals in foods and Cosmetics, supra note 9%, at 1.764 (rtxttOrlts
of Dr. Francis F. Heyroth, Nat'l Research Council's Ad Hoc Comm. on Fluoridation).
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fluoridation in the xggo's. Suppose that the Food and Drug Administration
were charged not only with testing the safety of drugs, but with inventing
and developing drugs which the medical profession depends upon to perform
its responsibilities. The FDA would often be faced with a basic conflict of roles
that would undoubtedly limit its ability to assess the impact of drugs thor-
oughly and objectively. Likewise, the PHS in the case of fluoridation was ham-
pered in its assessment functions by the need to perfect, as quickly as possible,
a method of eliminating tooth decay. The result was that while some ques-
tions concerning the safety of fluoridation were answered before the PHS en-
dorsement, others, primarily questions of long-term effects, were not.
f
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The PHS and Assessment of Fluoridation Since -1g5o
The assessment process for fluoridation which the Public Health Service has
followed in the past -1S years is both symbolic and significant. The task of con-
tinuing assessment has been complicated by the irrational charges and attacks
that have come from many opponents of fluoridation. Appeals to fear charac-
terize the speeches and pamphlets frequently used by antifluoridationists to
persuade people to oppose fluoridation. These tactics have lessened the like-
lihood that more rational critiques of fluoridation will be evaluated objectively
and have given the PHS the added burden of distinguishing between reason-
able and ridiculous criticism.
After the PHS announced its support of fluoridation, the American Dental
Association, the American Medic; Association, and other major scientific
and health organizations soon moved to endorse it, using PHS studies and re-
search as the bases for their conclusions. The PHS announcement also spurred.
the introduction of fluoridation in numerous carts of the country. One year
before the PHS endorsed fluoridation, one million Americans were drinking
fluoridated water. A year after the endorserrmt, five million were drinking it.
Once the decision to endorse fluoridanon was made, the PHS became ac-
tively involved in its promotion. The tone of PHS support was set in June,
x95-1, at the Fourth Annual Conference of State Dental Directors with the PHS
and the Children's Bureau in Washington. PHS spokesmen outlined a program
designed to persuade cityr officials, doctors, dentists and laymen to begin fluori-
dating tl:.i: water supplies. Descriptions were given about how to allay
people's fears about fluoridation: "[N]ever use the term artificial fluoridation;
there is something about that term that means a phony. We call it 'controlled
fluoridation."' An organizational framework for a fluoridation campaign
was suggested.: "You come out with a resolution from your county or local
medical organization. You do the same thing with your local board of health.
In many places the next thing to do is to go before lay groups, service clubs,
PTA's, and always invite the public officials, watermen, aldermen, mayors,
anybody you can get." And a strategy was recommended: "If you can, ... keep
-1-13-1
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fluoridation from going to a referendum." lal
 Since this conference, the PHS
has continued to be a major promoter of fluoridation, through preparation and
distribution of materials, storage of information and education of doctors,
dentists and Iocal public health officials.
At the same time, the PHS has experimented on the medical and dental
effects.of fluoridation.las
 The ten year projects in New York and Michigan
were completed, and various analyses were made of people who had been drink-
ing naturally fluoridated water all their lives. No serious physical defects were
observed. Reports of adverse physical effects of fluoridation do appear pe-
riodically, however, in the scientific literature, 10' and although most scientists
as well as .doctors and dentists seem to accept the PHS verdict on fluoridation,
there is disagreement. A number of prominent scientists have argued that more
ought to be known about the long-:erm consequences of drinking fluoridated
water before people drink it daily." 'I in Europe, while British public health
officials have endorsed fluoridation enthusiastically, the Danish goverment
has prohibited it, and Swedish cities have only recently begun to introduce it.
PHS officials have expressed their willingness to evaluate studies critical of
fluoridation carefully and objectively, but the ability of the PHS to offer a
balancer.( assessment is limited by the strong public commitment to fluorida-
tion it has voiced since 195o. Two particular kinds of limitations have been
noticeable.
1. The agency has not investigated as thoroughly as possible the results of
research that might cast doubt on the wisdom of PHS support of fluoridation.
For instance, an important element in the case developed by the PHS in -ig5o
for the safety of fluoridation was the calculation of a normal adult's daily tv tal
intake of fluoride, compared with the daily intake that might possibly lead
to harmful results. PHS scientists told the Delaney committee that their studies
had shown that an adult living in a fluoridated community ordinarily con-
sumed about 1.3 mg of fluoride each day 1 06 Since other PHS research indi-
cated that 4-5 mg "may be the limits of fluorine which may be ingested daily
without an appreciable hazard,""" the agency concluded that fluoridation con-
tained an acceptable safety factor. In 1966, however, scientists at the National
Research Council of Canada published a study 101 indicating that the individ-
101. Proceedings, Fourth Annul Conference of State Dental Directors with the Public
Health Service and the Children's Bureau xs, %s, 22 (x957.).
xo2. For reports of these experiments, see PHS, Fluoride Drinking Waters, PHS Docu-
ment No. 825 (McClure ed. 1962) Ihercinafter cited as Fluoride Drinking Waters).
so3. For a review of these reports, see Burgstahier, Dental and Medical Aspects of
Fluoridated Drinking Water, 68 Transat tions of the Kansas Academy of Science 223
(z965) [hereinafter cited as Burgstahler).
xo4. E.g„ Dr. Hugo Thorell, Swedish Nobel Prize-winning enzyme chemist, Dr. Simon
A. Beisler, Chief of Urology at Roosevelt Hospital, New York City, and Dr. Ludwik Gross,
Chief of Cancer Research, Veterans '.fospital, New York City. A recent survey conducted
by the author also indicates that many scientists who endorse fluoridation believe that
more research should be conducted an possible adverse effects.
xo5. Hearings on Chemicals x Foods and Coerrretics, supra note 9t, at =643.
xo6. Fluoride Drinking Wa.ers, copra note xoz, at 383.
io7. Marier & Rose, Tt.e Fluoride Content of Some Foods and Beverages--A Brief
Survey Eking. a Modifiic Zr-SPADNS Method; 1. of Food Science, Nov.-Dec., %966, at 94 %.
1132
i
f
a
%	 . l
}
Technology Assessment and the Law
SHE oeoRCE wnsttr C-TON rnw REVIEW
E ual's total intake of fluoride in a fluoridated community will now vary from z
=t to 5 mg. laborers who work outdoors in hot weather "undoubtedly" will get 	 F
. more than 5 mg, the authors said, because they drink much more water. The 	 -
increased levels were attributed to changes in recent years in the amounts of
fluorides in foods and beverages which are part of a normal diet.
Instead of sponsoring further studies to confirm or deny the Canadian re-
ports, the PHS responded by dismissing them rather disdainfully. Fluorida-
tion, agency officials said, has been proved completely safe, and no additional
3	 '	 ` studies are now necessary. One PHS scientist argued that the Canadian studies
'
could not be taken seriously because one of the authors "does not have a
f Ph.D.11108
z. The PHS also has adopted an aggressively defensive attitude toward
critics of fluoridation, which tends to discourage meaningful exchanges of
.	 ? views on the subject. For instance, Public Health Service scientists have re-
fused to publicly discuss or debate with scientists who are critical of fluorida-
tion the scientific merits of the PHS position. The PHS argues that such dis-
cussions "would serve no useful purpose,""' since fluoridation has been
proved completely safe. The scientific community does not unanimously
agree.11o
Moreover, the PHS attitude has occasionally led it to take action fostering a
charged atmosphere in which objective evaluation of fluoridation is difficult.
For example, when the American Society for Fluoride Research held its first
meeting in September, 2966, several well-known antifluoridationists were
openly associated with the group. Although presentations were made by
`:	 I pro-fluoridationists, andfluoridationists and scientists not committed to either -
view, the PHS feared that the conference might receive publicity which would
influence an impending referendum in Detroit on fluoridation. PHS therefore
successfully urged the American Dental Association headquarters in Chicago
and Detroit to release a statement charging that the ASFR "is only a sounding
board for fluoride opponents.""' The Detroit News picked up the release
and ran a front page story with the headline "Research Talk Called Plot Against
Fluorida`don."11?,
The PHS took similar steps in the fall of x967 with respect to an organiza-
tion called the International Society for the Study of Nutrition and Vital Sub-
stances, a European-based group that passed a resolution opposing fluorida-
tion.113
 When several American opponents of fluoridation learned of the So-
w	 '
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ciety's resolution, they formed a committee to distribute it in this country.
1
The PHS, learning of the American committee's activities, hastily issued a
statement claiming that American antifluoridationists had infiltrated an inter-
national society, pushed through a resolution condemning fluoridation and
were now using it for their own purposes in the United States. Later the PHS
learned that the American committee was formed long after the resolution
had been passed, and that none of the committee members had anything to
do with the drafting or passage of the resolution, and therefore issued a re-
vised statement. Nevertheless, this case and the case of the ASER indicate r u?
that the strength of its commitment to fluoridation can prompt the PHS to
take hasty action that compromises its ability to provide a detached, com- ij
R prehensive assessment of comments and research on fluoridation.
Conclusion
These three case studies indicate that the federal government's vested interestsI
.	 " in the contittuation of its technological programs limit its ability to provide
adequate technology assessment. In the field of weather modification, agencies
are reluctant to explore in depth the need for regulation of their own operational
programs. In the 55T project, the Federal Aviation Agency has been unable to
ask the kinds of questions about engine noise that might challenge basic as- I
{ sumptions about the plane the agency is developing. In the case of fluorida- 3
_	
^ tion, the Public Health Service's advocacy has interfered with its responsibility
for continuing assessment of its original endorsement.
The deficiencies in technology assessment for these particular programs for-
tunately have probably not yet resulted in serious damage to the public or the
environment. The pace of technological development through government
sponsored projects, however, continues to expand. Concurrently, as Professor n
Harold P. Green of the George Washington University National Law Center
Apoints out,
Technological advances carry with them the very real threat of destruction of
a
a
human beings and cherished human values. Haw much damage could a single
demented or evil person have inflicted on society in a single act 25 years ago?
Today, such a person in a single act may have the capability of inflicting upon
society immense damage measured in thousands, if not millions, of human
llves.114 1
Two recently publicized examples reveal the appropriateness of Green's de-
scription of the potential dangers of technology. In Utah, 6,000 sheep have
been killed in circumstances which strongly suggest that their deaths were the
unplanned consequence of chemical warfare tests conducted by the Army."'
In Colorado, the disposal by the Government of huge amounts of radioactive
wastes has apparently createe a possibility that an earthquake may inflict
1-4. Green, The New Technological Era; A 'View From the Law, Monograph No. i,
Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, Geo, Wash. Univ., Jan., 1965, at t,
%x5. NA, Times, Mar. x7, x968, at 46.
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8serious damage on the city of Denver in the near future. 110
 The fact that such
situations do occur, coupled with increased government invnivement in tech-
nological development, means that if the existing proce:.5. ii ,j technology
assessment are allowed to continue unchanged, they may become entrenched
patterns of decision-making which, although designed to confer the benefits
of science and technology upon society, in fact pose grave threats to the health
and safety of our physical and social environment.
Congressman Daddar*.o has suggestea +fiat creation of a Technology Assess-
ment Board would help Congress perform its technology assessment functions
more effectively by making available more information on the range of conse-
quences of specific applications of science and technology, 117
 The Board would
identify issues and provide Congress with a "balanced appraisal" of the costs
and benefits of projected programs. Undoubtedly, some such mechanism would
enable members of Congress to anticipate potential hazards more often, and to
debate issues of science policy more fully before vast amounts of government
money are committed to mission-oriented programs.
But the results of the case studies examined here imply that an institution
designed to educate the Congress will probably not confront some of the basic
weaknesses in technology assessment today. The studies indicate that the fed-
eral government is often aware of many of the implications of its programs
in science and technology, but that it should no+ ;.Pe relied upon for thorough
evaluation and regulation of the technologies it sponsors. What is needed to
complement the Government's own assessments is a way to counteract the natu-
ral tendency of the government to resist rigorous and comprehensive technol-
ogy assessment. But how should this function be performed, and who should
perform it? Two suggestions may be helpful in answering these questions:
1, Private groups, operating outside the framework of government, might
be able to persuade it to place more emphasis on reduction and elimination
of potential hazards of technology. One such organization has in the past ten
years acquired the respect of many scientists and politicians throughout the
country. In x958, a number of scientists, university professors and other citi-
zens in the St. Louis area who were concerned about the effects of radioactive
fallout formed the Committee for Nuclear Information (now the Committee
for Environmental Information), which has gathered information on pollution
and radiation hazards, performed scientific studies of potential hazards and
circulated information to the Government, the public and the scientific com-
munity. Through a monthly magazine, Scientist and Citizen, and occasional
testimony before congressional committees, CEI has generated a great deal
sz6. Td.
Y:7. Daddario Statement, supra note x, at 3.
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of interest in problems of environmental pollution. It has demonstrated that
private independent organizations can perform useful assessment functions.
Other groups, particularly within universities, could perform similar func-
tions in the area of science and public policy. There are, however, major prob-
lems which private technology assessment institutions must overcome if they
are to have any impact on government programs. First, they must have com-
petent, reputable staffs that are respected by government and the rest of the
scientific community even when they take unpopular positions on issues. Sec-
ond, they must find adequate funding. Finally, they must face the fact that
frequently important information on the structure and operation of govern-
ment programs is inaccessible unless the staff has an open channel of com-
munication with officials in charge of the programs.
z. Within government, steps could also be taken to tackle the problem of
providing thorough assessment of government -sponsored programs that may
involve technologically created hazards. Congress could, for instance, estab-
lish a Technological Hazards Board, authorized by statute to appear before
Congress and the agencies solely as a lobbyist for reduction and control of
pntential risks to the public and the environment. A staff of energetic, knowi-
edgeable public servants could survey government programs, inform sponsor-
ing agencies, Congress and the public of potential hazards, and discuss with
Congv:;s and the agencies ways of eliminating them. Since it would lobby,
the THB's functions would be much broader than those of Congressman Dad-
dario's Technology Assessment Board. Moreover, because sponsoring agencies
can, as we have seen, be counted upon to publicize and emphasize the poten-
tial benefits of their programs, the Technological Hazards Board would con-
centrate on identification and control of potential risks. in short, the THB
would perform a technological audit of government programs, without hav-
ing legislative powers or ultimate authority for regulating the conduct of
these programs.
The contribution to technology assessment that a Technological Hazards
Board could make can be illustrated with respect to each of the technological
programs we have previously examined. Since the Board would not have vested
interests in weather modification, it would be able to press Congress and the
relevant executive departments for action on the recommendations made by
the Newell Report, the NAS Panel and the NSF Special Commission for a
regulatory structure, The Board could have asked the kinds of questions
about engine noise of the SST that the FAA did not ask. And because it has
not been promoting fluoridation for the past :.8 years, the Board would be in a
position to provide an objective assessment of continuing research on fluorida-
tion or to ask the Food and Drug Administration to undertake a thorough in-
vestigation.
Because ultimate authority for direction of government programs would
remain with the Congress and the agencies, 'he TfIB would not be in a position
to stifle necessary scientific and technological progress through its single-
minded concern for potential hazards. its efforts would, instead, operate as
checks against the tendencies of Sponsoring agencies not to engage in compre-
1.136
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hensive technology assessment. The existence of the Technological Hazards
Board would, in effect, institutionalize a system of checks and balances on is-
sues of science policy formulation, thereby assuring a more rational, more
thorough assessment of individual government programs.
Many questions about a Technological Hazards Board wculd have to be an-
swered before it could be accepted by Congress. How to assure its indepen-
dence, or to define the scope of its activities—these and other issues would re-
quire careful analysis. But the idea of creating an institution, Iike the
THB, that would persuasively and persistently inject the need for eliminating
hazards into every government decision regarding applications of science and
technology should be seriously discussed. Perhaps the basic Iesson to be
learned from the cases we have observed is that such an institution is urgently
required.
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V. CASE STUDIES
C. Consideration of Environmental
_T	
I
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I - Advancing Technology and Social Values
In the evolving context of governmental planning or
efforts to initiate governmental planning of transportation
f	 `'
systems, considerations of environmental noise have made very
	
{	 recent entry into the process. We have generally been concerned
	
,.	 with the primary, direct, and immediate objectives of providing
more or new transportation services than with adverse side-
effects such as congestion, air pollution, noise intrusion,
and aesthetic debasement.
Planning of a "complete" national transportation network
was carried out in our early history. This scheme, though never
	
`	 enacted, was put forward in 1824 by the Corps of Topographical
Engineers under the War Department. Professor A. Hunter Dupree
states in Science in the Federal Government -(1957):
Despite constitutional scruples, the Congress
increasingly appropriated money for roads and
harbor improvements. one offshoot of Monroe's
straddling position on the constitutionality
of internal improvements was the Survey Act of
1824, under which the Corps of Topographical
Engineers made a comprehensive plan for canals
between the Chesapeake and the Ohio, along the
Atlantic seaboard, and for a road from Wabhing-
ton to New Orleans. This plan, the only one the
government ever attempted to zta ke for the country
as a whole, required considerable technical com-
petence, and had it been executed would have
required even more. (p.36)
F
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In his first annual message to Congress of December 6,
1825, President John Quincy Adams referred to the "internal
improvement of the country" in the very first sentence and
then continued:
The great object of the institution of civil
government is the improvement of the condition
of those who are parties to the social compact,
and no government, in whatever form constituted,
can accomplish the lawful ends of its institution
but in proportion as it improves the condition of
those over whom it is established. Roads anti can-
als, by multiplying and facilitating the cormnini-
cations and intercourse between distant regions
and multitudes of men, are among the most import-
ant means of improvement.l
Professor Richard B. Morris in Great Presidential Decisions (1960)
states in reference to President Adams' proposal that:
(T)he measures of his administration were "just
and wise and every honest man should have sup-
ported them," but many did not because they simply
could not abide their author, and still others
because they were frightened by his centralizing
philosophy of government. (p.107)
Apart from President Adams' personality difficulties there
were substantial political, economic, demographic, and techno-
logical reasons why a national road system was not considered
an urgent matter. As Samuel Eliot Morison states:
Watchers from afar can discern the shadow of things
to come in 1826, midway in President Adams' term
of office. The Erie Canal., completed the previous
year, made New York the Empire State and New York
v- 3 -
City the world's most populous urban center.
Yet the doom of the canal as a principal means
of heavy transportation was sounded in 1826
by a little horse-drawn line, first railroad
in the United States, built near the home of
the Adamses in Quincy; and shortly the Balti-
more & Ohio steam railway would be chartered.2
And to move further along in the last century:
Canals still carried most of the freight in
1850, but the completion of the Hudson River
Railroad from New York to Albany, where it
connected with the New York Central for Buf-
falo, and of the Pennsylvania Railroad from
Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, caused such an
astounding transfer of freight from canals to
railroads, particularly in the winter season,
as to prove the superiority of rail for long-
distance hauls, and to suggest that the loco-
motive was the proper instrument for penetrat-
ing the continent.
Surely 1800 to 1900 was the century of coal and steam.
The railroad was the means of transportation in that it fitted
both the conditions and needs of this rapidly expanding nation
even though canals continued in operation and steamboats found
their use on the Mississippi and its tributaries. A new trans-
portation era began to emerge about 1900, however. Professor
Morison's lively tract on "The Auto and the Ad Man" provides
the flavor as well as some interesting facts on this transitional
period.4
4During the last century the F
i	 tended to encourage technological
portation, as by means of land gra
cases, the Federal government beca
port was lent to the "demonstraf
of the telegraph. Support was a
efforts_ For examule. between 1
:ral government not only
•elopment, including trans
to the railroads. In some
	 ^`a
directly involved. Sup-
r
• phase" of the development
lent to certain research
and 1848 "a total of 233
s-ceanwoaz expiosions nau occurrea it wnj_cn z,3oz persvns nau
been killed and 2,097 injured, with property losses in excess
of $3 million." While it was not until 1852 that stringent and
effective laws were enacted regulating boiler construction, oper-
ation and inspection, the Franklin institute had researched the
problem in 1836 and made recommendations at that time which
embodied most of the recommendations finally adopted in Federal
legislation of 1852.6 t
In general, we have followed the presumption of.most Western
notions, namely, that the impact of scientific inquiry and tech-
.
nological advance is socially beneficial. From Francis Bacon on
we seem to have accepted the "science is good in itself" notion.
Certainly the scientific approach, however superficial., pervaded
the outlook of the philosophers of the Enlightenment, that high
f	 ,^
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5point of belief in human rationality and the potential, of man
top erfect himself and society on earth. The Royal Society
(chartered 166.2) and similar organizations promoted the idea
that "investment in science was an investment in prosperity."7
Such organizations as the Lunar Society (1775-1791) were more
"practical minded" and socially sensitive to the impact of
science and technology than the more prestigious Royal Society. 8
Even the human wastage and misery inflicted by the early 19th
century Industrial Revolution did not greatly diminish our
infatuation with science and technology.
However, protests were made over the abuses of expanding
industrialism supported by technological development. Consider
the following quote from Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines and
Modern Times (1966) in reference to Thomas H.cxioy:
Ho came to Baltimore toward the end of the last
century to say that he remained unimpressed by
all the power, natural resources, knowledge and
machinery that had so greatly extended man's
competence over his physical. environment. "The
great issue," he went on, "about which hangs a
true sublimity and the terror of overhanging
fate is, what are you going to do with all these
things?" (p.208)
Yet the prevailing attitude continued to encourage technologi-
cal development. This was particularly true in America during
the 19th century where resources were abundant, the population
`A
6n	 ^
was dispersed, transportation needs were critical and individual
initiative was given the widest scope.
The industrialism supported by coal, steam and a burst of
inventiveness,.motivated by the excitement of "progress" and
personal gain, reflected a social attitude raised to a Constitu-
tional right through the.doctrine of ."freedom of contract." 9 Fur-
thermore, numerous dedicated efforts to protect a broader and
longer term concept of the "public interest" were blunted or
defeated by the reluctance of the Federal government to encroach
upon the traditional bounds of State "police power" over health,
safety and general well--being. 10
We have relied primarily on the "market" system for guiding
and shaping the nature of new technological applications. There
have been notable exceptions, however, as with the long agitation
for unproved public protection from adulterated foods and drugs
which eventually resulted in the first Pure Food and Drug Act of
1906_ But governmental regulation has, in general, been gradual and
piecemeal and - as in the case of transportation - has usually
evolved as a reaction to public demand for correction of specific and
severe adverse effects of particular applications. The establish-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 is an example.
'r
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As is well known, many of o.z more prominent technology-
based regulatory agencies and statutory measures to control
E3	 technological applications were not established until well into
the 20th century. For the most part, these agencies represent
reactive measures rather than prospective efforts to assure
development of a new technology in the public interest. Even
LzTsadcasting was not brought under regulatory control until 1927
after frequency interference became intolerable. The development
of nuclear energy represents perhaps the most outstanding example
of new technology whose development began under government super-
vision and for which a reasonable well-ordered assessment struc-
ture has been maintained. 11
increasingly, since World War II, technological developments
have been initiated and supported by the government or through
combined government and industry efforts or government-university
arrangements.
The strong emphasis on promotion of the direct and immediate
benefits of advancing technology through the 19th and the first
half of the 20th century does not mean, of course, that all seg-
ments of the affected public were in sympathy with this
r	 °
9
underlying social philosophy and most certainly not with some
`7 i
of its effects. In the mid-1800's many English
i
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citizens protested vigorously over the noisy, smoky locomotives.
Some landowners arranged for the intermittent firing of guns
across their grounds to keep out railroad surveyors. "Parlia-
ment, exercising the right of eminent domain, eventually overcame
these difficulties for the railroad companies, but only at a price;
{
as a concession to objectors, a change was included in railway
charters requiring that locomotives must not emit smoke." 12 Public
reaction to large steam carriages "brought forth in 1865 the famous
Red Flag Act which requi-:ed a flagman on foot to precede each
13
steam vehicle." On the other hand, new technologies were sometimes
applauded as the means by which more agreeable qualities might be
introduced into the social environment. A quotation from Scientific
American for July 1899 states:
The improvement in city conditions by the general
adoption of the motor car can hardly be overesti-
mated. Streets clean, dustless, and odorless, with
light rubber-tired vehicles moving swiftly ar,..-1.
noiselessly over their smooth expanse, would elim-
inate a greater part of the nervousness, l^ istraction,
and strain of modern metropolitan life.
k	
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l= -	 The Constitutional Framework for the Allocation of
Governmental Power with Respect to
Transportation Systems Planning
Only in recent years has environmental noise gained
1 .	 sufficient attention as a social problew, to generate assess-
4	 1 eel
ments of the situation, proposals for comprehensive public
programs of noise abatements and enactment of a few innovative
regulatory schemes.	 Various factors have forced the problem
to the focus of public attention, as for example, the intro-
duction of commercial jet-powered aircraft over the past 15
years and increasing vehicular traffic resulting from urbaniza-
a
tion and further stimulated by the Interstate Highway System.
The decibel level in various noise environments is definitely
I
increasing.	 But there is more involved than this simplei
explanation of the growing concern with noise.	 This can be
described as a rather drastic shift in social value priorities.
This general concern, of which noise intrusion is but one elene nt,
is reflected in various statutory schemes enacted over the past
several years of which the most prominent is the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1959 which requires pursuant to
i
9102(7)(C), the submission of environmental impact statements
on "major Federal actions" and which established the Council on
Environmental Quality.
r
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The NEPA of 1969 and various other legislative schemes
promoting environmental quality are indicative of the need for
anticipatory project assessments, and hence, for more thoughtful
planning of public and public/private programs in such fields as
energy generation, law enforcement, health care services, and
transportation. It is with respect to the initiation of various
new transportation systems that public concern with the full
scope of environmental values and amenities has, perhaps, been
most manifest. Public protests have stalled the implementation
of new airports or the modification of existing airport facili-
ties. Numerous lawsuits have been instigated over the past few
years which have had the effect of blocking new highway construc-
tion.
There is little question but that governmental entities at
all levels have been somewhat tardy, if not delinquent, in giving
adequate emphasis to the transportation systems planning process.
The "planning function" for present purposes will be discussed
in terms of the provision for and implementation of anticipatory
assessments designed to take into account the effects of proposed
transportation innovations on all participants and social value-
institutional proc:sses affected by given proposals. Particular
attention will Lu t ,cused on the extent to which environmental
noise is given consideration as an adverse consequence in such
assessments.
4
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The abatement of environmental noise presents a severe
challenge to legal-political improvisation as well as to
technological ingenuity. The problem context of environmental
noise is a complex one in that noise is not associated with
one - or a few - social functions but is emitted from a vast
variety of completely unrelated sources. Many of the most
obnoxious noises come from moving sources or from multiple and
diverse activities acting in concert. Hence, various techniques
(abatement at the source, reduction of effects, or compensation
for noise harm) have been devised in an attempt to cope with
the multiplicity of sources and affected persons or activities.
The noise abatement task is further complicated by the necessity
to determine at what level of government these various techniques
can best be prescribed and implemented.
it is sometimes said that noise is a "local problem,"
but this characterization, can be a bit misleading. No doubt,
noise is a "local problem" with respect . to the Effects of noise.
It is not necessarily a local problem with respect to the Control
over the abatement of noise at the source or over the reduction
of the magnitude of noise effects, The "noise context" selected
for control purposes will ordinarily be defined in terms of the
- 12 -
noise effects emitted from particular discrete noise sources
or identifiable noise environments.
What then is the basic legal-impolitical framework within
which the environmental, noise problem must be analyzed? Environ-
mental: noise is primarily the result of a highly industrialized
r
society. In a most thoughtful book of a few years back entitled
Industrialism and Industrial Man (1960), the authors state:
Pluralistic industrialism will never reach
a final equi: ibrium. The 'contest between
the farces of uniformity and for diversity
will give it life and movement and change.
The themes of uniformity and diversity, and
manager and managed which mark the world
today will characterize it.in the future as
well. There will be constant adjustments
between these eternally conflicting themes,
but no permanent settlement. They will con-
stitute the everlasting threads of history:
the uniformity that draws on technology and
the diversity that draws on individuality;
the authority that stems from the managers
and the rebellions, however muted, that
stem from the managed. (p. 296)
our Constititutional development seems consistent with this form-
ulation. For example, Ar't.I,§8(3) provides that the Congress shall
have power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
f?
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The 1824 Supreme Court case of
Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheaton X; 6 L.Ed. 23) gave impetus to the
promotion of.the "Commerce Clause" and interstate commerce
by holding a New York law prpviding for a State "steamboat. . .  ... ...
monopoly" invalid. The subsequent 1851 case of Cooley v. The
7.	
'1]Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia (53 U.S., 2 How.
7 1
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the themes of uniformity and diversity ioted above. in that
case the Supreme Court undertook to determine whether the power
of the Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce
was exclusive of whether it Haight be in part shared by the
states. The Court adopted a rule which placed a segment of
control in the states, the test being whether a particular sub-
ject or activity of commerce requires uniform national control
or whether it is sufficiently local (and unique) in character
to permit State regulation. For example, a strong national
interest has been asserted ip railway regulation. In Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona (325 ;J.S. 761 [19451 	 the Supreme Court,
relying on the Cool2y Doctrine held that the Arizona Train
Limit Law (limiting train length) contravened the Commerce
Clause, the majority opinion stating that "Here examination of
all the relevant factors makes it plain that the state interest
- 14 -
^	 r
r
sl
alfr	^
i
t
j
is outweighed by the interest of the nation in an adequate,
economical, efficient railway transportation service, which
must prevail." But a strong State/local interest has been
recognized in the regulation of the use of interstate as well
as Staf- q highways. In South _Carolina S Late Highway Department
V. Barnwell Bros. (303 U.S. 177 L19381 ), a State statute limit-
ing the width and weight of motor trucks which was more restrict-
ive than those of most other states was^held not to be an undue 	
i
burden on interstate commerce even, though "interstate carriage
by motor trucks has become a national industvy," the Court 	 i
i
stating. "Few subjects of state regulation are so peculiarly
1
of local concern as is the use of state highways,"	 But compare
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (359 U.S. 520 X1959] ), wherein
the Supreme Court found an Illinois contour mudguard requirement
for motor freight carriers to be in conflict with the Commerce
Clause even though such "local safety measures" are normally
i
not found to place an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce.
The "states and their instrumentalities may act, in many
areas of interstate commerce,...concurrently with the Federal
T
government" and "Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate a
t'
legitimate local public interest is valid unless preempted by
r
	 Federal action,...or unduly burdensome on—interstate commerce....  
15
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In general, preemption by Federal legislation is not to be
inferred "unless the act of Congress, fairly interpreted, is
in actual conflict with the law of the state.IjI6 Ir r o^.
i
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III - Consideration bX Governmental Entities of
'	 the Noise Factor in the Assessment of
Highway Projects and
Vehicular Operations
Consideration of the noise factor by governmental entities
in the planning of highway transportation systems is notorious
for its absence. Planning in terms of anticipatory total social
impact assessments has not arrived even yet, although there are
now strong tendencies in this direction.
Such planning is to be clearly distinguished from the reactive
type of ad hoc regulations which have been in existence for some time
relating to various types of traffic noise control. 
17 
Manymunici-
palities have for years required mufflers on motor vehicles and
some have restricted horn noise. Most states have long provided
statutory requirements for mufflers and several have restrictions
on horn noise. Traditionally, local ordinances have provided for
subjective standards such as.restricting the making of "loud,"
"unusual," or "unnecessary" noise rather than by establishing quanti-
tative (decibel limit) standards. To some extent, zoning ordinances
providing for "quiet zones" have reflected slightly more concern for
the long--term welfare of the community.
This situation is beginning to change. Relatively new
environmental noise codes in Chicago and Minneapolis clearly repre-
sent a dramatic step forward in comprehensive planning for environ-
mental noise control in metropolitan areas. Ironically, the proposed
d
p ^ti
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and seemingly well planned New York City Noise Control Code which
sets specific decibel limits for most sound-producing devices
(though it retains the City's common law nuisance ordinances for
judicial precedent authority) does not undertake to regulate
motor vehicle noise, it being assumed that the State has preempted
such regulations by forbidding the passage of local ordinances incon-
sistent with existing State limits.lS
 As previously suggested, and
hereinafter discussed, the "preemption question" is one which poses
serious difficulties for governmental legislative/administrative
planning in connection with the abatement of noise attendant to the
operation of transportation systems.
At the State level, California has developed a statutory
scheme to assure the reduction of highway traffic noise over a per-
iod of time. The California Vehicle Code by §23130 prescribes
"operational" Vehicle Noise Limits for speed limit of 35 mph or
less and for speed limit of more than 35 mph. Section 23130(C)
provides that "This section applies to the total noise from a vehicle
or combination of vehicles and shall not be construed as limiting
or precluding the enforcement of any other provisions of this code
relating to motor vehicle exhaust noise." (emphasis supplied)
Section 27160 of the Vehicle Code provides that "(a) No person shall
sell or offer for sale a new motor vehicle which produces a maximum
noise exceeding the following noise limit..." (with dates and
decibel limits prescribed). Colorado and Minnesota have recently
F..
enacted legislation which is patterned closely after the California
scheme.19
I
The history of the Federal-aid to Highway programs perhaps
offers the most useful insights into the environmental noise prob-
lean with respect to highway motor - vehicle transportation. This
"	 program has been primarily concerned with the basic objective of
moving masses of people and goods rather than with secondary or
derivative environmental amenities.
The Federal-aid Highway legislation of 1916 laid the foundation
for a cooperative Federal-State relationship and resulted in the
strengthening of State highway departments. The Federal Highway Act
of 1921 "led to the rapid development of an integrated network of
improved highways throughout the entire country." Also, "In 1921
the War Department made a comprehensive study of the highway routes
important to the national defense," a study which was brought up to
date in 1935 through the cooperative efforts of the War Department,
the Bureau of Public Roads, and the American Association of State
Highway Officials. In 1941 the President appointed a National Inter-
regional Highway Committee to investigate the need for a limited sys-
tem of national highways and to advise the Federal Works Administrator
n
4^.	 j
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as to the prospects for utilizing some of the manpower and
industrial capacity expected to be available at the end of World
War II. The Federal-aid Highway Act of 1944 directed the designa-
tion of a National System of Interstate Highways limited in extent
to 40,000 miles "so Located as to connect by routes as direct as
practicable the principal metroplitan areas ` cities and industrial
centers, to serve the national defense and to connect at suitable
border points with routes of continental importance in the Domin-
ion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico,"
The long distances of the transcontinental
routes are a by--product of the selection of
the most important local and regional highways
which articulate into continuous routes. This
concept of the system is based upon continuing
traffic surveys and flow analyses which show a
heavy predominance of motor vehicles making rel-
atively short trips and a small proportion. 8f
actually transcontinental highway traffic.
One of the more .interesting episodes in the National highway
system development concerns the persistent efforts of the late
Congressman J. Buell Snyder of Pennsylvania_ Commencing with a bill
in 1936 directing the Bureau of Public Roads to survey and locate a
system of transcontinental and north-south highways, Representative
Snyder moved in 1937 to a proposal for a system of "superhighways"
200 feet wide with six traffic lanes, brightly lighted, with no
obstructions, so that they could be used as emergency landing strips
I	 I
---- -------- ---
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for airplanes and further suggested that airports be built at or
near the intersections of such highways. 21
Perhaps most relevant to our present purpose of evaluating
the Federal level highway planning process in terms of a total
social impact assessment is a review of the Report of the Presiden-	 f
tial Advisory Committee on "A Ten Year National Highway Program,"
attached to the Message of the President, National Highway Pro ram,
of February 22, 1955, which was referred to the Committee on Public
Works, 84th Congress, 1st Sess., House Document 93. in 1956 the
Congress enacted major Federal highway aid legislation which was
responsive to the request of President Eisenhower for:
(A) grand plan for a properly articulated (highway)
system that solves the problems of speedy, safe,
transcontinental travel---inter--city transportation--
access highways--and farm--to-market movement--metro-
politan area congestion--bottlenecks---and parking.
While the President's Message directed attention to the "Nation's
highway system, other modes of transportation being excluded," 22 the
social sub-system posited for this anticipatory assessment by both
the Advisory Committee study and the House Committee on Public Works
clearly disclosed an intention to include significant social inter-
actions and implications of the proposed "National highway system."
Further,
The Congressional Committee Report shows that an
extremely wide range of engineering, financial,
- 21 -
and social factors was considered. From our
present perspective, however, we would note that
some factors were given no attention whatever.
The Advisory committee and the Congress seemed to
be much more concerned with the efficient imple-
mentation of the highway program rather than with
cumulative and qualitative social impacts, partic-
ularly those which might be detrimental. No con-
sideration was given to increasing environmental
pollution which would result from the growing traf-
fic volume: air pollution from exhausts, engine
noise, resulting aesthetic debasement, or the deriv-
ative health hazards from the foregoing sources.
Nor was a great deal of attention given to the
relationship between the increased number and size
of motor freight carriers and the possible increased
hazards to private auto drivers and passengers. 23
r
Taking the Executive-Legislative anticipatory assessment of
the Interstate Highway System as the planning reference base for
this discussion, let's move ahead 12 years to 1968 when Senate
bill S. 2658 was introduced during the 90th Congress which proposed
increased maximum size and weight limits for motor freight carriers.
It might have been expected that a relatively comprehensive assess-
ment would have been made of the anticipated effects of this legis-
lation. Senate Report No. 1026, Committee on Public Works, U.S.
Senate of March 27, 1968, Vehicul.arWeights and Dimensions, to
accompany S. 2658, stated that:
Among the major issues presented to the committee
were those dealing with highway safety, economic
impact, effects of increases on road systems and
structures and the contributions of the various
user beneficiaries.
A
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Actually the Report gave very little attention to these factors
other than to the impact of increased weights and widths on the
existing road systems and structures. Some attention was given
to highway safety and to increased maintenance and construction
costs, but the Senate Report, by no stretch of the imagination, 	 a'
could be considered an adequate anticipatory total social impact
assessment.
This conclusion was to some extent recognized apparently and
even rationally justified as being consistent with the policy
enunciated in a letter from the Secretary of Commerce of August 18,
1964, to the Speaker of the House which made the point that such a
proposal as that represented in S. 2658 should be considered as only
a phase of a continuing process of " progressive implementation" of the
Nation's highway system. Therefore, it would seem not only fair but
prudent to appraise the S. 2658 assessment in the time-dimensional
context of the evolving interstate highway system. If one views the
1968 assessment in the context of the sequence of assessments made
by the Congress between 1956 and 1966, a somewhat different perspective
can be adopted. Numerous assessments leading to legislation or new
regulations relating to air pollution, highway safety, highway
beautification, citizen participation in freeway location, and reorgan-
ization of the entire Federal transportation regulatory structure were
- 23 --
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conducted during the 1956-1958 interim period. Also, pursuant
to the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1956, the Sec..:atary of Commerce
had undertaken to determine future maximum desirable dimensions
and weights for vehicles operating on the Federal-aid highway sys-
tems and a report was made to the Congress on August 18, 1964,26
The pertinent question remains, however, namely, whether
consideration by the Congress of the various highway-related legis-
lation during the 1956-1968 time period was "programmed" in such
manner as to sehieve a close approximation to a total social impact
assessment through time. S. 2658 breezed through the Senate but
met strong opposition in the House and was defeated, in large meas-
ure, it uo uld appear, because many affected participants brought
to the attention of the House members that many of significant "social
costs" had not been given appropriate consideration by the Senate. 27
The author has concluded in a previous paper that:
It i., clear that the interim 1956-1968 legislation
hLd the effect of filling in some of the gaps or
completing lightly treated segments of the 1956
assessment. It is an interesting question, however,
as to the extent to which this was accomplished by
deliberate design, by simple response to insistent
public or special interest demands, through serendip-
ity from other programs such as air pollution control,
or from sheer accident. Only to the extent such leg-
islative prcoosals were advanced as deliberately
designed components of an overall integrated program
of Highway/Motor Freight Carrier technology would it
satisfy the Total Impact Assessment Model. While the
r	 _
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aggregative assessments through time did tend
to expand the scope of '::he social sub-system
treated, they do not appear to have been, in
any real sense, programmed to secure a Total
Impact Assessment within a socially permissible
time span. The DOT/Bureau of Public Roads policy
of "progressive implementation" does not seem to
be at all the equivalent of the Total Impact
Assessment approach.2 8
It may be contended, of course, that in view of the Congressional
cormmittee structure and the customary legislative approach of submit-
ting specific bills to take care of particular problems, it is
unrealistic to expect the Congress to conduct total social impact
assessments of transportation systems or other public programs either
at a specific time or on an aggregative basis through time. The fact
remains, however, that the Congress has tended to approach transport-
ation system development for the most part on an ad hoc, piecemeal,
and non-integrative basis.
Daniel P. Moynihan has asserted that we are moving from a focus
on independent programs which "relate to a single part of the system"
to policy which "seeks to repond to the system in its entirety."29He
expects this movement to be a definitive trend in the 1970 1 s. In
short, we are giving increasing attention to total social problem
contexts or social systems as contrasted with programs directed toward
particular parts of such systems which are not coordinated by an over-
all. policy. "(A) policy approach to government . . . (seeks) to
encompass the largest possible range of phenomena and concerns." 30
J
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Moynihan cites the 1956 Interstate and Defense Highway System as
the "largest public works program in history" and states that the
eventual judgment will be that it has "had more influence on the
shape and development of American cities, the distribution of pop-
ulation within metropolitan areas, and across the nation as a whole,
the location of industry and various kinds of employment opportuni-
ties (and in all of these, immense influence on race relations and
the welfare of black Americans) than any initiative of the middle
third of the 20th century." 31But he also concludes that "the politics
of getting the Interstate Highway Program enacted, decreed, or at
least indicated, the narrowest possible definition of its purposes
and impact."32
Moynihan comments with reference to the planning and implementation
of the Interstate Highway System by the Bureau of Public Roads:
As bureaucrats, their instinct was faultless. Had
anyone realized what they were in fact doing, the
sheer magnitude of the interests they were affect-
ing, it is nigh impossible to imagine that they
would have won acceptance. Indeed, a bare fifteen
years after the Interstate program commenced, it is
near impossible to get a major highway program approved
in most large American cities. But it is too late:
most systems have been built. In the process--such
at least would be my views---quite appalling mistakes
were made, but they were mistakes having to do with
issues nominally altogether unrelated to the high-
way program Welf, and so no one was responsible for
them. . . .
-	 -	 -1^'
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Surely it is possible to hope for something more.
Government must seek out its hidden policies,
raising them to a level of consciousness and accept-
ance---or rejection--and acknowledgement of the extra-
ordinary range of contradictions that are typically
encountered . . . . Surely also it is possible to
hope for a career civil service that is not only
encouraged, but required to see their activities
in the largest possible scope.34
`	 S1
r'! '•,^ 	 Whatever the anticipatory assessment deficiencies of the
Congress, it has, in recent years, enacted a number of regulatory
schemes which obligate the Department of Transportation to take
into account a broader range of social impacts than has been custom-
ary in the past. For example, 99138 of the Federal-aid to Highways
Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C.A. §1653(f)(Supp. 1971) provides in part that
"It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort
should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and
public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges,
and historic sites" and implements this policy with specified require-
ments placed on the Secretary of Transportation. And the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 - 95102(2)(C) requires environmental
impact statements be submitted on all "major Federal actions." Num-
erous court cases are now being initiated which attempt to secure
strict compliance by the Secretary with the prO'7isions of these acts. 35
There will undoubtedly be increasing reaction, however, to the viaorou s
camp.ign of the "environmentalists." Even now there is some evidence
that many citizens are becoming resentful over the delays in public
r
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project completion resulting from court actions and with the
inevitable additional costs incurred by such delays.
Furthermore, certain legislation of recent years makes specific
reference to the abatement of highway noise. Starting in 1956, the
Secretary of Commerce (duties transferred to the Secretary of Trans-
portation since 1966) was required to "cooperate with the States . . .
r
in the development of long-range highway plans 	 which are formu-
lated with due consideration to their probable effect on the future
development of urban areas of more than .fifty thousand population."
The first active consideration of highway noise at the Federal level
was Policy and Procedures Memorandum 20-8 of the Bureau of Public
Roads, issued January 14, 1969. Environmental effects, which must
be considered by the State or local sponsor seeking Federal aid, are
defined to include "noise, air, and water pollution." Pursuant to
a 1970 amendment to the Federal-aid Highway Act (PL. 91-605) the
Secretary of Transportation is directed "to assure that possible
adverse economic, social, and environmental effects have been con-
sidered in developing . . . (any Federally aided highway) project	 ."
Further, he is to "develop and promulgate standards for highway noise
levels compatible with different land uses after July 1, 1972.1136
r	 ^
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IV - Governmental Assessment of the Aircraft Noise Problem
Despite certain disclaimers by the Congress that Federal
governmental action has not completely preempted State and local
regulation of aircraft noise, it is generally acknowledged that
the unique characteristics of air traffic require Federal action
for effective control. Hence, this discussion will focus on Fed-
eral control of aircraft noise with comments, as appropriate, on
State and local noise abatement regulatory efforts. While there
have been several successful private suits brought on the theory
of a "partial taking" (or inverse condemnation), commencing with
37
United States v. Causby in 1946, it is evident as noted by the
court in the 1969 New Jersey case of Township of Hanover v. The
Town of Morristown (wherein plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Town
of Morristown from enlarging its airport for reason of anticipated
increased noise from an expanded airport operation) that "private
compensatory damage suits do not accomplish the end objective of
noise suppression." 38
The Department. of Commerce Report on The Noise Around Us (1970)
asserts that pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1'?58 rern^iring
each particular model or make of aircraft to obtain an "airworthiness
certificate" and an "air operating certificate" that:
3
7
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It is clear that the FAA has,	 full power to
prescribe air traffic rules for the "protection of
persons and property on the ground," ncluding pre-
scription of air traffic rules in t..e interest of
noise abatement.(p• 146)
f
While there may have been some doubts about this authority as of
r 4".
1958, Michael Wollan, in his article on "Controlling the Potential
Hazards of Government-Sponsored Technology" indicates that even r
though noiseep r se was not mentioned in the Federal. Aviation Act
i.:
of 1958, it was generally assumed as of 1961 it not earlier, that
the FAA had the authority to prescribe aircraft noise standards.
Wollan comments:
A year later (1961) when Congress made its first
appropriation for research on SST feasibility, the
FAA, discussed more specifically the standards it
would use to regulate the SST's engine noise. FAA's
new administrator, Najeeb Halaby, told Congress:
"We would try to see to it that the noise levels were
tolerable to the community or as tolerable as the
then existing aircraft."39
It was with the passage of the Department of Transportation Act of
1966 that statutory authority was first specifically granted relevant
to aircraft noise, but no explicit provision was made for regulation.
Section 4(a) of the Act directs the Secretaxk of DOT to "promote and 	
3
r	 ,^
undertake research and development relating to transportation, includ-
ing noise abatement, with particular attention to aircraft noise."
	 i
All major participants in the national air traffic system have
recognized the existing and evolving dimensions of the -.ircraft noise
.	
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problem since shortly after World War 11, although the more serious
implications might not have become clear until the introduction of
jet-powered fleets in the late 1950's. Report No. 1463 of May 23,
1968, of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
states:
The right to use the airspace over the United
States in the operation of aircraft has long been
established. Aviation has become an essential
and widely approved part of our national trans-
portation system. However, aircraft noise and
sonic boom are unwanted and unpleasant. At this
stage of engine and aircraft development there
are no easy nor ready solutions to the continu-
ing and increasing problems.
A subcommittee of this committee first held
hearings on aircraft noise in September 1959 at
the New York International Airport. The House
of Representatives adopted House Resolution 420
in August of 1961 which specifically authorized
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
to investigate the problem, and in February of
1963 the committee published t3he "Investigation
and Study of Aircraft Noise Problems" (88th Cong.,
1st Sess., H. Rept. No. 36).
Over the last ten years we have had numerous
panels of experts, with representatives from vir-
tually all segments of the aviation industry, as
well as from local governments and the Federal
Govermi)ant. Airport operators, manufacturers, air
carriers and their associations, local port author-
ities, municipal groups, NASA, the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and the Department of Transportation
have all made contributions looking toward solutions,
particularly of the noise problem, but also many of
them have been giving increasing attention to•the
sonic boom problem.
F tE !k
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The noise problem is basically a conflict
between two groups or interests. On the one
hand, there is a group who provides various
air transportation services. On the other
hand there is a group who live, work, and go
to schools and churches in communities near air--
'	 ports. The latter group is frequently burdened
to the point where they can neither enjoy nor
reasonably use their land because of noise result-
ing from aircraft operations. Many of them
derive no direct benefit from the aircraft oper-
ations which create the unwanted noise. There-
;	 fore, it is easy to understand why they complain,
and complain most vehemently. The possible solu-
tions to this demanding and vexing problem which
appear to offer the most promise are (1) new or
modified engine and airframe designs, (2) special
I	 flight operating techniques and procedures, and
(3) planning for land use in areas adjacent, to
airports so that such land use will be most compat-
ible with aircraft operations. (pp. 3-4)
Congressional hearings in 1962 "confirmed a 1960 House
Committee recommendation that 'noise criteria be mandatory require-
ments in drafting specifications for future . . . aircraft," since
the lack of "maximum noise" criteria established by the Federal
government appeared to have been a "deterrent to manufacturers to
achieve greater noise suppression." It is obvious that competitive
considerations restrained the aircraft engine manufacturers from
allocating substantial research resources to aircraft noise abate-
,	 ment. Rather the objective was to "build engines and aircraft (with)
40
maximum performance characteristics without regard to noise." How-
ever, there were R&D efforts at the Federal level during the 1960's
Mj
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to cope with the aircraft noise abatement problem, as for example,
the NASA "Quiet Engine" project. 41 Nevertheless, despite the pre-
emption by the Federal government over aircraft flight operations
 
4f
pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and what might plaus-
ibly appear to be a corresponding responsibility for the full con-
sequences of such operations, including noise suppression, the
3
Federal government, overall, moved slowly. This would seem to have
been an inevitable consequence of the 1962 Supreme Court case of
Griggs v. Allegheny Count 4 2 which held the airport operator liable
for damages, including noise caused to a homeowner by aircraft oper-
ations and, therefore, completely absolved the airline operators and
the Federal government from any responsibility whatsoever.
The authority of the Griggs decision had the effect of
obstructing the coordinated efforts required of all involved partic-
ipants called for by the OST Jet Aircraft Noise Panel in 1966 to
abate aircraft noise. 
43
Further, Congress gave some '-bought to the
possibility of the Federal government's indemnifying all airport
operators throughout the U.S. against judgments obtained against
them for noise damage alleged under the Griggs doctrine but found
this to be "impracticable...44 Hence, it was not until the passage of
45
ss611 in 1968 relating to the abatement of aircraft noise and sonic
boom and the subsequent promulgation by the FAA of noise standard
'
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regulations on December 1, 1969, pursuant thereto, that the
aircraft engine manufacturers and the airlines had a compelling
!
incentive to introduce noise reduction criteria into their plan-
.
ning and operations.
	 4s
FAA Type Certification of commercial aircraft delivered after
`r
December 1, 1969, under Part 36 of the FAA Aircraft Regulations, is
perhaps the most significant Federal action to date for control of
aircraft noise.	 The DC-10 and Cessna Citation 500 have been certif-
icated, and the L-1011 and all subsequent subsonic aircraft will have
to comply with Part 36; the Boeing 747 was allowed until December 1,
-' 1971, for compliance.	 These planes are significantly quieter than
older planes, but effectiveness of Type Certification at a given
point in time will depend on the make--up of the fleet at that time.
Projections by the Air Transport Association estimate that by 1975
i
only 18.6% of the fleet will have been certificated under Part 36.
Thus, to the extent that it depends upon type certification as presently
structured, the noise problem will have been only slightly relieved	 j
46b	 1975 and could remain significant.Y	 9nif"can.`. until 1994.
Regulations with respect to retrofit, sonic boom, SST type
certification, and STOL/VOTL type certification are still in the
47developmental stages. 	 Of all potential regulations, retrofitting
would most likely bring about the most effective noise reduction
e ^{
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in the short-term, while type certification regulations will prob-
ably be most effective in the long run. of course, effectiveness
>f
will depend upon the maximum permissible noise levels set. The abate-
^r
ff	 ment effects of modest noise reduction requirements with respect to
j
r
type certification could be more than offset by --*i -'.ncrease in air
traffic in certain situations.
As a result of the pervasive Federal regulation of air
transportation pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, State
and local jurisdictions have been effectively precluded from control
over aircraft noise. Local ordinances undertaking to control, noise,
as, for example, by prohibiting flights over the city at less than
1,000 feet, have been struck down for being in conflict with FAA reg-
ulations or for imposing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce,
48
or both. on the other hand, it is quite clear that the Federal govern-
anent has not accepted a level of responsibility for aircraft noise
abatement (in terms of timely R&D and regulatory measures to reduce
noise at the source) which corresponds to the magnitude of control it
exercises over air transportation. Yet, the Griggs doctrine places
liability for aircraft noise on the airport owner-operator which is,
in most situations, a State or local governmental entity. Further-
more, the threat of massive damage awards is definitely increasing
49
since the aircraft noise situation is worsening in many areas. While
it may be generally agreed that air transportation must be regulated
E^
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at the national level, the lack of a corresponding national effort
to abate one of its most distressing side-effects encourages resort
to the courts as the only means of prodding, indirectly, a sluggish
J y.
Federal system into actio n. 50
Since the states and municipalities as airport owners-	 rc
operators must bear the direct and immediate burden of complaints
from the noise-abused public, they have seized upon whatever inter-
stitial measu.rr:;i are available (governmental, technical, economic,
etc.) to lessen the impact of community complaints and noise damage
judgments. Notable in this connection is the doctrine of proprietary
control over airport operations which has its source in the concept
of private ownership and operational status as distinguished from oper-
ation of the airport by a State or local governmental entity in its
governmental, capacity. 51While the Port of New York Authority has been
able to maintain noise standards set by itself (less stringent, how-
a
ever, than FAA standards for new aircraft) and the new California
S
regulations on noise standards for airports are essentially grounded
on the "power of airport proprietors," this regulatory technique has
severe limitations. This is particularly true for short-term relief
since most major airports are now situated in densely populated areas
and proprietor control over noise reductio:i at the source is essentially
non-existent. The FAA has clearly preempted aircraft operations as to
36	 .. 91
safety. As to noise, the airport operator is left with whatever
marginal control he can exercise through such a measure as "planning
runway utilization schedules to take into account adjacent residential
f	 areas, noise characeristics of aircraft and noise sensitive time per-
iods" which is provided, among other methods, in the California noise	 E d^
regulations for airports, 62While the proprietary doctrine may provide
the airport operator some small but useful bargaining leverage vis-a-vis
the Federal government in the present evolutionary phase of aircraft
noise regulation, it is based on a questionable legal assumption, the
future efficacy of which is in doubt; namely, that an instrumentality
of the state, acting in a private, non-governmental capacity, has a
degree of control over the activities prescribed in its State-originated
charter which the state itself is precluded from exercising.
Federal legislation since the enactment of 99611 in 1968 provides
some support for aircraft noise abatement. Noise is an environmental
impact and should be considered in 9102(2)(C) environmental impact
statements for airport development and modification. There are no
Federal noise standards for airports. The Airport and Airways Develop-
ment Act of 1970 declares it to be "national policy that airport develop-
ment projects authorized pursuant to this part shall provide for the
protection and enhancement of the natural resources and the quality of
the envirorui:ent of the nation." This Act also provides for public
hearings on airport projects, if requested.
An evaluation of the Federal role in aircraft noise abatement
planning must be approached with some caution and nany qualifications.
r
li
aircraft operations, might reasonably
to responsibility for aircraft noise
m might be handled in several ways,
(reducing engine noise); reduction
rs, insulation, or compatible land
compensation for those harmed by air-
nt has restricted its efforts primarily
it
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Approximate total social impact assessments have been initiated at the
Federal level as studies; for example, Report of the Jet Aircraft Noise
Panel of the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the
President, on Alleviation of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports of March,
1966, and the Joint DOT/NASA Civil Aviation Research and Development Pol-
icy Study of March, 1971. However, these studies were not intended for
E
and have not led to the development of a national plan for aircraft noise
r
abatement. Perhaps more illustrative of the comprehensive planning
approach are the Metropolitan Aircraft Noise Abatement Policy
.(MANAPS) of HUD/DOT initiated in 1969 which are now being developed into
a Planning Guidelines Manual for use by metropolitan communities in the
modification of existing airports or the location of new airports. The
central thrust of this effort is to provide alternative strategies for
achieving land use development compatible with airpox s.
There are, of course, plausible reasons which can be advanced to
rebut the implied suggestion above that the Federal government, in view
of its preemption of control over
i '	 be expected to assume a commensura
abatement. For example, the proble
4
including: abatement at the source
of the effects of noise as by buffe
use management; and provision for
craft noise. The Federal governme
to noise reduction at the source as
It has rejected the assumption of
l
t
pr	 .
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privileged to do pursuant to the Griggs case. It has not intervened
in the land use management function, this being a traditional prerog-
ative of State and local jurisdictions under the "police power."
The upshot of the situation described is that municipalities,
ti
whose citizens are directly and adversely affected by the noise, must
	 E '`
suffer the social costs without benefit of regulatory authority.
'r
This being the existing condition, states and cities have grasped what-
ever legal and non-legal devices are available to protect themselves
from liability as well as to reduce the complaints of noise-abused cit-
izens. This is why the proprietary doctrine has been asserted and to
some extent applied by the Port of New York Authority. And the Pre-
amble of the Noise Regulations for California Airports states, somewhat
unconvincingly it might be added, that:
These standards are based upon two separate legal
grounds: (1) the power of airport proprietors to
impose noise ceilings and other limitations on the
use of the airport, and (2) the power of the state
to act to an extent not prohibited by federal law. 	 Y
The fact of the matter is that this control is marginal at best.
Further, noise abatement programs involving comprehensive land use 	 j
schemes are either so costly or so long-term or so politically-charged
that such alternatives offer little short-term surcease. States or
localities would seem to have some appreciable degree of control over
aircraft noise effects only with respect to new airport developments.
i	 -
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The two preceding sections have touched briefly on the extent
to which the noise factor has been considered in the planning of
transportation systems as reflected by actions of various legislative
and regulatory entities at the Federal, regional, state and local
levels. Such actions represent the prescribing phase of theup blic
decision Process rather than the preceding assessment/planning phase.
Surely, if the program planning phase, supported by an anticipatory
project assessment component, has any vital relevance to the effec-
tive public decision process, it should influence the prescribing
phase either at the legislative or regulatory level or both. Hence,
Ione of the critical questions relates to the extent to which the
available hard, demoistrable data (concerning such factors as techno-
logical feasibility, economic costs, degree of safety provided, social
behavioral patterns, etc.) associated with and offered in support of
recommended noise emission standards actually support such standards
to the satisfaction of the responsible legislative or regulatory body.
Noise standards reflect, in part, a normative or social value judg-
ment by the prescribing entity, presumably determined to be in the
public interest. Therefore, the task of evaluating the social impact
of identified noise effects in particular contexts or in similar
patterns of noise intrustion contexts cannot be escaped. Put
otherwise, how much is it worth to reduce the noise level by so many
decibels within a given period of time? This question has many var-
iations depending upon the particular decisional context, including
a
the decisional arena, i.e., judicial, regulatory, municipal council, i
the Congress, etc.	 E
4
It is submitted that this is a, if not the, crucial question
ifor the adjudicating or prescribing entity it is also the crucial
question for transportation systems planners if the latter expect
to influence the standards prescribing entity. 3A few examples should
suffice to demonstrate the diversity of decisional contexts in which i
some evaluation is made, explicitly or implicitly, of the social
i
detriment of noise intrusion or, conversely, the social benefit of {
noise reduction or elimination.
i
Consider the judicial arena. While court cases are customarily
concerned with remedying adverse consequences of inadequate past
planning rather than with assessments of proposed projects, judicial
decisions do provide some simplified and approximate evaluations of
the social significance of "unwanted sound." Legal recognition of
noise intrusion can best be illustrated by cases in the eminent domain
i (highway right-of-way) context, including inverse condemnation suits.
r
Where there has been no "taking," the vast majority of jurisdictions,
st	 _
1
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if not all, refuse any legal remedy for highway construction/traffic
noise per se. This can be interpreted as p1`cing zero (or de minimis)
value on noise. Where there has been a "partial taking," about
half the states recognize nrAse as an element of consequential. damages.
Put otherwise, in these jurisdictions noise can be considered in determ-
ining the difference in the fair market value of the property before
and after the taking, such difference in the fair market value represent-
ing the compensation due the landowner.
in 1971, a Superior Court Judge in Elizabeth, New Jersey, made
an award of $164,119 to the local Board of Education which had allegt,d
damages caused by noise interference with the conduct of classes in a
local school after Interstate Highway 278 was constructed next to the
school. 54In 1965 the Highway Department had condemned 2,034 square feet
of the school's property for the highway for which the School Board
was awarded $3,700. After the highway carne into use, the noise level
increased from about 60 decibels to approximately 80 decib^-i.s. Inter--
Terence with normal speech commences at the 65-70 dB level. The court's
judgment included $94,350 as the cost of air--conditioning the school
and $51,000 as the cost of sealing all the windows.
This judgment prompts a number of observations and questions. 	
i
on the basis of legal precedent, half the states might have gone along
with the $3,700 eminent domain, award, ignoring the noise intrusion
ti. i►.-	 gel
a
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_	 t
- 
43
t
altogether.	 in short, no social value would be placed on noise
intrusion or noise abatement.	 Possibly, the courts of half the
states would have attempted to increase the award by an amount
representing harm caused by the - noise intrusion.
	
In the subject
r € case, did the cost of air-conditioning the school building accurately
^^ f
, 	 f f reflect the harm incurred to the educational process by the noise
ti
intrusion?
	
Was this the only concrete/operational means of giving a
R measurable magnitude to the noise intrusion?	 If not, then taking
F into account the probability of the noise, its magnitude and duration,
and the resultant interference with the educational process, how is
fz _
,f
j? the Latter Effect to be given some measurable social value dimension?
-	 ^ If the Highway Department had undertaken to work out an initial com-
promise settlement witl-, the School Board, would it have been based
9_
on the same considerations as the court ' s judgment or measured in some
r^
of-her way?
	
Could not the Highway Department have considered a two-
mile, 35 mph rather than a 60 mph speed zone in the vicinity of the
school?	 This would have greatly reduced the noise interference.
	
Was
the judgment at least implicitly made that this reduction in speed of
3 interstate vehicles would be a greater social detriment than the noise
intrusion on the school ' s educational function?
What were the options available to the court in this instance?
We can assume that this couri-: had no authority to abate the noise at
`I
1
r
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the source,	 i. e., relocate the highway or control the noise emission
f levels of vehicles moving in interstate commerce or other aspects of
t! interstate traffic. Apparently, the court considered it impracticable,
G
ii
if not impossible, to determine directly compensation for harm which
z:
would be done the educational process as well as possible physical and
psychological injury to individuals. Hence, the remaining option was
to in some manner reduce the effects of the noise. Presumably, effec-
tive buffering (as by sound barriers) was considered impractical.
Relocating the school would have, no doubt, posed far greater difficult-
ies and expense than sealing and air--conditioning the building. Hence,
did the court select the least costly, practical option available?
It must have appeared to the court that the award represented a reason-
able evaluation of the social impact of the noise intrusion. But what
if the cost of sealing and air-conditioning had come to $ 500,000? Do
the data and appropriate analytical techniques exist by which the pros-
pective harm to the educational process and to individuals might have
been calculated so that an award based on noise effects rather than
on the cost or reducing the effects could have been made? If so, would
this have been a more satisfactory mode of evaluating the social impact
of the noise intrusion than the means adopted by the court?
Parenthetically, it might be observed i_hat some analysts, in
the example given, would employ the notion of social impact only
 with
rSy
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reference to the evaluation of the actual social impact of the highway
noise on the educational process and in terms of physical and psycho-
logical harm to individuals. This definitional approach would make a
distinction between compensation for the harmful effects of the noise
on the one hand and the cost of abating the noise at the source or
reducing the effects of the noise on the other. The latter two alter-
natives would not be considered "surrogate" alternatives of the social
impact of the noise. it might be contended that the cost of noise
reduction (as by air conditioning) would be small compared with the
long-term harm done the educational process and to individuals. Even
assuming so in this instance, however, in other contexts the cost of
abatement at the source or reduction of effects could far exceed the
actual harm to individuals or to community value-institutional processes.
while the analytical approach may best be left to the needs of a par-
ticular assessment/decisional context, it would appear that the cost
of abatement at the source or the cost of reducing the effects of noise,
as in the New Jersey case, could be considered, consistent with custom-
ar•1 usage, as means of "internalizing" the social costs of environmental
E^	 d
noise.
If the task of evaluating the social im pacts of noise effects in
	 j
a
the judicial arena seem to pose certain difficulties, the task takes
1
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on even greater complexity in many assessment/planning functions in
legislative/regulatory arenas. Only a few illustrations can be
touched on here which necessarily involve the evaluation of social
benefit of reducing noise levels by certain amounts over given periods
of time or of avoiding the exposure of particular social activities
to specified noise levels.
Retrofit Regulations: Federal Aviation Administration
Should the FAA undertake to establish Rules and Regula-
tions pertaining to the retrofit of jet aircraft certi-
fied prior to the Boeing 747, the Administrator, pursuant
to 95611, is required to take into account whether any pro-
posed standard would be "consistent" with the highest
degree of safety in air commerce or air transportation
in the public interest" and to "consider whether any pro-
posed standard,. . , is economically reasonable, technolog-
is°ally practicable, and appropriate for the particular
f
i
r 4:,
's
type of aircraft, aircraft engine, appliance or certifi-
cate to which it will apply." Obviously, the social objet-
tive of reducing aircraft noise is circumscribed by con-
d
siderations of safety, cost, and technological feasibility.
Not only will these factors place maximum limits on the
noise reduction which can be realistically expected, but
F
E
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within . these limits, the noise reduction standard
will probably be arrived at by a process of "bal-
ancing" increments of noise reduction with the other
factors in order to arrive at an "optimum" standard -
or optimum set of regulations pertaining to all types
of jets considered for the retrofit program. This
balancing process inevitably involves an evaluation
of the social significance of aircraft noise reduc-
tion by given amounts within specified periods of
time. However, the intensity of public demand for
aircraft noise reduction may result in the establish-
ment of inflexible standards which must be met within
a given period of tithe. In such event, the other
factors would simply have to be adjusted so as to
assure achievement of the regulatory norm.
Center - City STOLRort Configuration:
City Council or
Metropolitan Governmental Unit
4foh .
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city blocks by condemnation and the relocation
of the displaced residences, businesses and pub-
lic facilities. This would be an enormously
costly undertaking. Assuming knowledge of an
appropriately designed STOL plane, the character-
istics of the required STOLport and the probable
f
	 air traffic patterns, the question will arise as
E
to the perimeter of the land area to be condemned
E
E
	 (with exceptions for activities which can accommo-
date to the higher noise levels which would be intro-
duced). The responsible decision-making entity
Ewill be directly confronted with the problem of
i
deciding the compatibility of various community land
uses and activities with particular noise levels.
Should all residences be condemned within the 40
NEF contour, the 35 NEF contour, or the 30 NEF con-
tour? The cost will increase drastically as the per-
imeter is pushed out. So how does the decision-maker
evaluate the social benefit of expanding the perimeter 	 F
from the 35 to the 30 NEF contour? The problem is, of
course, far more complex than stated here. if land
i
	 is condemned only out to the 40 NEF perimeter, then
1
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the City Council may be faced with multiple suits
in inverse condemnation for partial takings or would
be obliged to purchase avigational easements, possi-
bly out to the 30 NEF contour.
Selection of Noise Abatement Strategy for
An Existing Airport: City Council or
Metropolitan Government Unit
A problem far more complex than the new STOLport
example would probably confront a local governmental
entity attempting to select an appropriate noise
abatement program for an existing airport in a built-
up area. Primary types of abatement alternatives
include:
• Use of Preferential runways
• Traffic allocation among metropoli-
tan airports if more than one exists
• Airport redesign: runway length and
direction
• Insulation of structures in adjacent
areas
• Encouragement of compatible land use
through short and long-term legal
and economic incentives
• Selective relocation of schools and
other noise-sensitive activities
• compensation for noise intrusion
ii
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literally dozers of alterna , ive strategies might
Plausibly be considered, based on various combin-
ations of the above noted primary means of noise
abatement. These will involve different economic
costs, different degrees of disruption and incon-
venience, different time frames for implementation,
varying degrees of legal, institutional, and social
obstruction, and different levels of noise reduction.
So again, the question arises; just what social value
is to 'be placed on noise reduction in the particular
noise abatement context?
Legislation to Establish Federal Noise
Emission Standards for Non-Aircraft
Noise Sources: The Congress with
Implementing Regulations by EPA/ONAC
Development of a statutory scheme and implementing
regulations for applying Federal noise emission
standards to non--aircraft noise sources may be the
most complex, certainly the most far-reaching in its
consequences for noise reduction, of all the noise
abatement strategies. Most environmental noise
abatement control has been initiated at the
local level through specific ordinances or truncated
^ ref.
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codes. State regulation has been limited,
primarily to internal combustion engine sources.
It now is rather obvious that a coordinated pro-
gram for environmental noise abatement must be
shaped at the national level. A start in this
direction was made with the enactment of the Noise
Pollution and Abatement Act of 1970. 9401(c) pro-
vides for consolidation of the reviewing function
of noise-producing activities by the Federal agen-
cies in EPA/ONAC. This approach necessarily
involves uniformity of standards and inevitably
will come into conflict with the diversity of reg-
ulatory measures required for effective control of
particular noise environments at the State and local
i
levels. Further, new Federal standards will surely
wipe out some existing State and local noise regu-
latory schemes on which the responsible governmental
entities have expended great effort, time, and expense.
Fence, highly intricate questions will arise with
respect to the social value of environmental noise
reduction, not merely with reference to specific
noise contexts but also in terms of optimum noise
1
s
r
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reduction in the aggregate of noise environments
across the nation. An elaboration of the complex-
ities involved in this task are reviewed in various.
recent reports.and papers.55
Another way of posing the task of evaluating the social impact
of noise effects is to ask: how can available scientific, technolog-
ical, economic, and social behavioral data and analyses be applied by
the assessment/planning entities so as confidently to establish the
parameters within which realistic noise reduction goals, regulations,
and standards can be prescribed? Acknowledging that heated disputes
often arise over the validity of even so-called "scientific" data,
there would seem to be, nevertheless, a considerable reservoir of
consensus data and analyses concerning what is practicable with respect
to noise abatement within given periods of time, the economic costs
of alternative abatement strategies, and what the socio-political
effects will be, 'therefore, the question may be asked: how far have
we moved toward the application of available data and analyses in the
setting of noise standards, thereby eliminating a corresponding dearee
of needless and obfuscating partisan contentiousness? Hopefully, we
'i
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noise effects and the manner in which the costs and benefits of
noise abatement programs are to be shared are matters which prop-
56
erly fall within the ambit of adversarial process. Judgments on
such matters as these involve alternative concepts of social justice,
and the application of such concepts in particular decision contexts
constitute appropriate subjects for competing views in the public
decision process.
One further point of considerable importance needs to be made.
While at some point in time the responsible prescribing entity
must accept an anticipatory assessment outcome and a planning strategy
for implementation based thereon, this should not be the end of the
matter. After all, the objective is to achieve prescribed environ-
mental noise reduction. But in order to determine if the actual noise
levels of target sources or environments are in fact being reduced,
all Federal, State and local noise abatement programs must be monitored
and evaluated on a continuing basis so that modifications, as necessary,
can be introduced into these programs periodically. Effective noise
abatement involves a continuing evaluative function - not simply a
"one shot" decision.
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?	 by a special hospital committee, that have caused delays for women seeking
official approval. Asa result of the ruling, therefore restrictive state
:z
anti-abortion laws have been declared unconstitutional.
APPLYING GENETIC TECHNOLOGY
Vii!
I
The techniques reviewed in the previous section have improved considerably
( I
	mans capability for contrriling genetic disease. At the same time, however,
their application raises new and complex issues. Ouestions concerning "when"
is
and "how" genetic technology will be employed and who will be its "employer"
e
are fraught with legal, social, ethical and political ramifications. And
i	 whether the answers to these questions will be framed within the context of
E^
long-range societal goals or the immediate amelioration of individual or
f '1	 bl	 'll hs am7 y pro ems wT	 ave ,mportant consequences for deveiopYnq policy. The
remainder of this paper will explore some of these issues, emphasizinq the
	 -
1
variables which contribute to their complexity.
I. Treating Genetic Disease
Two modes of therapy should be considered: current medical treatment
and gene therapy. In the case of the former, most would agree that if an
appropriate treatment is available it would be morally reprehensible not to
provide it to all those in need. Modern medicine, guided by man's compassion
for man and its commitment to the individual, makes no distinction between the
sources and types of diseases or the individual "worth" of its patients.
L.
	
	 71 Eventhe four states -- Alaska, Hawaii, New York and Washington -- that	 '
have permitted unrestricted abortions will probably have to alter their laws.
These states have residency requirements which the Court struck down.
i=
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Prevailing professional and social mores "demand that all persons have
recourse to all reasonable medical expertise	 ,"72 Providing Droper care
to all, those in need, however, is not without its consequences.
A. Cost of treatment- One problem is the cost involved in providing the
treatment, In the case of cystic fibrosis, the most common autosomal
recessive defect in the white population, a recent study found that the costs
were so high that "families who have been able to attain a moderate income
.	 may be reduced to the }poverty level by chronic health problems	 ."73
The study also revealed the inadequacy of private health insurance, with the
finding that 31 per cent of the children "were unprotected by medical insurance
and only one-fourth had sufficiently comprehensive coverage to include
outpatient expenses and medication." 
74 
Another example is hemo philia, for
which the cost of treatment can be $12,000 per year for each hemo philiac or
approximately $480 million for all Americans suffering from the disease.. 75
Most American families would be unable to afford such treatment. Should the
72 Stevensonand Nowell, 92, cit., supra, n. 55 at 31.
73Audrey T. McCollum, "Cystic Fibrosis: Economic Impact Upon the Family,"
The American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 6l, July 1971, p . 1340.
741bid. When insurance was. available to families on an independent
basis, tTie study 'Found the cost of premiums to be as hi gh as MO-50 per month.
Blue Cross has established a system under which families having a child with
Cooley's Anemia can be reimbursed for transfusion costs even when their child
is treated as an outpatient. The plan is being set up on a one-year trial
basis and Judgment regarding its effectiveness must be reserved until the end
of that time. See B.J. Culliton, OD .  cit., supra, n. 49 at 591.
75K.M. 8rinkhous, "Changing Prospects for Children With Hemophilia,"
Children, Vol. 17, November-December 1970, p. 242.
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cost be absorbed by society? Can society then require that to receive such
treatment a patient must fulfill certain conditions?
A recent case in Pennsylvania emphasizes the implications of the latter
question. 76
 A mother was initially informed by state officials that in order,
1	 to receive treatment for her 12-year-old hemophiliac son she would have to go'`'
on welfare. The requirement was subsequently rescinded by the governor, who
^I
then told the-fami ly that they would have to recruit 36 donors a month and
drive 100 miles to Philadelphia to donate blood in exchange for their son's
treatment. The family, understandably perturbed, is now involved in
77
s	 negotiating a compromise with the state.
	 One must seriously question the
3	 intent of imposing such conditions on a family. Are there acceptable limits
to such conditions? What criteria should be used for.determining those limits?
And with whom does that responsibility rest? A recent court suit demonstrates
l
the challenge that lies ahead. Four young hemophiliacs have filed suit in
 federal court demanding that the government provide them and all other
hemophiliacs in the country with the treatment necessary to allow them to
f'
bleed normally. The suit contends that the youths were denied the "equal
protection" guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, citing the government maintenance
programs for drug addicts. 78 Thus, the familiar problem of allocating resources
becomes even more acute with the emergence of new genetic technology.
76The following account is taken from articles appearing in the
Washington Post, November 2, 1972, p. K3 and November 6, 1972, p. A20.
77As a result of this incident, it was recently announced that
Pennsylvania had established a program to give free treatment of hemophiliacs.
See the Washington Post, December 5, 1972, p. M.
78Washington Post, October 11, 1972, p. A18.
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B. Health Consequences of Treatment: Another unanticipated consequence
associated with treating genetic disease can be illustrated by examing the
treatment for PKU.. As already noted (supra, p. 17), the fetus of a
phenyiketonuric woman is exposed to high concentrations of phenylalanine
metabolites and, as a result, it may experience severe.retar.dation:and.heart
defects. 
79 
Thus, the medical science which enabled those mothers to lead
relatively normal lives now threatens to deny their children the same benefits.
Theoretically, correction of.the metabolic disorder should prevent damage to
the fetus. From a medical. standpoint, however, reinstatement of the low
phenylalanine diet poses two problems. First, "the health status of the
phe.nylket..onuric woman may not justify the difficulties involved in attempts
to control diet."$0 And second, there is the possibility that reinstatement
of the diet may "result in nutritional deficiency which may be as detrimental
to the fetus as maternal phenyiketonuria itself." 81 Under these circumstances,
should the mother be encouraged not to conceive at all? If she insists on
having a child, what is the physician's responsibility with reqard to
reinstating the special diet? Since the birth of such irreparably damaged
children will result in life-long institutional care, does society have a right
79According to R.R. Howell and R.B. Stevenson, "virtually every infant
born to a woman who meets the criteria for classic phenyiketonuria will
have major defects, with growth retardation and microcephaly as well as other
I>
	
	 structural abnormalities." "The Offspring of Phenylketonuric women," Social
Biome,  Vol. 18 (Supplement, 1971), p. S27.
BaV. Elving Anderson, "Discussion: Maternal Effects in Genetic Disease,"
E	 Ibid., p. S32.
81 8.0. Fisch, D. Doeden, L.L. Lansky and J.A. Anderson, "Maternal
Phenyiketonuria: Detrimental Effects on Embryogenesis and Fetal Develoument,"
American Journal of Diseases of Children, Vol. 118, December 1969, p. 855.
S^
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to intervene in preventing such births?
	 The consequences noted for PKU have
been linked to other mai;ernal.disorders as well,2 Thus increasing the
proportions of the problem.
C.	 Treatment by Gene Therapy:
	 Although the development and application
i of techniques for gene therapy are a number of years into.the future, theiri
potential impact warrants serious consideration at.this time.
	 The high degree i
of uncertainty and potential risks involved in usin q qene therapy clearly
-:F1 distinguish it from more conventional modes of therapy.	 Perhaps even more
important, however, is that both the uncertainty and the risks will affect
i^ future offspring as well as the present generation.
	 Friedmann and Roblin
write that "For an acce ptable genetic treatment of a human genetic defect, we
would require that the gene therapy replace the functions of the defective
gene segment without causing deleterious side effects in the treated individual
or in his future offspring." $3
	They conclude that "although the ethical
problems posed by gene therapy are similar in principle to those posed by
other experimental medical treatments, we feel that the irreversible and
heritable nature of gene therapy means that the tolerable margin of risk and
uncertainty in such therapy is reduced." 
84
	 They su pport the need for continued
research into the technology of gene therapy and propose eithico-scientific
criteria for applying these techniques.
	 However, they oppose using gene
therapy in human patients at this time because of man's limited understanding
of genetic processes and of how they might be affected by technological
82Stevenson and Howell, M. cit., supra, n. 55 at 35.
L
83Friedmann and Roblin, oR. cit., supra, n. 53 at 952.,
---- r
84 Ibid.	 p.	 953.
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intervention. 8
 The tone of their presentation, however, suggests that gene
therapy should and will become a useful method for medical treatment.
Theologian Paul Ramsey, however, is less certain about the use of such therapy.
He writes that "the unknown and unforeclosed risks to.future generations may
outweigh any benefit that might be secured for the individual patient. In a
matter of such grave importance, 'no discernible risk' is not adequate
protection. We need to know that .there are.no
 risks - a requiremen:L which
inheritable gene therapy is not apt to meet."86
 Ramsey is undoubtedly correct
when he contends that complete knowledge regarding the possible risks of gene
therapy is unlikely ever to be realized. Under such circumstances, then, gene
therapy affecting future generations would be prohibited if Ramsey's criterion
was observed. Ramsey believes that the choice is not simply between doing
nothing about an inherited disease and correcting it by gene therapy.
Alternative choices would include "having no children or fewer children. The
treatment would be continence or not getting married or using three
contraceptives at the same time or voluntary sterilization."87
 In light of
I
i.
the uncertainty and high risks involved in gene therapy, Ramsey finds more
acceptable these other alternatives for "treating" genetic disease.
The two points of view outlined above . converge at the crucial policy
questions: Are there any,conditions under which certain types of gene therapy
E.
85 Ibid., P. 954.
86 PaulRamsey, "Genetic Therapy: A Theologian's Response," in Michael
Hamilton (ed.), The New Genetics and the Future of Man, (Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co.: Michigan, 1972), p . 169.
87Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1970),
P. 118.
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should be prohibited or encouraged? What criteria or guidelines should be
used for determining those conditions? And with whom do these responsibilities
rest? These questions challenge both the scientific and ethical dimensions
	
ii	
of the policy-making process.
D. Treatment and the Gene Pool: Perhaps the most frequently cited
{ consequence of treating genetic disease is its impact on the human gene pool,
i.e. the total genetic information possessed by the reproductive members of
	 f
I^ the population. The present gene pool is the result of 3 billion years of
evolution and natural selection. Nature is successful in protecting the human x
species from detrimental genes because potential carriers either die prior to
reproducing or reproduce less frequently than other heriditary types. The
problem, as viewed by a growing number of people, is that medical advances
}E
	E	 have altered this situation by reducing the impact of natural selection. New
treatment permits the survival and reproduction of persons with inheritable
	
f	 disorders who in earlier times would not have reproduced. As a result, the
human gene pool experiences a higher frequency of many defective genes. For
i
example, approximately 90 per cent of the children who formerly died from
f
retinoblastoma - a malignant tumor of the eye - are now surviving because
i
of advances in surgery and chemotherapy. Many of these children will be blind,
but certainly able to reproduce and, consequently: to transmit the deleterious
gene to their progeny . $ Gene therapy which did not affect reproductive cells
would produce similar results. Treated individuals would still pass the
r 88 Reismanand Matheny, o	 cit.; supra n. 15 at 205.
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defect on to their offspring, thus requiring more and more gene tharapy.
What are the likely consequences if the genetic load is permitted to
increase? According to,some, the quality of the gene pool will continue to
deteriorate and greater demands will be placed upon the community's medical
services, since more people will be dependent on medical care and treatment.
Ramsey foresees "some future generation fwhichl will begin to experience
20 percent genetic deaths," $9 And Bentley Glass draws the following scenerio:
to contemplate the man of tomorrow who must begin his day
by adjusting his spectacles and his hearing aid, inserting
his false teeth, taking an allergy injection in one arm and
an insulin injection in another, and topping off his
preparations for l;6e by taking a tranquillizing pill, is
none too pleasant.
What is good for today's individual and his generation may be detrimental
to future populations, and unless some action is taken "the whole genetic
capacity of man will be much weakened." 91
This bleak picture has prompted the suggestion of measures designed to
cope with the deteriorating gene pool. Such measures rest on the belief
that the present pattern of genetic selection is much less desirable than
that which could be achieved by a deliberate and controlled effort. Two
types of proposals are frequently suggested. The first is a program designed
89 PaulRamsey, "Moral-Religious Implications of Genetic Control," in
John D. Roslansky (ed.	 Genetics and the Future of Man, (Appleton-Century-
Crofts: New York, 1966, p.
90 BentleyGlass, "Human Heredity and Ethical problems," Perspectives in
Biology and Medicine, Vol. 15, Winter 1972, p. 243.
91 Julian Huxley, quoted in Sol Tax and Charles Callender (eds.),
Evolution After Darwin, Vol. III, (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago,
90.
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to alter genetic composition by encouraging desirable traits, i.e.
	 "positive"	 i
t' eugenics.92	 The second is designed to alter genetic composition by reducing
i
the incidence of undesirable traits, i.e.	 "negative" &lgenics.	 The latter
_.
i
alternative might be accomplished by persuading those who have a high
likelihood of transmitting a genetic defect not to reproduce, by sterilization;
or by abortion of fetuses diagnosed as genetically abnormal.
{ The "deteriorating gene pool" argument is not without its critics.
	
They
contend that the predicted danger of a genetic apocalypse is erroneously
calculated.	 They see no "imminent danger of being overwhelmed by the bad
genes .	 .	 . we would seem to have no reason to fear that the narmal population
t_
will soon be replaced by that of individuals with abnormal genetic factors."93
! One force working to reduce the genetic burden is current demographic trends.
"In the short run, demographic trends (in and of themselves) are reducing the
incidence of serious congenital anomalies." 94
	Trends indicating smaller
family size and a lowered average age of childbearing will work to ameliorate
the quality of the human gene pool.
Another criticism concerns the nature and severity of genetic disease.
"Many a	 'bad'	 gene whose effects are overcome euphenically [i.e. by medical
icreatment] may be said to have lost its
	 'badness,' wholly or to a large degree
so that its accumulation no longer represents a serious biological 	 load even
92See supra, n. 66, for a discussion of the implications of such
programs.
93Reisman and Matheny, op. cit.,supra, n. 15 at 204.
94
Dudley Kirk, "Patterns of Survival and Reproduction in the United
States." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A.,
Vol.	 59, March 1968, p. 6669.
ij
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though it may represent a considerable economic load." 
95 
For example, if a
disease such as diabetes can be controlled by artificially altering the
environment, i.e. providing easy acquisition to insulin, then any real harm
to individuals is negated. Thus, "environmental changes have made some
hereditary defects irrelevant"; 
96 
it seems reasonable to expect similar
medical advances in the future.
There are those who also question an underlying assumption of proposals
designed to "protect" the gene pool - that such protection is an obligation
of this generation to future generations. Professor Martin P. Golding contends
that "We are thus raising a question about our moral relations to the community
of the remote future. I submit that this relationship is far from clear,
certainly less clear than our moral obligations to communities of the present." 97
It seems highly unlikely that today's generation can accurately predict the
needs and wants of succeeding generations.
One might go so far as to say that if we have an obligation
to distant future generations it is an obligation not to
plan for them. Not only do we not know their conditions
of life, we also do not know whether they will maintain the
same (or a similar) conception of the good life for man as
we do.98
Even if it could be agreed that there are real and identifiable obligations
95 PhilipHandler (ed.), Biology and the Future of Man, (Oxford
University Press: New York, 1970), pp. 910-911.
96Kirk, oR. cwt., supra, n. 94.
97 MartinP. Golding, "Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering," UCLA
Law Review, Vol. 15, February 1968, p. 453.
98 MartinP. Golding, "Obligations to Future Generations," The Monist,
Vol. 56, January 1972, pp. 97-98.
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to future generations, there is still the problem of deciding how to balance
those obligations against the obligations to the present generation.
Any attempt to manipulate the existing gene pool might not only foreclose
possible options of future generations, but might also adversely affect their
biological adaptability. The genetic diversity of the human gene pool has
long been recognized as necessary for ensuring adaptability to future
environments, so essential to survival in the face of constant evolutionary
change. "Genetic diversi ty is in one sense capital for investment in future
adaptations. Since genetic variahility represents evolutionary capability,
it-is a load we should be ready and willing to bear." 
99 
It would appear
morally and biologically unwise, then, to tamper with the gene pool signifi-
cantly without prior knowledge of the demands and needs of future environments.
Finally, many seriously doubt the efficacy of negative eugenic programs.
Most deleterious q-nes are maintained in the population by normal heterozygous
persons. It is estimated that "every individual is a carrier of three or
more of such genes, and that virtually every human being carries at least
one." 
100 
Since one cannot always be certain that such genes will manifest
themselves clinically in present or future generations, "only by eliminating
virtually everyone could our load of past mutations be eliminated, and this
only temporarily, as new mutations are occurring all the time." 101
r
99Marc Lappe, "Moral Obligations and the Fallacies of 'Genetic Control,"'
Theological Studies, Vol. 33, September 1972, p. 423.
100 ArnoG. Motulsky, George R. Fraser and Joseph Felsenstein, "Public
Health and Long-Term Genetic Implications of Intrar,terine Diagnosis and
Selective Abortion," in Daniel Bergsma (ed.), Intrauterine Diagnosis (Birth
Defects; Original Article Series, Vol. 7: Thefiats a Foundation - March
of Dimes, April 1971), p. 26.
101 OrlandoJ. Miller, "Discussion of Symposium Papers," Ibid., p. 34.
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An alternative suggestion for improving the gene pool, without acting
directly upon biological man, is to minimize or eliminate environmental
hazards.	 It is becoming clear that "we are exposed to a wide range of chemical
and physical agents which may damage the genetic material of our cells."102
Thus, to the extent that man contaminates his environment and introduces factors
i that render it harmful, "his best interests are served by the adoption and
enforcement of regulatory measures to prevent, minimize, or remove undesirable
103
E contamination."
ps
In view of the sometimes vehement stands taken by those on both sides of
the argument, it would seem to be useful to begin to assess the status of the
human gene pool.	 A six-year report of the American Eugenics Society speaks
directly to this point:
In view of the relative stability of the gene pool,
the problem is not generally viewed as one requiring
dramatic or 'crash'	 solutions.	 But in the long run,
j' changes in the distribution and fre quencies of genes may
be of greatest significance.	 At this stage the need is
for better identification of the present and potential
direction of changes rat er than action to alter these
trends in any major way. 04
It is also not too soon to begin to evaluate some of the suggested approaches
for improving man's capability to control genetic disease.
102 Bloom, op. cit., supra, n. 31 at 1. See also V.E. Headings, op. cit.,
supra, n. 50.
i
	
	 103National Commission on'Community Health Services, Changing Environmental
Hazards, Report of the Task Force on Environmental Health Public Affairs
Press, Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 20.
I04
Theodosius Dobzhansky, Dudley Kirk, Otis Duncan and Carl Bajema, The
American Eugenics Society, Inc. Six-Year Report, 1965-1970 (Published by t e
s: Society: New York), p. 6.
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II. Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion
When prenatal diagnosis is combined with abortion, it becomes possible
to alter directly the course of genetic disease. The introduction of new
automated procedures will facilitate diagnosis as well as lessen its cost.
It is likely, therefore, that as methods for intrauterine diagnosis improve,
that pressures to use them in the management of the pregnant patient will
increase.
105
 Undoubtedly, this new technical capability will also add another
dimension to the debate concerning abortion. it would be useful, therefore,
to examine some of the criteria for developing policy for this alternative.
A. Risks/Benefits of Prenatal Diagnosis: One important consideration
is the risks involved in using various prenatal diagnostic tests. All of the
techniques described herein carry some degree of risk. While most of the
evidence appears to indicate that the risk is minimal, much more data remains
to be collected and evaluated. In the case of amniocentesis, for example, it
has been suggested that "the current status of knowledge of the biology of
amniotic fluid and its contents - including the fetus - is so rudimentary that
this field must be regarded primarily as an area for research." 
106 
As noted
earlier (supra, p. 7), very little information'is available regarding the
long-term risks of applying amniocentesis. Since the use of any diagnostic
technique is ,justified only if the frequency of the disease or its severity
105"As couples feel social pressure to 'limit population growth and to
be content with only two children, most will very much want to ensure that
the two they do have are healthy. I expect the demand for amniocentesis to
develop strongly." C.O. Carter, "Practical Aspects of Early Diagnosis," in
Maureen Harris (ed.), Early Diagnosis of Human Genetic Defects: Scientific
and Ethical Considerations, Fogarty Tnternat ona Center Proceeding, No. 6,
1972.	 Department of Hea th, Education, and Welfare, Publication No. (NYH)
72-75) p 20
106Orlando J. Miller, ,off. cit., supra, n. 101 at 33.
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are greater than the risks posed by the diagnostic procedure, .a careful
assessment of those risks and the reliability of the diagnosis should be
made.
Because of the danger of applying these techniques to the general
population before their costs. - in terms of morbidity and mortality to mother
and Fetus	 have been reliably assessed, it has been suggested that they be 	 j
used only when a couple carries a moderate or high risk of giving birth.to
a child with a genetic defect.
107
 Various criteria for matting such determi-
nations have been proposed. 
108 
For example, statistics indicate that
	
s
increasing age at pregnancy is correlated with an increased incidence of
chromosomal abnormalities. 109 Thus, prospective prenatal diagnosis might be
110
warranted of mothers above a certain age.
As familiarity with these techniques increases, the risks will surely
diminish. Automation will make the required tests simple and inexpensive and
more couples will undoubtedly request them. Thus, by emphasizing the
criterion of risks/benefits, there might well come a time when prenatal
diagnosis will be an integral part of monitoring all pregnancies. There are,
however, other considerations.
B. Parent-Child Relationship: Since treatment or cure is not available 	
^i
for most genetic deseases, the only therapeutic alternative following the
1 . Michael M. Kaback, quoted in Maureen Harris (ed.), pl. tit., supra,
n. 105 at 85.
108 0,0, Carter, Ibid.., pp. 18-^19.
109
Luks and Ruddle, oE, tit., supra, n. 9 at 495-497.
110 Inthe case of Down's syndrome, for example, a substantial proportion
as high as 33 per cent - of children are born to mothers above the age of 40
years. Motul•sky, et. Al., off, tit., supra, n. 100 at 30.
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diagnosis of a defective child is an abortion. Important to consider here
is the effect that the wide-scale application of prenatal diagnosis combined
with abortion will have on the parent-child relationship. Ethicist John
Fletcher contends that	 j
the experience of parents in prenatal diagnosis and genetic
counseling does not lessen the affection they bear for their
	 ;t
children, already born or to be born, even though that
j9a	 relationship is permanently altered by the character of the 	
E
experience of enetic counseling and amniocentesis.
(emphasis added)
In his efforts to identify and describe this "altered relationship,"112
Fletcher suggests that a new stage of life is created, in which parents will
be as intimate with their children before they are born as they are after
they a ye born. One result of this was "that active roles as parents began
earlier in the course of pregnancy . . . Assurance of the health of the child 	
-
releases parental care, planning and symbolic activity usually reserved for
birth. 113 Fletcher quotes a number of couples responding that "they loved
them [their children] more because they had known them longer."
114
 Ironically,
Fletcher also found that this pre-natal intimacy "increases the sense of
compulsion towards perfection that middle-class people have; they want their
111 John Fletcher, "The Brink: The Parent-Child Bond in the Genetic
Revolution," Theological_ Studies, Vol. 33, September 1972, p. 428.
'
	
	
T12Ibid., pp. 457-485. His sample consisted of 25 cou ples who had
undergone amniocentesis and had given birth to a healthy child or had an
abortion performed.
113
lbid., p. 477.
114
Interview with Dr. John Fletcher, Director of Interfaith Metropolitan
Theological Education, Inc., Washington, D.C., August 11, 1972.
Sy-	 1.
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babies to be healthy, beautiful and perfect."" » 5 He sees a danger in this,
contending that "the drive towards perfection is one of the worst qualities
that human beings have since it causes them to become very intolerant." 116
Fletcher also asks if prenatal diagnosis,
because it inclines the parents to contemplate the abortion.
of the fetus before they are fully informed as to the
results of the test, erodels] that "basic trust" which
is so fundamental as to lead Erik Erikson to assert that
"the firm establishment of enduring trust over basic
mistrust is the first task of the budding personality
and therefore first of all a task for maternal care"?117
Fletcher contends that even if the diagnostic results are negative, the test
and its results are going to change the lives of the parents. "They will
never be the same parents they were before because this test is changing the
way they learn the roles of parenthood 11118 People have been brought up to
love their child, at least prior to its birth, without preconditions. But,
says Fletcher, "when you start contemplating the tests with the added feature
that abortion is an alternative, you have introduced an element of doubt into
that relationship that has never been there before. So you are a different
parent than you were taught to be." 
119 
Thus, genetic technology has altered
parenthood in a way that had not been anticipated.
What will be the effect of this new dimension of parenthood on the "basic
1151dem.
1161dem.
117 Fletcher, qR. cit., supra, n. Ill at 473.
11$Interview with John Fletcher, supra, n. 114
1191dem.
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trust" between children) and parents? Fletcher states that "nobody can
live with the thought that his parents would have killed him if he had been
sick. There is no way to accept that, yet you are going to have a whole
120
generation of parents who have had this opportunity," 	 In the context of
its present usage, Fletcher believes that prenatal diagnosis "does not
introduce a permanently insoluble moral conflict in the ethics of parental
caring." 
121 
But what will be its effect if applied on a wide-scale and
supported by socially and legally sanctioned abortion? Fletcher believes
that
Nothing could weaken or dissolve the parent-child bond
more effectively than children becoming afraid that the
parents made such decisions for trivial reasons of personal
convenience or because the were forced into it for
external societal reasons.T22
The parent-child relationship, then, constitutes another important variable
to consider when developing genetic technology policy (see infra, pp. 63-64 ,
for additional discussion of intrafamily relationships).
C. Economic Variables: Economic factors must also be considered. The
economic impact can be evaluated on two levels: (1) the burden which falls on
the individual family, and (2) the costs to society. The birth of a genetically
defective child creates new problems of resource allocation for a family. The
cost of caring for such a child can make deep inroads into a family's financial
120
Idem. Fletcher also inquires into the faelings of living children,
e.g. will they worry about their own security?, where amniocentesis was used
on a fetal sibling. 0O. cit., supra, n. 111 at 478.
121 Fletcher, op. cit., supra, n. 111 at 479.
122 1bid., p. 480.
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resources (witness the case of cystic fibrosis, supya, p. 23) and private
health insurance has been unable to absorb this impact. This drain on
resources might also have disruptive consequences for the family unit in
more subtle ways. 123
The costs to society are both direct.and indirect. Society not only
assists in providing care for defective individuals, but also assumes the
losses resulting from their inability to become economically and socially
productive members of society. Institutionalization and care for persons
with genetic disorders, many of which are chronic in nature, can be very
expensive. For example, the cost to society of caring for those suffering
from Down ' s syndrome, which has an estimated frequency of one in 600 births,
is approximately $1.7 billion annually. 124 The economic impact of genetic
disease, then, must be weighed along with other factors.
D. Abortion and the Gene Pool: While a program of selective abortion
might help to relieve the emotional and financial strain experienced by
individuals and their families, how effective would such a program be in
reducing the total frequency of deleterious genes? Arno Motulsky and his
colleagues have found that the use of selective abortion to reduce the cases
of autosomal recessive diseases "will be relatively small (between 12.5% and
34%) if the procedure is only initiated following birth of an affected
child."
125.
 In fact, selection against recessive genes under any conditions
123 SeeMcCollum, op. cit., supra, n. 73 at 1335-40, for a discussion of
some of the educational, social a--iic&—psychological needs of other family
members that might be compromised by the strain on family resources.
124 Glass, oR. cit., supra, n. 90 at 241.
125
Motulsky, et. al., oy. Lit., supra, n. 100 at ^9.
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will be ineffective unless there is also selection against heterozygotes.
For example, "a 50% reduction in reproduction of heterozygotes would reduce
the incidence of the recessive homozygate under random mating to one fourth
its former value in one generation." 
126 
For maximum effectiveness in
eliminating autosomal recessive diseases, premarital carrier detection
would be required to detect those coatings at risk. 127
Sex-linked diseases can be prevented by prenatal diagnosis of
heterozygote mothers and selective abortion of all male fetuses. The impact
of such a program, however, would be somewhat softened since many harmful
sex-linked diseases are a result of fresh mutations. Thus, "even with
prospective diagnosis, the maximum case reduction would not exceed two-thirds
of existing affected males for diseases with zero fertility." 
128 
A potential
dysgenic effect of such a program is that aborion of all male fetuses of
heterozygote mothers would result in an increase (as much as 50 per cent
with each generation in the case of hemophilia) 
129 
in female carriers in
future generations, thus requiring more abortions.
The possibility that selection against autosomal recessive diseases
would lead to an increase in their gene frequency could be the result of
"reproductive compensation," since couples would be inclined to replace the
affected child lost by abortion. A proportion of these compensating children
126 JamesF. Crow, "Rates of Genetic Change Under Selection," proceedings
of the rational Rcademy of Sciences of the U.S.A., Vol. 59 March 1968, p.660,
127
Motulsky, et. al., op. cit., su ra, n. 100 at 30.
728
1bid., p. 31.	 {
129
Friedmann, op, cit., supra, n. 11 at 40.
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will be abnormal gene carriers, thus increasing the frequency of abnormal
genes over that which would have resulted had no such program been implemented.
i
There is evidence, however, that "despite compensation, the total effects
on gene frequency are minimal and are not a cause for concern."l 30tt,
A program of selective abortion aimed at reducing the frequency of
i
harmful. genes raises a number of sensitive issues. For example, if a
distinction between affected fetuses and clinically normal carriers cannot
be made, as in the case of hemophilia, half of the male fetuses aborted
would be normal. The moral implications of such a procedure must be weighed
along with other considerations. A concomitant problem resulting from the
inability to distinguish between affected and normal male fetuses in utero
is that the result would be a 75 per cent probability of abortion with each
pregnancy. This would mean a "24% risk that five consecutive pregnancies
would be aborted." 
131 
In this instance, then, the deleterious effect on the
couple involved might be greater than if no such program were introduced.
As noted earlier, abortion of all male fetuses where sex-linked diseases
are indicated would result in an increase in female carriers, thus increasing
the frequency of the harmful gene and the need for abortion. Is there also
Justification for aborting female carriers? The abortion of such fetuses is
morally questionable since they exhibit no clinical manifestation of the
disease. From a population and public health point of view, a recent study
132
found little evidence to support such a program. 	 Perhaps such carriers
130 Motu 1 sky, Lt. a1. , M. ;I t.. supra n. 100 at 31.
131 MichaelM. Kaback, "Discussion of Symposium Papers," Ibid., p. 35,
132
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could be counseled not to reproduce; in this event, the moral and political
!I overtones of such a policy need to be carefully assessed. 	 Finally, there
are those who believe that the development of new medical techniques for
,I
treating such diseases will make the abortion of such fetuses unnecessary.133
E.	 Attitudes and Policies on Abortion: 	 Another factor which will
Y
influence the introduction and development of this approach involves existing
' attitudes and policies concerning abortion. 	 In a study of 25 couples,
_	
r: Fletcher found that while "abortion is the major moral problem of parents in
genetic counseling, [they] are inclined to favor abortion in case of a positive
34
diagnosis, and they have reached this position prior to counseling,"l
	 On
a much broader scale, a recent national survey found that majority support
for legal abortion has increased sharply.	 The survey revealed that 64 per cent
of all Americans support full liberalization of abortion laws, believing that
"abortion should be a matter for decision solely between a woman and her
physician.
11135
	Recent statements by both public and private groups also
reflect a more liberal attitude toward abortion. 	 For example, the Commission
on Population Growth has recommended that "present state laws restricting
abortion be liberalized along the lines of the New York statute [which, prior
133
Fritz Fuchs, quoted in Maureen Harris (ed.), op. cit., supra, n.	 108
at 124-125.
	
For example, ten years ago the chances were remotee that a baby
with Down's syndrome would live beyond its 15th birthday.
	
Since that time,
however, the development of new antibiotics has given such children a projected
life expectancy of 50 years or more.	 See Joseph D. Whitaker, "Science Lends
Hand to Mongoloid Baby,* 	 Washington Post, December 18, 1972, p. Al
134John Fletcher, "Moral Problems in Genetic Counseling," Pastoral
Psychology, April	 1972, p. 60.
135George Gallup, "Abortion Seen Up to Woman, Doctor," Washington Post,
4
August 25, 1972, p. A2.
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-1	 to the recent Supreme Court ruling, was the most liberal of the state abortion
	
{ laws] 
136 
And the World Council of Churches has called for its members
i
to be prepared to endorse the personal right of parents to
choose an induced abortion to prevent the birth of a gravely
defective child. 14herever the laws of the state make this
	
.i	 illegal., the churches should press for a modification of the
law to permit such options to take place 137
The possibility of using therapeutic abortions for genetic purposes
r!
	
rb^!	 raises concern among many who fear that in a social climate in which unwanted
preganancy is sufficient indication for abortion, there will be a tendency
for couples to seek abortions for arbitrary and casual reasons.
With increasing acceptance of abortion and limitations on
family size, it is probable that some families will seek
termination of pregnancies that involve less severely affected
fetuses, or those with disorders that are treatable to some
extent	 . . It is also likely that abortion may be chosen
for disorders of uncertain severity. It can in fact be
anticipated that families will not want to ri k any departure
from the normal karyotype in their offspring. 38
Perhaps it is appropriate to recall Fletcher`s fears regarding the possible
growth in intolerance on the part of future parents su ra, pp. 36-37). Those
who fear the emergence of an "abortion mentality," characterized by an
increasing intolerance for "weakness" or differentiation from a given "norm,"
136 TheReport of the Commission on Population Growth and the American
Future, Population and the American Future, (U.S, Government Printirg
Office: Washington, D.C., March 1972), F.-142.
137 WorkingCommittee on Church and Society, op. Lit., supra, n. 4 at 6.
138 AubreyMilunsky, John 14. Littlefield, Julian N. Kanfer, Edwin H.
Kolodny, Vivian E. Shih and Leonard Atkins, "Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis
(Third of Three Parts)," The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 283,
December 31, 1970, p. 1502. T e aut ors cite the XYY c romosome anomaly
as a disorder of "uncertain severity." The varied scientific opinion
regarding this genetic defect and its consequent policy implications will
be discussed later.
Y,
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point to an almost casual acceptance of abortion. This attitude, they maintain,
is reflected in statistics from those states which had liberal abortion laws
and in the growing acceptance of "early-stage abortion," which allows a woman
with a suspected and unwanted pregnancy simply to have her monthly menstrual
period extracted. 
139 
This concern over the effect of a program combining
prenatal diagnosis with selective abortion may be expressed as important
questions for policy: Do acceptable standards for deciding when to abort
need to be established? Whose respansibility is it to develop and apply those
standards? What will be the effect of such a program on attitudes toward
already existing "genetically defective" children?
F. Policy Alternatives: Debate has already begun regarding the types of
policy adjustments that might be made. For example, should a woman be
reiz,iired to agree to an abortion prior to prenatal diagnosis? Some contend
that "For parents unwilling to take that step, diagnosis of a disease in a
fetus would serve no useful purpose and would only create anxiety and grief
for Oe parents." 
140 
Thus, they firmly believe that "the decision to interrupt
the preganacy, if the suspected disorder is verified in the fetus, should be
trade before the amniocentesis."
141
 Should there be special provisions, however,
for those patients or physicians whose religious convictions preclude an
139Frr details of the procedure and some of its problems, see Time,
September 11, 1972, p. 47, also the Washington Post,January 26, 1973,
P. G5.
140
Arno G. Motulsky, "Genetic Therapy: A Clinical Geneticist's Response,"
in Michael Hamilton (ed.), M. cit., supra, n. 86 at 131.
141 Fritz Fuchs, "Amniocentesis and Abortion: Methods and Risks,"
oQ. cit., supra, n. 100 at 19.
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abortion under any circumstances? 	 'there are others who find unacceptable
such restrictions on individual decision-making. 	 The use of prenatal
diagnosis does not mean that "the geneticist may abrogate the couple's
decision by assuming that if the fetus is normal she will carry it, or if
abnormal, she will abort.
	
The genetic component is one of many, and the
client must be helped to put it in perspective for a positive choice."143
With respect to the difficult problem of deciding how "abnormal" a fetus 	 t
must be to justify abortion, one geneticist has suggested that society must
take advantage of "all morally acceptable developments that promise to minimize
the number of unfortunate individuals incapable of full participation in this
144
complex society."	 While this position might attract sympathy, it would
probably draw an equal amount of skeptical criticism. 	 Now is one to determine
if a fetus will be "incapable of full participation"? 	 This is a very real
problem, amply illustrated by the case of Down's syndrome
Some Down's children have rather gross retardation,
major heart anomalies, and many fail to survive infancy;
on the other hand, some have a rather mild retardation .
	 .	 .
no major heart defects, and have lived to at least middle
f
age. An individual carrying a gene or genes which cause
142Of relevance here is a resolution (S.J. Res. 64) recently introduced
by Senator Frank Church, which would make it national policy, in the
administration of all Federal programs, to protect physicians and health
care personnel in their exercise of religious or philosophical beliefs
which proscribe the performance of abortions or sterilization procedures.
Congressional Record, February 15, 1973, pp. S2567-58.
143F. James Lieberman, "Psychological Aspects of Selective Abortion,"y	 _	 p	 ^
Ibid.,
	 p.	 20.
144James V.	 Neel,	 "Lessons from a 'Primitive People,"' Science, Vol.	 170
z
November 20, 1970, pp. 820-21. 	 „ a
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retardation may be more or less retarded depending on other
genet ic factors and the external environment which is at
work.^46
Furthermore, many Down ' s children have been found not to suffer and to have
good emotional adjustment. 
146 
Thus, it would be difficult to determine an
absolute measure of biological fitness, since such fitness is to some extent
dependent on a particular environment.
A policy question which pervades all others concerns the basis upon
_.-
	
which society will allocate decisions to either personal conscience or public
choice. At what point is society ' s intervention into individual decision-
making justified? As prenatal diagnosis becomes more widespread, the tensions
resulting from its application will become more acute. There is a need to
relieve those tensions, balancing individual and societal needs with the
proper respect for human life.
III, Screening for Genetic Disease
If prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion were combined with
screening programs designed to detect heterozygous carriers, it might be
possible to realize significant reductions in the incidence of some recessive
diseases. If at -risk parents were identified prior to reproduction, they
could eliminate the risk by remaining childless, by adopting their family,
or, when available, by artificial insemination or prenatal diagnosis. Another
advantage of such programs is that the detection of the homozygous child
after birth might be followed by immediate treatment, thus reducing and perhaps
eliminating the deleterious effects of the disease.
'r
145
Rober' C. Baumiller, "XYY Chromosome Genetics," Journal of Forensic
Sciences, Ve', 14, October 1969, p. 417.
146 KarenLebacqz, Letter to the Editor, The Hastings Center Report,
Vol. 2, February 1972, pp. 12-13.
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A. Cost/Benefits of Screening: Cost/benefit analysis has shown that
screening programs would result in large savings for both the family and
society. For example,
The cost for successful medical treatment of phenylketonuria
is estimated to be no more than one tenth the cost of care
for a retarded patient in an institution. Early diagnosis
and treatment thus saves the community about $9,000 annually
per patient. Moreover, the patient who escapes the immediate
consequences of this mutant allele will eventually earn
income and pay taxes, representing a further benefit to the
community.147
In the case of detection prior to birth, a recent study demonstrated that
in the case of cystic fibrosis, a substantially favorable economic ratio
would result. 
148
As new screening techniques become available an important
part of planning large-scale screening programs should be the assessment of
the costs involved in treating the genetic diseases. Present evidence seems
to indicate a substantial economic saving.
B. Screening and the Gene Pool: Another important criteria for assessing
the value of screening is its potential for reducing the frequency of
deleterious genes. The underlying assumption of such a program is that
heterozygous couples will not mate, or in instances where they do, they will
not have their own children. It has been suggested that this latter alternative
is best realized through a program of voluntary sterilization. It should be
useful, therefore, to review the potential impact of these two approaches on
the gene pool.
If the fertility of heterozygotes and normal individuals were identical,
147Charles R. Scriver, "Screening for Inherited Traits: Perspectives,"
ti	 in Maureen Harris (ed.), 92. cit., supra, n. 105 at 95-96.
148Motulsky, et. al., oe. cit., supra, n. 100 at 30.
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the frequency or the abnormal gene would remain constant. However, many
genes which result in autosomal recessive diseases owe their high frequency
to the heterozygote's advantage in fertility or mortality. If heterozygotes
were to cease mating with one another and this advantage persisted, there
	 `` 3
would be an increase in the genes since heterozygotes would have a greater
	
s.
average number of children. Consequently, the
gene loss previously incurred by infertility or early death
in homozygotes would cease. In the case of cystic fibrosis
persistence of the assumed heterozygote advantage for about
100 generations would increase the frequency of carriers in
white populations from 5% ( .its present level) to 50%.149
If there were little or no difference in fertility between heterozygotes and
is
normal persons, as might be the case if family size became more standardized,
a system in which heterozygotes avoided marriage would prevent a decrease
in abnormal gene frequency. There might even be a slow increase due to
fresh mutations, though several thousand generations would pass before the
150
frequency of carriers would be doubled.
5
Sterilization of heterozygous carriers appears unlikely to have any
it
substantial impact on reducing deleterious genes. If the program.were
compulsory, it would require 1,500 years to reduce the frequency of a particular
recessive gene by half.
151
 If sterilization is undertaken on a voluntary basis,
the rate of decrease would be much less. Thus, the elimination of.a recessive
defect by sterilization is a very slow process and probably of no immediate
149 Ibid ., p. 28.
75nlbid.
15 Ching Chun Li, Population Genetics, (The University of Chicago Press:
Chicago, 1955), p. 253.
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value in eugenic programs.
C. Voluntary versus Compulsory Screening: Genetic screening raises
other essential policy issues. One crucial and heavily debated issue concerns
the nature of such programs: Should partici pation in screening programs be
voluntary or be made compulsory? The controversy over this question has
turned into a full-fledged debate. At least ten states 752 and the District	 f
of Columbia have enacted screening programs which will either require, or
at the discretion of a doctor or health officer may require, black persons
to undergo tests for sickle-cell anemia. There is little disagreement about
the desirability of such tests if they are voluntary, but when the tests are
made mandatory, the debate becomes vigorous.
The City Councilman who introduced the compulsory sickle-cell anemia
legislation in the District of Columbia defends his position, contending that
"this is a trait and a disease that has been ignored. There is no cure, but
a family knowing the facts would know what counseling or steps to take . . .
I don't think we can get at the problem on a voluntary basis. There is too
much apathy."
153
 On the other side of the debate, there are many persons who
find mandatory programs both unnecessary and counter-productive. A recent
genetics task force of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences
strongly urged that
152 Theten states are: Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York and Virginia. At least four
of these states - Naryland, Massachusetts, New York, Virginia - and the
District of Columbia will consider legislation in 1973 to repeal the
compulsory features of their programs.
153Henry S. Robinson, quoted in Victor Cohn, "Disease Publicity Raises
Problems." Washington Post, November 12, 1972, p. Al2.
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s	 genetic screening programs should be conducted on a voluntary
' !{
	
	 basis	 . There is currently no public-health justification
for mandatory screening for the orevention of genetic disease.
The conditions being tested for in screening programs are
i^
	
	 neither "contagious"nor, for the most part, susceptible to
treatment at present .154
It Is also feared that state enforced screening programs will be the beginningf
of greater government intervention into what many consider to be an area for
E	 private decision-making.
When you start talking about compulsory testing, you also
start talking about compulsory genetic counseling. When
you start talking about compulsory genetic counseling, you
r	
start talking about putting the state behind it. Then you
get into all sorts of implications . . . . I'm for voluntary
M j
	
	
sickle trait testing, but I believe compulsory genetic
testing sets a bad precedent in our kind of society.155
The possible implications of compulsory counseling might include state-
supported marriage and sterilization laws for genetic purposes, the precedents
for which already exist. In fact, 25 states still retain eugenic sterilization
statutes, 22 of which are compulsory. 
156 
There are also state laws prohibiting
154A report from the Research Crou p on Ethical, Social and Legal Issues
in Genetic Counseling and Genetic Engineering of the Institute of Society,
Ethics and the Life Sciences, "Ethical and Social Issues in Screening for
Genetic Disease," The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 286, May 25, 1972,
pp. 1130-31. In the case of sickle-cell anemia there is no acceptable and
effective treatment at this time. See R.B. Scott, "Urea Therapy in Sickle-
Cell Anemia," The New England Journal of Medicine, 285: 1025-26, nctober 28,
1971.
155 Paul McCurdy, Georgetown University, quoted in Victor Cohn, oEa. cit.,
supra, n. 153.
156 WilliamR. Matoush, "Eugenic Sterilization - A Scientific Analysis,"
Denver Law Journal, Vol. 46, 1969, p. 633. In recent years, however, these
laws have not been enforced.
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consanguinous marriages, most prohibiting marriage between first cousins or
157
persons more closely related.	 Might not the same legal rationale which
led to these laws also be used to justify their application to carriers of
deleterious genes? 158 While a definitive answer is not possible at this time,
there is some speculation that all such laws might be declared unconstitutional.
159
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 	 the Supreme Court held that the state has no
power to interfere with the use of contraceptives by married couples, such
use being considered one of the rights reserved to the people under the Ninth
Amendment. If one interprets the case broadly, it may be read "to affirm
that the decision by a husband and wife to have children, or not to have
' children, or how many children to have, is one in which the state may not
interfere, whether the purpose be to limit the population or to improve it
eugenically."160	Underlying this reasoning are certain assumptions regarding
the "rights" of couples to reproduce.
1•
E` D.	 Procreation and Genetic Disease:	 If procreation is viewed as a
s,
couple's "right," then it should be useful for planning genetic counseling
activities and services to have some feeling for the kinds of reproductive
decisions that couples will make and the reasons for their decisions. 	 Ramsey
157
Michael Farrow and Richard Juberg, "Genetics and Laws 'Prohibiting'
Marriage in the United States," Journal of the American Medical Association,
209: 535-538, July 28, 1969.
158
In this regard it is interesting to note that Virginia's law also
requires sickle-cell screening for marriage license applicants. 	 Virginia
Code, section 32-112.14
159381
U.S. 479	 (1965).
160Frank P. Grad, "Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and
Possibilities," UCLA Law Review, Vol. 15, February 1968, p. 488.
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finds it "shocking to learn . . . how many parents will acce pt grave risk of
having defective children rather than remain childless." 
161 
Unfortunately,
there are only a few empirical studies concerning the tendency toward risk-
taking among couples and the results are somewhat mixed. In his study of 25
couples, Fletcher found that "Given the choice of accepting a genetically
162
defective child or resorting to abortion, 	 they would choose the latter."
Another study involving 455 couples found that "on the whole, they took
responsible decisions on the basis of the information. Where the recurrence
risk was high - that is, equal to or greater than l in 10 - two-thirds (109
out of 170; were deterred from planning further children." 
163 
In his study
at Yale, Hsia reports that only 25 per cent of the couples in a high risk
group were deterred by counseling. 
164 
And in their study of 76 families,
Leonard and his colleagues report that 34 (45 per cent) stated that "They
165
regarded the disease as a reason for curtailing reproduction."	 Finally,
161 Ramsey, op. cit., supra, n. 89 at 166.
162 Fletcher, oR. cit., supra, n. 134 at 53-54.
163C.0. Carter, K.A. Evans, J.A. Fraser-Roberts and A.R. Buck, "Genetic
Clinic: A Follow-Up," Lancet, Vol. 1, February 6, 1971, p. 281. Both this
and the Fletcher studies may be somewhat biased due to the character of the
sample populations, The majority of the Fletcher sample was middle-class
and has a graduate degree, while the Carter, et. al., sample over-represented
the upper social classes and was probably above average in education.
164Y.E. Hsia, "Choosing My Children's Genes," Paper presented at the
American Association for the Advancement of Science annual meeting,
Washington, D.C., December 29, 1972.
165
Claire 0. Leonard, Gary A. Chase and Barton Childs, "Genetic Counseling:
a A Consumer's View," The New En gland Journal of Medicine, Vol. 287, August 31,
1972, p. 435. This study focused on parents of children with three types of
genetic diseases: cystic fibrosis, phenylketonuria, and Down's syndrome.
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the results of a follow-up study 
166 
in England of 53 women referred for genetic
counseling in families with Duchenne muscular dystrophy (a sex-linked disease
for which there is no treatment) can be summarized as follows: Of the 41
women at high risk (defined as greater than 1 in 10), 36 decided to have no
further children and two decided upon selective abortion. Only two disregarded
the risks and intentionally became pregnant. Of the five women at medium
risk (1 in 10 to 1 in 20),'only one planned to have further children. The
others considered the risks too great. Of the seven women at low risk (less
than 1 in 20) only one was not reassured by the low risks and has avoided
167
pregnancy.
It should be pointed out that in most cases these studies refer to the
impact of genetic counseling on couples' reproductive intentions, not their
observed reproductive behavior. Generally speaking, these data suggest that
counseling can have a significant impact on reproductive attitudes. The
findings regarding actual re productive behavior are not so encouraging. In
the largest of the aforementioned studies, Carter and his colleaques report
E
that of those high-risk couples who stated that they were attitudinally
deterred from having further children, 24 per cent (26 out of 109) had at
least one additional pregnancy. Among the low-risk couples, who also claimed
i
to be attitudinally deterred, 15 per cent (9 out of 60) had at least one 	 R:
,S
166
A.E.H. Emery, M.S. Watt and E.R. Clack, „The Effects of Genetic
Counselling in Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy," Clinical Genetics, 3:147-150,
1972. The investigators report that all socia c asses were represented and
that their distribution was similar to that of the general population.
167 Ibid., pp. 148 and 149.
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additional pregnancy. 
168 
At least in this particular study, there appears
to be a considerable degree of difference between the impact of genetic
counseling on reproductive attitudes and its impact on actual reproductive
behavior. There is an obvious need for more systematic investigation into
the question of risk-taking its well as for determining those factors which
influence such reproductive decisions. .lames R. Sorenson has identified some
of these factors: "(1) the size of the risk, (2) the severity of the potential
abnormality, (3) the social and private attitudes of the parents toward
abnormality, (4) the economic capacity of the family to endure the burden of
a genetic disease, (5) the genetic health of existing children, and (6) the
type of counseling parents receive." 
169 
Butas he points out, there is little
data concerning the specific role that each of these factors (and perhaps
other factors as well) plays in parental decision-making.
'there is no consensus, however, that there is, or should be, a "right
to procreation." Ramsey believes that
If the fact situation disclosed by the science of genetics
can prove that a given person cannot be the progenitor of
healthy individuals (or at least not unduly defective
individuals) in the next generations, then such a person's
"right to have children" becomes his duty not to do so, or
to have fewer children than he might want (since he neve
had any right to have children simply for his own sake).Y70
Thus, Ramsey calls for the development and adoption of an "ethics of genetic
168 Carter, et. al., off. cit., supra, n. 163 at 283.
169 JamesR. Sorenson, "Social Aspects of Applied Human Genetics," Soc ial
Science Frontiers, 1971, No. 3, Copyright (c) 1971 by Russell Sage Foundation,
New York, p. 13.
1 . Ramsey, pp. cTt., supra, n. 87 at 35.
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	t;	 duty," whereby couples act responsibly and morally in order to prevent the
	
`	 birth of a defective child. Joseph Fletcher suga psts that a more appropriate
guideline for developing policy is "needs." He explains that
'	 4 1	 -
'i
l'.
Needs are the moral stabilizers, not rights .
	 . If human
rights conflict with human needs, let needs prevail. If
medical care can use genetic controls preventively to
protect people from disease or deformity, or to ameliorate
such things, then let so-called "rights" to be born step
aside.
Rights are nothing but a formal recognition by society of
certain human needs, and as needs change with changing
conditions so rights should change too. The right to
conceive and bear children has to stop short of knowingly
making crippled 1 5yildren - and genetics gives us that
kntwledge . . .
r r
t
^
j To what extent the state should be the agent for balancing the genetic
"rights" and "needs" of its people is a question that society may soon have
f:
to face. There may be a fine line between a particular genetic defect being
i^
reason for a couple to refrain from procreation and its being reason for
compulsory restrictions on the part of the state.
E. Target Populations: The nature of the orogram also raises questions
concerning the populations toward which such programs should be targeted.
}
The programs aimed at sickle-cell anemia c'iearly demonstrate the problems
involved. These programs, and their efFacting legislation, reoresent the
nation's first genetic effort directed at a particular race. 2 While many
other groups experience a high incidence of genetic disease, e.g. the Ashknazi
171 Joseph Fletcher, "Ethical Aspects of Genetic Conrols: Designed
Genetic Changes in Man," The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 285,
September 30, 1972, p. 782.
172 Sickle-cellanemia, with a frequency of i in 400, is the most common
genetic disease in the black population. The incidence among the white
population is much smaller. See Victor Cohn, "Disease's Effects Often
i	 Exaggerated," Washington Post, November 13, 1972, p. A8.
l
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Jews and Tay-Sachs disease, and those of Mediterranian ancestry and Cooley's
Anemia, none has been singled out for compulsory testing. The problem with
isolating a specific ethnic group is that it might be interpreted as a
racist gesture. Such has been the case with sickle-cell anemia, with some
comparing it to the "racist eugenics legislation that led to the final
solution in Nazi Germany,
11173
 and others viewing it, when combined with some
forms of genetic counseling, as "white genocide." 
174 
Whether or not these
criticisms are valid, they are one reason for the growing opposition among
blacks to sickle-cell programs. And yet, without their involvement and
cooperation it is unlikely that such programs can accomplish their aims.
There is also criticism of laws such as those in Virginia, which
require the screening of persons in correctional institutions and state
mental hospitals. Some question the intent of such laws, maintaining that
there is
no valid reason why prisoners and mental patients should
be tested . . . the potential for mischief is great . . .
scientific knowledge has in the past been perverted to
fulfill social ends, and there is, unfortunately, nothing
. . . whic would lead one to believe there is no basis
for alarm $5
173 JamesE. Bowman, Director of Laboratories, University of Chicago, I
quoted in Victor Cohn, pp. cit., supra, n. 153.
174
Victor Cohn, "Sickle-Cell Project Outlined," Washington Post, July 21,
1972, p. A15. A recent study reports a direct "relationship etween fears
of racial genocide and the use of family planning methods." The investigators
note the depth and source of this fear, writing that Negroes are "responding
to a long history of every possible tyre of oppression which has been
perpetrated against blacks. The resistance to family planning and to family
planning agencies run by whites is merely a symptom of the deep sense of
historical and life-long estrangement." William Darity and Castellano Turner,
"Family Planning, Race Consciousness and the Fear of Race Genocide," The
American Journal of Public Hep.ith, Vol. 62, November 1972, pp. 1458-59.^
175
Bowman, quoted in V ictor Cohn, op. cit.,supra, n. 153.
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Another concern for screening legislation is the age at which persons snould
be screened. For example, the District of Columbia requires that "Each child
admitted to a public school, either kindergarten or the first grade as the
case may be, shall have been tested for sickle-cell anemia." 
176 
There are
many, however, who believe that testing at such an early age is of dubious
value and probably undesirable. They argue that these children "are too young
to fully understand the implications of being a trait carrier, could suffer
from the stigma, and may forget all about it by the time they are likely to
be considering marriage and child-bearing." 
177 
Much more data needs to be
collected regarding the "best time" at which to initiate such testing.
_F. Program Design and Management: Another broad policy concern is the
implementation an, administration of screening programs. It is essential
that screening programs be designed for the purpose of attaining one or more
predetermined goals. Establishing clearly defined goals will help to avoid
circumstances which might be costly in both scientific and human terms. A
recent report suggests that the most important goals of a screening program
are those that
either contribute to improving the health of persons who
suffer from genetic disorders, or allow carriers for a given
variant gene to make informed choices regarding reproduction,
or move toward alleviating the anxieties of families and
communities faced with the prospect of serious genetic disease.178
176 Regulation No. 72-9, section 2 (May 5, 3972).
177B.J. Culliton, "Sickle-Cell Anemia: National Program Raises Problems
As Well As Hopes," Science, Vol. 178, October 20, 1972, p. 294. Also,
E. Beutier, D.R. Boggs, P. Heller, A. Maurer, A.G. Motulsky, and T.W. Sheehy,
"Hazards of Indiscriminate Screening for Sicklinq," The New England Journal of
Medicine, 285: 1485-86, December 23, 1971.
178 Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, op. cit., supra,
n. 154 at 1129.
r
Another reason for establishing goals is to assist in program evaluation. If
screening programs are to compete successfully with other programs for resource,'
allocation, it will be necessary to provide "proof" of their effectiveness in
order to justify public support. identifiable goals are clearly needed for
such evaluation. "Evaluation cannot exist in a vacuum. One must always ask
evaluation 'of what.' Every action, every program has some value for some
„179
purpose.	 Thus, an important task for program planners and administrators
will be to develop appropriate measures and techniques for evaluating their
180
efforts.
The design and operation of screening programs raises other important
considerations for policy-makers. One general observation concerns the
relationship between public programs such as genetic screening and the commu-
nities to be served. Citizen pressure is becoming more influential in
determining what services the community will receive. Suchman writes that
Once sufficient evidence has accumulated to indicate the
potential benefits of a program, the public is likely to
demand the program without waiting for conclusive proof.
The greater the need, the stronger the pressure to put the
program into operation as soon as it begins to look
successful.
Thus, "popular causes" spring up which bring pressure upon
the program administrator to satisfy public demand regardless
of professional judgment or evaluation findings. 181	C
i
179
Edward A. Suchman, Evaluative Research: Principles and Practice in
Public Service and Social Action Programs, Russell Sage Foundation: New York,
1967), pp. 37-38.
180
Fcr a relevant discussion of the needs and problems of program
evaluation, see Suchman, Ibid., especially chapters 6-8; Aaron Wildaysky,
"The Self-Evaluating Organization," Public Administration Review, 32:509-520,
September/October 1 972; and Thomas A. More ouse, "Program Evaluation: Social
Research Versus Public Policy," Ibid., 32:868-874, November/December 1972.
181 Suchman, pp. cit., supra, n. 179 at 153 and 152.
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The difficulties involved are illustrated by the history of PKl! legislation,
in which "a small group of determined and highly motivated parents of mentally
retarded children, together with a few equally dedicated physicians, needed
less than three years to pa rsuade forty-one states to pass laws requiring the
testing of newborn children for nhenylketonuria	 ."182 This effort has
been characterized as "a simplified and incomplete understandinq of the
objective situation, a singleminded campai7a which trumpeteU success and ignored
failures, and most of all a failure to consider the harm that mi qht be done
183
by seeking to do good."	 The result has been a "poor piece of legislation,
one with noble aims, but based upon unwarranted medical assumptions." 184 If
the circumstances surrounding the evolution of PKU le g islation are studied
carefully, it may be possible to avoid similar pitfalls in planning future
screening programs.
185
G. Screening Tests: Extra care must be ta'-en to develop testing procedures
that will be accurate and subject to a minimum latitude of interpretation. A
problem which might develop as a result of unreliable testing methods is that
a "high proportion of false negatives or false positives riot only will cast
suspicion and discredit on the method, 	 but may result in professional
182 Bessman and Swazey, off,. cit., su rp , n. 4; at 49.
-!83
Ibia., P. 50.
184 AmericanAcademy of Pediatrics, "New Child Health !,q-slative Z•^ s
Proposed - Academy Subcommittee Issues Guidelines," quoted in Bessman and
Swaxey, ibid., P. 72.
185History may already be repeating itself. There are cries that a new
kind of "sickle-cell crisis," one due to hastely drawn and poorly-planned
sickle-cell legislation, is occurring. See Cohn, off. Lit., supra, n. 153
at Al.	
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malpractice charges
	 ."	 The case of PKU illustrates this problem as
well as more serious consequences.
Laboratory tests do not detect PKU but rather high blood
phenylalanine levels, which can have causes other than PKU.
Furthermore, the tests suitable for the mass screening
1 required by law are subject to misinterpretation and error.
The tests are not accurate; they miss a number of cases of PKU
and yield false positive reactions in an even greater number.
Given a positive test, the physician will very probably put
+. the child on a low phenylalanine diet.
	
. But a child who
does not have PKU is actively endangered by the diet and can
r,.
suffer physical deterioration at the least; a number of
children have died from being treated forPKU, and it is
likely that they did not have the disease .187
While it may be claimed that the physician is still able to decide the
appropriate course of treatment for an infant, the fact that such legislation
is a matter of public policy exerts a "powerful stimulus to prescribe in
accordance with the cultural mores" 188 and, in the case of PKU, has resulted
in the use of an unproven treatment. 	 Reliable testing procedures, therefore,
+- are necessary both to assure proper treatment and to gain the confidence and
cooperation of the community.
H.	 Screening Services and Delivery:	 There is also the question of what
services should be included in the designing of screening programs. At a
minimum, such services should include follow-up diagnosis, treatment and
186 IrvingLadimer, "Legal Consideration in Screening, Treatment,
Counseling and Research in Sickle Cell Disease," Paper presented at a
Symposium on Sickle Cell Disease, New York, November 19, 1971, pp. 7-8.
187
Bessman and Swazey, op, cit., supra, n. 47 at 50-51.
188 JosephD. Cooper, "The Role of Government Legislation in Management
of Problems in Medicine," in Anderson and Swaiman (eds.), op. cit., supra,
n. 46 at 170. Bessman and Swazey report that there have been at least
"half a dozen malpractice suits involving PKU." Op. cit., supra, n. 47 at 72.
a
_	 a
1
3
T
61
r
..
genetic counseling. Some geneticists contend that
ii
j
	
	 It is probably unjustified on ethical grounds to mount
large-scale screening programs for disease or carrier
detection in conditions where the patient and carriers
cannot be offered specific effective medical therapeutic
alternati es, including intrauterine diagnosis and
'.;	 abortion. 89
This reference to abortion raises sensitive policy questions, including
whether or not public funds should be used to provide abortion services. If
society's resources are expended in order to provide families with information
that is required for intelligent reproductive decision-making, can it then
deny them the option to implement their decision, an abortion being one option
they might choose?
Genetic counseling also has an important role to play in screening
programs. First, it can provide couples with the basic genetic information
required to make informed and intelligent decisions about subsequent
pregnRrcies. And second, it provides the follow-up support needed to help
those couples implement their decisions.
In providing information to couples, the genetic counselor will be able
to explain the source and meaning of a particular defect and, after appropriate
testing and analysis, inform them of the risk of its occurrence or recurrence.
Tice lack of such information might lead to poor derision-making in either of
two directions. Some couples might have additional children when the
probability is high that their future offspring will be adversely affected.
Or, conversely, couples with conditions in which tree risk is very low may
189 RobertF. Murray, Jr., "Problems Behind the Promise: Ethical Issues
in Mass Genetic Screeni „ig,” The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 2, A pril 1972,
p. 13.
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have no further children as a consequence of unreasonable fear. A recent
	
F	 study of families with genetically-ill children found that
regardless of socio-economic class, birth order of the
chronically ill child, religion, burden of care, and the
	
j4	 heriditary nature of the condition, families continue to
	
E	 have children, whether purposefully or unplanned as do the
parents of normal children. There is a strong indication,
however, that this would not be the case if parents were
aware of the risk involved in the transmission of genetic
	 r.
	
!	 defects and if this information were coupled ith knowledge
	
^.{	 of effective techniques to prevent pregnancy. 90
	
-	
E3!
Thus, the proper transmission of genetic information to couples might help
	
j=	 them in planning their future families.
is
# On a second level, counseling is needed to help couples adjust to and
implement their reproductive decisions. A few examples drawn from case
studies provide some insight into the various demands that would call for
1'follow-up counseling. Pletcher studied the period of time following
	
{	 amniocentesis and found
the parents in considerable anxiety, and whatever problems
existed in their marriage or family relationships were
exacerbated
	 . , If a marriage is troubled, the strains
will most likely break forth in this period, testing to the
limits the capacity of the couple to face their problem and
make plans . . . . Counselors should be particularly attentive
to the deeper personal problems which emerge in this period.191
Fletcher describes existing counseling centers as poorly set-up to deal with
these problems, noting that perhaps "one in twenty-five centers would be
sensitive to marital problems and fewer than that would have the means to
help people." 192
 He also found couples in "need for support and counseling
I90
Harry Sultz, Edward Schlesinger and Joseph Feldman, "An Epidemiologic
Justification for Genetic Counseling in Family Plannin g ," The American Journal
of Public Health, Vol. 62, November 1972, p. 1492.
191 Fletcher, o p . cit., supra, n. 134 at 56.
192 Interview with John Fletcher, su ra, n. 114.
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at the time of therapeutic abortion and the deep depression suffered at the
time."
193
 Unfortunately, he notes that abortion counseling facilities are
less than adequate for the task.
Counselling might also be required to follow up on the initial diagnostic
tests. It is important to consider the total health needs of the patient and,
to use the case of PKU, neglect of such needs regarding the dietary problems
might result in more serious physical and emotional problems.
When treatment of a child involves restrictions in diet,
it has broad implications for the entire family. Flow
the parents feel about food, how much they use food as a
weapon in the parent-child relationship, and how the other
children in the home react, can mean the success or failure
of the dietary regime. Consideration of the child as a
member of a family that has many other responsibilities
requires that medicinal and dietary care be obtainable
without undue drain on family resources.194
There is need to assure, then, that any intervention into the genetic
decision-mai<ing process will not be more injurious to the individual and/or
his family than if such intervention had not occurred.
Counseling support might also help couples overcome the severe guilt
feelings which often accompany the birth of an affected child. In the case
i	 of hemophilia, for example
there is a need to deal with the emotional upset that
occurs - the shock at the discovery, the guilt and the
self-blame which comes from the inevitable feeling that
parents are somehow responsible for causing the disorder
and the fears as to what hemophilia entails.
193
Fletcher, op., cit., su ra, n. 134 at 51.
794Recommended Guidelines for PKU Pro g rams for the Newborn, (U.S,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Health Services and Mental
Health Administration, 1971), Public Health Service Publication No. 2160,
P. 9.
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Helping the family through the upset is, of course,
important in its own right, but it is also necessary for
treatment purposes. Until the emotional problems are
handled, it is very likely that the therapeutic efforts
which require education of the parents about the reality
of hemophilia will be hampered.195
Family follow-ups and counseling, therefore, might provide both the parents
and the affected child with more effective genetic guidance.
A commitment to create such counseling services also entails the
responsibility to ensure that the services reach prospective consumers. In
his study of 250 counseling a-.:ts, Sorenson found 25 per cent located in a
hospital setting. He contends that
Hospital based medical genetics will probably increase
significantly as the impact of the various intrauterine
diagnostic procedures become more accepted . . . . Today,
with various forms of heterozygosity detection possible,
as well as amniocentesis, there is an increasing need for
the delivery of medical genetics to be associated with the
facilities of a hospital and laboratory.196
This setting, according to Sorenson, will not only hermit the maintenance of
adequate facilities, but will most likely increase "the proportion of lower
195 LeeSalk, M. Hilqartner and B. Granick, "The Psycho-Social Impact of
Hemophilia on the Patient and His Family," Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 6,
August 1972, p. 503. In the same article (p. 496), the investigators report
that in "14 of the 25 cases, there appears to be a clear-cut deleterious
impact, e.g. contributing to the breakup of the marriage or most leading to
a psychological withdrawal by the husband from family relationships." For
further evidence highlighting the presence and impact of parental guilt, see
David G. Langsley, "Psychology of a Doomed Family," American Journal of
Psychotherapy, 15:531-538, 1961; and Simon Olshansky, C rom c Sorrow: A
Response to Having a Mentally Defective Child," Social Casework, 43:190-193,
April 1962.
196 JamesA. Sorenson, "Sociological and Psychological Factors in Applied
Human Genetics," Department of Sociology, Princeton University, October 1971,
pp. 14 and 15.
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socio-economic groups receiving counseling."197
Consideration should also be given to the nature of the delivery mechanism.
A prime requirement for any mechanism we devise to deliver
service is that it be sufficiently flexible so that we can
individualize the service package to fit in not only with
abilities and peculiarities of the agents who are dispensing
service but also with the individual differences of the
consumers who receive them, and the communities and settings
in which such services are provided and utilized.198
r
The importance of this point can be sufficiently demonstrated by the recent
i
attempts of the National Institutes of Health to promote an employee sickle-
cell testing campaign. The program was cancelled; one of the major reason=-
given for this was that it was "not organized by blacks with black feelings
in mind. 16199
 The Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences has
recommended that "From the outset program planners should involve the
communities affected by screening in formulating program desiqn and objectives,
in administering the actual operations of the program, and in reviewing
results."200
I.	 Screening Facilities and Organization: The provision of adequate and
functional diagnostic facilities must also receive high priority from program
planners. For maximum quality control and personnel expertise, testing should
probably be done in regionally centralized laboratories so that costs can be
minimized and the training of qualified personnel more easily accomplished.
197 Sorenson, op. cit., supra, n. 169.
198 RudolphHormuth, "Or ganization of Community Services in Phenylketonuria,"
in Anderson and Swaiman (eds.), off. cit., supra, n. 46 at 165.
199 VictorCohn, "Black Health Care La q Cited," Washington Post, November 15,
1972, p. Al2.
200
Op cit., supra, n. 154 at 1130.
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A screening program should be carried out in conjunction
with.a facility large enough to handle a volume of samples
sufficient to detect several positive cases per year to
assure experience in laboratory diagnosis. Efficiency is
materially increased when a single central laboratory is
utilized. The development of a system of quality control
on a statewide or regional basis should be cons i dered to
insure a high degree of reliability of results.Z02
Because "biochemical assays necessitate facilities that often are well
beyond the means of the average clinical laboratory, [ it] simply is not
feasible for one laboratory to perform all of the tests now possible . . . " 201
Thus,
Similar consequences to those which resulted from the impact of public
pressure on the evolution of PKU legislation (supra, pp. 59-60) might also
occur during management of diagnostic facilities and the provision of follow-
up services. Past experience with establishing abortion facilities to meet
expanding demands 
203 
and the difficulties which appear to be emerging in the
201
"Geneticists Press for Regionalization," Laboratory Management,
r	 Vol. 10, October 1972, p. 25.
202Recommended Guidelines for PKU Programs for the Newborn, g. cit.,
supra, n. 194 at 4. Such a network as been established By t e National
Genetics Foundation, Inc. Each of their 45 centers in the United States and
Canada is staffed and equipped to perform the biochemical and chromosomal
analyses necessary to diagnose the most common genetic diseases. In addition,
some of the centers have the specialized personnel and facilities required
for diagnosis of one or more rare genetic defects. All of the centers are
staffed to provide genetic counseling and follow-up to any diagnosis. See
their brochure "Genetic Counseling and Treatment Network," (National Genetics
is	 Foundation, Inc., 250 West 57th Street, New York 10019).
203Neubardt and Schulman discuss the problems which resulted in New York
following the changes in its abortion law and conclude that "Abortion has
exposed in rather vivid fashion the weaknesses of our medical institutions."
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development of hospital cardiac programs, 
204 
demonstrate the problems
confronting program planners caught up in a cross-current of public pressure.
The problems may already be emerging in the newly-enacted sickle-cell screening
programs. Virginia, like a number of other states, hurried to join the
bandwagon of states with sickle-cell testing programs. However, Virginia's
Department of Health reports that "Sufficient funds have not been appropriated
for recruiting or hiring the appropriate number of genetic counselors. . . .
Until additional funds are appropriated, we are simply unable to meet all of
the responsibilities placed upon us by the new legislation." 
205 
The consequences
which result, and which merit emphasis, are not only that the necessary
facilities and services will not be provided. but that a "confidence gap" is
created between those designated to provide and perform the services and those
who are to receive them. Such a situation obviously benefits no one and, in
the final analysis, is probably counterproductive.
J.	 Screening Costs: There is also a need to consider the cost of
screening and counseling services. The use of various diagnostic tests and
extensive laboratory work can be quite expensive (for example, a typical
examination with ultrasound of a potentially abnormal pregnancy can cost as
t r	 -
204The Inter-Society Commission for Heart Disease Resources reported
that hospitals are under new public pressure to enlarge their cardiac
programs. The Commission warned that "With the introduction of new techniques
for coronary-artery surgery hospitals are again being stimulated to expand
their surgical programs and there is evidence we may again see a proliferation
of poorly planned units with costly duplications of facilities and suboptimal
care." See "Hospitals Warned on Heart Surgery," Washin ton Post, October 16,
1972, p. A15.
205 PatriciaHunt, Director, Bureau of Child Health, in a letter to this
author, October 6, 1972.
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high as fifty dollars). Systematic study is needed of the costs involved
in providing genetic services to the population and the extent to which
such services are not used because of a family's financial circumstances.
Also important is the role of private health insurance in helping families
absorb the costs of genetic services. At this time,
i
No insurance company 	 . recognizes the concept of
preventive medicine. The fetus is not recognized as	 l `
a patient. Cytogenetics is not, for the most part,
recognized. The insurance situation seems particularly
outrageous when one stops to consider that preventive
medicine will be the mainstay of health care in the
next century. 206	!
.As the availability and demand for genetic services increase, the question
of costs will become an increasingly important matter.
K.	 Screening and Genetic Information: The collection and dispersion
of genetic information acquired through screening programs also raises
important policy questions. As more and more genetic information about
individuals and their families is accumulated, how should it be used? What
protection should be guaranteed to the individual to whom such information
refers? Those who establish data-gathering systems need to be aware of the
possible abuse of the information which they possess.
The management of screening programs carries with it two inherent
potential sources of abuse. First, in a large-scale screening program 	 s
206
	
quoted in Laborator Management, Vol. 10^	 Carlo Valenti, 	 , October
x	 1972, p. 23. Geneticist Valenti reported that Blue Cross/Blue Shield has
"agreed to partially cover the cost of diagnosis depending upon the type
of policy held by the patient. However, the reimbursement schedule which
i,	 they have offered is still less than adequate: 125-40 for a chromosome
analysis and $15-25 for a buccal smear. These figures compare with hospital
charges of $100 for a diagnosis based upon leukocyte cultures, $250 for
a diagnosis based upon amniotic fibroblast cells, and $40 for a buccal
smear."
a
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the responsibility for the quality and quantity of care that a patient
receives rests with a team of medical experts rather than in the context of
of the traditional doctor-patient relationship. Thus, both the medical and
ethical responsibilities to the patient are more diffused and consequently
more difficult to fix. Experience with PKU screening illustrates this point.
Not only are records of tests filed in several different
places in the state health department, but the entire
preventive medicine apparatus of the state, including
psychology, nursing, statistics, social services, nutrition,
and education, is alerted to the condition. In this
process, information which could seriously affect an
individual for life is passed about among nonprofessional,
nonmedical personnel who have no legal or moral responsibility
to the individual.207
The second potential source of abuse arises from the use of computerized
data-gathering techniques. A vast network of screening programs not only
calls for the collection of large amounts of data, but also requires that
such data be rapidly and efficiently stored, retrieved and transmitted
between diagnostic centers. The ability of the computer to meet these demands
makes it an ideal tool for such data management. The problems posed by the
use of computers are not new. They simply change the economics and nature of
processing information in ways that could result in the abuse of civil
liberties. Questions regarding what data is to be collected, for what
purposes, to whom it will be made available, and what mechanisms will exist
for individuals to obtain and contest such data are all matters for public
policy. A recent report of the National Research Council's Computer Science
and Engineering Board describes the challenge to policy-makers.
207
Bessman and Swazey, op. cit., supra, n. 47 at 73.
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i
!	 Our task is to see what appropriate safeguards for the
individual's rights to privacy, confidentiality, and
	
i
due process are embedded in every major record system
in the nation, particularly the computerizing systems
that promise to be the setting for most important
organizational uses of information affecting individuals
	
i
iI	 in the coming decade.208	 i
1 d'
The risks involved in the collection of confidential information from
ji
any part of the population are accepted by society because of the presumed
	 s
benefits of using this information. In the case of genetics, for example,
i `	 the iuentificat-on of heterozygous carriers would be of great value in
estimating the gene frequency among different population. From this
information one could calculate the number of individuals who are likely to
be affected within the particular po pulation. 'thus, better planning for
and control of genetic disease are potential benefits to be derived from
screening programs. There is a need, therefore, to strike a balance between
the community's requirement for information and its subsequent use and the
individual's rights of privacy.
L.	 The Misuse of Information: In developing an appropriate information
policy, one should bear in mind the kinds of abuses that might affect a
"defective" individual. One such abuse is the possibility of encumbering
him with a lifelong public stigma. A diagnostic medical label can destroy
A	 or distort relationships within a family and can close access to many of the
normal channels and outlets usually open to people. Such influence can
result in two ways: first, through affecting an individual's attitudes, his
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208Quoted in Gerald S. Schatz, "Computers and Privacy: Continuing
Questions of Civil Liberties," News Re +art, Vol. 22, December 1972, p. 5.
(News Report is a monthly publication of the National Academy of Sciences).
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image of himself, his self-confidence and, therefore, his involvement in
an activity; or second, by identifying a person in such a way so that he
is systematically discriminated against. Past experience with genetic diseases
d
illustrates this point clearly. Persons with Huntington's chorea, a disease
characterized by progressive mental deterioration, will probably manifest
signs of the disease by age 35, but may not have symptoms until a much later
age.	 Until that time they are quite capable of functioning normally.
However, the stigma which is often associated with a family with a history
of the disease has resulted in "great secrecy within the family because of
"i
the fear of social, economic, !.r legal penalties should the knowledge be
I
	
	 209
made public."
iThe case of sickle-cell anemia illustrates the problems incurred by the
f	 innocent carrier of the disease. The major problem is confusing the person
i
who has the disease with the person carrying the trait, but not the disease
i	 symptoms. A recent report expressed concern about the
dangers of societal misinterpretation of similar conditions
and the possibility of widespread and undesirable labe7-ng
of individuals on a genetic basis. For instance, t&—
public may incorrectly conclude that persons with sickle-
trait are seriously handicapped in their ability to
function effectively in society . . . Extreme cauVon
should therefore be exercised before stm that lend
themselves to stigmatization are taken.
A consequence of such stigmatization is that "much unnecessary anxiety on
the part of parents and trait carriers and psychologic harm occurs when sore
209 JohnWhittier, Audrey Heimler and Charles Korenyi, "The Psyc'"atrist
and Huntington's Disease (Chorea)," American Journal of Psychiatry, V-)l. 122,
June 1972, p, 1550.
210 Instituteof "Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, 9R. c.t., su rF-,
n. 154 at 1132.
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persons are identified as carriers of sickle-cell trait without an
understanding of the harmlessness of their trait." 
211 
Individuals might
come to be regarded as physically weaker or less fit. An example drawn from
experience with another disease may help to W ustrate the possible harm.
Dr. Nicholas Hobbs, director of the staff for a five-agency federal study of
labeling, has reported "growing evidence that for a child to be labeled
anything - whether the label is 'mentally retarded' or `gifted" - influences
what social system he gets into and shapes his whole future." 
212 
Hobbs
cites the example of a young child who was found to have a heart murmur. He
was treated differently by his parents, "sheltered and not allowed to play
with other children." Five years later doctors found the child's heart
perfectly good, but by then "he had already developed a picture of himself
as having heart disease and had taken on a restricted life-style that may
never fully reverse." Great care must be taken, therefore, to avoid
"overprotectinq" carriers when it might later result in their adopting
unnecessary and restrictive life-styles.
Another problem has been the denial to some sickle-trait carriers of
employment opportunities or life and health insurance. For example there
are reports that an airline stewardess was grounded after the airline
discovered she carried the trait. 
21;3
Also, insurance companies "have been
211
Beutler, et. al., op. cit., supra, n. 177 at 1486.
212
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Qu^ted in Suzanne Dean, "Study Probes labeling of Children as Retarded,"
Washington Post, September 6, 1972, p. A8.
213 RudolphJackson, Coordinator, National Institutes of Health sickle-
cell disease program, quoted in B.J. Culliton, "Sickle Cell Anemia: The
Route from Obscurity to Prominence," Science, Vol. 178, October 13, 1972,
n_ 141.
EE
changing or raising the premiums or dropping insurance on persons with the
214
trait . . ."	 Thus, "sickle-cell testing has shown up in employment
records, in insurance company records, and is becoming more and more abused
215
by people who do not understand the nature of the disease."	 While certain
carriers of the sickle trait can experience some problems where the oxygen
supply is diminished, most carriers will never have any problems and there
is "no evidence that trait carriers have a hiqher risk of disease or a shorter
than normal life-span." 
216 
This stigmatization of sickle-cell carriers has
"created emotional resistance among many persons to sickle cell screening and
217
genetic counseling . .	 and consequently, the effectiveness of such
programs has been greatly impaired.
The XYY chromosome abnormality presents yet another problem associated
with stigmatization. This sex anomaly occurs in males with two Y chromosomes
and one X chromosome (the normal chromosome complement for males is one of
both X and Y chromosomes). The controversy which surrounds this aberration
concerns the extent to which its presence predisposes an individual to engage
in antisocial and violent behavior. A review of the literature indicates that
the controversy is far from resolved. On the one hand, there are studies
214 RudolphJackson, quoted in "Bias Against Sickle Trait Victims Probed,"
Washington Post, November 14, 1972, p. A6. Some insurance firms have been
reported to charge trait carriers as much as "150 per cent of the usual
premium	 ." Joseph Christian, quoted in Culliton, oE. cit., supra, n. 213
at 142.
275Mona Blake, School Board, Fairfax County, Virginia, quoted in "Sickle
Cell Examination is Opposed," Washington Post, November 1, 1972, p. B9.
216Christian, c ,.. cit., supra, n. 213.
217Cohn, op.:ic , supra, n. 153 at Al.
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which suggest a correlation between the XYY abnormality and certain types
P
of aberrant behavior, with one concluding that "the additional Y-chromosome
genetically predisposes the 47, XYY male to the development of a psychopathic
i	 personality and to consequent aberrant behaviors and antisocial conduct."218
i'
r	 There is equally persuasive evidence, however, which suggests that there is
u	 no strong correlation between the presence of the XYY chromosome complement
and a particular type of behavior. Two researchers recently claimed that the
suggestion that "XYY males are uncontrollably aggressive psychopaths appears
to be nothing mere than a myth promoted by the mass media." 219 In addition
to the mixed findings suggested by these studies, there are also questions
regarding the methodological and conceptual approaches employed in the
220
Investigations.
	 In light of this continuing debate, therefore, any attempt
to develop policy which seeks to respond to the needs of individuals with the
XYY anomaly would be premature. 
221 
The present state of knowledge does not
218
W,M. Court Brown, "Males with an XYY Sex Chromosome Complement,"
Journal of Medical Genetics, Vol. 5, 1968, pp. 348-49. Also see
Lytt Gardner and Richard Neu, "Evidence Linking an Extra Y Chromosome
to Sociopathic Behavior," Archives of General Psychiatry_, 26: 220-222,
March 1972,
219 SeymourKessler and Rudolf H. Moos, "XYY Chromosome: Premature
Conciuslons," Science, Vol, 165, August 1, 1969, p. 442. Also see S. Wiener
and G. Sutherland, "A Normal XYY Man," Lancet, 2:1352, December 21, 1968.
220
Saleem A. Shah (ed.), Report on the XYY Chromosome Abnormality,
(National Institute of Mental Health: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970),
Public Health Service Publication No. 2103, pp. 23-27.
221 Thequestions for policy consideration might include how much effort
should be directed toward rehabilitating criminals if the underlying basis
for their abnormal behavior is genetically determined. Or, how should the
XYY individual be dealt with both prior to and following the commission of
a crime? Since the XYY chromosomal abnormality can be detected in utero by
amniocentesis, does society have a right to intervene into the repra^uctive
decision of couples found to have conceived an XYY child?
r
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permit any definitive statement regarding the possible link between the XYY
complement and certain types of behavioral pathology. This lack of consensus
highlights the danger "that incomplete or inadequate understanding of the
phenomena might possibly become embedded into public policy or legislative
	
t	 222
enactments."
	
Thus, there is a need for more systematic data collection and
research into this problem, and others like it, in order to provide the necessary
t . information from which policy decisions can be made. While such research
	
-!	 itself creates problems regarding the confidentiality of data and individual
privacy, the problem of stigmatization is apparently an immediate one. A
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recent investi gation concluded that XYY men had been falsely stigmatized
and it is not unreasonable to assume that such information, when improperly
understood, might affect a man's opportunities for gaining employment or
obtaining	 24 parole, or prejudice his judicial proceedings. 	 Furthermore,
presumptions that a person's chromosome pattern clearly
disposes him toward aggressive and antisocial behavior
could lead to further stigmatization of that individual.
Responses from others interacting with . him might be of
222Saleem A. Shah, "Recent Developments in Human Genetics and Their
Implication!, for Problems of Social Deviance," in Daniel Bergsma (ed.),
Advances in Human Genetics and Their Impact on Society, (Birth Defects:
Original Article Series, Vol. 8: The National Foundation - March of Dimes,
July 1972), p. 79.
223
G.R. Clark, M.A. Telfer, D. Bajer and M. Rosen, "Sex Chromosomes,
Crime and Psychosis," American Journal of Psychiatry, 126: 1659-63, 1970.
224 Recently, a public- , interest group threatened a law suit regarding
a study inquiring into the frequency of XYY males in a population of children.
The group felt it an invasion of privacy to get information about an individual
that might guide his future treatment. They took the view that the law
might use this information in some way that would adversely affect the
individual. For example, if it was known that an individual was an XYY,
there might be a greater tendency to judge himguilty if arrested by police.
See Robert Cooke, quoted in Maureen Harris (ed.), p, cit., supra, n. 105
at 82.
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a fora that would tend to promote aggressive behavior,
j	 thereby making a possible upWorranted assumption become
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Care must be taken, therefore, to guard against such abuses.
M.	 Safeguarding Research Data: As suggested earlier, research into
the XYY problem will create its own difficulties. It is important, then, that
the requirements of rigorous scientific research be balanced with the proper
respect for and protection of the rights and welfare of the subjects under
study. The proper protection of the rights of research subjects requires
policy that will safeguard confidential records and protect access to such
}	 information. Unfortunately, only eleven states have statutes that recognize
226
the confidentiality of general research information of a public health nature.
Investigators thus face serious difficulties in protecting such information
from court subpoenas. Even when such statutes are in operation, however, they
are often "overly broad in regard to the possible ranqe of material considered
confidential within the statutes, and thus the researchers and even more
importantly the subject may be misled in relying on a statute that might be
given a narrow judicial construction." 
227 
It would seem to be an appropriate
role of the legislature to formulate more discriminatory models for safe-
guarding the confidential nature of research data. The XYY anomaly, as well
as experience with other genetic abnormalities, illustrates the potential
problems of data management in large-scale screening programs.
225
Shah (ed.), 2E. Sit., supra, n. 220 at 9.
226 RalphK. Schwitzgebel, "Confidentiality of Research Information in
Public HeElth Studies," Harvard Legal Commentate, Vol. 6, 1969, p. 192.
227
Ibid., p. T96.
T' ^v
a
i
u.
77
N.	 Public Education: Much of the stigmatization cited above can be
lessened, and perhaps to a great extent avoided, if the public can be educated
about the nature and consequences of genetic disease. In the case of sickle-
cell disease, the issue is not merely identifying trait carriers, but giving
those individuals and society better information about what being a trait
carrier reins. An educated public can thus be a means of "reducing the
potential risk that those identified as genetically variant will be stigmatized
or ostracized socially." 228 So far, efforts in this direction have not been
very successful. The excessive pessimism and hostility among blacks toward
genetic screening programs has been attributed to the "large amounts of
'unfortunate sensationalism' and badly informed 'scare campaigns' in TV and
newspapers." 
229 
Clearly, a more carefully constructed and broad-based
educational campaign should accompany genetic screening.
Education, however, has other important functions to perform. Studies
indicate that most people are unaware of the opportunities for genetic services,
with persons of the lower socio-economic classes relyinq "primarily on family
and friends for information, [which] means not only that they are not likely
to be as informed as others, but that there is an increased chance that they
230
will in fact receive incomplete and often erroneous health information."
Thus, an important task will be to make peo ple aware of available medical
opportunities. Education is also necessary if persons are to be able to make
228 Instituteof Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, op, cit., supra,
n. 159 at 1130.
	 SLit.,
 op. Lit., supra, n. 153.
230 Sorenson, U.  Sil., supra, n. 196 at 7-8.
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intelligent decisions regarding their future medical and genetic status.
A survey of PKU parents demonstrates the educational challenge ahead. The
survey was designed to find out how much such parents knew about their
	
'	 circumstances; the results were not very encouraging.
1. 61% did not know the disorder was inherited;
2. 58% did not understand the importance of early diagnosis;
3. 56% said that they had never discussed the condition with
a professional source;
4. 56% did not know that the condition can be treated with a
	
^
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special diet.231
If genetic screening programs are to be effective in ameliorating the effects
of genetic disease, an educated public is essential.
IV.	 Genetic Counseling
i
Genetic counseling is one of the most important means for transforming
the results of medical and genetic's research into measures designed to provide
immediate and practical aid to individuals. The emphasis of the following
discussion will be on the training requirements for genetic counseling, the
possible roles tnat genetic counselors might assume in performing their
counseling services, doctor-patient communication, and the responsibilities
of the genetic counselor to his patients and society, particularly with respect
to the information to which he has access.
A.	 Training Requirements: Today there are about 200 genetic counseling
units in the United States. With the increasing awareness of the need for
counseling, the number of these units should proliferate. The services offered
by the units, however, will only be as good as the counseling personnel which
231 Lloyd Kramer and Benjamin White, "A Survey of Families and Relatives
of Proven Phenylketonuria (PKU) Patients in Maryland," Paper presented at
AO-A n......,I au,,..+,..., n --- ;,..,_ n..ki;- u­ i4,6	 iecn
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provide them.
What appears to be developing	 . is a rapidly expanding
knowledge base permitting increasingly refined prediction
and control of genetic and chromosomal problems, but no
concomitant professional or organizational locus of training,
socialization and control. What this means is that genetic
counseling as currently practiced exhibits considerable
diversity, With no singular professional training experience,
counselors rely largely on their individual medical	 w
backgrounds, local institutional constraints, as well as
the specific demands placed on h m in the counseling
session to shape their counsel. 3
As a result of this diverse and often narrow educational and training
experience, two problems emerge. First,
because most physicians lack adequate training in diagnosing
genetic defects, misdiagnosis and inappropriate advice can
be serious problems. For example, if a couple are told
that a given problem is genetic and accordingly opt for
sterilization, they have taken an irreversible step. If
the doctor was wrong, not only has he caused the couple
much grief, but he is legally liable. The current structure
of genetic counseling facilities combined with the lack of
diagnostic capacity make such problems likely. In addition,
given the current lack of training in medical genetics,
practicing physicians probably ignore the genetic aspects
of many diseases.233
The second problem which stems from this diversity in backgrounds is that
Professional counselors . . . tend to erect fences
around their area of counseling interest and, by fiat,
allow other professionals to give genetic facts but not
counseling.
Counseling preserves established by vested areas of interest
also increase the likelihood that families will miss
vital pieces of information. When no one person carries
80
the primary responsibility for organizing the genetic
information and counseling the family, important aspectsis
of information may be overlooked.234
i^
There is a need, therefore, to define qualifications and to provide
f	 proper training for genetic counselors and to consider ap propriate guidelinesI
x	 for the conduct of counseling services. Ladimer suggests that appropriate
standards should cover the
(1) definition of the field or process of genetic counseling;
(2) scope of services; (3) practitioners qualified to serve;
(4) institutional and other settings suitable for counseling;
(5) protection of interests; (6) relation to other fields,
professions and services; (7) methods for evaluation; and
(8) professional and community obligations.235
Certainly, an important goal of training counselors should be to sensitize
them to the wide variety of needs and expectations that may be expressed by
their patients.
B. Role nrientation: Sensitizing the genetic counselor to patient needs
and expectations naturally raises the question of how he should relate to his
patients. The role orientation of counselors has been a subject of considerable
discussion. Two basic positions can be distinguished. On the one hand, there
are those who view the counselor as an informer, whose task is simply to
inform the couples of the risks involved. They see any attempt on the
counselor ' s part to influence the decisions of those whom he counsels as beyond
r
a
involvement with his counselees. No matter which of the two views one
i
adopts, it is important to recognize the influential role which a counselor
can assume. Sorenson has observed that
counselees are often informationally dependent on the
counselor for not only a technical diagnosis and assessment
of their situation, but they seek in addition some assistance
`i	 in giving meaning to the condition they find themselves in,
a condition of calculated risk, but a condition for which
there are few behavioral precedents as to how to interpret 	 te,.
these risks or how to make sense out of them.236
Thus, lacking adequate and meaningful information, a couple seeking help is
confused and worried. They are searching for someone with authority to
answer their questions and this "dependency role" may make them more
susceptible to the counselor's own views. And it is difficult, if not
impossible, for the feelings of the counselor not to be conveyed to his
237
patients.	 The opportunities which exist for counselors to influence the
decision of a couple are illustrated by the following example.
If the couple is facing the risk for an autosomal recessive
disorder the counselor can tell the couple that they have
a three in four chance of having a normal child. He might
do this if he thinks that the couple ought to have more
children. On the other hand, if he is pessimistic and
believes that the couple ought not to chance reproducing
he might say that they face a risk of one in four that the
child will be abnormal. In both cases the same factual
236 , cit., supra, n. 232 at 15. Sorenson presents an excellent
description and analysis of the context in which genetic counseling occurs,
emphasizing the evolution of a new doctor-patient relationship and its
implications for applied genetic decision-making.
237
Fletcher's study tends to support this point, with the finding that
"The counselor's wishes for outcomes in a case will be conveyed directly or
indirectly to the patient." (emphasis added) 0^. cit., supra, n. 134 at 60.
The importance of recognizing and analyzing the nature of this influence is
stressed by Sorenson, who writes that "the ultimate role of who makes final
decisions regarding the use of genetic knowledge is usually less ethically
and morally neutral than is the situation in the delivery of more standard
medical services." Op. cit., supra, n. 196 at 19.
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information is conveyed to the clients.
	 In the first
situation the counselor stresses normality, while in
ii the second he stresses the potential abnormality. 	 This
variation is certain to have an impact on the decision
of the clients.238
-
I
Thus, the genetic counselor's own biases may well become important factors
influencing a family's decision.
C.	 Doctor-Patient Communication:
	 The ultimate quality of genetic
counseling will, to a large extent, depend on the interaction between the f
_. patient and the counselor.
	 of the various factors which contribute to this
interaction, certainly one of the most crucial is the communicative process
• between the counselor and his counselees.
	 Now well do patients receive,
comprehend,	 and apply the information given to them by their physicians?
To what extent are instances of misunderstanding
	 d d'an	 ng an	 istortion due to the
patient's or physician's inability to "communicate"?
	 Answers to these
questions are crucial, for it may well be that shortcomings in the treatment
r
of a chronic illness can be related to such misunderstanding or distortion. 239 j
There appear to be at least three pertinent clearly-defined variables
in the doctor-patient communicative process.
	 First, there is the ability of
E the physician-counselor to communicate information to his counselees.
	 Of
what value is it to have pertinent information unless the counselor is able
238
8orenson, 92. cit., supra, n. 196 at 22.
239 Undoubtedly, many individuals distort, forget, or reject the nenetic
information conveyed to them by the genetic counselor. A study of parental
understanding of phenyiketonuria concludes: "If exposing parents to merlY.al
information aims at improving their understanding of the illness or at
favorably influencing the course of the child's illness, the present study
f83
-	 to deliver it effectively? But while it is the counselor's role to promote
effective communication, it is a role, according to some, "for which most
physicians have unfortunately had little training." 240
 The problem resulting
from poor communication is described by a recent study of doctor-patient
communication in a pediatric clinic of a large hospital. The study found
that physicians tend to be overly technical in the language they use with
f
,--a
	
their patients. "In more than half of the cases we recorded the physicians
resorted to medical jargon. This did not necessarily leave the patient
dissatisfied;
	 It did, however, leave most of the mothers unenlightened
about the nature of the child's illness." 241
 This problem is also applicable
to genetics. Unless the information is properly explained and understood, it
may evoke unreasonable fear on the part of families. For example, in a
follow-up study at a genetic counseling clinic, it was found that in some
instances odds had no meaning to couples. "The mother of a child with a
myelocele remembered that she had been given a 1 in 25 risk, but said that
if she had another child 'either it would or would not be affected and so the
risk is 50/50 1 . 1 '
242
 On the basis of her reasoning, this woman had adopted
three children. Unquestionably, then, "attention to effective communication,
a skill that should not be too difficult for any trained person to master,
could make a valuable contribution to the quality of health care and its
availability to the general population."
243
 Genetic counseling would appear
240 Reismanand Matheny, oR, cit., supra, n. 15 at 30.
241
Barbara Korsch and Vida Megrete, "Doctor-Patient Communication,"
Scientific American, Vol. 227, August 1972, pp. 71-72.	 i
242 Carter, et. al., oar. cit., su ra, n. 163 at 282.
243
Korsch and Megrete, op.  Lit. , supra, n. 241 at 74.
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to have much to gain from a concerted effort in this direction.
In a recent study in a congenital heart clinic with a well trained
genetic counseling unit, it was found that after receivin g
 genetic information
only about 25 per cent of the families retained and understood the attendant
recurrence risks. 244 Thus, even with highly-skilled genetic counselors, the
reception and understanding of genetic information was significantly impaired.
This leads to a second variable in the doctor- patient communicative process:
the basic knowledge of biolo gy and genetics that patients bring tv the
counseling session. Leonard and his colleagues found that "the substratum
of biologic knowledge possessed by many parents is inadequate to support
the information imposed upon it by the counselor." 246 In the long run,
therefore, there is a need for a better-educated public. Of more immediate
'r
	
concern, however, is the need for systematic and empirical investigation into
how counseling information is received and applied. Perhaps such information
t	 should be repeated. If so, how often and at what intervals? It might also be
helpful to modify counseling services to the specific educational and socio-
economic backarounds of the consumers. How this might be most effectively
and efficiently accomplished will require additional study.
While greater education is a necessary prerequisite for more effective
doctor-patient communication, it is apparently not always suffient for
producing the desired effect, e.g, the family's understanding of the counseling
information. in a study of PKU families, "Parents with greater education were
244J.A. Reiss and V.O. Menashe, "Genetic Counseling and Con genital Heart
Disease," Journal of Pediatrics, 80:655--656, April 1972.
246Leonard, et. al., off. cit., supra, r. 165 at 438.
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246
ii	 no less inaccurate or distortion prone than those with less education 	 ."
The investigators suggest that "the capability to understand illness might be
considered an emotional phenomenon." 
247 
Thus, a third important variable is
+	 the context in which genetic counseling is provided. A recent study of qenetic
counseling cited " emotional conflict" as an inhibiting influence on a family's
understanding of counseling information. 248 To what extent, then, do parents
• "	 remember information given to them when the context is so emotionally charged?
Is reinforcement required? If so, what forms should it take? Clearly, the
Motional context of genetic counseling requires careful assessment when
.	
t
considering ways to improve the counseling process.
Doctor-patient communication, then, is an essential element of the
counseling process and thus becomes an important criteria for designing and
evaluating genetic screening programs. The three variables discussed above
must be viewed as essential elements of doctor-patient communication, which,
if carefully studied, evaluated and im proved upon, could contribute to more
effective control of genetic disease.
k	 D. "Responsible" Genetic Counselinq: How one defines the responsibility
3
of the genetic counselor to his pa^ients will depend, to a large extent, on the
way one characterizes the practice of genetic medicine. There are those who
contend that genetic screening and counseling are altering the paradigm of the
246Sibinga and Friedman, off. cit., supra, n. 239.
247
Ibid.
248 Leonard, et. al., J.. cit., supra, n. 155. The investigators noted
(p. 435) that five of the Families interviewed "observed that the genetic
information given at the time of dia gnosis or shortly thereafter was not
retained because of emotional shock." Also, see supra, pp. 63-64.
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traditional doctor-patient relationship and thus changing the nature of the
physician's responsibilities within that context. 	 Traditionally, the practice
of medicine was primarily devoted to individual therapy, with the patient
'..he responsibility of a single physician.
	
Large-scale sc reening programs,
however, have shifted the focus of attention from the individual to a larger
population and from a single physician to team care. 	 While medical codes
+ ' regarding the professional responsib i lities of the physician to his patient
have been adequate for those problems arising from the traditional practice
of medicine, new genetic technology and the kinds of medicine it makes
s.
possible may require a reevaluation of the ethical norms governing medicine,
Perhaps the best illustration of the problems which can arise concerns the
4
kinds of information that should be given to the patient.
Under the traditional doctor-patient relationship, the p<ysician
examines his pa4t ient and, on the basis of his diagnosis, then acts to prescribe
the most effective alternative for alleviating the illness. 	 in this
arrangement, the patient assumes that the physician possesses superior
knowledge concerning questions of medicine and health. 	 This is not the case
in genetic counseling.	 "There is no assurance that a counselor has any more
expertise than the counselee in evaluating risks for recurrence of a problem
or in estimatin-7 the ability of the family to adequately handle a problem,
249
should it occur." 	 Under these circumstances, then, the counselor gives a
couple information so that they can act, rather than as a prerequisite to his
acting on them. Questions arise, however, concerning the status of a
249Sorenson, op. cit., supra, n. 232 at 9.
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physician's therapeutic privilege in the counseling context. That information
should he give to his patients? Unfortunately, traditional ethical precepts
offer little guidance. Consequently,
Since there are few normative guidelines outlining the
information that should be given in the counseling sessions, 	 ,F
other than the provision of minimal information about the
	 j
disease and its recurrence risk, the actual information
that is exchanged, and the degree to which this constitutes
counsel, advice, or behavioral suggestion, varies depending
on the particular conditions.250
Y
i
The problems which may emerge from this unsettled situation can be
demonstrated by the following "cases."
Earlier discussion of the XYY chromosome abnormality emphasized the
inconclusive nature of research concerning its consequences on human behavior
( supra-, pp. 73-74). Assume for the moment that amniocentesis is performed on
an expectant mother concerned that her child might be a Tay-Sachs baby,
While no evidence of Tay-Sachs disease is found, the abnormal XYY chromosome
abnormality is discovered. What should the counselor tell the mother? One
question which this example raises is whether a counselor can simply act as
an "informer," responsible only for providing his patients with the facts?
In the case of the XYY anomaly, what are the "facts"? What consideratiork
should the counselor give to the effect on the parents and their family
situation if given this information? Might parental concern about the possible
presence of an abnormality adversely influence their care of the child? A
recent report on the XYY anomaly suggested that "parental expectations and
apprehensions about possible - but as yet unknown or even non-existant -
250
Ib id ., pp. 16-17.
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problems, may well create certain difficulties and lead unwittingly to
251
self--fulfilling prophecies." 	 Perhaps more importantly, should individual
counselors, each with their own built-in biases and operating within the
context of varied family situations, be given the responsibility to make
such decisions? By whom and by what criteria should such responsibility be
allocated? And if a child or young adult, while participating in a screening
program to detect other sex anomalies is found to be an "XYY" should he be
informed of this condition? Ramsey raises the question o l, "whether the
individual might be endangered by the acquisition, in any society, of complete
knowledge [or in the XYY case, of partial and as yet unconfirmed knowledge]
of his behavioral genetics? Such knowledge may be too heavy for many to bear
and still rem
	
252
ain spontaneous and free in their personal lives." 	 Without
any common ethical perspective, answers to these questions would undoubtedly
vary from counselor to counselor and according to the situational context in
which they occur.
In cases in which early detection of a disease cannot be accom panied by
appropriate treatment for the patient or his family, the question arises
whether the uncovering of the disease does more harm than good. The urgency
of this question is demonstrated by the possible development of a safe and
253
accurate test for presymptomatic detection of Huntington's chorea.	 A
251
Shah (ed.), op. cit., supra, n. 220 at 26.
252, cit., supra, n. 86 at 174.
253H.C. Kiawans, G.W. Paulson and A. Barbeau, "Predictive Test for
Huntington's Chorea," Lancet, 2: 1185-86, December 5, 1970. The authors
report using "levodopa" as t eir testing agent. They stress the need, however,
for additional e=xperimental testing and caution against hasty interpretaticns
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reliable and accurate test will mean that persons who lack the deleterious
gene will be reassured that the disease will not develop , and, thus, they
will also be reassured that any children that they might have will be
unaffected. But for those whose tests are positive, they will be confronted
rwith the fact that their future will include gradual physical and mental
degeneration. This possibility has led some to argue that "it is not 	
f
unreasonable to withhold the use of a test of this sort until we have something
tangible to offer to those who give a positive result," suggesting that
"depression and the risk of suicide would be more or less inevitable." 254
There are those who would object to this alternative, finding "no reason to
deprive the patients involved of the right of decision to learn, early or late,
their inevitable fate." 
255
(emphasis added) It is important to remember that
if the test is to be of value, persons with predictive signs of Huntington's
chorea must refrain from having their own children. If such persons are to
be informed, then it is imperative that the counselor carefully evaluate the
emotional state of the patient prior to tellin g him, "Should the diagnosis
be confirmed without proper preparation, serious behavioral or mood disorders
may ensue, including suicide." 
256 
Thus, what is to be told and how it is to
of test results, noting that "A positive result does not prove Huntington's
chorea, it only increases the prediction coefficient . . . A negative result
is still meaningless and requires new evaluation in years to come."
254 DavidL. Stevens, "Test for Huntington's Chorea (cont.)," The New
Englane Journal of Med i cine, Vol. 285, August 12, 1971, o. 414.
255 WillardGaylin, "Genetic Screening: The Ethics of Knowing," The New
England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 286, June 22, 1972, p. 1362.
L256 Whittier, et. al., op. cit., supra, n. 209 at 1550.
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be told assume new proportions in the information equation established
between the counselor and his patient.
	
i
While the above examples are single, isolated cases, they help to
demonstrate some of the issues which may emerge concerning the counselor's
responsibility in providing information to his counselees. A general overview
of this responsibility highlights four additional policy questions. First,,is
the question of whether persons are deprived of their freedom of choice when
pertinent information is withheld. Without the knowledge necessary for
making intelligent decisions, i.; the power to decide still meaningful? When
arbitrating the question of what to communicate to the patient, it should be
remembered that "For parents, genetic counseling can constitute a fundamental
crisis, or emergency. in their reuroductive careers. At issue is the decisinn
257
as to whether to keep open or to close the social family biologically."
To what extent, then, should a "third party" be permitted to take that decision
(in any meaningful sense of the term) away from a couple?
A second issue concerns the validity of the assumption that the withholding
of information would be in the best interests of the patient. Some geneticists
express the opinion that, in the case where there is no effective therapy for
an illness informing the patient and his family of his condition will do more
harm than good. Knowledqe of the condition
prior to its clinical manifestation may merely provoke
increased patient or parental anxiety without offering
them any positive reassurance. There will be little
benefit to the patient and, for a time, at least, some
possible degree of harm to the parents and pp atient,
depending upon their emotional stability.258
4
257Sorenson,oP. cit., supra, n. 232 at 10.	 5
258Murray, op . cit., supra, n. 189 at 10
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-F It is certainly questionable, however, whether the counselor will be able
i i to determine what the "best interests" of his counselee are. 	 Genetic
h
counselors, unlike the family physician, are not well-acquainted with their
it
patients and their families. 	 Thus, some believe that "[hen counseling
becomes much more routine, part of the accepted practice should not be the
^b
routine of withholding information from the counselees on the spurious
15
grounds that the counselors know what is best for patients they hardly know
269
at all."	 There is also the problem of a physician's own values, which may
differ from those of his patients, and the effect that they might have on his
judgment to discern his patient's best interests. 	 "The potential for conflict
is especially great in genetic counseling in which the options elected depend
on one's opinions about such controversial matters as the iripGrtance of the
260
traditional concept of family, the morality of divorce and of abortion, 	 ."
The cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship is the patient's trust
in the integrity and ability of his physician. This poses a third question:
If information that is withheld today is discovered later, what will be the
effect on the relationship between the medical profession, and particularly
genetic counseling, and its patients? Might there be a general loss of
confidence in the medical profession brought about by the routine withholding
of information? When could a patient be sure that he was being told all?
The possible damage to the practice of medicine and its consequent impact on
259
Alexander M. Capron, "Ethical and Legal Aspects of Genetic Counseling,"
Paper presented at the First Advanced Symposium: Genetic Counseling, The
New England Institute, Ridgefield, Connecticut, July 6, 1972, p. 4.
260 Ibid., p. 5.
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the health of the population must be added to the growing list of policy
considerations.
t,	 The fourth and final broad policy question concerns the nature of the
counselor's responsibility beyond his individual patient. Specifically,
what is the responsibility of the counselor toward a patient's family and
society? With respect to access to information, it has been sug qested that
"As a general rule all unambiguous diagnostic results should be made available
261
to the person, his legal representative, or a physician authorised by him."
A question arises as to whether a patient's family should also be told, since
this might dive them the opportunity to evaluate intelligently their own
health status. It has been suggested that the traditional, confidential
doctor-patient relationship might be less important than people's "right to
know about the risks that they run, whether infectious, toxic, or genetic." 262
And if such information is withheld, could the physician or screening program
administrators be found legally negligent?
There may be instances in genetic medicine where the needs of the
individual and those of society conflict. Considering the possible dangers
of the presence of the XYY chromosome abnormality, does the counselor have the
responsibility to forewarn the community and perha ps expose the XYY individual
and his family to an undercurrent of social and legal pressures? And upon
making a diagnosis of Down's syndrome and advising his counselees, to what
extent should the counselor consider the costs to societ_/ of providing
261 Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, op. c , t., supra,
n. 154 at 1131.
262 JohnLittlefield, quote in Time, June 26, 1972, p. 51.
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institutional care for that child? This issue requires considerable thaught
and leads one to ask if the individual physician is in a position to measure
and evaluate the cumulative, and sometimes remote, effects of his individual
s	 acts? Should such considerations influence the case of his patient? It
might well be that "The individual physician is unfaithful to the trust the
s	 patient places in him if he withholds a specific therapeutic agent in
anticipation of some eventual perturbation of human ecology. Society,
263
therefore, cannot possibly delegate such decisions to each physician."
t'
But how society and its institutions is to make these decisions is far from
clear.
Genetic technology is becoming an increasingly important part of
society's vast medical arsenal. Applying such knowledge, however, may create
a myriad of problems. In the hope of stimulating discussion and focusing
a
attention on the most pressing policy issues related to genetic technology,
this paper has sought to identify and analyze some of the major problem
areas. It is apparent that society must begin to make some conscious
decisions regarding the use of this technology. How these decisions are
made will affect not only the health of this generation, but that of many
generations to come. These, then, are the promises and problems of genetic
technology.
k
":	 e
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Edmund D. Pellegrino, "Physician, Patients, and Society: Some New
Tensions in Medical Ethics," in E. Mendelsohn, et. al., op. cit., supra, 	 i
n. 47 at 80.
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E, Community Level Impacts of
Expanded Underground Coal
Mining
Vary T. COATES, P.I.
May 1975, pp. 1-35
F d',
INTRODUCTION
Under a research contract from the Electric Power Research Institute,
Hittman Associates, Inc., undertook to perform "A Technology Assessment of
Extraction of Coal by Underground Mining Methods." Project Independence an-
ticipates increasing coal production from 599 million tone per year to between
1.2 and 1.5 billion tons within ten years, much of the increase to go for the
generation of electricity. It is further anticipated that accomplishing this
objective will require the opening of one new underground mine (as well as one
new surface mine) per month during the ten year period. Hittman Associates
was therefore asked to evaluate the requirements for deep mined coal in terms
of alternative future production strategies, to analyze the interrelationships
among technological components of the deep mining process, to describe opera-
tional constraints on the expansion of deep mining, to analyze the impact of
present and projected developments upon the physical, social, and community de-
velopment environments, to identify present, potential, direct, and indirect
participants and affected parties and their role in this development, and to
specify and assess a range of public and private policy alternatives which are
practically available to -increase the production of deep mine coal for electric
generation.
As a subcontractor to Hittman Associates, The Program of Policy Studies
in Science and Technology (The George Washington University) was asked to (1)
identify and evaluate the various roles and interests of the groups directly or
indirectly connected with ( potentially affected by) underground coal mining;
and through consultation to assist Hittman Associates in their performance of
two further tasks: (2) analysis of impacts of expanded coal production in a
3
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geographical area or community selected by them for a "site study" or "case
study," and (3) specification of a range of public and private policy alterna-
tives (including strategies for related R&D and monitoring requirements) which
i
appear to be practically available to increase the production of deep mine coal
and delineation of the consequences of adopting each alternative.
In carrying out these tasks, the Technology Assessment Group (TAG) of
the Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology:
(a) reviewed recent and current literature concerning underground
coal mining, in order to develop a tentative list of poten-
tially affected parties and participants in the process (see
Appendix A, Bibliography);
(b) conducted lengthy but informal interviews with representatives
of such participants and parties who could be identified in
Washington, D.C. area (see Appendix B for a list of interviews);
y
	
	 (c) analyzed available census materials and other data related to
the counties selected by Hittman Associates for their case study
}
	
	
or site investigation (Marion and Monongalia Counties in West
Virginia);
(d) conducted interviews with community representatives, leaders,
and decision makers in the selected West Virginia Counties, in
order to identify other potentially affected parties who may
not be represented by recognized or organized interest groups
(see Appendix C);
(e) sought for case studies +,f similar communities where rapid
expansion of similar extraction industries (or the decline of
such in ,4ustries) has occurred, and utilized one such case his-
tory for comparison with the West Virginia counties, in order
to project and generalize potential impacts on the country as
a whole.
The following report deals only with community level impacts and describes
the situation in one western county where rapid expansion of an extraction in-
dustry, closely similar to underground coal mining.. has recently occurred. It
then attempts to project the impact which similar development might have on
E1
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Marion and Monongalia Counties, West Virginia, in order to forecast the im-
pacts at the local level which may be anticipated from a national expansion
of deep coal production such as envisioned by Pro ject Independence. In this
report, we have relied heavily on recent studies by the Technology Assessment
Group (TAG) of six communities in other sections of the country to provide a
baseline of information about problems and trends affecting rural small com-
munities.
'
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COMMUNITY LEVEL IMPACTS OF EXPANDED UNDERGROUND
COAL MINING
The Case of Sweetwater, Wyoming .
In order to forecast the potential local impacts of underground coal
mining expansion, and to generalize these to national and regional impacts,
3
it is instructive to look at a case history of a county in which rapid expan-
sion has already occurred in a very similar industry.*
it
r	
Sweetwater County, Wyoming, historically depended on railroading and
coal mining as the mainstays of its economy. 	 Both declined rapidly after
World War II, railroad employment dropping from 1,700 in 1950 to under 300
in 1974, and coal mining employment from 2,000 in 1960 to almost nothing in
1974 (some increase in coal mining is now expected).
Other industries took up the slack, chiefly construction of Flaming
Gorge Uam, oil and gas production, and a steady growth in trona mining. 	 By
1970 mining and processing -- -including trona, oil, and coal -- employed
1500 people.
In 1970 a boom began in Sweetwater County, as a "cumulative result of
separate (corporate) decisions to invest large amounts of capital" in trona
plant and mining operations and in construction at the Jim Bridger Power Plant.
Trona, used as an industrial chemical, is natural soda ash, and is mined ±,3
with processes and technology very similar to those used in underground coal
mining.	 Miners from West Virginia have in fact been recruited to work in
Y
*John S. Gilmore and Mary K. Duff, University of Denver Research Institute,
Denver, Colorado 80210: A Growth Management Case Study: Sweetwater County,
Womin . Final draft, December 1974. Prepared for Rocky Mountain Energy Company.
We are greatly indebted to John Gilmore for permission to draw heavily on
DRI's excellent study. We have endeavored to report the findings of this study
as accurately and faithfully as possible, and apolo gize in advance for any in-
advertent misinterpretation.
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western trona mines since they need little or no further training.
	 Thus we
.	 can relate the experiences of Sweetwater County to the potential local impacts
u
of rapid expansion of underground coal mining.
j	 From 1971 to 1974, mining employment increased 73 percent, from 1,530
to 2,650 men, better than 17 percent growth per year.
	 Construction employment
i'
[associated both with trona mining and the power plant] shot up from 400 to
4,800.	 Local and state government employees, including school teachers, cor-
a
respondingly rose from 880 to 1,300.
=m	 Total employment in the county from 1970-74 more than doubled, from
7,230 to 15,225.	 County population also doubled, from 18,391 to 36,900.	 Ac-
cording to Gilmore* a growth rate of five percent per year would have been
manageable, but Sweetwater's growth from 1970 to 1974 was 19 percent per year.
The infrastructure was inadequate. 	 The market mechanism was unable to furnish}I
r	
the factors of production.	 Housing was in short supply and prices rose rapidly,
`l
retail sales facilities were overloaded, and the financial viability of munici-
palities and school systems deteriorated through a lack of both ca,.ital and
operating -funds.
The housing industry was unable to respond rapidly to the sudden demand.
Construction labor had to be imported and pirating was common.	 Local sewage
.	 treatment was inadequate and housing developers had to build treatment facili-
ties.
	
Much of the land in the county was owned by the government (as is the
. 
case in many western counties) and a few large owners -- some of them corpora-
Lions -- held the rest, so that a seller's market prevailed.	 The result was	 _y
that new housing was priced too high for workers; the largest homebuilder in
f *0R. cit.
}
AA
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the region, for example, decided against a 200 unit project for this reason,*
Mortgage money was in very short supply.
New workers therefore had to rely on mobile homes, of which there were
soon 4,000 to 5,000 in the county. The average mining Family in Sweetwater
County has 2.2 children, .9 dogs, and .3 cats -- so mobile home living was
often cramped and unsatisfactory.**
Overcrowding, the case study team concluded, contributed to increases in
alcoholism and mental problems, petty crime, violence, behavioral and educa-
tional problems with the children, family fights, and high divorce rates. It
also increased fire hazards, caused breakdowns in sanitary and trash collec-
tion systems, overloaded public service facilities, and caused excessive burden-
ing of medical care facilities.
Educational and recreational facilities also fell behind. Both local
school districts bonded themselves up to the local limit but the accumulated
deficit in building facilities rose to $3 million.
Prices rose even faster than the national rates of increase. This put a
heavy burden on both newcomers and long-time residents, but especially those
i
residents with fixed incomes and those in service and government employment
9
whose salaries did not go up as fast as industrial wages. Available employment
	 j
for women did not increase proportionately to total employment. Wives and
daughters of the newcomers sought jobs and could not find them.
Crime rates, traffic congestion, and parking problems were increased
dramatically. One police agency reported that complaints rose 50 percent in
a year.
-	 i
*Gilmore and Duff, n2. cit., p. 14. The average annual income for Sweetwater
miners was (1974) $11,4A0. Using the home mortgage borrowing power rule used
by most mortgage companies (twice annual income) this would indicate mining
families with one wage earner could afford a house -osting approximately $25,000
or renting for $190-240; typical new housing in the county is said to cost about
$34,000 to $43,000 or rent for about $235 monthly.
**According to an unpublished mining company survey, cited in Gilmore and Duff,
P. l5.
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As  the quality of life in the community deteriorated, the impacts on the
i-Olning companies were also dramatic. Productivity declined by 25 to 40 percent
from 1972 to 1973, and tonnage per shift in the trona mines dropped 60 to 75
percent. Employee turnover rose sharply -- 35 percent in some companies and
up to 100 percent in others	 in spite of attractive competitive wages, labor
supply could not catch up to demand and workers had to be actively recruited
from areas as far away as Canada and blest Virginia.*
Lmployment turnover in municipal government also rose sharply since
government salaries were not competitive with those o{- industry. When gov-
ernment pay was increased, municipal budgets were strained but people were
still not available. Demands for increased municipal services could not be
met. The additional assessed valuation from new homes even at inflated prices
did not cover the related demands made on municipal revenues -- this was true
even for conventional homes and especially true for mobile homes.
If the growth rate subsides in the near future, these problems will not
all be solved; in some cases they will worsen. New public facilities cost
more than the community can afford when they must be added quickly. There was
about $2,100 increase in bonding capacity in Sweetwater (1973) for each new
school child,** but that child also requires school plant expansion costing
$5,100 ($40-50 per square foot). If mining operations go into a decline, in
the future, the community will be left with heavy i nvestment in facilities it
can no longer use, and-a debt burden that will be insurmountable.
* Gilmore and Duff, off. cit., p. 20. Employee turnover is attributed to
higher wages in the construction trades plus "quality of life problems be-
setting the community," based on both observation and survey data.
**Ten percent of assessed valuation (State Constitution).
i	
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Several points are worth stressing in considering this case study of a
modern boom town:
-- the lack of anticipation of and preparation for the
rapid growth;
-- the secondary effect of expansion in some sectors of
employment on other employment sectors, and the ef-
fect on total population;
-- the short-tern failure of the market place to accommo-
date, and the rapid deterioration of the quality of
life in the community;
-- the differential burden placed on some segments of the
population; and
-- the impacts on the stimulating industry itself, and
the implied constraints on further expansion.
Sweetwater County had not foreseen or prepared for rapid growth despite
the fact that domestic and foreign demand for natural soda ash was steadily
increasing, and trona mining is concentrated in Wyoming and especially in
Sweetwater. The decisions that brought about the sudden growth in employment
were made separately in a number of corporations without any communication
between the companies themselves or between the companies and the communities
which were to be impacted.
An important point to remember in assessing local Impacts is that every
miner who moves into a community from outside is likely to mean 3.1 new in-
habitants. If a new mine opened employing, ultimately, 500 miners, this could
mean 7,563 new inhabitants (and of those 510 approximately will be school
children). But the new mine is also likely to mean construction workers, addi-
tional government employees, school teachers, services and trades people --
possibly 2,363 additional new inhabitants.*
*See Methodological Note, p. 36.
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the twelve-fold increase in construction employment resulted both from
the opening of new mines and the construction at the power plant (and result-
ing sedondary construction in the community).
	 State and local employees,
Which include school teachers, increased in four years by 48 percent.
	
We do
not know how many construction workers. moved into the county with their fami-
lies as permanent or temporary residents, but if all of the new mining jobs
had been filled by newcomers, 850 with families, this alone would account
I
.	 for 19 percent out of the total 101 percent growth in population.
	 The 952
!	 (estimated) mining families would account for 1,142 children immediately added
to school rolls, the population of two to three new elementary schools.
-	 3(
Fight-six percent of the people in Sweetwater Count Y live in two +awns.	 ; d 
Rock Springs (pop. in 1 970, 11,657) and Green River (pop. 4,196). The towns
had been gaining in population over the past decade (20 percent and 12.4
k3	 percent respectively) although the county itself had lost 8.5 percent of
its population -- an example of the continuing centralization in rural areas
as larger towns grow at the expense of smaller towns and rural population.
Towns of this size cannot generally accommodate rapid growth in population
because of the small housing stock and the lack of mortgage money from
country banks, which are often reluctant to tie up limited resources in
longterm loans. Since Rock Springs and Green River had been growing slowly
over the decade, there is also likely to have been little underutilized
infrastructure. In such cases; quality of life quickly deteriorates from
ii
overcrowding, inadequate public services, and congested streets and retail
k.	
trade facilities.
i, This deterioration of community environment places a heavier burden on
some segments of the population than on others. Those with fixed incomes, par-
1-10-
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ticularly the aged, suffer from rising prices for housing and consumer goods.
Wives bear the brunt of overcrowded housing, poor zhopping facilities with no
parking space, children's behavior problems stemming from crowded schools and
non-existent recreation facilities, inadequate waste collection, and too few
repair and maintenance workers. Those who need or wish to work find that the
number of jobs available to women have not kept pace with the number of new-
comers seeking such jobs. It is difficult to establish roots in such communi-
ties, and family stability suffers.
As community life becomes less acceptable, and at the same time,
competition for labor increases, employee turnover rises and productivity de-
clines. Thus the industry whose growth has stimulated the process is in turn
impacted by the results of unplanned, unmanaged growth and these impacts can
become a significant constraint on further development.
The research team headed by Gilmore and duff (see footnote, p. 1) con-
cluded the significant lowering of productivity in trona mines in Sweetwater
County resulted primarily from excessive employee turnover, which stemmed from
two factors: higher rates being paid in the construction industry (where compe-
tition for labor resulted both from the expansion of mining employment and con-
struction of a large power plant, and the secondary impacts of these projects on
employment growth) and from the deteriorating quality of life in the community.
The second factor, unsatisfactory community conditions, they concluded, was of
major importance. The pacing parameter for growth management is often the
ability of the community to provide housing and the public services which must
accompany it. Traditionally housing stock grows at about three percent in large
urban areas but only about one percent in rural areas; in Wiest Virginia housing
¢1ar^
r'
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stock, in the 1960's, expanded at about two percent per year.* When a com-
munity is able to anticipate and prepare for a sadden change in its economy,t'	 -
E
for example a large industrial plant relocating in the area, cooperation be-
tween the community and the company can overcome this potential constraint
by intervention in the ordinary housing market (for example, local develop-
ment corporations or company housing, bond issues for new public facilities,
r^
mobile classrooms, etc.).
In the absence of such planning and policy interventions, the secondaty
3
impacts of sudden economic growth may be sufficiently detrimental to provide
a brake on further economic activities, as indicated in the following
3
schematic, Figure 1.
^I
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*Interview with Dr. Stephen Fuller, formerly Regional Planner, Appalachian
Regional Commission, now consultant to the Commission and Assistant Pro-
fessor of Urban and Regional Planning, The George Washington University.
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Figure 1: Schematic of Camnanity Impacts -- Rapid Growth V.T.Coates
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11. Marion and Monongalia Counties, West Virginia.
In population size and distribution, Marion and Monongalia Counties are
very different from Sweetwater County, Wyoming. Large even by western stan-
dards, Sweetwater covers 10,429 square miles and had (in 1970) only 18,400
people, for a population density of 2 per square mile. By contrast, Marion
County is 1/33 the size ( 311 square miles) and has over three times as many
people ( 61,400) for a population density of 197 per square mile. Monongalia
County has 365 square miles of land and 63,700 people, its density being 175
per square mile. Eighty -six percent of Sweetwater's people live in two com-
munitli^s, Rock Springs ( 11,657 population) and Green River (4,196). Marion
County has, similarly two towns of over 2,500: Fairmont ( 26,093) and Manning-
ton (2,747) which together account for 47 percent of county residents. Monon-
galia also has two towns: Morgantown ( 29,431) and Westover ( 5,086) which to-
gether have 54 percent of county population.*
Thus the West Virginia counties have each about three times as many
people as Sweetwater, and about twice as many townspeople. In West Virginia
more people live in small hamlets or on farms ** and the distance between human
if
settlements is smaller, so that more people can drive to new jobs without
changing their place of residence. In Marion and Monongalia Counties, community
residents rely on this tendency to discount the community impacts of new mine
development -- their immediate response to questions concerning potential
*Unless otherwise specified, figures in this section are taken from: U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County and City Data Book, 1972, U.S.
Government Printing Office. In most cases, 1970 figures are used for comparison
with Sweetwater County, Wyoming, in the last year before its rapid expansion. Later 	 i
figures are not available in many instances where they would have been desirable.
**In West Virginia, as in most rural areas, farm population has sharply dropped in
recent decades; it is now 900 in Marion, and 1,200 in Monongalia, down 54 percent
and 44 percent respectively since 1960. h'Any people continue to live on farms
which are no longer productive while working at other jobs. In Sweetwater, only
131ersons were classified as farm population in 1970; the average size farm in
Sweetwaer is 15,000 acres compared to 100 acres in Marion and Monongalia.
a
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impacts of greater mining employment is (a) that new miners will not move into
the community but will drive to work from their present homes in other counties
(or the adjacent state), and (b) that "most" of the jobs will be filled in any
case by the counties' unemployed.
The TAG research group discounts this factor on several grounds. Commut-
ing to work across county lines is common in many rural West Virginia counties; 	
14^
thus in Doddridge and Taylor Counties (100 percent a p d 90 percent rural, respec-
tively) adjacent to the study areas, from 28 to 30 percent of workers are em- 	 f
ployed in other counties, chiefl L Marion and Monongalia, however, the avail-
able labor force in such counties is small, and should expansion of deep mining
occur simultaneously in several adjacent counties or throughout the region, the
significance of commuting as a factor will be sharply reduced. Rising prices
of gasoline may also reduce the attractiveness of commuting in the future.
Overall unemployment rates in the counties have not been high: about four percent
in 1970 (compared to Sweetavater's 4.4 percent just prior to the boom) and under
six percent in 1975. Moreover, these unemployment figures have limited rele-
vance to mining, since they are inflated somewhat by female unemployment rates
(women are seldom employed in the mines although there are now a fear, perhaps
six, in the two counties), and many of the other unemployed would not be ac-
cepted for mining jobs because of health, age, or other factors.
As will be seen in Table I, Marion and Monongalia Counties, although the
1
;,1
TABLE I
LABOR FORCE
1970
Female
Total Employed % in % Con- % Manu- %White % Foremen/ Labor
Labor Force Min_in- g struction facturing %Govt. % Trade %Service %Edu. Collar Craftsmen Force
21,100 16.1 5.5 26.6 13.1 17.7 7.2 7.0 34.6 19.0 7,771
21,900 10.5 6.3 11.9 37.5 15.9 7.1 25.1 49.3 13.4 8,416
7,000 15.7 7.3 8.1 14.4 20.2 9.9 6.8 40.1 17.6 1,004
County
Marion
Mononga11a
Sweetwater
r
The most striking difference is the strong base of manufacturing in
I
Marion County as compared to Sweetwater (and Monongalia). The three largest
^E
employers in Marion (a lamp manufacturer, a glass bottle manufacturer, and a
power plant) together employ 5,550 people.* Another twelve firms together sup-
ply 2,850 jobs. Thus the 8 , 400 far outweigh the fewer than 3,000 mining
^i
!	 jobs in the county. However, approximately half of the industrial jobs are in
i
firms directly tied to mineral industries (a mining equipment manufacturer,
a construction firm specializing in coal preparation plants, a second engineer-
ing and construction company, the railroad, the power plant).
Approximately 38 percent of the labor force in the West Virginia counties
(1970) is female, as contrasted with only 14 percent in Sweetwater. The avail-
ability of employment in manufacturing, as well as in government, trade, services,
and education may mean that, should mining (and construction) employment increase,
wives of newcomers would also have an opportunity to find employment to a greater
extent than was the case in Sweetwater. However, there have recently been a num-
ber of layoffs in manufacturing plants in the two counties, so that if a national
h	 recession prevails there may be little or no gain in female employment oppor-
tunities.
Marion and Monongalia Counties had a median family income of $7,800 in
1970 (the .U.S. median was then $9,586); 12.8 percent of Marion County ' s families,
and 13.2 percent of Monongalia`s, fell below the poverty line in income. Twenty-
two percent of Marion County ' s population, and 13 percent of Monongalians, re-
ceived either social security payments or old age assistance in 1970; these
-17-
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lj Sweetwater County was slightly better off in 1970 than the two counties
in the study area (see Table II); thus the beneFits of increased employment
would be slightly greater, but the detrimental impact of inflated housing and
consumer costs would also be somewhat greater, in the West Virginia area,
should a similar boom occur.
TABLE II
INCOME CHARACTERISTICS
i
i^
Median % families Social Sec. Old Age % population
County Fam.Inc. below pov. Recipients Assistance Rec. S.S. and OAA
Marion $7,807 12.8% 11,817 306 22%
Monangalia 7,762 13.2% 7,973 214 13%
Sweetwater 9,077 7.6% 2,331 61 13%
Housing stocks in the two counties are shown in Table III. It should be
noted that from one--half to two-thirds of the housing is at least thirty-five
years old and 8-11 percent lack flush toilets, piped water, or some plumbing
facilities. Of the housing units added since 1939, about 16 percent are mobile
homes. The price of housing in Sweetwater County rose rapidly under increased
demand because of a shortage of developable land, the necessity of new sewage
and water treatment facilities, competition for construction labor, and a lack
of mortgage money. A glance at Table III shows that the same figures would pre- 	 1;
a
l
vail in West Virginia.
TABLE III
HOUSING STOCK - 1970
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Population Marion County Monongalia County
Total 61,356 63,714
Rural 32,690 29,241
Housing; units
Total 22,264 21,094
Rural 11,296 10,085
Vacant Units
Total 85 90
Rural 79 80
,Mobile Homes (1974) 850 (3.8%) 1,567 (7.4%)
Built before 1939 14,996 (67%) 11,327 (54%)
Built before 1949 15,970 (76%) 13,513 (64%)
Lacking Some Plumbing 1,830 (8%) 2,324 (17%)
No Piped Water 559 (3%) 809 ( 4%)
No Flush Toilet 1,261 (6%) 1,643 (8%)
(Edith Plumbing)
Med.Value (owner) $10,200 $15,500
Med. Rent $	 51 $	 87
Public Sewer
Total 14,641 (66%) 13,448 (64%)
Rural 3,716 (33%) 2,591 (261)
Source. U.S. Census, Housing Characteristics, 1970.
Sweetwater County
18,391
2,365
	6,5 6
	 4
997
	
9
	
i
unknown
F,
3,918 (60%}
4,521 (69%
411 (6A)
147 (2%)
227 (4%)
	
$15,550
	
a
$	 65
5,774 (89%)
303 (30%)
It has been estimated that about 15 percent of the land in the two
counties is developable for residential and commercial use (because of slope
and other topographical features) and about half of that amount is already
developed.* This means roughly 50 square miles to accommodate housing, public
*Hittman Associates.
LA
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facilities, and related uses. Marion County lending institutions had $96.5
million in assets in 1970, and Monongalia's had $86.1 million, about half of
Sweetwater County's potential savings/population ratio in 1970. There is no
branch banking in West Virginia.* At present almost no mortgage money is avail-
able except through FHA.: Some means is needed for marshalling resources needed
for economic development in.a region where sudden growth would mean great demands
on very limited development fundGi There is a shortage of developed industrial
sites, and portions of the . present industrial base are obsolete.**
About 65 percent of the housing is presently served by public sewer sys-
r t"
i
s
a
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tems. (In Sweetwater County, the figure in 1970 . was 89 percent.) Of housing
in "rural" areas of the two counties, where new developmeni- would presumably
occur, only 33 percent (Marion) and 26 percent 'Mononga
.
lia) are now public
sewer systems. Both counties are now facing the necessity of extending their
sewer systems. Additional houses in the outlying areas would help to cover
the costs of this addition, provided planning . is done beforehand as to where
development is likely to occur.
There are about 2,417 mobile homes in the two counties. Banks are mope
willing to make the small, shorter term loans for mobile home purchase than tie
up their limited resources in long term mortgages. Mobile homes, however, do
al and countynot provide sufficient additional tax revenue to cover the municipali
	
	p	 p
services which must be provided (acc
E
make relatively poor use of limited
purchase mobile homes at least durir
ferring conventional home ownership
is
*State Code, §31A-8-12.
**Region ill: Regional Plan.
f"
a
be great resistance in West Virginia -- particularly high-rise apartments which
might otherwise be attractive because of land pressures -- because of the value
traditionally attached to owning one's own land.
In 1970 there were 11,874 public school children in Marion County and
11,272 in Monongalia. Marion County in 1973 spent $694 per child (projected
to be $741 in 1974-75)* and Monongalia spent $836 (average expenditure per child
r
in the State is $910).** Bond issues for schools have several times been defeated i
in each county; most recently, in April 1975 Marion County voters defeated a bond i
issue intended for consolidation of seven high schools into three larger high
schools to serve the entire county. Most schools in both counties are over-
crowded and teacher loads are above national averages. In Monongalia County
about 100 high school students are now forced to attend classes in the afternoon
or evening because of overcrowding.*
3
County tax assessors report that 7 percent of county revenue in Marion and 	 r
9 percent in Monongalia is derived from property tax on coal mines. The Business
f
and Occupations Tax levied on sales ($3.50 per $100 as applied to coal mines)
goes to the State rather than the county, as does the (consumer) sales tax;
there ?s no severance tax applied to coal mining.** ,, Increased county revenue
would therefore result from increased property tax on new mines and on homes,
automobiles, utilities, and personal property if mining employment and total
population rose significantly.
*Telephone interviews with E. Jordon, Marion County School System, and with
a representative of the Morgantown School Board.
_*West Virginia Office of School Statistics, responding to telephone inquiry.
**-In Interviews.
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"Hard-core" unemployment in the two counties is estimated at about: three
percent* but is higher in the adjacent rural counties. If qeneral emplovment
increases, there will be an indirect beneficial impact on this problem; while
the "hard-core" unemplo yed (the people with low skills, older persons, the
partially disabled) are not eligible for reining jobs they would benefit from
expanding secondary employment in tow-skill service occupations and from
removal from trainable younger workers from these jobs.
In any assessment of community impacts of coal mining, the cumulative
impacts of fatalities, injuries, and disease (and the effect of constant
awareness of this danger) should be considered. In 1972 and 1973, fatalities
per million man-hours from underground coal mining averaged .57** Disabling
injuries average 40.92 per million man-hours.*** In West Virginia, as of
September 1972, 11.8 percent of working coal miners were found to have simple
pneumonoconiosis and 1.3 percent to have the much more serious "complicated
category" of the respiratory disease (commonly called "black lung")**** Thus
with an average of 5,760 miners employed (1970-1973), Marion and Monongalia
might expect 6 fatalities per year from accidents in the mine, 453 men disabled,
680 miners with simple pneumonoconiosis and 75 with a serious version of the
disease (those workers already retired or disabled are not included).'"
*Interviews.
**Coal Age, February 1974, p.83.
***Coal Miners and The Economy, AUMWA Research Report, Sept. 30, 1974, p.13.
r'	 ****Coal Age, July 1973, p.145.
I *****At an average of 240 days per year, eight hours per day, for 5,760 miners.
fi.
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For purposes of illustrating more quantifiable impacts of expanded coal
mining in Marion and Monongalia . County, two scenarios are presented below, the
first based on a 60% increase in mining employment over a ten year period
(5 percent growth per year), the second based on a doubling of mining employ-
ment over ten years ( 7.5 percent growth per year).
TABLE IV
COMMUNITY IMPACTS
A.	 Assuming 5% growth per year in mining employment, for 10 years.
Impact Base 1s_ t yr. After 5 yrs. After 10 yrs,
Mining 5,760 288 new miners 1,590 new miners 3,620 new miners
Employment (ay.1970-73) (+ 5%) (+27.6%) (+62.8%)
Resulting 125,070 893 4,929 11,222
Pop.Growth(l) (est.1974)(2) (+0.77.) (+3.9%) (+9%.
Other 26,320 552 3,339 7,602
Employment(3) (1973) (+2%) (+12.7%) (+m q%)
Resulting 125,070 1,270 7,680 17,485
Pop.Growth(4) (1974) (+1%) (+6.1%) (+'U
Total Pop. 125,070 2,163 12,609 28,707
Growth(5) (1974) (+1.7%) (+in%). (23%)
No, of New
School 22,449 625 3,625 8,193
Children(6) (1970) (+2.8%) (+16) (+36.6%)
New Schools (7) 1+ 7 16
Housing(8) 40,000 521 3,622 6,878
Mobile 2,417 +172- +1.006 +2.290-
Homes(9) (1973) 2,589 3,423 49707	 {
Fatalities 6 7 8 10
ii	 (1	 yr) a
Disabled 453 men 475 577 737
(1 yr)
Pneum., )
Complicated 75 79 96 122
I
j^
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TABLE IV (Cont'd)
B. Assuming 7.5% growth per year in mining employment, for 10 years.
Impact Base 1st yr. Auer 5 yrs. Auer 10 yrs.
Mining 5,760 432 new miners	 2,509 new miners 6,111 new miners
Employment (ay.1970-73) (+7.5%) (+44%) (+106%)
Resulting 125,070 1,339 7,778 18,944
Pop.Growth(l) (est.1974)(2) (+6.2%) (15.1%)
Other 260320 907 5,269 12,833
Employment(3) (1973) (+3.4%) (+20%) (+48.80)
Resulting 125,070 2,086 12,118 29,516
Pop.Growth(4) (est.1974) (+1.7%) (+9.7%) (24%)
Total Po. 125,070 3,425 19,896 48,460
Growth(5p} (est.1974) (+2.7%) (+15.9%) (x-39%)
No. of New
School 22,449 985 5,720 13,933
Children(6) (1974 est.) (+4.4%) (+25%) (62%)
New Schools(7) 1-2 11 27-28
Housing(8) 40,000 9.21 4,768 11,611
(1974) (+2%) (+11.9%) (+29%)
Mobile 2,417 x-274= -1,589= +3.870=
Homes(9) (1973) 2,691 4,006 6,287
Fatalities(1 yr)(10)	 6 7 9 13
Disabled (i yr) 453 men 486 650 933
Pneum.,
Complicated 75 82 108 154
[Footnotes, Rage 24]
- .	
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(1) . Latest population figures from 1970 but used for illustrative.purposes.
(2) Assuming 85% of new miners have families, with an average of 3.5 persons
per family unit; 15% with no dependents, in temporary quarters or drawn
from families already living in the area; hence 3.1 new inhabitants per
miner.
(3) Growth in other employment estimated at ratio of 2.1 additional jobs per
miner. Service (all non-basic) employment to basic employment is actually
3.14 and 2.88 in the two counties (Rittman Associates figures).
(4) Non-basic industry employees estimated at 50% family heads (average 3.5
persons per family), b0% single and living intemporary quarters or drawn
from families already living in area; hence 2.3 additional residents per
employee.
.^
5} Addition of (2) and (3) above.
6 Assuming an average of 1.2 school children ^er family unit (following
Gilmore and Duff, on. cit.); see (2) and (4 above.
children(7) Estimated at 500 	 per school.
8 Based solely on families, see (2) and (4) above; baseline of 40,000 units
represents 1974 stock minus units dilapidated or with no plumbing.
(9) One-third of new units assumed to be mobile homes, the current trend in
the two counties according to Rittman Associates. Second number is new
mobile homes added to 1973 baseline.
(10) Fatalities are estimated at .57 per million man-hours, disabling acci-
dents at 40.92 per million man-hours (see p. 21). Man-hours estimated at 240
8-hour clays per year (Bureau of Mines). Figures represent annual estimate
for last year of period given (lst year, 5th year, 10th year) and are not
cumulative. Pneumonoconiosis, complicated, estimated at 1.3% of employed
miners (see p. 2I).
Marion and Monongalia Counties are relatively well supplied with the trans-
portation needed for growth, since new highways are already nearing completion.
However, within the cities of Fairmont and Morgantown, and in many parts of the
counties which might be developed, secondary roads are narrow, mountainous and
poorly maintained. A large "people mover" is under construction in Morgantown
with Federal demonstration funds (primarily to carry students from an outlying
campus of the University of West Virginia to the downtown campus, a distance of
seven miles). The justification for this project was the congestion at some
hours over the narrow, winding road linking the two campuses. Within the cities,
streets are narrow and parking will be a serious problem if large scale growth
occurs; as already noted, land for additional shopping areas will be limited
and expensive.
i
c`	
—
{
1
-25-s
u
In terms of the impact of coal expansion on local transportation systems
the potenti al damage of increased coal haulage may or may not be a serious problem
nationwide. The West VirginiaHighway Department maintains a 60,800 lb. maximum
load level for anything hauled by truck in the state. The department indicated•
S^f
i
i
I
E
that it was not having any problems with excessive haulage on the part of coal
companies in the area.
	 Approximately 5% of all state-wide road maintenance is
r, a result .
 of coal traffic.*
	 (Highways in the state of Test Virginia are all
>^	
if
maintained by the state.)
Overweight hauls must_ receive prior state approval and the West Virginia
highway department maintains a force of inspectors to prevent violation of this
regulation.	 However, there are many night-time violators who Toad up their
trucks after the state inspectors have ended their work day and travel the state
roads with overweight cargoes.	 In the state of West Virginia this has been a
problem more serious with the oil well, natural gas, and timber industries,'
than with coal, because of the highly transient nature of their business. 	 Coal
mining operators are more apt to obey state haulage regulations so as to continue
to enjoy good relations with the state . 	regulatory agencies.
	 The state highway
commission has the legal authority to shut down any mine found to be hauling
.; coal in excess of the legal limit, without an authorized permit to do so.***
Excessive haulage tends to be a greater problem in the Eastern Kentucky
coal areas.	 In their desire to produce extra tons of coal at a minimum . of trans-
portation cost, many Eastern Kentucky coal operators haul in excess of the legal
limit.*
*E. D. Keesing, W. Va. Highway Dept., Asst. Dir., Maintenance.
*Ibid.
** Ibid.
iII t	 J
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Expansion of underground coal may not present a problem for the state
of test Virginia in terms of an overtaxation of its road system. Almost all
of the long distance movement of coal is done by rail or barge, with truck
.traffic accounting mainly for the transfer of coal from the mine mouth to either
rail head or barge landing site. The dependence upon barge systems as the major
form of coal haulage is.expected to continue, but the "locks" serving barges may
become a serious constraint.
County Commissioners, businessmen, regional planners, coal miners, and
other community representatives in the study area who were interviewed almost
without exception dismiss the possibility of significant expansion of under-
ground coal mining within the two counties. They do not believe that demand
for coal will rise sufficiently to make it economically feasible to develop the
i) lower grade veins which have not already been developed. They also say that
new mines would be too far from the river for barge transportation, and
4
developing new rail spurs adds to the cost of the coal. On the other hand,
E3
when asked to address the question of potential community impacts of expanded
i;	 coal mining, community representatives generally think only of the beneficial
effects of additional employment and income within the community.
{Whether or not such opinions as to the feasibility of expansion are valid, 	 l
it is clear that if expansion did occur, the community would be unprepared for
i;
it, and hence unable to manage the resulting growth so as to minimize disruptive
consequences to the community. If significant development is to occur steps 	 {
should be taken to set up lines of communication between mining companies and
community leadership, so that the State and the counties and their municipalities 	 ??
can prepare for growth. Emphasis should be placed on encouraging the maintenance
!E	 !	 .`
j	 of a balanced, diversified economic development as a buffer against the
1
i[
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possibility of a sudden downturn in mining after a period of growth, and as
3 a way of spreading the benefits of growth over other segments of the community
}
as well as those directly	 involved in mining.	 For this to happen, ways of i
s'E channeling development funds and investment money into the community are
needed.	 Mousing and land use planning and regulation will be needed. 	 Phased
lj
development of additional public service systems, schools, recreation facilities,
ji
medical facilities, and industrial sites should be planned in advance, and the
mineral industry should be forced to take some responsibility for helping the
< y f, community to meet the additional demands on it without incurring a disasterous
debt burden.
,E
i{
Table V presents a list of potentially affected parties and participants
i!I,
,. at the local level, based on the analysis of Marion and Monongalia Counties
' and Sweetwater County.	 In Table V, X denotes those who will make the original —
decision to expand coal mining.	 Y denotes those who will be forced to respond
to such decisions by providing additional services, products, and facilities, {
or who will in the ordinary course of events respond by adjusting their actions
(businessmen) or political stances (interest groups). 	 Z denotes those who will
be affected involuntarily, e.g., by rising prices, competition, or expanded
. opportunities.	 The active, anticipatory participation in the decision process --
of those denoted Y is particularly desirable in order to manage community growth.
The extent to which real and potential impacts in these three counties are
generalizable to counties across the nation where future coal development
would occur, is a subject needing further study but is beyond the assignment
3
E	 E
given to TAG.
i
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TABLE V
Potentially Affected Parties and Participants at the Local Level
(X) Housing Industry (Y)
(Y} Public Service Systems
(Y and Utilities (Y)
(Z) Land Owners (Y)
(Y) County and Municipal (Y)
(Z) Systems: Revenue and
Expenditures, Employment,
(Y) etc.	 Elected Officials,
Government Administratory
(Y) Regional, State, and (Y)
Local Planners
Investment and Lending (Y)
Institutions
(Y)
Citizen and Public
(Y) Interest Croups (Y)
Families of Miners (Z
(Y) Residents, Especially (ZI
those on Fixed Incomes,
Consumers
Hard-core Unemployed (Z)
Coal Mines and Companies
Managers
Union Miners
Non-Union Miners
Construction Companies
Construction Workers
Supporting Industry
(Mine Equipment, etc.)
Trade, Service, and
Government Employers
and Employees
Local Businessmen
Medical and Mental Health
Delivery Systems
School Systems
,f	
f
i
X = Actors, Decisionmakers
Y = Responders (Participants)
Z = Non-voluntary Affected Parties
e
i	 _
s}
III. Policy Implications.
Consideration of potential community-level impacts of expanding deep
coal mining suggests an area where policy intervention.may be in order to
modify and control detrimental societal consequences from a change in the
level of utilization of a technology. Intervention options include, at the
first stage:
1. Establishment of communication mechanisms between local
governments and coal companies in localities where coal
reserves exist. The purpose of the communication chan-
nel is to provide early warning when one or several coal
companies plan significant expansion in the area, so that
the community has time to plan for growth. A cooperative
Community Development Board or committee including repre-
sentatives of mining companies; other industrial, financial,
and commercial interests; local governments; and public
interest groups could then prepare strategies for meeting
anticipated community needs.
2. A national integrated planning mechanism (either for the
coal industry or for all energy source industries) at the
Federal level, to identify areas where extensive develop-
ment is possible and to plan such development in orderly,
staged phases with prior attention to materials stock-
piling and environmental protection.
If adverse economic, social, and environmental effects of expanded
domestic resource exploitation are to be controlled and modified, integrated
planning methods must be developed; however, such long range planning at
either the local, the regional, or the national level itself implies signifi-
cant societal consequences which call for prior assessment. Only one aspect
of the policy intervention Option suggested above has been considered by the
yg;
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energy/environmental concerns has been recognized but remains as yet unre-
solved.*
Federal anti-trust laws are based on the policy that the public inter-
est is best served by promotion of free and vigorous competition in the market
	 y
place; they were enacted to prohibit restraints on that competition. The
Sherman Act of 1890 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1-7 (1970)) provides:
Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States or with foreign na-
tions, is hereby declared to be illegal....
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed gui1 ty of a mis-
demeanor....
Section 1 makes illegal any agreement in restraint of trade regardless
of the intent of the parties or the public benefit arising from the agreement,
because such concerted action creates market power which acts in restraint of
competition. Section 2 prohibits "monopolizing" and conspiracies or combina-
tions to monopolize. Monopolizing is not the mere possession of a monopoly,
rather "it implies a positive drive apart from sheer competitive skills to
seize and exert power in the market."** Intent is the key to violations of
Section 2 and such intent is seen in the use or acquisition of market power
or dominance, to enhance prices or exclude competitors.
*See Rowe,"Antitrust Policies and Environmental Controls,"29 Business Lawyer
897 (April 1974); Blumberg, "Corporate. Responsibility and the Environment,"
VIII The Conference Board Record 42 (1971) reprinted in Blumberg, Corporate
Responsibility in a Changing Society (1972).
**Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A., at 92-94 (1970).
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n
When viewed against the background of Federal anti-trust laws, therefore,
z^ several aspects of the suggested policy options raise questions of legality:
i^
a. The sharing of business information relating to the expansion
of employment and/or coal production with ( i) local communi-
ties and (ii) other coal companies or "the coal industry";
b. The agreement between competitors over aspects of coal devel-
opment and production locally and nationally.
The determination of the lawfulness of such an arrangement for implementing
_l methods of integrated planning i n the coal industry also rests on the degree of
economic concentration and vertical integration of the coal industry and the
effects and degree of governmental participation in such planning.
Although free and vigorous competition is supposed to be enhanced by the
availability of accurate information on business conditions, modern enterprises
depend for competitive advantage on secrecy and confidentiality rather than on
f an open exchange of information. 	 While the anti -trust laws do not forbid the
collection and dissemination of business data, the use of such data to control
prices or output is illegal .* 	Even where the information is not used to set
price or production, the exrhange of business information between competitors
may yield an unfair competitive edge to the firms sharing the information and
a
constitute an agreement in restraint of trade.
However, an individual company may communicate with the local govern- 4
.	 ti . ments about its plans for expansion and may agree with the community on a plan
for development which would promote the quality of life in the community with-
out any anti-trust problem. 	 It is less clear whether communications between;
companies when made through participation with local governments are also free
*see Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U . S. 553 ( 1936); Maple Flooring
Mfgr's Ass'n v.	 United States, 268 U.S.	 563 (1925).
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of anti-trust problems. Where only general information relevant to planning
and no anti-competitive activities or practices are involved, joint industry
and governmental consultation does not violate anti-trust prohibitions. In
fact, as a result of environmental legislation, some coopecdtive planning
involving local communities and industry has been encouraged by state and
i; Federal governments.* Industry-wide sharing of plans for expanded mining
activities is not forbidden by the anti-trust laws; indeed a great deal of
'	 information about company activities is already made public through press
f"	 releases, trade publications, annual reports and other public documents.
The true relevance of the sharing of business information among competitors
{	 to anti -trust laws is the use which the companies make of the information.
r;
The primary anti
-trust problem of the proposed intervention lies in
y, the agreement between competing firms on a plan for the orderly development
1 '	 of coal deposits so as to minimize the adverse impacts on the communities
involved, and to make a concerted response to the economic, social and
environmental problemz. If this agreement were to control the locations and
rates of expansion of coal industry increaseh in employment and production,
it would have an ultimate influence on the output of the coal industry, the
amount of coal entering the market and the market price, and would be an
agreement in restraint of trade and illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The problem of an agreement in restraint of trade arises also when more than
one business entity agrees with another or another person to control or limit
its economic activity.
*Sep., Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1) and
Clr^an Air Act, 33 U.S.C. §1316.
agreement for integrated development with the cooperation of and for the
benefit of the small communities which would be disrupted by disorderly ex-
pansion, these localities could not offer immunity from anti-trust laws. The,
good intentions of the parties and the social benefit to be gained by such
agreement are no defense to the illegality of the action in restraint of
trade. In some regulated industries, such an agreement could be upheld,
even though it is anti-competitive in nature, if the regulatory body charged
with the authority to weigh the broader public interests to be served against
the effects on competition determined that orderly development of coal de-
posits was the more important public interest. But the coal industry is not so
regulated and without specific statutory exemption, the agreement must fail.
The era of cooperative integrated planning between industry and local govern-
ments must await Federal action on the implications for national anti-trust
policy.
The coal industry has a high degree of economic concentration. A small
number of companies control a major portion of the supply and market for coal
and coal products such as coke. In addition many of the coal companies are
vertically integrated so that a single corporate entity controls the coal from
mine to ultimate purchaser. With such an oligopolistic structure, any agree-
ment or course of concerted action among coal companies may also lead to viola-
tions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In determining whether such violations
might arise out of adoption of an agreement between major producers or
industry-wide, the use of the market power created in the agreement as well as
the intent of the parties would be examined. If the participating companies
used the information obtained through the agreement and/or the development plan
r
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In the agreement itself as the means to exert market power by controlling
i
or influencing the flow of coal to the market or its price or to exclude
competitors, the requisite intent for violations of Section 2 would probably
i
be demonstrated by the course of conduct of the firms so charged. The plan-
t.
ning agreement might also be used to set up exclusive rights of development
between companies operating in different or the same locations. The poten-
tial for anti-competitive abuse is apparent,
What, then, --an the mining companies do to promote integrated planning
for expansion of mining activities in cooperation with local governments?
Without running afoul of the anti-trust laws, they can cooperate on an
individual basis with local governments and encourage industry-wide coopers-
Lion with local governments. They can communicate their plans for expanded
activities to the localities directly or through media facilities and encourage
others in f"° industry to do likewise. They can seek Federal review of de-
velopment agreements between more than one coal company and a locality in the
appropriate agency if Federal agency action is involved in the development
or by seeking an opinion from the Department of Justice in a formal Business	 a
Review p rocedure which would provide some limited protection. They can seek
the establishment of a government-regulated procedure for the adoption and
implementation for such integrated planning agreements.*
If, as predicted in this partial technology assessment, detrimental
impacts on local communities of rapidly expanded deep coal mining production
*Blumberg, supra. 	 One of the frequent concerns voiced in his article was
that firms that sought to deal effectively with environmental concerns would
be placed at a competitive disadvantage with those firms which neglected
such responsibilities, the result of these fears would be that firms would
pressure the government to regulate appropriate corporate responses through
law.
'f
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are sufficiently serious to constitute an eventual constraint on further ex-
pansion because of their effects on productivity, coal mining companies and
the electric power companies which depend on their output should consider
the advantages to themselves of actively encouraging such voluntary communi-
cation and cooperation within the restraints imposed by present anti-trust
legislation. At a higher level and in a more long-range context, the Federal
Energy Administration could after more extensive analysis contemplate proposal
to the U.S. Congress of appropriate modifications of anti-trust legislation
and establishment of an information and planning mechanism at the Federal Ievel.
This action could be considered 'in connection with the establishment of a
National Materials Information System, now being studied under the auspices
of the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. Policy analysis of
the proposed interventions could also be initiated by the House or Senate
Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, by request to the Office of
Technology Assessment.
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ABSMACP OF REPORT
The aircraft/airport noise problem has reached its. present--
and socially unacceptable--dimension as a result of several cond-
itions: the reluctance of the Federal Aviation Administration to
give adequate attention to aircraft/airport noise, this environ-
mental intrusion being considered to date as a mere "side-effect"
to the FAA responsibility to promote a national system of safe and
efficient air transportation; the tardy, piecemeal efforts of the
Congress in confronting the problem prior to 1972, preferring pre-
viously to deal with the situation on a partial 9611 "source" control
basis rather than as a total social problem context involving a
coordinated inter-Federal as well as a Federal-State-Local-Private
Sector effort; the uncertainty, both real and professed, of the
"control structure" concerning who has the authority to do what
with respect to aircraft/airport noise abatement; the deficiencies
of "acoustical science" to provide convincing and reliable "demon-
strable data" on the magnitude of the adverse effects of noise on
people and social activities; and the relatively recent emergence
of a social sensitivity to noise as a serious environmental intru-
sion rather than a necessary or mere incidental "externality" of a
progressive, industrialized society. These conditions have produced
a situation in which noise-abused citizens have been forced to ini-
tiate judicial remedial actions in order to generate a minimum ef-
fort on the part of responsible governmental entities. Further,Ii.
}
	
	
the lack of both useful data of the effects of noise and viable
legal theories has inhibited the effectiveness of this reactive ap-
e
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roach to aircraft/airport noise abatement although the resources
are now being marshalled which could result in substantial liability
1
,a
AA
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to some airport proprietors unless an effective strategy of Noise
abatement is promptly initiated, It is generally agreed, however,
that the ,judicial approach is not a suitable means for bringing
airport operations in,.o compatibility with other community activities
and social interests.
The crucial deficiency with the existing legal/institutional
control structure is that there has been no integrated approach to
the problem of aircraft/airport noise abatement. There has been
no inclusive governmental effort to identify the effects of noise,
to establish "public health and welfare"' goals for the elimination
or reduction of detrimental effects, and to align noise abatement
tasks with governmental entities at all levels having the social
mission interest, the formal authority, the professional capabilities,
and other existing resources to execute the required tasks in a co-
ordinated manner. Instead, the general disposition of responsible
or potentially responsible public and private sector entities pro-
ducing, regulating, or otherwise affected by aircraft/airport noise
has been to evade rather than confront the problem. This has led
to a practice of each entity acting in isolation rather than in co-
ordination in order to protect itself from liability, additional
administrative duties, or other real or imagined burdens.
The Griggs case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1962, which
placed liability for aircraft noise harm on the airport operator,
thereby immunizing both the Fe'eral government and the air carriers,
has been a primary contributor to the inadequacy of the aircraft
noise regulatory scheme. The Griggs "legal solution" produced
r.i
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habits, of thought and patterns of behavior among the major partic-
ipants in the aircraft/airport noise context which have effectively.
precluded a constructive goals--means,. social problem approach. Not
until passage of the Noise Control Act of 1972 was there even a stat-
utory framework which could accommodate systematic development of x
an integrated-aircraft/airport noise abatement strategy,
As of this time, the most critical existing conditions emerge
f
from the interactions of the statutory mandate of the Noise Control
Act of 1972 to bring environmental noise levels into compatibility
with the "public health and welfare,' the 1973 Burbank case ruling
of full Federal preemption over aircraft noise,-and the lingering
liability for aircraft/airport noise imposed on the airport opera-
for by Griggs. The EPA is obligated to establish the "public health
and welfare" goal and the FAA is responsible for promulgating appro-
priate regulations for the control of aircraft/airport noise, but
the airport operator is still left with current and continuing res-
ponsibility for noise harm under the Griggs doctrine. Surely, a
recognized principle of social justice is the acceptance of commen-
surate responsibility (whether in terms of accountability or liabi-
lity) with the scope of formal authority conferred on and asserted
by a given entity or level of government. The majority opinion in
Burbank observed that it is the "perva rsive nature of the scheme of
federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to conclude
that there is preemption.
Among the basic Findings and Conclusions of this Report are
the following:
A. Federal control by the EPA and FAA over aircraft/airport
noise is pervasive as found by the Supreme Court in Burbank, based
largely on §7-. of the Noise Control Act of 1972, which includes a
revised 9611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requiring the
introduction by EPA of "public health and welfare" considerations 	 I{	 a
into the FAA §611 aircraft noise regulatory process.
's
3
B. The essentially complete Federal preemption of control 	 j
over aircraft/airport noise necessarily implies, in terms of res-
ponsible public administration, that the Federal government initiate
r
the required administrative and legislative actions to design and
implement an integrated aircraft/airport noise abatement strategy.
This initiative involves the alignment of authority with responsi-
bility with skill capabilities and with financial resources for ef-
fective implementation of the Noise Control Act of 1972/95(a)(2)
"public health and welfare" goals.
C. The most promising legal/institutional instrument for the
design, implementation, and operation of an effective aircraft/air-
port noise regulatory scheme in the near time is the device of air-
port certification for noise pursuant to §611 and 9612 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 and 95 and §7 of the Noise Control Act
of 1972: Major advantages in this admittedly complicated approach
1
include; 1) recognition both that there exists a national air trans-
portation system which requires a high degree of uniformity in re-
gulation, and that each particular airport requires a somewhat
unique approach to its noise abatement task; 2) opportunity for all
of the principal participants affecting or affected by the aircraft/
airport noise situation to contribute to the design and implement-
ation of airport noise abatement plans pursuant to the certification
process; and 3) provision for all noise abatement techniques (tech-
nological, operational, and land use management) to be applied in
f.,. 5
r
a systematic, articulated manner to the noise abatement task.
D. It is incumbent upon the FAA, in cooperation with EPA,
1) to provide airport proprietors with reliable data on intended
or prospective technological and operational abatement actions as
essential inputs into airport noise abatement plans; and 2) to im-
plement proposed technological and operational abatement actions in
timely and effective fashion so as to enable airport proprietors 	 -r,
to come into compliance with EPA §5(a)(2) "public health and welfare" 	 r	 •^
goals at the earliest practicable date.
E. There now exists no coordinated system of revenue sources
and funding mechanisms directed explicitly to aircraft/airport
noise abatement. Such a system must be a parallel action to that
of the EPA FAA 97 aircraft/airport noise regulatory process. Ini-
tiation and coordination must be located at the Federal level so as
to bring the responsibility for aircraft/airport noise abatement
into alignment with the authority for abatement which is now lodged,
per Burbank, in the EPA and the FAA.
F. A primary consideration in achieving the public health and
welfare goal in airport noise environments is to effect a realloca-
tion of the "social costs" of aircraft/airport noise so as to
place the burden of abatement costs on the user/beneficiaries of
air transportation and thereby relieve noise-exposed non-beneficiaries
who now suffer this social cost--harm to public health and welfare.
This is the first level of social justice concern.
G. The secondary objective is to allocate the costs among
the user/beneficiaries of air transportation and, insofar as feasible,
in proportion to the degree of benefit derived. This is the second
r.
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;I	 level of social justice concern.
The primary Recommendations of this Report are based upon and
directly related to the foregoing Conclusions. The focal point of
the entire scheme of recommendations is the imposition of a "pub- 	 '3
l`	 lic health and welfare" noise level requirement as a condition to
airport operating certification. Most of the recommendations are 	 t t4,
proposed for reason that they in some manner provide the necessary 	 :3
- F
	
	 formal authority for or contribute to the efficiency and quality of
the process of developing airport noise abatement plans.
The recommendations also reflect a dominant Federal role in
i
the implementation of an integrated aircraft/airport noise abate-
ment strategy. This role involves not only authority but the accep-
tance of a commensurate responsibility to provide the essential re-
sources to implement the mandate of the Noise Control Act of 1972.
However, the recommendations also make clear that States, munici-
palities, non--airport owners but affected jurisdictions, airport
i
proprietors, and innumerable private sector entities have indispen-
sable functions in the implementation of an integrated noise abate- 	 {
ment program.
The capability for the promulgation and implementation of air-
craft/airport noise standards requires not only a legal mandate but
adequate administrative and financial resources. Though the Bur-
bank opinion disclaims knowledge of the "ultimate remedy for air-
craft noise which plagues many communities and tens of thousands
of people," it obviously makes little sense to have the authority
a
lodged at the Federal level with other essential resources to be
supplied at the State/local level. This is essentially the mis-
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alignment between legal authority, political and social capability,
and financial resources which has negated effective noise abatement
efforts since Griffis.  This misalignment of legal authority and im-
plementation resources can be corrected only by Federal level action.
It would seem incumbent upon the Congress, commensurate with the
authority lodged at the Federal level, to provide the abatement im-
plementation resources which are beyond the ability of State or mun-
icipal airport owners or of airport proprietors to assemble.
The recommendations made with respect to the funding of an in-
tegrated aircraft/airport noise abatement strategy recognize the
need for new or expanded versions of existing funding arrangements
and mechanisms for the collection of revenues from appropriate
sources and the disbursement to designated abatement action entities
(public or private) in a systematic and equitable manner. It is
stressed that such funding programs should make maximum use of exis-
ting revenue sources and mechanisms in order to simplify and expe-
dite implementwtion of essential abatement actions. In this connec-
tion it is recommended that the Airport and Airway Development Act
of 1970 be amended to; 1) provide explicitly for grants for noise
abatement purposes; 2) require that approval of ADAP grants for
whatever purpose be conditioned upon adequate consideration of noise
effects in addition to air and water quality; and 3) that the "spon-
sor" category be enlarged to include "adjacent non-airport owner
jurisdictions" and relevant private sector entities. It is also
recommended that the tax on sources of revenue now provided in the
Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 be increased so as to bring
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund resources to a level commensurate
with the Federal responsibility to contribute effectively to the
implementation of an integrated aircraft/airport noise abatement
strategy.
r
